Iraq tests new security formula for Saudi-Iran rivalry

Arjavi Indraneesh

Iraq’s proposal for a joint security council bringing Saudi Arabia and Iran into a formal mechanism is more than another attempt at regional mediation. It reflects Baghdad’s growing conviction that diplomatic contact between the two powers, while valuable, is no longer sufficient to prevent security crises from spilling across borders.
National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji has identified the central problem with unusual clarity: the relationship between Riyadh and Tehran remains burdened by a “crisis of trust”. That diagnosis matters because the two governments have already restored diplomatic relations and maintained channels of communication. The difficulty is therefore no longer the absence of dialogue. It is the absence of confidence that either side can reliably control the forces, alliances and military networks operating around it.
That distinction explains why Iraq is proposing a security body rather than another political dialogue forum. Saudi Arabia and Iran formally restored relations in 2023 after seven years of diplomatic rupture, under an agreement brokered by China following earlier rounds of Saudi-Iranian talks hosted by Iraq. Embassies reopened and senior officials resumed contacts. The reconciliation eased one of the Middle East’s most consequential rivalries and created expectations that confrontation might gradually give way to managed competition.
Those expectations have proved harder to sustain at the security level.
The underlying architecture of rivalry remains largely intact. Iran retains relationships with armed movements and political-military networks across Iraq, Yemen and other parts of the region. Saudi Arabia continues to regard many of those actors as extensions, formal or otherwise, of Iranian strategic influence. Tehran, for its part, remains deeply suspicious of Saudi security partnerships with Western powers and emerging regional defence arrangements.
The result is a relationship capable of supporting diplomatic meetings while remaining vulnerable to military incidents that neither government may fully control.
Iraq sits directly inside this contradiction. Baghdad has strong political, economic and religious ties with Iran, but it has also spent years rebuilding relations with Saudi Arabia and the wider Gulf. Iraqi governments have therefore sought to avoid being forced into an exclusive alignment with either camp. Mediation has become an instrument of Iraqi national security precisely because Saudi-
Iranian confrontation frequently plays itself out on Iraqi territory. That makes al-Araji’s proposal partly
an exercise in Iraqi self-preservation.
The urgency became particularly evident after Saudi Arabia said drones launched from Iraqi territory had targeted oil infrastructure in the kingdom in July. Riyadh blamed Iran-backed armed groups and warned that it retained the right to respond. The episode produced an especially dangerous scenario for Baghdad: Iraqi territory becoming a launch platform for attacks on a neighbouring Arab state, followed by the possibility of retaliatory strikes inside Iraq.
Saudi and US forces subsequently attacked targets associated with Iran-aligned groups inside Iraq, demonstrating how quickly the Saudi-Iranian security contest can compromise Iraqi sovereignty. Al-Araji’s simultaneous emphasis on restricting weapons to state control is therefore closely connected to his call for Saudi-Iranian security coordination. The two issues cannot easily be separated. Iraq
cannot convincingly mediate between its neighbours while armed organisations operating within its borders retain an independent capacity to determine questions of war and peace.
A joint security council could, in theory, provide several mechanisms that are currently weak or absent. Saudi and Iranian officials could exchange intelligence concerning cross-border threats, establish direct channels for verifying responsibility for drone or missile attacks, develop procedures for preventing escalation after security incidents and communicate warnings before accusations harden into decisions for retaliation.
Such machinery could be particularly important because modern Gulf confrontation increasingly occurs in an ambiguous space between state and non-state action. Drones can cross borders without clear identification. Armed groups can claim independence from governments that possess influence over them. Cyber attacks, maritime incidents and strikes on energy infrastructure can produce enormous consequences before responsibility has been firmly established.
A standing security mechanism would not eliminate those threats, but it might create additional time for investigation before military responses are authorised. The greater challenge is whether Saudi Arabia and Iran are prepared to provide the transparency such a mechanism would require.
Riyadh’s principal concern is unlikely to be whether Iranian diplomats are willing to meet Saudi counterparts. It is whether Tehran can restrain armed organisations aligned with its regional strategy and whether commitments made by Iranian officials will translate into behaviour by those groups.
Iran faces a different trust problem. Tehran has traditionally regarded Gulf security structures backed by the United States as instruments designed partly to contain Iran. Saudi participation in new military partnerships and continuing Western deployments across the Gulf reinforce Iranian fears that security coordination could become another channel for pressure rather than a genuinely collective arrangement.
Iraq is attempting to construct a middle layer between those competing perceptions. Baghdad is well placed diplomatically because it maintains working relationships with both governments and previously hosted the negotiations that prepared the ground for the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic restoration. Yet Iraq is simultaneously weakened as a mediator by its own fragmented security environment. Saudi officials cannot overlook attacks attributed to Iraqi-based factions, while Iran will resist arrangements that appear designed to dismantle organisations it regards as part of its regional security network.
The proposal consequently places a significant burden on Baghdad itself. For the initiative to acquire credibility, Iraq would need to demonstrate that its government possesses effective authority over armed activity originating from its territory. Al-Araji’s declaration that decisions of war and peace belong exclusively to the Iraqi state is therefore not merely a domestic political statement. It is effectively a condition for Iraq’s larger regional diplomatic ambition.
There is also a broader strategic shift behind the proposal. Middle Eastern governments are increasingly seeking regional arrangements capable of operating alongside, and sometimes independently of, traditional external security guarantees. Years of conflict have encouraged Gulf states to diversify diplomatic and defence relationships rather than depend entirely on a single outside power. China’s role in the 2023 Saudi-Iran agreement illustrated that change. Iraq’s current initiative represents another version of the same trend, but with regional states themselves attempting to institutionalise crisis management.
The environment in which Baghdad is making its proposal is considerably more dangerous than the one that produced the 2023 reconciliation. Conflict involving Iran has increased pressure on Gulf shipping, energy infrastructure and neighbouring states. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has reminded Iraq and the Gulf monarchies how rapidly geopolitical confrontation can become an economic emergency. (IPA Service)

Courtesy: Arabian Post