The US-Israel war with Iran has now stretched beyond five weeks, inflicting extensive damage on energy infrastructure, airports, ports and commercial and technology hubs across the six GCC states.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz to Gulf oil and gas exports is, in itself, an economic catastrophe. It forces the GCC to conclude that energy export security is not national security.

Drone and missile attacks triggered a sharp decline in visitor arrivals and an exodus of high-net-worth investors from financial centres such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Yet the UAE’s robust air defences and crisis management protocols have helped to restore confidence in public safety.

It is too early to calculate the full fiscal impact. But the components are clear: higher military spending, reconstruction costs and severe oil and gas revenue losses from a closed Hormuz.

Wall Street investment banks are now quantifying the impact of the war on GCC economies. Goldman Sachs estimates that if the conflict continues to the end of April, GDP in Qatar and Kuwait could decline by as much as 14 percent, as Doha and Kuwait City export all their oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the GCC’s two largest economies, could see GDP fall by 3 percent and 5 percent respectively, as they retain some export capacity through pipeline-linked tanker terminals at Yanbu and Fujairah.

The resulting economic losses are likely to exceed those seen during the Covid-19 pandemic, as energy exports and non-oil activity come under pressure across the six GCC states.

It is significant that no major credit ratings agency has downgraded GCC sovereign debt since the war began on February 28 (Bahrain’s debt was downgraded by Fitch a week before the war began due to public finance concerns, not geopolitics).

The GCC faces a secondary economic shock as borrowing costs rise sharply in the post-war environment. A roughly 0.5-percentage-point increase in the US 10-year Treasury yield – against which GCC debt is priced – combined with an expanding war risk premium on regional assets will push funding costs significantly higher.

Crucially, a ceasefire involving only the US would not eliminate Iran-related geopolitical risk, suggesting this premium is likely to persist.

The impact will be broad-based, raising the cost of capital across sovereign issuance, bank funding, corporate borrowing and project finance, and tightening financial conditions across the region.

The UN estimates that direct war damage to the GCC thus far exceeds $200 billion. However, this is a fraction of the losses sustained due to lost petrocurrency revenues and shifts in sentiment regarding the GCC’s tourism and business ecosystem.

The GCC’s dollar pegs constrain monetary easing by regional central banks. With the US dollar strengthening since the war began and inflation risks limiting the scope for aggressive Federal Reserve easing in 2026, policy flexibility remains tightly restricted.

Because GCC currencies cannot devalue, the burden of macroeconomic adjustment falls disproportionately on asset markets. This is already evident in equity performance, with Emaar Properties shares down more than 35 percent from their pre-war peak.

While Emirates airline is not publicly listed, the sharp rise in jet fuel costs and the hit to tourism will weigh heavily on Dubai’s aviation sector, which accounts for roughly 27 percent of the emirate’s GDP.

The war will reshape Dubai’s property market. Off-plan launches represented two-thirds of a record $187 billion in transaction volumes in 2025. However, transaction volumes could sink as low as $40 billion in 2026 without the off-plan ballast.

UAE property developers can no longer rely on presales financing from investors at the very moment they have raised $6 billion in global capital markets – a combination that creates a clear blueprint for a debt squeeze.

While GCC banks are well capitalised and liquid, they will face higher borrowing costs in the global interbank market and losses on their property loans as their exposure to the sector is still excessive at 15-25 percent.

Bahrain could face more sovereign debt downgrades since its energy infrastructure has been extensively attacked by Iran and it is not exporting any diesel, naphtha, jet fuel or aluminium via Hormuz. Iran war risk is also a geopolitical sword of Damocles on the growth of the GCC’s financial hubs.

Paradoxically, even the steep rise in Brent crude and liquefied natural gas is actually negative for the GCC as it increases the risk of a global recession. It also accelerates the diversification strategies of its Asian clients away from the Middle East.

A higher-for-longer risk premium on GCC assets is also now inevitable.

The article Gulf’s growth model faces its first true stress test appeared first on Arabian Post.

The geopolitical convulsion in Iran has led to panic buying in Brent crude as Saudi Arabia’s largest refinery Ras Tanura and Qatar’s LNG mega complex at Ras Laffan shut production even as tanker traffic in the Straits of Hormuz comes to a halt amid soaring war risk, insurance premia, IRGC attacks on oil tankers and a 3X spike in VLCC/LNG freight costs. This is a disaster for India, the world’s third largest crude oil importer at 5-MBD, of which no less than 2.6-MBD originates from the Gulf states and Iran via the Straits of Hormuz maritime choke point.

A protracted war in the skies above Iran or a blockade of Hormuz would have a disastrous impact on India’s current account deficit and set the stage for the Indian rupee, the worst performing currency in Asia despite Modi’s (56 inch) chest beating propaganda to inexorably depreciate to 100 against King Dollar, the planet’s resurgent FX safe haven. Higher inflation in India amid a widening current account deficit at fiscal pressures would ignite capital outflows from Dalal Street in Asia’s most expensive stock market.

The GCC is the destination for 15% of Indian exports and its entrepôt Dubai is the transshipment hub for Indian exports to Europe and Asia. The 10 million Indian workers in the GCC also account for 40% of $135 billion in global remittances it attracted last year. The UAE is a favourite destination for India’s financial elite and the Iran crisis has exposed its vulnerability to drone and missile attack on its airport, seaports, five star hotels and luxury villa enclaves on man made islands in the Gulf.

There are 3.8 million Indians living, working in the UAE, which is also the second largest market after the US for Indian electronics exports. The end of the Dubai property bubble and the escalation of US-Israeli aerial attacks on Iran are thus a financial, trade, diplomatic and human disaster for the Indian diaspora.

India’s high-net worth elite will increasingly favour Singapore/Hong Kong, Switzerland and even Malta as safer hubs for their offshore nest eggs than the UAE, Bahrain or Qatar since geopolitical and logistics risk in the Gulf have just skyrocketed.

The Indian rupee has fallen 10% against the US dollar in the past 2-years. The Indian rupee was 58 when Modi was first elected prime minister in May 2014 and has now fallen to 92, a horrific 48% depreciation in a decade when the BJP supposedly delivered an economic miracle. This 48% fall in the Indian rupee since 2014 is one reason why so many Arab ultra high net worth family offices I know in the Gulf refuse to invest in Indian private equity apart from the usual complaints of dodgy sponsors, manipulated IPOs, high taxation, onerous bureaucracy and politicised securities regulator. All these trends will be magnified by the Iran crisis and inevitable fallout on the Indian rupee, inflation, current account deficit and a steeper INR yield curve.

The Iran crisis’s endgame could well be $100 Brent and a plunge in cross border trade and private investment flows that could presage a global recession even as inflation and interest rates surge in India. The volatile geopolitics of the Middle East will only amplify the traditional Indian investor penchant towards hard assets such as gold and silver over financial assets like equities, G-Secs, corporate bonds, mutual funds and private equity.

The anti-rupee phobia of long term Indian HNW investors in the Gulf will be reinforced by a steeper depreciation path for the INR in the next 3-years. Indian wealth will naturally gravitate to the offshore embrace of King Dollar. The parabolic rise in global gas prices after the closure of Qatar Energy’s LNG complex, the largest in the world, is also a disaster for the Indian fertilizer and crop nutrient market, which is also hostage to the war in the Gulf. Modi could thus face political unrest in the next wave of Indian state elections, particularly in the agricultural heartlands of the Punjab, Haryana and UP.

The loss of Iranian imports and a multi-billion dollar write off in India’s investment on the Chabahar Port in the Gulf means, India is at the mercy of Trump not to impose punitive tariffs on its cheap Russian oil and gas imports.

The sharp rise in the Indian VIX to a 9-month high reflects panic on Dalal Street amid a quest for protection from a Nifty whose downside risk could be a lot more than 25,000 as corporate earnings growth assumptions must now be reevaluated in a grimmer macro/INR zeitgeist.

Hopefully, the return of El Niño will not mean a weak monsoon that will aggravate the fuel price hit to margins and rural demand. The RBI cannot ease in this macro milieu and even a 6.7% G-Sec rate is insufficient to offset the higher inflation risk implicit in $85 Brent crude. My fave short remains the paint sector for obvious reasons, especially since Asian paints is losing market share to Grasim even as input costs soar to wreck margins.

The article Iran war is an economic disaster for India appeared first on Arabian Post.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has once again established itself as a significant player in the Iraqi political landscape. In the recently concluded Iraqi legislative elections, it became the sole Kurdish party to increase its seats and secure seats in nine provinces of Iraq. PUK has historically been a proponent of cordial relations between Kurdistan and Baghdad. However, the PUK chose to remain cautious before endorsing any political coalition in the Iraqi parliament, given the uncertainty surrounding Baghdad’s political landscape. In an interview, Saadi Ahmed Pira, a member of the Political Bureau of PUK, discusses the future political roadmap of Iraq and Kurdistan, along with election campaign strategies.

Q: The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has reemerged as a substantial force in Iraqi politics. PUK is the sole Kurdish party that has secured seats in nine provinces of Iraq and has also increased its seat count. In your opinion, what are the factors that have contributed to the success of PUK?

 Pira:  The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has consistently been a significant force in Kurdistan. PUK led the opposition forces during the Kurdistan Revolution. It was a significant factor in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government following the uprising. We have consistently served as the important facilitator for resolving the issues in Iraq; therefore, today’s triumph is not novel. Iraqis now widely recognize the PUK as a genuine and patriotic Iraqi party, dedicated to the country’s well-being. Again, it is important to remember that the PUK’s vote share also increased in the Kurdistan parliamentary elections that were held last year, and it continued to be the second-largest force.

Q:  In its election campaign, the PUK emphasized that it is the sole Kurdish force capable of defending the rights of citizens in Baghdad. What were the reasons for designating this as a critical point of the PUK’s campaign?

A: Certainly, the Kurdish populace has been grappling with a financial crisis for more than a decade, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been deprived of its allocated annual budget. I am unable to comment whether the KRG or Federal government was responsible for the situation; however, I can confirm that the financial crisis and dearth of salaries are not solely the responsibility of the Kurdistan Regional Government. PUK contributed in creating a favourable environment for the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad to agree on a solution to the problems, especially the problem of oil exports and the solution of the financial crisis in the region. The PUK remains steadfast in its commitment to safeguarding the rights of Kurdistan citizens.

Q: The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has consistently advocated for the development of cordial relations between Kurdistan and Baghdad. What is the plan of the PUK to resolve the long-standing disputes with the Iraqi federal government, which include disputed territories, hydrocarbon revenue distribution, and budget allocation?

 A: The federal budget and the salaries of our employees are constitutional rights for all Iraqi citizens. Therefore, Baghdad does not provide us with a charitable donation. There are significant issues between Iraq and the Kurdistan Region that have been causing disruptions in our relations for an extended period of time. However, we must resolve these issues to create a tranquil and stable environment. A preliminary agreement has been reached to return the oil revenues to Baghdad by the end of the year, which was a component of the solution to the salary crisis.

The Kurdish leadership has failed to exert pressure on Baghdad to resolve the long-standing crisis of the disputed areas, which has persisted without a permanent solution since the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the legacy of dictatorial administrations. This time, the Kurdish leadership must exert greater pressure to resolve this matter. It is imperative that we, the Kurdish leadership, ensure that our people in these regions have credible protection. The residents of these areas are our offspring and people. It is imperative that we provide them with assistance.

Q: The new government in Kurdistan has been in a state of impasse since last year. Are you of the opinion that the results of the Iraqi legislative elections will facilitate the construction of a government in Kurdistan?

A: The Iraqi elections are not associated with the establishment of the new government in Kurdistan. These are two different things. We have engaged in extensive negotiations with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to resolve the obstacles and announce the new cabinet. However, as is the case like any other matter, we and the KDP hold divergent perspectives, which is entirely reasonable given that we are two different political organisations. We are two distinct entities, each with its own perspective and objectives. The Iraqi elections’ magnitude is not a factor in the delay in announcing the cabinet. The Kurdistan parliamentary elections results have determined the first and second parties. We have differing opinions on certain matters.

Q: Which political faction will the PUK support in Baghdad?

A: The PUK has conserved a harmonious relationship with the Iraqi political forces since the time of Mam Jalal (Jalal Talabani, the founder of the PUK). The PUK, which is under the leadership of Mr. Bafel Talabani adheres to the same course as Mam Jalal. This is the reason the PUK has its weight and color in Baghdad. The leadership of the PUK has consistently been a positive influence in Iraq, following the footsteps of Mam Jalal, and it will continue to do so in future.

Q: The PUK has maintained a significant presence in numerous regions of federal Iraq and has maintained a firm hold on its strongholds in Kurdistan. This is to be attributed to whom?

A: This is the result of the political honesty and integrity of the PUK leadership in their pursuit of the Kurdish people’s prosperity and the stability and peace of Iraq. Unity in our political endeavours is always a desirable quality. We have repeatedly asserted that Iraq is the strategic depth of Kurdistan, and that the Iraqi constitution will resolve all of our issues. Consequently, we are committed to coexisting with Iraqis. There are numerous objectives that unite us, and we are eager to contribute to the political process in Iraq through our efforts to assist the Kurdish people.

Q: In 2022, the PUK supported the nomination of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani for the position of Prime Minister, a support that has been epic in the past. Is it reasonable to assume that PM Al-Sudani will continue to receive support from PUK?

A: It is premature to discuss the matter. We are uncertain about the political equation that may emerge and the Shiite forces’ potential consensus. It is accurate that Mr. Sudani received a favourable outcome in this election; however, not all Shiite voters supported him. The framework of Shiite coordination persists, even though dozens of other Shiite forces have secured seats in parliament. The Shiites are the ones who are entitled to the position of prime minister in the new Iraq, as per the political customs. However, I anticipate that it will be a significant amount of time before they reach a consensus on a candidate, potentially several months. Nothing is clearly visible as of now, and the scene is bleak. We should await the outcome of their negotiations. We will then be a part of the majority required to assume this position.

The article PUK to wait and watch until Baghdad picture becomes clear appeared first on Arabian Post.

For decades a shadow economy of drugs, counterfeit currency and illicit cash flows has threaded its way across South Asia, North Africa and beyond. What makes this underground economy especially dangerous is not only its scale but the way statecraft, organized crime and violent Islamist militancy appear to intersect – creating a self-reinforcing funding loop for groups that seek to destabilize societies and export terror. At the center of recent concerns are two names often linked – Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and India’s most notorious fugitive, Dawood Ibrahim. Together, analysts and media reports say, they help sustain a transnational “narco-jihad” aimed as much at financing jihadi networks as at undermining rival states.

The modern toolkit for financing insurgency and terror is diverse: heroin and cocaine profits, protection rackets and extortion, hawala transfers, counterfeit notes and smuggling corridors. Where these revenue sources meet disciplined criminal networks and permissive or complicit institutions, the result is an extremely resilient terror economy. Observers say narcotics trafficking -sometimes routed through criminal outfits with political protection – has long been a major revenue stream used to arm, train and sustain militants across multiple theatres.

The pattern is simple and frighteningly effective. Farmers or traffickers produce or source drugs; organized groups refine, move and launder the proceeds; militant cells take a cut for protection and logistics; corrupt officials, brokers and false-front businesses recycle the money back into operations. When one finds links running between a state’s security apparatus, an organized crime syndicate and jihadi organizations, the possibilities for both funding and strategic deniability multiply.

Dawood Ibrahim – long linked in open-source reporting to organized crime, extortion rackets and alleged support for violent extremist activity – heads a network (frequently referred to as “D-Company”) that has been tied to smuggling and trafficking routes spanning South Asia, the Middle East and parts of Africa. Investigations and long-running coverage by security analysts indicate D-Company’s role in narcotics and other illicit trades has helped it build logistical reach that can be exploited by militant elements.

There are also reported intersections between D-Company’s global crime contacts and Islamist militants in Africa and West Asia. Indian media coverage from 2014, for example, cited concerns in security circles about emerging links between Nigerian militant networks and elements of Dawood’s organization for smuggling and distribution routes into India. These connections, if true, demonstrate how criminal and extremist groups can mirror each other’s networks to mutual advantage.

Indian and international intelligence agencies have repeatedly linked D-Company’s drug profits to terrorist financing, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Dawood’s younger brother, Anees Ibrahim, reportedly established contacts with extremist commanders in Africa and West Asia, enabling D-Company to utilize Boko Haram and Al Qaeda networks to move cocaine and heroin. Nigerian couriers were initially used to smuggle narcotics into India before local collaborators took over distribution.

Several extremist organizations have long used criminal revenue streams to fund operations: from conventional smuggling to drug production, and from hawala networks to extortion. In parts of Africa, jihadi groups and criminal syndicates have reportedly moved cocaine and other drugs along routes that ultimately reach Asian and European markets, often with local and regional facilitation. Similarly, the “southern route” for Afghan heroin – which flows through Pakistan and Iran toward Gulf and European markets – remains a key artery in the narcotics economy despite periodic interdictions and policy shifts.

UN agencies report that, while global opium production has seen major swings since the Taliban’s 2022 ban, cultivation in some years has rebounded in new forms and localities, keeping pressure on transit states and widening the reach for smugglers.

Meanwhile, porous borders in South and Southeast Asia – and criminal links into Myanmar and the Golden Triangle – have made India’s northeastern states and coastal hubs attractive for traffickers seeking alternative transit corridors. Analysts warn that as enforcement tightens in older routes, criminal networks adapt, shifting trade to weaker-policed borderlands and urban distribution nodes.

Perhaps the most troubling allegation is not that criminals and militants trade with one another – that has long been documented worldwide – but that elements within Pakistan’s state security apparatus may either tolerate or actively facilitate parts of the system for strategic objectives. Historical reporting and some insider claims have suggested that, at various times, Pakistan’s establishment viewed narcotics profits as a possible source to underwrite covert operations. Whether this is formal policy or the work of “rogue” networks embedded within the institutions, the operational effect is similar: an expanded, semi-protected hinterland for illicit finance.

These allegations are highly sensitive and politically charged. International bodies and watchdogs have repeatedly emphasized the need for robust, transparent financial controls precisely because permissive environments allow malign actors to exploit grey areas. Pakistan’s removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list in October 2022 did not, experts warned, mean the underlying vulnerabilities vanished – rather, it made continued vigilance even more important.

Beyond drugs, counterfeit currency and forgery can be used as tools of economic sabotage. Incidents of near-perfect Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) seizures in the region over recent years have raised alarms about networks that manufacture and move counterfeit notes to destabilize neighbouring economies or to fund black-market operations. When such operations are tied into smuggling chains that also carry narcotics and contraband, the criminal economy becomes a multi-headed threat that is hard to starve without coordinated regional action.

The article ISI-Dawood: How a transnational ‘narco-jihad’ threatens regional security appeared first on Arabian Post.

In an era when the global economy staggers under the weight of inflation, trade wars, and geopolitical fractures, China’s Communist Party has just unveiled a roadmap that feels less like a policy document and more like a quiet revolution. The fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee, which wrapped up in Beijing on October 23, adopted recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, covering 2026 to 2030. This is no mere bureaucratic exercise. It positions China at the cusp of socialist modernization by 2035, bridging the triumphs of the past five years with a future oriented toward self-reliance and collective well-being. As the world grapples with uncertainty, this plan stands as a testament to disciplined governance and long-term vision, one that prioritizes people over profits and harmony over hegemony.

The session’s communique depicts a society that has endured challenges and emerged more resilient. Over the 14th Five-Year Plan period, from 2021 to 2025, China clocked an average annual growth rate of 5.5 percent, adding more than 35 trillion yuan to its economy. These are not abstract figures; they translate to lifted millions out of poverty, expanded access to education and healthcare, and a pivot toward sustainable industries. The plenum affirmed these gains while acknowledging the headwinds ahead: strategic opportunities laced with risks, from domestic structural shifts to external pressures like protectionist tariffs and supply chain disruptions. Yet the response is not retreat but resolve. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the party recommitted to his core position and the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, framing these challenges as tests to be met with innovation and unity.

At its heart, the 15th Five-Year Plan rests on six guiding principles: the party’s overall leadership, putting people first, pursuing high-quality development, deepening reforms, balancing efficient markets with effective governance, and safeguarding both growth and security. These are not slogans but actionable imperatives. High-quality development, for instance, shifts the focus from sheer scale to substance. China aims to build a modernized industrial system that bolsters the real economy, fostering what officials describe as new quality productive forces. This means breakthroughs in core technologies, from high-performance chips and quantum computing to large AI models and deep-space exploration. Recent strides, like the “AI Plus” initiative, are set to permeate scientific research, manufacturing, and even consumer sectors, creating scenarios where artificial intelligence empowers everything from precision agriculture to urban planning.

Self-reliance in science and technology emerges as a cornerstone, a direct counter to the “raging storms” of external containment efforts. The plenum’s emphasis on achieving greater autonomy here is pragmatic, born of necessity. Western sanctions on semiconductors and rare earths have only accelerated China’s domestic push, with investments pouring into R&D and talent cultivation. Officials at a post-plenum press conference underscored this, noting the plan’s intent to tackle “major tests” through tech advancements, including AI and manufacturing applications. By 2030, the goal is substantial improvements in these areas, laying the groundwork for industries that not only compete but lead. This is not isolationism; it is insurance against volatility, ensuring that China’s growth engine hums regardless of global caprice.

Equally vital is the plan’s commitment to a robust domestic market and a new development pattern. Consumption will be the anchor, stimulated through sectors like the silver economy for aging populations, low-altitude aviation for logistics, and rural tourism. Rural revitalization takes center stage, with accelerated modernization of agriculture and integrated urban-rural progress. Imagine vast farmlands equipped with smart irrigation and drone surveillance, or villages reborn as hubs of eco-tourism and e-commerce. These steps aim to narrow regional disparities, refining China’s economic layout for balanced growth. In a world where inequality festers, this pursuit of common prosperity offers a model worth emulating: policies that ensure public well-being, from expanded social safety nets to cultural enrichment that ignites national creativity.

The green transition weaves through it all, under the banner of building a Beautiful China. China, already the global leader in renewable energy installation, pledges a comprehensive shift toward low-carbon paths. This includes exporting affordable green technologies, from solar panels to electric vehicles, to aid the world’s climate fight. The plenum calls for major strides in ecological conservation, recognizing that development without sustainability is a dead end. Amid COP conferences that often dissolve into finger-pointing, China’s approach is concrete: lead by example, share the gains.

Opening up remains high-standard, geared toward mutually beneficial cooperation. The plan envisions new horizons in trade and investment, even as it fortifies national security. Modernizing the security apparatus and advancing the Peaceful China Initiative signal sincere urge for stability at home and abroad. The People’s Liberation Army’s centenary goals by 2027 will modernize defenses without adventurism, underscoring China’s preference for diplomacy over dominance. In Belt and Road corridors from Africa to Latin America, this translates to partnerships that build infrastructure and capacity, not debt traps as critics falsely claim.

Critics in Washington and Brussels may dismiss this as authoritarian blueprinting, but they miss the point. China’s model thrives because it listens—to its 1.4 billion citizens, to the lessons of history. While the West chases short-term electoral wins, Beijing plans in decades, adapting socialism to the digital age. The 15th Five-Year Plan is a link in that chain, propelling China toward modernization that is socialist, Chinese, and profoundly human-centered.

As the world teeters, this plenum invites us to look eastward. Not for imitation, but inspiration. In fostering self-reliance amid adversity, nurturing green innovation, and prioritizing shared prosperity, China charts a path where progress lifts all. The call is clear: unite around these principles, break new ground, and build a future where no one is left behind. The next five years will test this resolve, but if history is any guide, China will deliver.

The article China’s 15th Plan: Pioneering High-Quality Development appeared first on Arabian Post.

In his maiden speech in the United Nations General Assembly, Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, called for lifting of international sanctions on Syria, becoming the first head of state from Syria to address the gathering in nearly 60 years. This signifies the first appearance of a Syrian president since Nureddin al-Atassi took office in 1967. Syrian President Sharra engaged in a series of bilateral discussions with global leaders during the General Assembly sessions, framing it as Syria’s revitalized diplomatic drive.

Since assuming office in December last year, Ahmad Al-Shaara has been conducting a diplomatic campaign. He successfully garnered substantial diplomatic backing from almost all principal stakeholders in the region. In July of this year, the United States removed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the organization commanded by Al-Shaara, from its designation as a “foreign terrorist organization.” In May, he journeyed to Paris to confer with French President Emmanuel Macron and engage in discussions with senior Saudi Arabian officials. The Arab League warmly welcomes the current Syrian regime. These initiatives illustrate the Al-Sharaa regime’s revitalized foreign efforts to reintegrate Syria into the global diplomatic framework. Nonetheless, the description is inaccurate; the aim of this diplomatic initiative is to validate Al-Sharaa as the exclusive leader of the nation. The regime’s objective is to solidify its dominance over a divided Syria by obtaining external recognition and legitimacy.

The regime seeks to persuade all ethnic and religious factions in Syria of its permanence and that it is advantageous for them to accept Al-Sharaa’s supremacy by securing the approval of foreign authorities. International recognition empowers the prevailing regime to monopolize and centralize power. Recent significant decisions clearly demonstrate this. Al-Sharaa recently announced parliamentary “elections,” in which committees he designated will elect two-thirds of the parliament members. The current administration has dismantled the former police force. Instead, it has expanded Idlib’s General Security apparatus, with recruitment proceeding at breakneck speed.

Priority is being given to young men from the three northern provinces (Idlib, Hama, Aleppo) where HTS sustains its support base. Anas Khatab, the former administrative director of Jabhat al-Nusra, the antecedent of HTS, has been designated as the new head of Syria’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Syrian citizenship is being conferred upon foreign militants affiliated with HTS, who constitute around 20 to 30% of its forces. They have been integrated into the military and are currently holding positions within the administration.

The termination of countless judges, especially women, has not resulted from professional wrongdoing but rather from their affiliation with minority ethnic groups. The appointment of ministers is now executed via a non-transparent process. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s brother, Maher, has been designated as the Minister of Health. Key positions in defense, foreign affairs, and interior have been conferred upon close colleagues of Ahmed al-Sharaa, like Murhaf Abu Kasra, Asaad al-Shaibani, and Alem Kiddie. The hyper-centralization of Syria’s governance confines decision-making to a small group of five or six individuals around Al-Sharaa.

Moreover, Damasus is utilizing sectarianism as a tool to create a “homogeneous popular support base” within the Arab Sunni community, rallying portions of the populace around sectarian dynamics. The “Mazlumiya Sunniya” (Sunni victimhood) narrative has been extensively utilized to consolidate a substantial segment of the Arab Sunni community in support of Al Sharaa’s government, notwithstanding the myriad political, social, and regional divides present among their ranks. The new ruling authorities have swiftly acknowledged that sectarianism serves as an effective political tool for consolidating their grip over territories with ongoing resistance to their authority.

The escalation of sectarian rhetoric and violence by the current regime and its supporting armed forces has initially targeted the Alawite population and subsequently extended to encompass the Druze communities within the country. The military forces, ostensibly under government command, consistently display insubordinate and militia-like conduct, especially towards minorities. When intimidation fails, as seen with the Kurds, the Al-Shaara dictatorship resorts to blatant blackmail.

Al-Sharaa consistently condemns Israeli military actions in southern Syria as infringements on the nation’s sovereignty. Such denunciations typically seem authentic and valid. However, Al-Sharaa’s denunciations are insincere because his actions and statements contradict each other. The Syrian leader indicated that a Turkish military operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces may be contemplated if they fail to completely assimilate into the Syrian military by December, as outlined in a March agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces, during an interview with Turkey’s Milliyet newspaper on September 19, 2025.

Al-Sharaa intimidates the Syrian Kurds with the prospect of a Turkish military incursion, instead of denouncing Turkish involvement in what is evidently an internal Syrian issue. A de facto president who advocates for foreign intervention against his own citizens forfeits the moral authority to address the territorial sovereignty of a nation. The Syrian government characterizes it as a matter of national security for Ankara when Turkey is the actor. Violations of sovereignty are only recognized when Israel is implicated. This double standard is both hypocritical and futile. The Bashar al-Assad dictatorship utilized the same strategy for years, ultimately leading to Assad’s exile in Moscow.

The marginalization of ethnic and religious minority groups, including Christians, Druze, and Kurds, would ultimately lead to long-term instability and a lack of legitimacy for the new regime. An inclusive governance approach that incorporates a wider range of political perspectives is vital to maintaining national unity. This administration is currently implementing a singular plan to consolidate its authority, leading to the neglect and subversion of the democratic aspirations and interests of the public. The international community should refrain from endorsing the regime of Ahmad Al-Sharra, which is indistinguishable from the prior regime of Basha Al-Assad, unless it implements a comprehensive course correction.

The article Al-Shaara’s recent diplomatic wins emboldened him to monopolize power appeared first on Arabian Post.

For decades, the Muslim Brotherhood has loomed large in the Western imagination, often described as the ideological mothership of global Islamism. To many policymakers in Washington, London, or Brussels, the name alone has become shorthand for a wide spectrum of Islamist activity. Yet, this perception is increasingly divorced from reality. The Brotherhood, fractured and in disarray since its downfall in Egypt, no longer commands the sweeping influence it once aspired to. At the same time, treating the movement as irrelevant risks ignoring its enduring ideological legacy and the dangers posed by its offshoots and imitators.

The Muslim Brotherhood was once a formidable force, especially in the mid-20th century, when Egyptian exiles and migrants spread its ideas far beyond Cairo. By the 1980s, its international leadership attempted to centralize authority through a body known as the “International Organization.” But infighting, regional rivalries, and divergent priorities eroded cohesion.

Branches in the Gulf, North Africa, and even Jordan increasingly charted their own paths. In Sudan, Hassan al-Turabi forged a distinct Islamist vision. In Jordan, Hamas created deep fissures within the local Brotherhood. By the time Egypt’s short-lived Brotherhood government was toppled in 2013, the organization had already lost much of its grip. Competing leaderships sprouted in Doha, Istanbul, and London, and newer factions declared the “old guard” irrelevant.

Today, remnants of the Brotherhood resemble abandoned franchises—still recognizable in name but lacking unified command, structure, or strategy. Even the death in 2022 of Ibrahim Mounir, a senior Brotherhood figure in London, passed with barely a whisper among Islamists in Europe and North America.

Yet, paradoxically, in the West the Brotherhood still commands an outsize focus. Policymakers, journalists, and analysts routinely invoke its name as though it were the mastermind behind every Islamist group. This is misleading. Other networks – Salafis, Deobandis, Barelvis, Jamaat-e-Islami, Qatari and Turkish state Islamism, as well as Khomeinists – play equally significant or even greater roles in shaping Islamist politics across the United States and Europe.

Ignoring these other actors has serious consequences. For instance, South Asia’s Deobandi movement, from which the Taliban emerged, operates seminaries and organizations across America, often under the radar of federal scrutiny. Radical Barelvi groups like Dawat-e-Islami, implicated in violence from France to South Asia, run some of the wealthiest mosques in the US. Yet, Western security establishments remain fixated on the “Brotherhood brand”, leaving other dangerous networks to flourish.

The irony is that Arab governments themselves long ago recognized the peril of the Brotherhood. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, and the Gulf states – save for Qatar – have all cracked down on the movement, often harshly. Algeria’s “Black Decade” in the 1990s, triggered by the Brotherhood-linked Islamic Salvation Front’s electoral gains, descended into a civil war that left more than 200,000 people dead. Entire villages were wiped out; thousands disappeared into state prisons. For Algerians, the idea of treating the Brotherhood as a harmless “charity movement” is laughable.

In contrast, Western governments have often extended legitimacy to Brotherhood-linked groups under the banner of “community engagement” or “interfaith dialogue”. Despite repeated warnings, including the UK’s 2015 internal review led by Sir John Jenkins, the Brotherhood continues to operate openly in Britain, Europe, and North America through charities, NGOs, student associations, and lobbying groups. These networks provide social services but also spread ideological influence, shaping Muslim communities and lobbying against Western interests.

Even if the Egyptian movement is a shadow of its former self, its ideological children remain potent. Hamas, originally nurtured by the Brotherhood, continues to wage war against Israel while maintaining support networks across the West. Brotherhood-trained ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb still inspire generations of activists who may no longer call themselves “Brotherhood” but embody its vision. American groups like the Muslim American Society or Muslim Youth of North America, while not centrally controlled from Cairo, continue to employ Brotherhood-style indoctrination practices under distinctly American guises.

In this sense, what exists today is not a global Brotherhood conspiracy but a patchwork of Qutbist and Islamist movements – often independent, sometimes competing, but still drawing intellectual and strategic sustenance from the Brotherhood’s legacy.

The West must move beyond lazy shorthand. To treat every Islamist group as “the Muslim Brotherhood” is both inaccurate and dangerous. It blinds policymakers to the very real threats posed by Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia, Dawat-e-Islami in the West, or Khomeinist proxies raising funds for Hezbollah. It allows dangerous networks to avoid scrutiny while the “Brotherhood debate” endlessly consumes political oxygen.

At the same time, dismissing the Brotherhood as entirely inconsequential would be equally naïve. Its ideological DNA – totalitarianism cloaked in religious legitimacy – remains deeply embedded across Islamist currents worldwide. From Algeria’s scars to Hamas’s ongoing terror, the consequences of underestimating this movement are plain.

The Muslim Brotherhood today is less a centralized empire than a faded logo – yet one whose ideas continue to animate Islamist activism in new forms. The real danger lies not in Cairo’s collapsed leadership but in the decentralized, Western-rooted networks inspired by Brotherhood thought and nurtured by decades of political accommodation.

For policymakers, the task is urgent: stop treating the Brotherhood as the singular menace, and start mapping the full spectrum of Islamist movements operating on Western soil. To ignore this complexity is to repeat the mistakes of the past, ensuring that while the Brotherhood may be weakened, its ideological heirs continue to erode democratic societies from within.

The article Muslim Brotherhood’s Fading Empire and Its Dangerous Heirs appeared first on Arabian Post.

Bangladesh is entering one of the most dangerous phases of its history. At the centre of this looming crisis is the unelected regime of Muhammad Yunus, which is presenting itself abroad as democratic and reformist while systematically dismantling the country’s defence and intelligence structure.

Behind the veneer of Nobel fame and global endorsements lies a far darker reality: Yunus’ growing alignment with Islamist radicals, foreign actors, and transnational networks that aim to transform Bangladesh into a hub for jihadist operations. If successful, this project would not only destroy Bangladesh’s sovereignty but also destabilize South Asia and export militancy across the globe.

Yunus’ image as a global humanitarian has shielded him from meaningful scrutiny. His ties with influential figures in Washington, Brussels, and London – from the Clinton Foundation to George Soros’ networks – give him legitimacy abroad. Domestically, however, his administration is empowering Islamist elements, suppressing secular voices, and hollowing out state institutions.

The real project is clear: dismantle the secular Bangladesh Army and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), and replace them with an Iranian-style “Islamic Revolutionary Army” (IRA) controlled by ideologues loyal to jihadist politics. Such a shift would institutionalize extremism inside the state and create a new sanctuary for transnational terrorism.

The Yunus regime is increasingly mirroring Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarian tactics. Dozens of journalists face fabricated charges, independent media outlets are censored or co-opted, while Islamist propagandists enjoy unchecked freedom.

International watchdogs note a troubling trend: secular critics are punished while extremist groups linked to Al Qaeda, ISIS, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Hamas are expanding their activities – in some cases, under state patronage.

The case of Jashimuddin Rahmani, the cleric behind Ansar Al-Islam, illustrates the danger. He openly encouraged killing secular writers and even American citizens. Yet Yunus’ regime permits such radicals to operate with impunity, while Western rights groups maintain a silence that amounts to complicity.

The geopolitical backdrop further complicates the picture. Saudi Arabia’s growing defence alignment with Pakistan introduces a dangerous variable. Riyadh has historically funded Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, and speculation grows that it may now seek protection under Islamabad’s “nuclear umbrella”.

Yet Pakistan is no reliable partner. Its decades-long ties with Tehran make it a possible gateway for Iranian infiltration into the Kingdom. Worse, Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex thrives on exporting instability. Just as Pakistan helped destabilize Afghanistan, it could drag Saudi Arabia into similar chaos, undermining the monarchy itself.

Although the Saudi rulers may feel delighted with this new arrangement, it overlooks several crucial factors. First, Islamabad has decades-old, deep-rooted relations with Tehran, and its renewed ties with Riyadh could open the door for Iran to expand its espionage network within the Kingdom through active collaboration with Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

At the same time, Pakistan – a country grappling with acute economic crises – may push the Kingdom toward the fate of Afghanistan, where Pakistan’s infiltration ultimately turned the country into a rogue state and epicentre of Islamist terror. Furthermore, this development could mark the beginning of a silent regime change plot that might one day end monarchism and create an atmosphere of anarchy and chaos. With these troubling prospects in mind, Saudi Arabia and its ruling elites may well have committed a historic blunder – one that could spell the beginning of the end of a century of monarchism in the Kingdom.

For Islamabad – crippled by economic crises – mere financial perks from Riyadh will not suffice. Instead, Islamabad is likely to push the Kingdom into an alarming situation by collaborating with Islamists and jihadists, while simultaneously increasing the threats from Iran by secretly providing Tehran with sensitive information about Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment thrives on exporting instability. In time, it could push Saudi Arabia towards the fate of Afghanistan – an arena of Islamist chaos where Pakistan was the chief manipulator. The monarchy may have unwittingly paved the way for its own destabilization.

Dhaka’s deepening ties with Islamabad under Yunus only add to this dangerous mix. The ISI views Bangladesh as a potential launchpad for cross-border terrorism into India, while Washington sees the country as a pawn in its competition with China over Myanmar. In this volatile chessboard, Bangladesh risks becoming the sacrificial ground for competing regional and global agendas.

The Bangladesh Army and DGFI have long been the main bulwark against Islamist militancy. They dismantled the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), crushed Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), and neutralised outfits like HuJI-B, Ansar Al-Islam, and Hizb ut-Tahrir – most of which were nurtured by Pakistan’s ISI.

For India, DGFI’s success has been a shield against infiltration in its northeast. For Bangladesh, it preserved sovereignty. For Yunus and his Islamist allies, these institutions are therefore the greatest obstacle. Their strategy is simple: discredit the military, prosecute its counterterrorism leadership under bogus “war crimes” charges, and replace the command structure with ideologically loyal cadres.

Already, smear campaigns are being directed against General Waker Uz Zaman, the Army Chief, accusing him of bias and duplicity. At the same time, there are attempts to isolate the Bangladesh Armed Forces from UN peacekeeping missions, depriving them of international credibility and revenue.

The article Bangladesh on edge of security collapse appeared first on Arabian Post.

When Bangladesh’s students took to the streets last year, their demands were clear: dismantle the structures of fascism, restore democracy, and build a government that put the people before politics. Their movement culminated in a historic moment on August 8, when Nobel laureate and Grameen Bank founder Dr. Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Advisor to the interim government. The appointment followed the dramatic departure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India on August 5 under army supervision, a move that signalled the end of her political era. The army chief, General Waqar-uz-Zaman, assured the public that this transition would serve the nation’s best interests.

However, one year later, optimism has given way to disappointment. The interim government, hailed as a product of the people’s movement, now stands accused of the very sins it pledged to eradicate-chief among them nepotism and cronyism. Nowhere is this more visible, or more damaging, than in the health sector, which teeters on the brink of collapse.

The root of the crisis lies in the appointment of Nurjahan Begum as Health Advisor. While she has been a long-time associate of Dr. Yunus, serving at Grameen Bank since its early days in 1976 and later becoming chairman in 2010, she has no academic background, professional training, or policy experience in health or medical administration. Her appointment appears to have been based solely on loyalty and personal history rather than merit or competence.

From the moment she assumed her role, critical decision-making slowed to a crawl. Experts say this lack of leadership has directly stalled progress in strategic planning, infrastructure development, disease prevention, and healthcare management. The situation has reached a breaking point with the unprecedented 18-month delay in approving the Operational Plan (OP) – the backbone of Bangladesh’s health service delivery.

Bangladesh’s health sector operates on rolling five-year strategies under the Health, Population and Nutrition Sector Programs (HPNSP). After the fourth programs ended, preparations for the fifth were underway, involving over a hundred Project Evaluation Committee (PEC) meetings. Yet, despite the groundwork, 38 operational plans remain unapproved-23 for the Health Services Department and 15 for the Health Education and Family Welfare Department.

This failure has brought crucial national health targets to a standstill. Efforts to expand healthcare access, lower maternal and child mortality rates, strengthen family planning services, and improve public health awareness have all stalled. The consequences are immediate and severe: over 25,000 health workers face the loss of their jobs, and many essential services have been either scaled back or shut down altogether.

The ripple effects are being felt across the country’s primary healthcare system. Payments have been halted for 3,855 paid peer volunteers, 1,086 Ansar members, and 350 OP employees under the Department of Family Planning for the past 18 months. The disruption has paralyzed key functions – from maternal and child care to vaccination drives, disease surveillance, and hospital management.

At the community level, shortages of birth control kits and essential medicines have left thousands without access to basic services. In a move that baffled health experts, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare recently scrapped the existing operational plan in favour of a new two-year project. Officials warn that such a project is unworkable in the short term and will only deepen the crisis. Public health professionals have already sounded the alarm that this policy misstep could derail Bangladesh’s commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The issue is no longer confined to professional circles. In July, Hasnat Abdullah, the southern organizer of the pro-government National Citizen Party (NCP), openly called for Nurjahan Begum’s resignation, questioning her qualifications and capacity to manage the nation’s health system. Despite these public appeals, the interim government has taken no corrective action, further fuelling suspicions that personal loyalty is valued above competence.

The Health Advisor’s perceived indifference became a national talking point following one of the country’s most heartbreaking tragedies. On July 21, a Bangladesh Air Force F-7 training jet crashed into Milestone School and College in Diyabari, Uttara, claiming the lives of students and injuring many others. While the nation grieved, Nurjahan Begum was reportedly focused on her own health issues and did not visit the scene. For many, this absence symbolized the government’s detachment from the realities facing ordinary citizens.

If the current trajectory continues, the damage to the health sector could be irreversible. Primary healthcare delivery, disease control programs, hospital administration, medical education, vaccination efforts, family planning initiatives, and public health campaigns are all at risk of grinding to a halt. Infrastructure projects could be abandoned mid-construction, and trained medical personnel may leave the sector entirely due to non-payment and lack of institutional support.

The public health crisis could spill over into economic and social instability. Poor health outcomes reduce workforce productivity, increase healthcare costs, and strain families already battling inflation and unemployment. Moreover, prolonged disruption risks undoing decades of progress in maternal and child health, immunization coverage, and communicable disease control.

Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. The interim government was meant to serve as a bridge toward stability, reform, and good governance. Instead, it has allowed nepotism to undermine its credibility and paralyze essential public services. Replacing unqualified political appointees with competent, experienced professionals in the health sector is no longer a matter of political preference – it is a national necessity.

Failure to act will not only erode public trust but also jeopardize the health of future generations. The people who once rallied to dismantle authoritarianism did not risk their lives and livelihoods to watch their healthcare system collapse under the weight of favouritism. For the sake of Bangladesh’s health, economy, and social stability, urgent reforms are needed – and they must begin with ending the culture of nepotism that has brought the nation’s health sector to the brink.

The article Bangladesh health sector faces collapse appeared first on Arabian Post.

In 2003, Washington justified its invasion of Iraq by claiming Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction and ties to Al Qaeda. These allegations -later proven false – enabled the toppling of Iraq’s leadership, replacing it with an externally controlled regime of opportunists and mercenaries. Iraq’s sovereignty was dismantled, and its oil wealth looted under the watch of the US Deep State.

This was not a one-off. It was the first act of a brutal geopolitical blueprint—a regime-change model later repeated in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. Western media branded these interventions as part of an “Arab Spring,” masking the real intent: destabilization, economic exploitation, and the installation of puppet governments loyal to foreign interests.

Egypt’s “25 January Revolution” in 2011 was sold as a popular uprising, yet it was driven by Western-backed networks. Mubarak’s ouster led not to stability but to chaos, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi – another foreign-backed figure—briefly in power before being overthrown.

In Libya, NATO’s 2011 intervention ended with the gruesome killing of Muammar Gaddafi. The once-prosperous nation descended into lawlessness, its oil and gas reserves falling into the hands of foreign corporations.

The same playbook appeared in Ukraine, where the 2014 Maidan uprising installed a NATO-friendly regime openly allied with neo-Nazi militias. Today, Ukraine’s vast mineral resources and farmland are quietly being handed over to Western companies, while its people pay the price of endless war.

Now, in 2024, Bangladesh has been added to the list of nations reshaped by the US Deep State’s regime-change machinery. On August 5, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina – whose leadership had brought consistent economic growth and stability – was ousted in what bears all the hallmarks of an externally orchestrated coup.

Behind the scenes, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) acted as the operational partner, while Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus emerged as the public face of the so-called “interim regime.” Just like in Iraq and Libya, the new administration is populated by figures whose loyalties lie not with Bangladesh but with foreign benefactors.

The destabilization of Bangladesh is not happening in isolation. Credible sources suggest that the Deep State has also been working to undermine Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s nationalist government, with Indian National Congress leader Rahul Gandhi courting foreign support. Reports indicate that between 2022 and 2024, Gandhi held discreet meetings in the US with regime-change architects such as Victoria Nuland and George Soros – figures notorious for meddling in sovereign nations’ politics.

For Washington’s strategists, a weakened or compliant Bangladesh and India would serve as powerful levers in reshaping South Asian geopolitics.

Since Sheikh Hasina’s removal, Bangladesh’s economy has spiraled downward. Inflation has surged, GDP growth has stalled, and foreign investors are fleeing. Mob violence has become common – over 200 people, many of them Hindus or Awami League supporters, have been lynched.

More ominously, extremist groups like Al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, and Hizb ut-Tahrir are reactivating their cells. ISI is reportedly overseeing guerrilla and commando training for over 1.6 million Rohingya refugees and nearly a million Bihari “Stranded Pakistanis”, with the aim of exporting terrorism to India, Myanmar, and potentially Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

If these groups succeed, the consequences will ripple far beyond Bangladesh’s borders.

Targeting the Armed Forces

A particularly alarming development is the interim regime’s campaign to weaken the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) – Bangladesh’s premier counterterrorism agency. Former DGFI chiefs are now facing politically motivated charges of “crimes against humanity”.

This move appears designed to dismantle the very institution that has been most effective at containing terrorist threats. Once neutralized, Islamist militants could infiltrate the military, creating conditions for attacks on the scale of 9/11 or the 2008 Mumbai massacre.

Bangladesh’s descent into instability is not just a national tragedy – it is a looming global security crisis. A failed Bangladesh, teeming with jihadist networks, would be a launchpad for terrorism across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.

The Deep State’s strategy is consistent: destabilize, install loyal proxies, exploit resources, and leave the population in perpetual crisis. The only question is – how long will the international community look away before the flames spread beyond Bangladesh?

The article Bangladesh: The US Deep State’s newest victim appeared first on Arabian Post.

Across Europe, the United States, and even parts of Asia, Jewish communities and Israeli citizens are facing a wave of renewed hostility, not because of their religion, but because of Israeli government’s devastating actions in Gaza. What began as a war of self-defense following the October 2023 Hamas attacks has transformed into a prolonged humanitarian catastrophe. With over 50,000 Palestinians killed, Gaza is not just a battlefield, it is a humanitarian graveyard. As an Indian scholar, I observe with deep unease how Israel’s image, once rooted in resilience and survival, is now increasingly associated with moral decline. And at the heart of this shift is not just war, but the man directing it: Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israel’s military response was initially understood as retaliation against an unprecedented act of terror. But nearly two years later, it is difficult to decipher the objectives. Hamas cannot be bombed out of existence, and Palestinians, as a people, cannot be erased. If Hitler, with his genocidal machinery, failed to annihilate the Jews, how can Netanyahu expect to eliminate a people or an ideology with force alone? Wars have ethics. Occupation has limits. And leadership, above all, demands responsibility.

What Netanyahu is doing now is not merely retaliatory—it’s strategic self-preservation. It is a war prolonged, not solely against Hamas, but against political dissent, democratic institutions, and increasingly, against the very soul of Israel. Even among partner countries like India—long friendly to Tel Aviv—concerns about Gaza’s devastation are making it harder to maintain stable, open ties. Realist foreign policy may prioritize interests, but no nation can long ignore the moral stain of collective punishment.

Israel was beginning to emerge from a prolonged era of covert diplomacy, carving out a new regional foothold through the Abraham Accords and enjoying an unprecedented wave of Arab diplomatic engagement. But Netanyahu’s persistence in prosecuting a war with diminishing returns has jeopardized that progress. Many of Israel’s allies are starting to speak up against Bibi, and are getting increasingly uncomfortable in being publicly associated with his government.

Power as an End, not a Means: Netanyahu could have left behind a legacy of economic prowess and geopolitical pragmatism. Instead, it is now marked by democratic backsliding and institutional sabotage. His judicial overhaul effort aimed at neutering Israel’s Supreme Court ignited one of the largest civil resistance movements in the country’s history. Reservists refused duty, former Mossad and Shin Bet chiefs condemned the plan, and economists warned of irreversible investor flight. Netanyahu dismissed them all, invoking “the will of the people” while undermining the very frameworks that make democracy resilient.

Like Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Netanyahu has mastered the art of cloaking authoritarian instincts in the rhetoric of patriotism. But history tells us that strongmen rarely exit gracefully. Mussolini, too, believed Italy’s future rested solely in his hands; he left behind a legacy of ruin. Bibi’s trajectory is alarmingly familiar.

When Leaders Become Liabilities: For a man who built his brand on security, the October 2023 attacks exposed staggering failure. Years of undermining the Palestinian Authority, fixating on Iran, and ignoring brewing tensions in Gaza created a blind spot that Hamas exploited with precision. In most democracies, such a collapse would lead to resignation or serious political reckoning. Netanyahu chose deflection and denial.

What followed was not just war, but the tightening of his political grip—vilifying opponents, rallying far-right allies, and portraying himself as indispensable. He brought fringe figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich into mainstream power, sacrificing societal cohesion for coalition arithmetic. Israeli democracy, long admired for its vitality even amid war, now teeters as Netanyahu aligns with messianic ultranationalists who reject pluralism and inflame racial tensions. And while Israel burns internally, the consequences are global. Jews around the world are being judged for the decisions of a government many did not elect and even more do not endorse. The reputational damage Netanyahu has inflicted on Jewish communities globally is immeasurable.

Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt warned in How Democracies Die that it is often elected leaders, not generals, who destroy democracies by gradually dismantling institutions and norms to advance their own political agendas. Netanyahu has followed this script faithfully: inciting against judges, delegitimizing Israel’s Arab citizens, tolerating/promoting violence from settlers, and branding dissenters as traitors. Israel once prided itself on institutional strength amid constant external threat. But Netanyahu’s reign has hollowed out that pride. His obsession with avoiding prosecution has taken precedence over national interests, and his consolidation of power resembles more an autocrat than a statesman.

A Nation Larger Than One Man: To his credit, Netanyahu does have tangible accomplishments. He globalized Israel’s economy, opened diplomatic doors, and projected strength on the world stage. But a true leader knows when to step aside. Instead, Netanyahu clings to office like a man trapped by his own contradictions—too powerful to be challenged, too compromised to walk away.

Israel is more than Netanyahu. Its people, its institutions, and its moral legacy deserve better. Increasingly, even its allies are making the distinction between the Israeli state and the man leading it. The hope for a post-Netanyahu Israel is not just political, it is moral. For the sake of both Israelis and Palestinians, and for the credibility of Jews around the world, that hope must be realised soon.

The article Netanyahu’s Israel in the World’s Eyes appeared first on Arabian Post.

On July 26, 2025, amid the grandeur of Shanghai’s World Artificial Intelligence Conference and High-Level Meeting on AI Governance, China unveiled what may well become the defining moment in the transformation of global artificial intelligence – its AI Global Governance Action Plan and the bold proposal to create a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, initially headquartered in Shanghai. These moves signal not just China’s confidence, but its willingness to steer AI toward a future grounded in consultation, joint construction, and shared benefit, especially for countries of the Global South.

As Premier Li Qiang delivered the opening address, he framed the current state of AI governance as “fragmented,” with wide differences in regulatory approaches and institutional frameworks across nations. China’s proposal to launch a centralized body reflects not hubris, but pragmatism: a conviction that to manage AI’s accelerating capabilities responsibly, the world needs a broad consensus and unified standards, not a patchwork of regional rules.

Premier Li’s critique of “technological monopolies” and a system in which AI becomes “an exclusive game for a few countries and companies” extends a direct but tactful rebuke of unilateral AI dominance. China positions itself as the antidote, offering openness and inclusion rather than exclusion. Chinese-made AI systems are not theoretical constructs – they are delivering tangible benefits across the world. In Myanmar, Japan, and Brazil, Chinese AI is already contributing new momentum in agriculture, education, and cultural exchange. From precision farming techniques in Myanmar to AI-driven digital classrooms in Brazil and health‑monitoring systems in neighboring Japan, Chinese AI is showing that smart technology can uplift societies in practical, meaningful ways.

While detailed reporting on these deployments remains limited in number of articles, it is widely reported that these partnerships align with China’s Global Development Initiative and global South solidarity strategy, embedding Chinese AI not as a tool of influence, but as an enabler of local development.

Parallel to its global outreach, China is doubling down on its domestic AI ecosystem. In response to escalating U.S. export controls on advanced Nvidia chipsets, local industry has mobilized: alliances like the Model‑Chip Ecosystem Innovation Alliance and Shanghai’s AI Committee were formed to integrate chips, LLM developers, and industry partners including Huawei, Biren, Metax, SenseTime, and more.

Huawei’s unveiling of its CloudMatrix 384 system, with 384 proprietary 910C chips and milestone‑beating performance in key benchmarks, signals that China is rapidly closing the gap with, or in some metrics even overtaking, U.S. AI powerhouses. Tencent’s Hunyuan3D World Model, Baidu’s “digital human” livestreaming avatars, and Alibaba’s Quark AI Glasses further demonstrate the creative breadth and commercialization readiness of Chinese AI innovation.

The newly proposed World AI Cooperation Organization is not just symbolic – it embodies China’s 13‑point AI strategy, which emphasizes open‑source ecosystems, UN‑led dialogue channels, safety frameworks, and equitable access, especially for developing countries.

China explicitly states that it is prepared to discuss arrangements with countries willing to join, inviting over 40 nations and organizations to participate in WAIC‑2025, including delegations from South Africa, Germany, Qatar, Russia, and South Korea. This indicates genuine openness, not coercion.

By tentatively proposing Shanghai as headquarters, China is seeking to leverage the city’s AI infrastructure and cosmopolitan character as an international hub for coordination and innovation, making the organization genuinely global in both form and function.

To counter criticisms that Chinese AI lacks transparency or fosters censorship, Beijing has doubled down on open-source AI licensing models, with companies like DeepSeek and Alibaba releasing large language models for global use. This step has drawn both acclaim and concern – but it undeniably reflects an intent to democratize AI, not hoard it behind walls. At WAIC, Premier Li underscored China’s desire to offer “more Chinese solutions” and “more Chinese wisdom” to the international community – words meant not to signal technological nationalism, but a global public good orientation.

China continues to lead in deployment scale, from smart cities to digital education platforms, giving it a practical edge in shaping AI use cases worldwide. Unlike models centered on competition or coercion, China’s emphasis on consultative multilateralism invites countries to participate rather than passively accept dictated rules. The proposed organization’s focus on the Global South signals a willingness to ensure that AI development benefits those often left behind in digital transformation. And as Western nations use tech controls and export restrictions to limit Chinese advancement, China is answering with self-reliance and cooperation, not retreat or isolation.

Of course, organizing a truly global AI governance body will require surmounting skepticism – about data privacy, algorithmic bias, political neutrality, and transparency. Critics warn that state-directed AI can embed internal ideology or censorship into exported models. The U.S. editorial press highlighted concerns about political alignment in Chinese models – even calling for caution in their deployment overseas.

Yet China’s willingness to open source key models and invite broad membership gives the proposed organization an advantage: accountability through participation, rather than distrust through exclusion.

The test lies in execution: whether the organization remains inclusive and respects local governance norms or becomes a tool for geopolitical leverage. But China’s current posture – promoting broad participation, offering development cooperation, and pushing for open‑source access – marks a meaningful departure from tech monopolism and signals a constructive path forward.

At a crossroads between fragmented regulatory silos and a competitive rush toward monopolistic dominance, the global community needs a bridge. China’s AI Global Governance Action Plan and its proposed World AI Cooperation Organization offer precisely that: a new global architecture grounded in consultation, shared values, and equitable access.

The question now is whether other nations will rise to the moment, engage in building a governance framework that truly reflects global consensus, and deliver AI development that benefits not just a handful of powerful economies, but humanity as a whole. If realized in good faith and with transparency, China has the opportunity to redefine global AI governance – not as a race for dominance, but as a cooperative journey toward shared prosperity. What Beijing has laid out in Shanghai is not just policy – it is an invitation. The world will decide whether to join.

The article China’s AI Diplomacy in the Age of U.S. Unilateralism appeared first on Arabian Post.

M. A. Hossain

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Recently, we saw large-scale violence targeting the Syrian Druze community in Sweida province in southern Syria. Druze are a small religious minority group in Syria and are around 3.20% of the total Syrian population. As per the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces and allied militias have carried out massacres in Sweida, and approximately 600 members of the Druze community have been killed, including 140 women and children. This eruption of violence was an eerie reminder of a series of violent attacks that have been launched against the Syrian religious and ethnic minorities since the current regime came to power. The Syrian National Army (SNA), which is also part of a coalition led by President Ahmad Al-Shaara’s group Hayat Taheer Al-Sham (HTS) attacked Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in North-East Syria in December 2024. In particular, fierce fighting along the Tishreen Dam became the focal point. In March, indiscriminate killings of Alawites were carried out in the Syrian coastal areas, especially in the city of Banias. While exact figures remain difficult to verify, more than 1,300 individuals, most of them Alawites, lost their lives. In some cases, entire families were summarily executed. These atrocities were solely directed against the Alawite minority and instigated by militias affiliated with the new regime, ostensibly as part of a response to attacks in Latakia and Tartous from armed groups affiliated with the deposed Assad regime. In the name of fighting former President Bashar Al-Assad, loyalist collective punishment was inflicted on the Alawite community.

In June this year church in the Syrian capital of Damascus was rocked by a suicide explosion; in this deadly attack, 25 people were killed. The Syrian authorities blamed the attack on the Islamic State (IS) group. However, a lesser-known Sunni extremist group, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, claimed responsibility for this attack. Many analysts believe this little-known group has deep links with HTS, as their relations with HTS stretch back to before the Bashar Al-Assad regime’s fall. Then, it was allegedly part of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s broader coalition and helped HTS recruit cells to operate inside Assad-held territory. If we look at the pattern of all these past attacks, it clearly indicates that they were carried out on the instructions or at least with tacit approval of the current Syrian regime. The objective of these attacks was to subdue the minorities through terror, so they wouldn’t demand their political rights. The current Syrian regime got emboldened by the recent lifting of Western sanctions and the informal recognition it got from Arab states and the United States. In May 2025, the US president met Ahmad Al-Shaara in the Saudi capital Riyadh and expressed admiration for him. He went further and mentioned Al-Shaara as a strongman, the brute, the resilient survivor, and declared him a “Tough guy with a very strong past.” The US president should have done research and dug more into the past of Al-Shaara, as his past is one marked by links to al-Qaeda, nothing else.

HTS subscribes to the Salafist school of thought, which is the same as Al-Qaeda’s. The group imposed strict Islamic rule in areas it controlled in the past, and civilians in those areas say the group’s practices are like those of the Islamic State. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham used to host a significant number of foreign fighters, including Arabs, Turks, Chechens, Uzbeks, and Muslims from China’s Xinjiang province. The group’s attitude toward heterodox minorities like the Druze and Alawites never changed. There is, for example, a small community of Druze in northern Idlib whose inhabitants were forced to convert to Islam by HTS predecessor, Al-Nusra Front, in 2015. We should always be mindful of the fact that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is no different from Al-Qaeda; it’s just the old wine in a new bottle. In January 2017, HTS was born out of the merger of Salafi jihadists from mainly Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Haq, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din with Al-Nusra Front. HTS tried to showcase through various mergers with other groups that it has ended its affiliation with Al-Qaeda, but definitely, these mergers did not indicate an ideological split with Al-Qaeda but were part of a strategy to increase the group’s appeal within Syria.

Ahmad Al-Shaara should come to his senses and understand the fact that just by taking off his military attire and wearing a business suit, he can’t fool the world. Syria is a multiethnic society consisting of Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkomans, Alawites, Druze, and Yazidis. To keep the country united and stable, the future Syrian state should be a nation that accommodates and grants rights to all the ethnic and religious groups, so that everyone feels their participation in running the state. Unless the current regime doesn’t follow this approach honestly, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) must be isolated and marginalized by the international community. As with the current jihadist ideology and criminal actions, the current regime of Al-Shaara remains a ticking time bomb that arguably poses a greater long-term threat to the region and Syria’s stability.

The article Al-Shaara Proved He is Still a Jihadist Commander appeared first on Arabian Post.

M A Hossain

It is easy to overlook the quiet revolutions in geopolitics, especially when the headlines are dominated by wars in Ukraine and Gaza, tensions in the Indo-Pacific, or the perennial drama of U.S.-China rivalry. Yet, beneath the surface of global power struggles, there is a subtler but equally consequential shift unfolding across Central Asia and the South Caucasus. And it is not Moscow, Beijing, or Washington leading the charge—but Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.

In recent years, the Gulf states have redefined themselves from oil-rich rentier economies into strategic actors with global ambitions. Their latest frontier is the heart of Eurasia, a region long trapped between competing empires and great power rivalries. By investing in infrastructure, hosting peace negotiations, and building pragmatic partnerships, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are becoming indispensable intermediaries in a geopolitical landscape once exclusively dominated by Russia, China, and Turkey.

This is not an isolated trend. The recent GulfLink logistics venture between Kazakhstan Railways and the UAE’s AD Ports Group is a case in point. On the surface, it looks like another trade deal. But look closer, and it signals a strategic reorientation: Central Asia is being connected southward to the Gulf’s transport hubs, offering an alternative to the overland routes that traditionally linked the region only to Russia or China. Similarly, Uzbekistan’s decision earlier this year to lift visa requirements for Gulf nationals is more than a tourism move; it is an invitation for deeper economic and cultural integration.

And then there is diplomacy. When the UAE hosted peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it stepped into a role historically played by Moscow. For decades, Russia’s shadow loomed large over the South Caucasus, cemented through military bases, energy pipelines, and the promise of security guarantees. Yet after Moscow’s failure to prevent renewed hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh and its growing preoccupation with Ukraine, space opened for new actors. The Gulf states were quick to seize it, offering neutrality and incentives for peace built around economic dividends rather than coercive pressure.

This approach deserves attention precisely because it is different. Unlike the United States, which tends to mix security assistance with ideological lectures, or China, whose Belt and Road Initiative often fosters dependency, Gulf states deal in pragmatic reciprocity. They do not seek regime change. They do not export ideology. They invest. They build. And, crucially, they do so without forcing local leaders into rigid alliances.

History makes this shift even more striking. Central Asia and the South Caucasus were once tightly bound to the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the region inherited messy borders, fragile institutions, and lingering ethnic disputes. Russia continued to exploit these vulnerabilities, maintaining influence through energy, security pacts like the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and its self-appointed role as a regional arbiter.

But over the past two decades, this dominance has frayed. China emerged with its Belt and Road projects, flooding the region with infrastructure loans. Turkey leveraged soft power, shared language, and culture to cultivate a “Turkic world” narrative. The United States made intermittent forays, mostly driven by counterterrorism concerns after 9/11.

Into this crowded arena came the Gulf states, offering something different—a partnership model without the baggage of past empires or ideological strings. And it is precisely this neutrality that gives Abu Dhabi and Riyadh an edge. They are not there to compete with Russia or China directly. Instead, they provide hedging space for local actors, allowing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to diversify their foreign relations beyond their immediate great power neighbors.

What makes Gulf engagement particularly relevant is its non-intrusive conflict management style. Consider the South Caucasus. Armenia’s reliance on Russian protection proved hollow when Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow’s credibility as a security guarantor collapsed. In stepped the UAE—not with troops or ultimatums, but with a neutral venue for talks and an economic vision to incentivize peace.

This approach mirrors the Gulf’s own experiences in conflict mediation. The Saudi-Iran détente brokered by China was facilitated by years of quiet Gulf diplomacy. Similarly, the UAE’s role in Yemen’s peace process demonstrated that even bitter conflicts can be softened through economic carrots rather than military sticks. Applying this model to Eurasia, where frozen conflicts are a legacy of Soviet-era borders, could unlock new pathways for stability.

The same logic applies to Central Asia’s simmering disputes. The Ferghana Valley, shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, remains a hotspot of ethnic tension, porous borders, and radicalization risks. Gulf states, with their experience in counterterrorism and deradicalization programs, can provide expertise without provoking nationalist sensitivities. By supporting security cooperation while simultaneously investing in logistics and trade, they address both the symptoms and the root causes of instability.

Critics might argue that the Gulf cannot replace Russia or China. True. They neither have the hard power to dominate Eurasia nor the historical ties that Moscow enjoys. But that misses the point. Gulf states are not trying to supplant the great powers; they are inserting themselves as moderating actors, capable of balancing rival influences. This “dynamic neutrality,” as some analysts call it, allows them to engage simultaneously with Russia, China, Turkey, and the United States without being seen as a threat by any single actor.

Moreover, the Gulf brings something the others lack—capital unburdened by political conditions. While Western aid often comes with demands for governance reforms, and Chinese loans tend to create dependency traps, Gulf investments are framed as mutually beneficial deals. A new port, a logistics hub, an energy pipeline—these projects give immediate, tangible benefits to local populations, making Gulf engagement politically palatable.

There is also a deeper lesson here about the changing nature of global power. In the 20th century, influence was projected primarily through military bases, ideological blocs, or coercive economic leverage. In the 21st, especially for middle powers like the Gulf states, influence increasingly comes from soft leverage—connectivity, capital, and credibility.

Of course, there are limits. The Gulf states cannot resolve every frozen conflict, nor can they indefinitely maintain neutrality if regional rivalries sharpen. But their very presence already alters the strategic calculus. For Armenia, disillusioned with Russia’s protection, the UAE offers an alternative partner. For Kazakhstan, caught between Russian security demands and Chinese economic dependence, Gulf investment provides a third option. For Azerbaijan, already aligned with Turkey, Gulf diplomacy adds another layer of strategic depth.

The broader implication is that the geopolitical map of Eurasia is no longer binary. It is not just Russia versus the West, or China versus the United States. It is multipolar, with middle powers like the UAE and Saudi Arabia redrawing the contours through trade routes, peace talks, and pragmatic alliances. But for now, the message is clear: the Gulf states are no longer just consumers of global order. They are quietly becoming its architects—one port, one pipeline, and one peace deal at a time.

The article Gulf States in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Pragmatism Redrawing the Map appeared first on Arabian Post.

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CHINESE SYMBOLISM ON CONFIDENCE IN FULL PLAY

M A Hossain

In the realm of global politics, symbolism matters almost as much as substance. President Xi Jinping of China has decided not to attend this year’s BRICS summit which will be held in Rio de Janeiro. This is the first time President Xi will not be at the summit since BRICS’s inception. This has become a breaking news globally. While the official explanation cites “scheduling conflicts,” the deeper reality suggests something more complex, and perhaps more consequential, for the future of the world’s most prominent coalition of emerging economies.

At first glance, the decision may seem trivial. After all, Chinese Premier Li Qiang will represent Beijing at the summit, and China’s foreign ministry insists that Beijing remains fully committed to BRICS and supports Brazil’s presidency of the group. But in international affairs, particularly in institutions built on mutual symbolism and solidarity, the absence of a key figure can speak louder than any official statement. It can send a message—intentional or not—about shifting priorities, evolving strategies, and potential fractures within alliances.

This is not the first time President Xi has chosen to skip a major international summit. In 2023, he declined to deliver a speech at the BRICS gathering in South Africa, delegating the task to his commerce minister without any clear explanation. The pattern of disengagement—two high-profile absences in two years—raises legitimate questions. Is China quietly stepping back from the frontline of BRICS leadership? Or is it, in fact, signalling supreme confidence that its influence within the bloc is so firmly established that personal appearances are no longer necessary?

To understand what may be at play, it is helpful to recall the historical context of BRICS itself. Originally conceived as a loose grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—economies outside the traditional Western sphere. BRICS has often been more aspirational than operational. Unlike NATO or the European Union, BRICS lacks binding treaties or a common defence policy. Its strength lies in its symbolism: a counterweight to Western dominance and a platform for the Global South to amplify its voice in world affairs.

China’s role in this group is undeniably central. It is the largest economy among the members by far, the principal driver of intra-BRICS trade, and a key player in development financing through institutions such as the New Development Bank. As of 2024, BRICS nations account for nearly 40% of global GDP—a staggering rise from the mere 8% they represented at the dawn of the millennium. Much of this economic transformation has been underpinned by China’s relentless growth and its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, which has spread Chinese influence across Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Given this commanding position, it is tempting to see Xi’s absence as a mark of confidence, not retreat. Just as Franklin D. Roosevelt or Winston Churchill did not need to attend every Allied summit in person to exert influence during World War II, Xi may be demonstrating that Beijing’s dominance is now institutionalized within BRICS. Whether he physically attends or not, China remains the gravitational center of the bloc’s economic and strategic agenda.

Yet this interpretation overlooks a crucial point: global leadership is not only about leverage but also about presence. History teaches that absent leaders can erode alliances. The post-World War I disillusionment with the League of Nations, largely due to the U.S.’s refusal to fully commit, is a stark example of how absenteeism can undercut global institutions. Even in modern times, when U.S. presidents skip key summits—as Donald Trump did with ASEAN gatherings—it often sows confusion and weakens diplomatic cohesion.

Moreover, symbolism matters even more for a grouping like BRICS, which is still in the process of defining its identity and role in the evolving world order. In this context, the Chinese president’s absence could inadvertently reinforce concerns about whether the bloc has the unity and shared vision necessary to challenge the Western-led system in a sustained and credible way.

A more plausible explanation lies in China’s broader recalibration of its global strategy. In recent years, Beijing has increasingly sought to exert influence through infrastructure investment, trade expansion, and technology rather than through high-profile diplomatic theater. Its growing economic ties with Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia, as well as its deep involvement in the Middle East through strategic partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, illustrate a preference for concrete, often bilateral, engagements over symbolic multilateralism.

Furthermore, by maintaining a degree of ambiguity about its intentions—sometimes engaging, sometimes retreating—China may be borrowing a page from the playbook of leaders like Trump, who famously kept allies and adversaries guessing. In a fragmented world moving away from unipolarity, such unpredictability can be an asset. It prevents rival powers from coordinating against you and allows you to shift your diplomatic posture as circumstances change.

Looking ahead, the real test is not whether China skips another summit or two. The test is whether it remains willing to invest in the hard work of alliance management: building trust, resolving disputes, and showing up when it matters. The fate of BRICS as a credible alternative to Western-led institutions depends on such engagement. Without it, the bloc risks becoming little more than a statistical curiosity—a group that represents 40% of the global economy but fails to shape global outcomes.

In the end, Xi Jinping’s absence may not signify the end of China’s commitment to BRICS. But it may well mark the start of a more selective, calculated approach to global leadership—one that, while perhaps strategically sound for Beijing, carries the risk of weakening the very institutions through which leadership is exercised. Whether BRICS can thrive in such an environment will be one of the defining questions of the next decade.

The article XI BRICS no show: Strategic shift or silent warning? appeared first on Arabian Post.

In a global economic environment that remains shaky and uneven, China’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) is more than just a bright spot – it’s a quiet vindication of long-term planning, policy stability, and a commitment to innovation-led growth. Contrary to Western narratives of economic decoupling or investor flight, the latest data paints a far more grounded picture: foreign capital is not just staying in China – it is doubling down.

The numbers are compelling. According to the Ministry of Commerce, foreign direct investment in China’s high-tech sectors totalled 109.04 billion yuan ($15.22 billion) between January and May 2025.Investment in e-commerce services surged a staggering 146 percent year-on-year, aerospace equipment manufacturing rose by 74.9 percent, and chemical pharmaceuticals saw a 59.2 percent uptick. These are not marginal gains; they signal a structural commitment by foreign firms to tap into China’s evolving industrial ecosystem.

It’s not hard to see why. China today is not merely a manufacturing hub – it is increasingly a laboratory for business model experimentation and technological advancement. From digital infrastructure to low-carbon industrial transitions, China is setting the pace for what the next generation of economic development looks like. And multinationals are embedding themselves deeper into this transformation.

The development of new quality productive forces is accelerating the emergence of innovation-driven digital and green productivity. In this sense, foreign firms are not just beneficiaries of China’s rise – they are co-creators of its future. The notion that China is somehow “closing off” or turning inward misses the mark. What we are witnessing instead is a reconfiguration: from low-cost production to high-value innovation, from simple exports to complex, symbiotic value chains.

The recalibration is not only in products, but in purpose. Many foreign companies now view their operations in China as critical nodes in their global strategy. As Nathan Stoner of Cummins emphasized, the goal is “not only to serve the Chinese market, but also to support Chinese automakers in their global expansion.” Such partnerships underscore a quiet but profound shift: China is no longer just a destination – it is a springboard.

Beyond the numbers and boardroom strategies, there is a broader story unfolding – one of renewed confidence in China’s institutional and infrastructural resilience. Whether it’s the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region’s advanced logistics ecosystem, or the growing network of free trade zones, or simply the massive consumer base that embraces digital transformation faster than anywhere else, China offers a business environment that rewards long-term vision.

This momentum goes beyond factories and laboratories, reaching into tourism, services, and cultural exchange. The new partnership between Air China, Air New Zealand, and Tourism New Zealand is emblematic of how people-to-people connections are bouncing back with economic consequences. Air New Zealand’s $700,000 investment in Chinese market promotion and the expected 33 percent increase in premium seats on the Shanghai-Auckland route are signals of demand recovery and soft power resonance.

In geopolitical terms, this continued flow of capital and confidence into China is instructive. Despite strategic competition, tech restrictions, and trade uncertainties fueled largely by Washington and its allies, global business leaders continue to differentiate between political rhetoric and economic reality. For many, the question is not whether to invest in China – but how to do so more smartly.

Indeed, countries like the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Germany have seen their FDI into China rise 60.9 percent, 10.3 percent, and 7.1 percent respectively in the first five months of 2025. These are not economies with trivial stakes – they are core players in the high-tech and automotive sectors, and their renewed bets on China carry weight.

The Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, in a mid-June report, noted that foreign enterprises are reshaping industrial chains and driving localized innovation. This is crucial, because it signals not just transactional investment, but transformative integration. It’s not only capital that is flowing into China – it is also trust in its long-term vision.

Of course, challenges remain. From demographic transitions to the complexities of decarbonization, China’s road ahead is not without bumps. But if the current surge in FDI is any indication, global investors are voting with their wallets – and their presence. They are betting on China not out of sentiment, but out of strategy.

As the world wrestles with economic fragmentation and sluggish growth, China’s continuing ability to attract and absorb foreign investment serves as a reminder: stability, innovation, and openness are not just slogans – they are tangible advantages. In this volatile decade, few nations offer all three at once. China does. And the world is paying attention.

The article Why the World Isn’t Leaving China appeared first on Arabian Post.

The question of regime change in Iran has recently resurfaced after the killing of Iran’s top military commanders following the Israeli airstrikes. However, Israel’s short-term goal was to damage Iran’s nuclear facilities to severely diminish its weapons program. But the Israeli Prime Minister mentioned during his speeches that the war with Iran “could certainly” lead to regime change in the Islamic Republic.

It is not the first time that foreign powers have imagined Iran as a crumbling house, one that only needs a gentle push, or a series of airstrikes, before it falls into new hands. This was the fantasy in 1953, when the CIA and the British intelligence overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh, Iran’s prime minister, who had nationalized the country’s oil, and pushed Iran into Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s autocratic rule. And this was also the dream in the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran with military and economic support from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, who believed the newly revolutionary Iran would collapse in months. Founded in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has democratic, theocratic, and authoritarian elements in its governance system, which makes it a hybrid. The founding figure of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, envisioned a state run by Islamic clerics and jurists who ensured all policies adhered to Islamic law.

As Iran was a constitutional monarchy before the revolution, theocratic elements were effectively grafted on top of the existing republican ones, such as the parliament, executive, and judiciary. Iran has a unicameral legislature (one house of parliament), called the Majles, and a president. There are regular elections for both. But, while there are democratic elements within this system, in practice, it is a “closed loop” that keeps the clerical elite in power and prevents challenges to the supreme leader. There is a clear hierarchy, with the supreme leader at the top. This complex system of governance makes the Iranian regime a unique one in the Middle East. Iran is not Syria, Libya, or Iraq, where, in the recent past, regime change has been achieved. United States policy makers often underestimate the strength of the Iranian state, which is structured for survival. The following features and dynamics make the Iranian regime hard to replace.

The Iranian military has a dual architecture designed to resist coups and invasions: Artesh, the regular armed forces of around 420,000 men across ground, naval, air, and air-defence troops, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an elite, ideologically driven military with roughly 190,000 personnel across ground, naval, and air branches. Beyond them is the Basij, a vast paramilitary network with hundreds of thousands of members embedded in every corner of Iranian society—in the streets, in neighbourhoods, in schools, and mosques. They aren’t just loyalists of the Ayatollah but woven into a deeper idea of the state and committed to the core ideology of the Islamic Republic. Despite Israel’s extensive and quite successful campaign of assassinations targeting senior IRGC commanders, the core of this group has not been hollowed out but hardened. A younger generation of more ideologically rigid commanders has emerged. This new generation of Iranian military commanders has also been battle-hardened in close-quarter conflict in Syria and understands how wars of state collapse can unfold. Bombing and Air campaigns could significantly destroy military and civilian infrastructure in Iran, but to replace the Iranian regime, President Trump must be prepared to fight not just a standing army but a system with decades of experience in asymmetric warfare.

Iran is not governed by a single man or clique that can be decapitated. The Iranian state is a competitive authoritarian system with institutions that have evolved over a century. Even amid a crisis, the system generates new leaders, factions, and power centres. Even the deaths of some influential figures would not bring the system down; it would renew it. Iran is not merely a conventional state; it is built upon a revolutionary, theocratic ideology. The current structure is more than a government; it is part of an ideological movement rooted in the principles of revolution and resistance. It is naive to think that any external military attack or intervention could destroy this structure. Historically, when Iran faces external threats, its citizens unite under nationalist sentiment, thereby strengthening the ruling regime.

More than 46 years after the Iranian Revolution, there is still talk among Iranians, both those living in the country and among the diaspora, that the end of the regime is nearing. Unless and until large factions of the regime’s military, police, and intelligence forces begin defecting, it will be hard for the people of Iran to overthrow the regime. And unfortunately, in every protest movement in Iran since the 1979 revolution, that hasn’t happened. The protesters haven’t convinced significant individuals within the regime to step away and join them. Yes, there is discontent among the Iranian people, especially regarding women’s rights, economic crises, and political freedoms. However, this dissatisfaction has not yet transformed into a well-organized movement. A significant number of Iranian citizens are voicing their dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime over issues of human rights abuses, the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader, the declining economy of the country, and the lack of freedoms of speech, assembly, and thought. From the 2009 Green Movement to the 2017-2019 economic protests and the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, Iranians have demonstrated extraordinary courage in confronting state violence. But these uprisings have not translated into regime collapse.

Iranian opposition groups may be getting western media attention, but the hard reality is that they have no ground presence inside Iran. The monarchists and the former Mojahedin (Presently NCRI) are positively despised by much of the Iranian diaspora, but unfortunately have no grassroots support.  On top of this, there is no unity among Iranian opposition groups. Even there is no consensus on the basic norms of democratic governance. The opposition remains paralysed and ill-prepared to step in if the regime collapses and poses no major threat to the current regime.

The article Iran is not Syria, not even Saudi Arabia appeared first on Arabian Post.

“We made a great deal with China. We’re very happy with it.” So declared President Donald Trump in his familiar tone of triumphant ambiguity on June 11, fresh off what was touted as a breakthrough agreement to restore a trade truce between the United States and China. But if history has taught us anything, it is that “done deals” in the Trumpian lexicon tend to be either dangerously fragile or conveniently fungible.

The latest accord, emerging from two days of intense talks in London, follows an alarming spiral in trade tensions that had once again threatened to upend global markets and rekindle the tit-for-tat tariff warfare that haunted the latter years of Trump’s first term. According to Trump, China has committed to lifting its restrictions on the export of rare earths – materials critical to the global technology and defense sectors – while the U.S. has agreed to a calibrated rollback of punitive measures, including the threatened revocation of visas for Chinese students.

As ever, the devil is not just in the details, but in their implementation. Much like the May Geneva agreement that this deal purports to reinforce, the London framework is conditional, tentative, and, crucially, subject to “final approval” by both President Trump and President Xi Jinping. That qualifier alone renders the euphoria premature.

Still, to be charitable, the very fact that Washington and Beijing are speaking the language of dialogue rather than confrontation is an encouraging sign. Following a phone call between the two leaders earlier this month, there appears to be a renewed willingness – albeit under duress – to keep diplomacy afloat. For a world economy battered by uncertainty, this resumption of talks is, if nothing else, a stabilizing force.

Yet, Trump’s boastful framing – that the U.S. walks away with a 55% tariff shield while China gets 10% – betrays a zero-sum worldview that continues to inform his trade doctrine. The truth, however, is far less tidy. Tariffs have proved to be a double-edged sword, inflicting damage on American consumers, industries, and allies as much as they have squeezed Chinese exports. The World Bank’s recent downward revision of global growth forecasts points to tariffs and unpredictability as “significant headwinds,” underlining the global costs of such brinkmanship.

Beijing, for its part, has projected a more measured tone. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, in remarks following the London consultations, emphasized mutual benefit, calling on the U.S. to “honor their words with actions.” The Chinese side welcomed the “principled consensus” as a foundation for predictability and stability in bilateral economic relations. While Beijing’s rhetoric may be couched in diplomatic platitudes, it signals a strategic patience that stands in stark contrast to Trump’s performative deal-making.

Indeed, despite facing considerable pressure – both domestic and international -China has remained consistent in its emphasis on dialogue, reciprocity, and multilateralism. It is no secret that Beijing is playing a longer game. From its support for a multilateral trading system to its efforts in promoting South-South cooperation, China has positioned itself as a steady hand amid a turbulent global order.

In this light, the reestablishment of a U.S.-China economic and trade consultation mechanism should be viewed as more than a temporary fix. It offers a framework through which recurring disputes can be ironed out, interests aligned, and trust slowly rebuilt. Importantly, it provides a venue for strategic communication -something sorely missing during the height of tariff wars in 2018–19.

However, for this framework to bear fruit, both sides must resist the urge to revert to maximalist posturing. The United States must accept that unilateralism – whether in tariffs or technology controls – cannot substitute for a sustainable policy. Likewise, China must be prepared to meet the U.S. halfway, especially on issues of market access, intellectual property, and transparency.

The elephant in the room, of course, is the technological cold war that continues to simmer beneath the surface. While rare earths and tariff percentages dominate headlines, it is the battle over semiconductors and AI supremacy that threatens to define the next phase of U.S.-China relations. Washington’s decision to maintain restrictions on high-end AI chips – particularly those from Nvidia- while easing others, reveals both the complexity and the stakes involved.

Beijing, not surprisingly, has responded with innovation. The resurgence of Huawei, once a poster child of American sanctions, stands as testament to China’s determination to chart its own technological path. As Huawei’s founder Ren Zhenfei put it bluntly this week, China may still be a step behind, but it is catching up – by stacking and clustering if necessary.

In the short term, these dynamics will continue to fuel friction. But in the long term, they offer a compelling reason for structured cooperation. For neither side can afford the costs of sustained decoupling. The global economy – still reeling from inflationary shocks, supply chain disruptions, and climate-induced volatility – desperately needs the world’s two largest economies to find common ground.

To that end, the inclusion of Chinese students in American universities, affirmed in this deal, is more than a diplomatic gesture. It is a recognition that people-to-people ties remain a cornerstone of bilateral engagement. Academic exchanges, research collaboration, and cross-cultural education build bridges that tariffs and bans cannot destroy. They plant the seeds of mutual understanding in a landscape too often scorched by suspicion.

The road ahead remains bumpy. Structural trade conflicts persist, strategic mistrust abounds, and electoral politics – particularly in the U.S. – can derail even the most promising of frameworks. But the London agreement offers a glimpse of what is possible when mutual interest outweighs mutual animosity.

This development not only helps stabilize U.S.-China relations but also injects much-needed momentum into the global economy. It serves as a reminder that even amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry, there is still space – indeed, an urgent need – for pragmatic cooperation.

Trump may brand it a win, but real victory lies not in tariffs or trophies, but in the hard, unglamorous work of sustained diplomacy. For now, both sides have stepped back from the precipice. The challenge will be to keep walking forward – together.

The article The High Stakes of the Latest U.S.-China Agreement appeared first on Arabian Post.

By any military measure, Ukraine’s ‘Operation Spider Web’ was an astonishing success. In a meticulously planned operation, Ukrainian drones struck deep into Russian territory, obliterating at least 40 military aircraft—including nuclear-capable Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers—in a single, devastating blow. The attack revealed not only meticulous Ukrainian planning over 18 months but also the glaring vulnerabilities of Russia’s so-called impenetrable airspace. It was a coup de main that will be studied in military academies for decades. But as history too often reminds us, tactical brilliance can be the prelude to strategic disaster. The world now holds its breath, waiting to see what comes next.

The immediate question is not whether Russia will respond—it will—but how. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must now reckon with that distinction. Launched on the eve of scheduled peace talks in Istanbul, Spider Web didn’t just dismantle a third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet—it may also have dismantled the fragile architecture of diplomacy that remained. If this was a calculated move to strengthen Ukraine’s bargaining position, it was cynically timed and perilously shortsighted. It risks transforming what was still, however tenuously, a brutal regional war into an epoch-defining catastrophe.

We’ve seen this before. In 1914, the assassination of an Austrian archduke triggered a cascade of commitments, mobilizations, and miscalculations that led to a global conflagration. In 1941, Japan, feeling cornered by U.S. embargoes, attacked Pearl Harbor—a masterstroke of surprise that ultimately led to its own annihilation. And in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the planet within inches of nuclear oblivion, saved only by backchannel diplomacy and the mutual recognition of unacceptable costs.

Ukraine’s gamble did not occur in a vacuum. It came at a time when President Trump has been seeking to limit American exposure and end the war, while Europe is increasingly divided over how far to support Kyiv without inviting catastrophe. It also came amid a U.S. political landscape reshaped by Donald Trump’s return to the White House, a president who has made clear his disinterest in “forever wars” and who, notably, has remained silent on this latest escalation. The American public, too, seems less inclined to bankroll Kyiv’s ambitions, particularly when those ambitions risk dragging NATO into a direct confrontation with a nuclear adversary.

Zelenskyy’s supporters will argue this operation was necessary—a bold stroke to jolt Russia from its entrenched positions and to demonstrate Ukraine’s capability for long-range asymmetric warfare. They will say it sends a signal to Moscow: Ukraine cannot be intimidated and has the resolve to strike at the heart of Russian military power. They may even compare it to Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor—a preemptive blow to degrade a long-term threat.

But the analogy doesn’t hold. Israel acted in secrecy against a latent, undeclared threat. Ukraine struck openly, on the record, against a nuclear-armed power just hours before peace talks. Worse, it struck not against fielded forces in battle, but strategic nuclear bombers inside Russia, a move that risks prompting a doctrinal response from Moscow. Since its updated nuclear posture last year, Russia allows for nuclear use in response to conventional strikes that threaten its strategic deterrent—exactly the kind of attack Spider Web represents.

It is no exaggeration to say that Zelenskyy has lit a fuse dangerously close to a powder keg. Which raises a larger question: What exactly was the purpose of this attack?

Some suspect it was less about battlefield utility and more about political optics. With Western support waning and battlefield momentum stalled, Zelenskyy may have felt compelled to show that he still commands initiative—that he remains a credible partner worth backing. There’s also speculation that this operation was a plea for continued arms shipments now under threat from Trump’s “America First” administration.

But if this was an attempt to impress or pressure Western allies, it may backfire. The attack has already emboldened voices in Washington and Brussels who argue that the war is spiraling out of control. And it gives ammunition to Moscow’s propaganda machine, which is portraying the strike as Russia’s own Pearl Harbor. When a nuclear power perceives itself as the victim of an existential assault, dangerous decisions follow.

We must also ask: was NATO involved? Did European allies—through satellite intelligence or remote drone operations—have a hand in the planning or execution? If so, this operation could cross a previously avoided threshold, bringing NATO into direct conflict with Russia. That’s not just a strategic misstep—it’s a generational blunder.

President Zelenskyy must now answer for the consequences of his audacity. Yes, the strike humiliated Russia. Yes, it exposed the rot within Moscow’s security establishment. But the cost of that humiliation could be paid not just in Ukrainian lives, but potentially in the lives of millions across Europe and beyond, should Putin interpret this as justification for escalation.

History is littered with leaders who mistook tactical victories for strategic triumphs. Napoleon’s march into Moscow, Hitler’s advance into Stalingrad, even George W. Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” moment in Iraq—all stemmed from an overestimation of short-term success and a blindness to long-term consequence.

Zelenskyy, admired as he rightly is for his courage and resolve, must now be judged for his judgment. By launching Spider Web when he did, and in the manner that he did, he may have sabotaged the very peace he claims to seek. Worse, he has placed the entire international order at the mercy of a man like Vladimir Putin, whose worldview is shaped not by cost-benefit logic but by grievance, pride, and a paranoid sense of historical destiny.

The West must now perform a high-wire act. It must reaffirm support for ending the war. It must also demand restraint and a return to diplomacy. A nuclear confrontation, even a “demonstrative” one over a deserted military base, would rewrite the rules of war and peace for generations to come. It would show that nuclear blackmail works—or that nuclear retaliation can be normalized. Neither outcome is acceptable.

Operation Spider Web may be remembered as a brilliant military feat. But unless it is followed by swift and sober diplomacy, it risks becoming a historical monument to hubris—the kind that ignites wars from which there is no return. The lesson from history is chillingly clear: great fires often begin with a single, dazzling spark.

The article Zelenskyy’s Reckless Gambit: A Tactical Masterstroke That Threatens Strategic Collapse appeared first on Arabian Post.

​I spent a wonderful afternoon with an​ old friend​, a Persian prince in his cousin’s Jumeirah villa to heal from the trauma of multiple Hindutva chick​en hawks keyboard warriors berating me for​ pointing out the fact that Dassault Aviation shares have fallen 3% in Paris while the Chinese J-10CE fighter jet (Vigorous Dragon) soared 20% in Shenzhen. Only a moron with a Stone Age IQ would believe the military communiques of the Modi government (which lied so shamelessly to the Indian people about the IAF de​bacle at Balakot but still won the election since Namo is the Mozart of communal hate marketing.) or the ​jihadi ​johnny jet set that has anoin​ted General Asim Munir (​The ​Luminous ​One), the cap​o di tutti capi among the spit and polish Generalji​s at Rawalpindi GHQ, who has never won a war other than against their own people, in East Bengal, Sind NWFP and Balochistan.​

The Hindutva trolls all seem intellectually underprivileged since only a certified moron could believe all the multiple lies any government, let alone a classic Third World fascist/communal kleptocracy will tell its own people in war time. There are many things wrong with Pakistan but nobody of my social class or education believes a word or whatever Gobelsian doublespeak uttered by the assi-tussi Praetorian Panjus who run Mount Olympus from the Rawa​lpindi GHQ. G​eneral Asim Munir, poor thing, did not even get into the Kakul Military Academy. A mulla’s son like Zia, he never had the opportunity to benefit from the social milieu of D​elhi’s St. Stephen ​College, let alone the whisky and soda s​undowner sipping officer buddies of the British Indian Army, who volunteered to fight and die​ for human decency from Anzio to Malaya, El Alam​ein to ​the pitiless jungles of Burma.

A bunch of thoughts from Matt. Communal hate, the mother’​s milk of the RSS, modelled on the Hitler youth and the alma mater of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin, is the worst possible political ideology for India. After all, the religious and ethnic fissures go back centuries and the fault lines of communal hate can precipitate spasms of best​ial violence whose endgame is mass slaughter as happened in the killing fields of Punjab and Bengal​ in the summer of Partition.

Modi’s intellectually and morally stunted acolytes have demonized Muslim, Christians, Sardarjis, secular humanists and even kissy kissy lovers on St Valentine’s Day throughout his decade in power. Su​re​ly the sane people of India, they exist as so many of them are my fondest friends in life (including my wife and Manju), realize that 2​00 million peopl​e cannot be demonized/marginalized without igniting the dark centrifugal forces of a communal civil war as happened in Gujarat under CM Modi i​n 2002.

In my own life, I loved travelling around Yugosl​avia and even had Serbian and Croatian girlfriends in succession when I lived in Europe. The young people of Yugoslavia were so wonderful, they​ shared so many values in common. Then Tito died and then Slobodan ​Milošević​, a merchant of communal hate like Modi took power in Belgrade. By the time Slobo w​as hauled by the Americans to the international criminal court ​at the Hague,​ Yugoslavia had split into seven countries and 300,000 people were butchered in the civil war of the 1990’s. If Modi’s BJP contin​uous to elect clowns of hate in a communal circus, India could well share the fate of Yugoslavia. Cannot Indians remem​ber their own history/Punjab and Assam in the 1980’s, the Naxalite revolt, Kashmir under governor Jughead, the ethnic horrors of Sri Lanka under the LTTE and East Bengal genocide under General Tikka Khan.

I consider myself a well​-wisher ​of India, and admirer of its ancient past and humanistic ethics, a son of Sindh, who loves the river that gave India its very name (yes, we are industrious too LOL!). Yet I genuinely fear that the quasi​-illiterate hate mongers in Modi sarkar, the B​JP and the RSS are driving India into a twilight zone of a communal civil war, a Yugoslavia of mega death and tragedy for South Asia’s next generation. I doubt if Modi has ever read the works of St. Agustine, but the Christi​an scholar who lived in 4th century Roman Algeria, said it best – “if there is not enough time in life to love, how can you find time to hate?”. So, don’t be so square Namo, come let us all go to a hippie commune in Lake Tahoe or visit the Scandinavian love shack in Ayia Napa. The moment you charm some nice Swedish girls, you will be transformed into a kinder, gentler lover​ boy Namo with your 56 inch chest and 66 inch toun!​ How about a personality makeover from uptight hater to happy camper.

The article Reject the merchants of hate in Indian politics! appeared first on Arabian Post.

He was a handsome young Gen-Z kid from Dubai, son of a Sindhi family long settled in the UAE, only a few years older than my twins. I can just imagine him as a toddler, all decked out in ​Babyshop diapers, then a little guy having his birthday bash with his classmates at McDonalds​ or Kidzania, as an IHS student on a school bus in Oud Metha Road​. Then a young college graduate, I can imagine his parents’ sheer joy when he married his beautiful bride and who would have ever thought that the​ir last picture together would be a testament to a lost youth and a doomed love. He made one fatal mistake that cost him his life and a lifetime of grief for all those who loved him in a life cut short by merciless animals with guns who decided that he and 25 other innocent human beings must die, ​just because they hated his religion.

Neeraj Udhwani’s life was stolen by a cabal of terrorists in an exquisite Kashmir resort town called Pahalgam, his murder, an act of political symbolism in the lethal game of nations by murderers who have broken every shred of decency that defines the human condition. Dr. Lambert, my old prof., used to say ​”there is one compelling reason ​why we should study international politics​” – “this stuff kills”. Neeraj is with God now, as is Dr. Lambert. RIP.

The powerless have always been defined in terms of the powerful in India and Pakistan, two states created amid the bloodlust of one of history’s most obscene spasms of violence in August 1947, the summer of Partition. Kashmir was the jewel that both successor states to the British Empire wanted to annex to their tarnished, bloodstained crown in the name of a phony Two Nation Theory. In an ancient land that encompassed a thousand nations, 330 million Gods, religious/cultural syncretism and a society that is a laboratory of human diversity and communal coexistence.

Yet as in 1965, 1971, 1999, 2001, ​2008, 2016 and 2019, India and Pakistan are mired in the pantomime of war that will claim countless more lives on both sides just to appease the sacred fury of mindless nationalism. 25 centuries ago great souls like Mahavira and the Gautama Buddha walked the face of the earth and we now live in the age of space travel, cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Yet we have not lost the primal urge to kill and murder to sacrifice the young and the innocent in the name of vengeful ​deities, like the tribe of hereditary stranglers known as thuggis who committed mass murder of strangers on the remote roads of late Mughal India in the name of the Goddess Kali.

Why does this undercurrent of bestial violence disfigure the kaleidoscope of the subcontinent’s history? Why was the tryst with destiny so hollow and the freedom at midnight such a cruel illusion​ if the endgame was to have midnight’s grandchildren massacred in terrorist outrages from Peshawar to Colaba, Kashmir to Balochistan, Dhaka to Jaffna​?

Modi will launch a retaliatory strike and General Munir, the Luminous One, has every political incentive to climb up the escalatory ladder to whip up the nationalist zealots who legitimize his praetorian regime. Balakot was a close call but sanity prevailed on both sides before either reached the point of no return. Yet who knows if a miss calculation now could lead to a tactical nuclear ​strike by a Pakistan high command that has never abandoned a first ​use capability​ doctrine? Will the ultimate act of terror be a mushroom cloud over a subcontinental battlefield or God forbid an entire city via a nuclear weapon fired in blind anger or primal fear? If this is freedom at midnight, India and Pakistan can have it. May the Gods destroy the miasma of evil that swirls in the netherworld of our ancestral motherlands’ pathological power politics. John Lenon was so right in Imagine, all we are saying is, give peace a chance!

The article Season of madness in the age of terror appeared first on Arabian Post.

President Donald Trump’s erratic dance with tariffs continues to confound not just global markets but even his own team. On April 22, in a move that underscored the White House’s habitual policy incoherence, Trump declared that the “very high” tariffs on Chinese goods would soon be “substantially reduced.” This comes after days of raising them dramatically at the start of the month, then selectively exempting key electronics sectors – moves that reflect both strategic confusion and political expediency. There was no solemn excuse for this U-turn, of course. There never is. But Trump’s tone, uncharacteristically tempered, spoke volumes. For an administration that has long relished the adversarial theatre of economic brinkmanship, the shift reads like a quiet concession: the strategy has failed to yield the wins it promised. The tariffs – which at one point soared to 145% on some Chinese imports – have not yet coerced Beijing into concessions, nor they appear rescuing American manufacturing from its decades-long decline in the near future.

The timing of Trump’s admission is no coincidence – it aligns with growing signals from Treasury Scott Bessent that the tariff war with China is “unsustainable.” In a private summit on the same day as Trump’s public reversal, Bessent attempted to soften the edges of the administration’s rhetoric, suggesting that the trade war would “de-escalate” even though no formal negotiations with Beijing were underway. It was a diplomatic smokescreen for a fundamental truth: the American tariff regime, under Trump’s watch, has become a parody of strategic statecraft. Perhaps the most telling detail in this week’s series of developments is not what was said in Washington, but what hasn’t been heard from Beijing. Unlike other nations caught in Trump’s tariff dragnet – countries that have eagerly sought exemptions, side deals, or at least a seat at the negotiating table – China has so far refrained from requesting any meetings. It is a calculated silence. In Beijing’s reading, Trump’s inconsistencies speak louder than his tariffs.

China’s Ministry of Commerce minced no words in its response. Pointing out that tariffs on certain Chinese exports to the U.S. had ballooned to an eye-watering 245%, the ministry accused Washington of weaponizing trade in a manner devoid of strategic logic. It characterized Trump’s numbers game as little more than performative populism – an apt description for an administration that confuses spectacle for strategy. This entire saga reveals a deeper malaise at the heart of U.S. trade policy: the abandonment of long-term thinking in favor of erratic theatrics. There was a time when American economic diplomacy, for all its flaws, followed discernible objectives – liberalization, multilateralism, strategic containment. Now, under Trump, it is driven more by press cycles and poll numbers than by principled engagement or economic logic.

The irony here is particularly bitter. Trump campaigned – and governs -as the self-styled defender of American workers. Yet his tariff policies have imposed higher costs on the very people he claims to champion. American manufacturers dependent on foreign components have seen their production costs steadily climb. Farmers, caught in retaliatory crossfire from Beijing, have been forced into dependency on government bailouts. And consumers have felt the sting of higher prices across retail sectors. What we’re witnessing isn’t collateral damage from a coherent strategy – it’s the signature chaos of economic self-sabotage.

Worse still, Trump’s exemptions for electronics – devices that constitute a significant portion of U.S.-China trade – only add to the incoherence. Why carve out Apple’s supply chain while leaving steel and solar panels to twist in the wind? If the goal is national economic security, why selectively protect the tech sector, which is perhaps the most vulnerable to intellectual property theft and geopolitical dependency? These contradictions betray the transactional instincts that guide Trump’s approach: punitive where it is politically safe, lenient where corporate interests overlap with electoral math.

All this would be merely chaotic if it weren’t also dangerous. Trade, after all, is not a zero-sum game. It is a mechanism of interdependence that, for better or worse, shapes geopolitical alliances and economic ecosystems. The U.S.-China trade war has already sent ripples across global markets, strained ties with long-standing allies, and eroded American credibility in trade diplomacy. And now, with Trump signaling retreat under the guise of recalibration, it is hard not to see the entire episode as a self-inflicted wound.

Yet this, too, is classic Trump: to sow conflict and confusion only to emerge, eventually, as the “great negotiator” who ends the very crisis he created. We saw it with North Korea. We saw it with NAFTA. And now, we see it again with tariffs. t there’s a palpable fatigue around the world with this familiar routine. The damage to America’s international image cannot be reversed with a speech and a smile. Consistency, reliability, and respect for the rules of engagement – these are the currencies of global leadership. In their absence, even the most powerful economy can find itself isolated. One wonders, too, what comes next. China, for all its provocations, has shown strategic patience. It has not panicked in response to Trump’s volatility. It has not begged for relief. It has waited, calculating that chaos is its own kind of leverage. In that, Beijing may have read the game better than Washington.

This moment, then, is not just a turning point for Trump’s trade agenda – it is a referendum on American governance in a globalized world. A world where power is no longer measured solely in economic volume or military might, but in strategic coherence, institutional memory, and the ability to negotiate without bullying. For now, the Trump administration’s tariff whiplash serves as a cautionary tale. It is a reminder that power, when wielded without purpose, invites decay. That policy, when driven by impulse, devolves into farce. And that leadership, when hollowed out by ego, ceases to lead at all.

The article How Trump’s tariff war dismantled US trade credibility appeared first on Arabian Post.

President Donald Trump’s declaration of April 2, 2025, as “Liberation Day” marked a seismic shift in U.S. trade policy, with the imposition of sweeping reciprocal tariffs that have sent shockwaves through the global economy. The new measures include a universal 10% tariff on all imports, with punitive rates as high as 54% for China, 46% for Vietnam, and 20% for the European Union, alongside a separate 25% levy on foreign-made automobiles. Framed as a corrective to decades of “unfair” trade practices, the policy has been celebrated by the administration as a rebirth of American industry. Yet beneath the rhetoric lies a complex web of economic consequences, retaliatory threats, and a potential reordering of global trade dynamics that could leave the U.S. and its allies grappling with long-term instability.

For American manufacturers, the tariffs present a double-edged sword. On one hand, industries like steel, automotive, and textiles – long battered by foreign competition – may see short-term gains as higher import costs push consumers toward domestically produced goods. The Alliance for American Manufacturing, for instance, praised the move as a lifeline for workers who have “seen unfair trade cut the ground from beneath their feet for decades”. However, the reality is more nuanced. Many U.S. manufacturers rely on global supply chains, importing components like auto parts from Mexico or semiconductors from Asia. The 25% tariff on foreign auto parts, for example, could raise production costs for American automakers by $2,000 to $15,000 per vehicle, forcing them to either absorb losses or pass expenses onto consumers. Small businesses, from craft breweries to electronics assemblers, face similar strains. The National Association of Manufacturers warned that thin margins could collapse under the weight of new tariffs, jeopardizing investments and jobs.

Consumers, meanwhile, are poised to bear the brunt of this policy. Despite White House claims that tariffs act as a “tax cut,” economists overwhelmingly agree that import taxes inflate prices for everyday goods. Fruits and vegetables from Mexico, clothing from Vietnam, and electronics from China – all staples of American households – will become more expensive. The Yale Budget Lab estimates that the average American family could pay an additional $2,700 to $3,400 annually. Retailers, already grappling with inflation, warn of unavoidable price hikes, particularly for items like apparel and toys, which lack a domestic manufacturing base. Even sectors temporarily spared, like pharmaceuticals, face uncertainty as the administration considers future investigations that could extend tariffs to critical medicines.

The global reaction has been swift and severe, signaling the onset of a protracted trade war. China, the EU, Canada, and Japan have all vowed retaliatory measures. Beijing denounced the tariffs as “bullying” and pledged to “fight till the end,” likely targeting U.S. agriculture and technology exports. The EU, already finalizing countermeasures against earlier steel tariffs, warned of duties on American tech firms, while Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney called the move a “fundamental change” to the trading system and promised “forceful” retaliation. Even traditionally neutral nations like Switzerland and Thailand are recalibrating trade strategies, with Thailand’s finance minister predicting a 1% GDP contraction due to lost exports. The collective backlash threatens to fracture supply chains, disrupt alliances, and erode the WTO’s authority, as countries increasingly bypass multilateral frameworks in favor of bilateral deals or regional blocs like the RCEP, where China holds sway.

The long-term implications for global trade are profound. Trump’s tariffs represent not just a tactical escalation but a philosophical rejection of the post-WWII liberal order. By weaponizing trade deficits and framing security alliances as transactional – where allies like Germany or Japan must “balance trade” to retain U.S. protection – the administration is dismantling the premise of mutual economic gain that underpinned institutions like the WTO. Economists warn that the resulting uncertainty could deter foreign investment in the U.S., as companies balk at volatile policy shifts. Many auto giants, which built U.S. plants to avoid earlier tariffs, now face renewed pressure as the 25% auto levy will disrupt their carefully calibrated supply networks. Meanwhile, the administration’s ambition to replace income tax revenue with tariff proceeds appears mathematically dubious, as reduced imports would shrink the very tax base it seeks to exploit.

Historical parallels offer cautionary tales. The Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930, which deepened the Great Depression, loom large in economists’ warnings. Goldman Sachs has already downgraded U.S. GDP growth forecasts to 1.7%, citing trade policy risks, while models predict a $438 billion contraction in U.S. GDP if retaliatory tariffs escalate – a larger blow than any other nation would suffer. The erosion of trust in U.S. predictability may prove irreversible, pushing trading partners toward self-sufficient regional ecosystems or alternative markets. Factually speaking, Trump’s tariffs are less a solution to globalization’s discontents than a high-stakes gamble – one that prioritizes political symbolism over economic stability. While the administration touts “liberation” from foreign competition, the costs – higher prices, lost exports, and a destabilized trading system – will be borne by the very workers and consumers it claims to protect. The world is now bracing for a new era of economic nationalism, where the rules of trade are written not through cooperation but through conflict, and the collateral damage could reshape economies for decades to come.

The article Trump’s Tariff Gamble: A Path to Global Recession? appeared first on Arabian Post.

The winds of uncertainty are sweeping through Europe as the continent grapples with the stark reality of a diminished U.S. commitment to its security. The handling of the Ukraine crisis by the Trump administration has rightly sent shockwaves through European capitals, unearthing a reality that policymakers have long feared but often failed to address head-on: the United States, under its current leadership, is no longer a reliable guarantor of European stability. This development has prompted European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to propose a comprehensive five-point strategy aimed at bolstering the continent’s defense capabilities – a kind of first step towards strategic autonomy. Yet, beyond military considerations, the fundamental challenge before Europe is how to redefine its role in an increasingly transactional world order.

The Trump administration’s justification for halting military aid to Ukraine – framed under the guise of prioritizing peace – has been met with widespread skepticism. Many European leaders fear that this move will only embolden Russia and pressure Ukraine into an untenable settlement. French President Macron has been particularly vocal in their criticism, asserting that withholding arms from Kyiv plays directly into Moscow’s hands. Meanwhile, Poland has also expressed frustration over Washington’s lack of consultation with European allies, highlighting a growing transatlantic rift. Similarly, British PM Kier Starmer has also repeatedly exhibited commitment to Ukraine. While Viktor Orban of Hungary is siding with Trump’s strategy on the Ukraine peace process,  exposing the divergent responses among European allies.

Von der Leyen’s response is emblematic of a broader shift in European strategic thinking. The proposal to increase defense spending, relax debt regulations, and mobilize nearly 800 billion euros to fortify military capabilities marks a significant step towards reducing dependence on Washington. Yet, the challenge remains daunting. Military rearmament, even if pursued with unwavering determination, is a slow and costly process. The idea of European strategic autonomy has gained renewed traction, but its feasibility is questionable in the short term. Even if all necessary political, legal, and financial frameworks were swiftly put in place, it would take decades for the European Union to emerge as a global military actor capable of rivaling existing great powers. The costs of such an endeavor would be staggering, especially for economies already under strain.

Yet, the conversation around strategic autonomy should not be limited to military dimensions. A more pragmatic and immediate avenue for Europe to assert its independence lies in economic resilience. The EU’s heavy reliance on U.S. economic policies and supply chains leaves it vulnerable to the whims of Washington’s shifting priorities. If Europe is to manage the turbulent waters of the 21st century, it must invest in economic sovereignty through technological advancement and diversified supply chains. Digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and the green economy represent vital areas where the EU can secure greater autonomy without incurring prohibitive costs.

A critical element in this equation is China. Despite ideological differences, the economic synergy between Brussels and Beijing is undeniable. With bilateral trade amounting to $804 billion, the EU-China economic relationship is one of the most significant in the world. However, trade has stagnated since its record high of $847 billion in 2022, largely due to EU concerns over China’s technological ascendancy and Washington’s pressure to align with U.S. restrictions on Chinese investments. The Trump administration’s approach to transatlantic trade – characterized by tariffs, threats, and demands for economic concessions – has left the EU in a precarious position. On one hand, Brussels is expected to support Washington’s hardline stance against Beijing. On the other, it is treated as an adversary in trade disputes. This paradox is untenable.

There is a growing recognition in European policy circles that closer economic ties with China could provide a counterbalance to U.S. dominance. Unlike Washington, which prioritizes unilateralism, both Brussels and Beijing share a commitment to multilateralism and global governance reform. They have common ground on issues ranging from WTO restructuring to AI governance and climate change. A deeper economic partnership between the EU and China could serve as a hedge against Washington’s increasingly unpredictable policies. Of course, such a shift would not be without complications. Differences on human rights, market access, and security concerns will persist. However, strategic engagement, rather than alignment with Washington’s zero-sum calculus, would offer Europe greater leverage.

This is not to suggest that Europe should abandon its transatlantic ties. The United States remains a crucial partner, and NATO remains central to European security. But the era of blind reliance on Washington is over. Trump’s transactional diplomacy has laid bare the reality that alliances are now dictated by interests rather than shared values. Europe must adapt accordingly. A diversified strategy – one that enhances military preparedness while also securing economic independence – offers the best path forward.

Europe’s predicament is reminiscent of an empire in transition. For decades, the U.S. has maintained a hegemonic system with Europe at its core, exercising control over military, economic, and political domains. But hegemony is costly, and as Washington struggles under the weight of debt and domestic turmoil, it is looking to shift the burden onto its allies. This is the essence of Trump’s strategy: maintain dominance without paying for it. Europe, long accustomed to the security umbrella provided by the U.S., now faces the reality that those days are numbered.

In a striking speech at the European Parliament, renowned scholar Jeffrey Sachs described the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a proxy war instigated by the U.S. to maintain its strategic foothold. While such assessments may be contentious, they underscore the broader reality: Washington’s primary interest is not in European stability but in global power projection. Europe must recognize this and act accordingly.

The old transatlantic order is fading, and what replaces it depends on the choices Europe makes today. A reactionary approach – one that simply compensates for U.S. disengagement – will only prolong dependency. A proactive strategy, combining defense modernization with economic diversification, offers a genuine path to sovereignty. The coming years will determine whether Europe remains a subordinate player in Washington’s grand chessboard or whether it finally steps into its own as a geopolitical force. The stakes could not be higher.

The article Redefining Europe’s role in shifting global power equation appeared first on Arabian Post.

On January 20, 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order suspending all USAID and State Department-funded projects, totaling $60 billion, for 90 days. This decision was framed as a reassessment of foreign aid effectiveness and its alignment with the administration’s strategic priorities. The abrupt termination of nearly 10,000 foreign aid grants and contracts has sent economic and humanitarian shockwaves through countries in the Middle East, North Africa (MENA), and South Asia, raising concerns over regional stability, economic sustainability, and geopolitical realignments.

The US has historically been a major financial backer of many MENA nations, offering aid to bolster fragile economies, reinforce security frameworks, and support humanitarian projects. In 2023 alone, Jordan and Egypt were among the top beneficiaries, receiving $1.6 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively. With this aid now suspended, these nations are scrambling to secure alternative economic partnerships.

Jordan, one of the region’s most politically stable nations, relies heavily on US assistance to sustain its economy and support its 1.3 million Syrian refugees. American aid has been crucial in funding healthcare, education, and employment initiatives. The aid suspension places these programs at risk, forcing Amman to seek emergency funding from Gulf nations and international lenders.

Egypt, a long-time recipient of substantial US military and economic assistance, faces economic uncertainty due to the aid cuts. American funds have been instrumental in maintaining Egypt’s defense capabilities and financing infrastructure projects. With US support in limbo, Cairo is turning to China and the Gulf states to bridge the financial gap. However, Gulf nations, already contending with their own economic challenges, may not provide indefinite assistance, leaving Egypt in a precarious position.

Lebanon has been hit hard by the aid cuts, with UNICEF forced to scale back crucial programs amid an escalating food crisis. Over half of children under two years old in eastern Lebanon are now facing severe food insecurity. In Sudan, where conflicts have displaced millions, at least two million people have lost access to life-saving assistance due to the abrupt funding halt.

South Asian nations, already grappling with economic hardships and humanitarian challenges, are struggling to maintain essential services following the aid suspension. Countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal, which have relied on US funding for healthcare, education, and economic development, are among the hardest hit.

In 2023, Bangladesh received $490 million in US aid, much of which was allocated to healthcare and refugee support, particularly for the Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar. The suspension has forced the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b) to lay off over 1,000 employees, while over 300 non-profits reliant on USAID funding have ceased operations, leaving thousands unemployed. Healthcare services for Rohingya refugees have effectively collapsed, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian crisis in the world’s largest refugee settlement.

Pakistan had been set to receive $845 million in aid for 39 key projects spanning energy, economic growth, agriculture, governance, and health. The funding freeze has led to the imminent closure of over 60 UNFPA-run health facilities, cutting off 1.7 million people- including 1.2 million Afghan refugees-from essential reproductive healthcare services. The reduction in aid not only disrupts Pakistan’s economic and public health stability but also diminishes US influence in the country, a key strategic ally in South Asia.

Nepal, which signed a five-year $659 million development deal with the US in 2022, is also suffering from the funding suspension. Over 300 NGOs and non-profits focused on gender equality, healthcare, and education now face financial gaps. In the Terai region, early-grade learning programs in 39 schools have been halted, jeopardizing literacy and child development efforts. The dismissal of 36 staff nurses in federal and provincial hospitals has further strained Nepal’s already struggling neonatal healthcare system, exacerbating the country’s high infant mortality rate.

While India received a relatively modest $150 million in US aid in 2024 and is not as severely impacted, the aid suspension presents an opportunity for New Delhi to expand its regional influence. Over the past decade, India has increased its development assistance to Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, focusing on infrastructure and trade. With US aid drying up, India may step in to support these nations, strengthening its role as a regional leader.

The sudden withdrawal of US aid has prompted a realignment of economic and political partnerships across the Arab world and South Asia. Countries that once relied on American funding are now seeking alternative sources of support.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has already gained traction in many MENA and South Asian nations. With US aid now suspended, countries such as Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan are increasingly turning to Beijing for infrastructure investments and financial assistance. However, China’s economic aid often comes with long-term debt risks, as seen in Sri Lanka and Zambia, raising concerns over financial dependency.

Russia is also moving to fill the void left by the US Moscow has deepened security and energy partnerships with Middle Eastern countries like Egypt and Syria, while also strengthening ties with Pakistan. However, Russia’s ability to provide large-scale economic aid is limited due to Western sanctions and its own financial constraints.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have stepped in as financial lifelines for struggling Arab economies. However, their assistance tends to be strategic rather than long-term, focusing on investments rather than sustained economic support. Countries that fail to develop self-sufficient economies may find themselves vulnerable to shifting Gulf priorities in the future.

The US aid cuts have not only triggered immediate humanitarian crises but also forced affected nations to reassess their economic dependencies. While some view this as a financial catastrophe, others see it as an opportunity to build self-reliant economies and diversify global partnerships.

For Arab nations, the challenge lies in reducing reliance on foreign aid by strengthening domestic industries and enhancing regional economic cooperation. South Asian countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan must develop sustainable development models, seeking alternative funding sources while bolstering internal economic resilience. India’s role in regional assistance is likely to expand, but it alone cannot replace the scale of US aid.

Ultimately, the suspension of US foreign aid marks a pivotal moment in global economic relations, compelling nations to reassess their partnerships and forge new paths toward sustainable growth and stability.

The article US aid suspension triggers economic crisis in MENA and South Asia appeared first on Arabian Post.

Trump inherited a US economy with 3% growth, a 4% unemployment rate and near 0% recession risk a mere 6-weeks ago. His outrageous tariff threats, policy U-turns, DOGE cutbacks in government spending and mass deportations have ignited a global trade war as well as slashed economic growth, business/consumer confidence. A US recession has now begun as the Atlanta Fed’s GDP Now sees a -2.8% slump in the Q1. Its shock waves will be felt in the Gulf as the price of Brent crude oil has plunged from $82 to $69 since the Inauguration.

Gulf currencies are pegged to the US dollar, whose fall is now accelerating as the Euro has soared from 1.02 to 1.07 and sterling has risen from 1.22 to 1.28. The fall in the US dollar hits the purchasing power of Gulf investors at precisely the moment that budget deficits in all six GCC countries will rise sharply since the current Brent price is 30-$40 below their respective budget breakeven price.

Global stock markets are in free fall and the Volatility Index (VIX) has spiked to 23.6, 30% above its Biden era levels. The US Treasury bond market yield has fallen from 4.80% to 4.20% as Uncle Sam IOUs become a safe haven asset for risk capital whose macro pendulum has swung from greed to fear. Gold is above 2900 an ounce but Bitcoin/crypto, whose psychotic volatility (20X Auric’s) has proved a lousy hedge when Nasdaq tanks, as its savage 25% correction attests. POTUS-47 was the no brainer Crypto Pres but he turned out to be as fake as the Wizard of Oz.

Since the GCC currencies are pegged to the dollar, the burden of adjustment when the US cycle turns nasty, is felt in regional stock and property markets. In 2008, the Wall Street subprime crisis triggered a crash in Brent crude from $148 to $35 and forced Saudi Arabia to organise the biggest output cut (4.2-MBD) in the history of OPEC. This is not possible now, even though Saudi Arabia’s budget breakeven price is $35 above the current spot price, forcing the kingdom to become the biggest sovereign borrower in the world, replacing China.

Trump’s drill baby drill ethos and America’s new status as the global LNG superpower means that the US will replace Russia as the energy supplier to Germany as well as increase its market share in India, which imports 5.4-MBD. OPEC’s spare capacity is now 7-MBD and a glut is certain as offshore Brazil, Guyana, Venezuela, Canada and offshore West Africa add at least 1.5-MBD in new supply into a glutted market. If sanctions on Russian oil are removed, after Trump’s Ukraine deal, a showdown between Saudi Arabia, Russia and even OPEC+ exporters like Kazakhstan and Iraq for downstream market share in Asia becomes certain. In other words, a price war that could see oil prices plunge to $40, a level that I had argued 3-months ago.

An oil price crash means a deflation big chill in the Gulf’s property bubbles, which are highly likely to collapse, as we witnessed in 2008 and 2014. All the macro logic of asset flows, liquidity risk premia and speculative metrics, when off plan is two-thirds of sale and pieces of paper trade 30% higher than built property, the end of the bubble is certain. This was the hard lesson learnt by leveraged speculators in 2008 and 2014, when prices fell 50-60% and the property bear market lasted for 4-6 years. Risk is a four letter word but then so is ruin.

The article Recession risk and an oil price crash are a disaster for the Gulf property cycle! appeared first on Arabian Post.

All roads lead to Riyadh, which has replaced Geneva as the epicentre of global diplomacy in 2025.

Presidents Trump and Putin will meet in the Saudi capital amid the most dramatic U-turn in US foreign policy as Washington switches sides in the Ukraine war in favour of the Kremlin, bypassing the EU and the embattled Ukraine state.

Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi is in Riyadh to coordinate the Arab League’s counter offer to Trump’s Gaza plan. Saudi Arabia has even offered to act as a mediator to reduce the risk of war between the US, Israel and Iran.

Potential sanctions relief on Russia, coupled with a Gaza settlement, will have a seismic impact on the global oil and gas market and impact the energy geopolitics of Europe, China, India and the Middle East.

Trump has conceded to Putin’s maximalist demands by just agreeing to meet him in Riyadh without any representation from Brussels or Kyiv. However, in a surprise move on Tuesday, Kyiv agreed terms with Washington on a minerals deal that Ukrainian officials hope will improve US relations and pave the way for a long-term security commitment.

Trump has made no secret of his desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize by ending the Ukraine war, while he must also lower oil prices to combat rising inflation pressures in the US economy. So, he has a vested interest to capitulate to Putin’s demands and offer generous sanctions relief to the Kremlin as an incentive to end the war at once.

What does this mean for markets? Oil prices could fall when the smoke signals from the Riyadh summit reach the oil futures trading pits of London, New York, Chicago and Singapore.

Oil futures options and swap markets worldwide now trade 15-20 times the 104 million barrels consumed daily. The global oil market, not Russia, Saudi Arabia or even the US, will decide where the marginal price of Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) trade in 2025.

Trump’s maverick tariffs and provocative policy shifts on Ukraine-Russia have made professional oil traders slash their risk exposures in the markets. This is the reason volatility has trended down in the past three weeks even as Brent has traded in a narrow range. However, that trading range could widen significantly after the Riyadh summit.

Even if a deal materialises, it may not be implementable if its terms are not acceptable to President Zelensky or Germany’s new centre-right Chancellor Freidrich Merz.

Zelensky has bluntly said that Ukraine will not “accept any deal about us without us”. Germany is the EU’s economic colossus accounting for one third of the bloc’s GDP; it has paid a terrible price for its energy dependence on Russia’s Gazprom since the Schröder/Merkel eras.

If Merz seizes on a Riyadh deal to engineer a separate rapprochement with Russia in exchange for cheap gas imports, a major inflection point in global energy prices is inevitable.

The strategic stakes for Saudi Arabia from the Trump-Putin summit could not be higher. The kingdom’s preeminent national interest is the success of the Crown Prince’s Vision 2030 project for socioeconomic transformation. The last thing Saudi Arabia needs is a major fall in crude oil prices – Brent is already a painful $30 below the Royal Budget’s breakeven price.

While the Saudi debt/GDP ratio is not excessive at 34 percent, the kingdom has replaced China as the largest sovereign borrower in global offshore debt capital markets. So Saudi Arabia will do its best to appeal to Trump to moderate his “drill baby drill” rhetoric and divert the president from his strategy to go full throttle as a global LNG superpower.

Saudi Arabian oil production has fallen to nine million barrels per day (bpd), the lowest in four years, as it has borne a disproportionate share of Opec+ output cuts designed to stabilise the market. It is significant that Riyadh’s production capacity is now 12 million bpd, exactly what it was in 1980, the year two Opec founder members went to war when Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded Khomeni’s Iran.

Global oil demand was only 60 million bpd in 1980 and thus Saudi Arabia is no longer the sole powerbroker in Opec, the reason the kingdom forged its own Kremlin connection with Russia in 2016.

If sanctions are lifted, Saudi Arabia and Russia will have to reach a new modus vivendi on downstream market share within the Opec+ framework to prevent a 2014-2015 scale price war.

A surge in output from Guyana, offshore Brazil, offshore West Africa and Canada is also a harsh reality for Moscow and Riyadh, as is quota non-compliance by Kazakhstan, Iraq and Nigeria inside Opec+. Mediocre demand growth for petroleum products in China, the world’s largest oil importer, must also be factored in.

On the supply front, “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran may help tighten the oil market but Trump is also holding out a diplomatic olive branch to Iran if it abandons its nuclear programme. This must be a tempting prospect for Tehran, now that it has lost its militia proxies in Lebanon and Gaza and its dynastic vassal state in Syria.

If post-Khamenei Iran decides to respond to Trump’s overtures and seals a grand bargain with Washington, all bets are off for the price of oil.

My guesstimate for Brent’s trading range in the first half of 2025 is $65 to $75.

However, 2025 is a game-changing year for world politics akin to 1918, 1945, 1989 and 2001. The volatility of black gold is certain to rise.

The article Riyadh summit will shape global energy geopolitics appeared first on Arabian Post.

V.S. Naipaul once said that ancestral memories are like “trap doors to a bottomless past”. This was my first thought when I heard about the death of HH Prince Karim Aga Khan, the 49th Imam Zaman of Islam’s Ismaili sect and unquestionably the world leader who has inspired me most in my lifetime. I am not an Ismaili. In fact, my direct ancestor, the Mukhi of Calcutta Jamat in 1837, led a tax revolt/property dispute against the 1st Aga Khan when Lord Auckland invited him to flee Qajar Persia for the protection of the British Crown. We are known as Sunni Ismailis but the Khoja Sunnat Jamat is miniscule while the Ismaili Imamate runs history’s biggest development network across Africa, the Arab world, South Asia and the ancient Ismaili enclaves in Tajikistan, Hunza and Afghanistan.

Prince Karim was a man any human being should be proud to call Hazar Imam. A Harvard history graduate (Kirkland House ’58), an Olympic skier and medalist for Iran at the Innsbruck Winter Games, a powerful force for liberal values, gender equality, women’s empowerment and education across the Islamic world, a patron of art, music and culture akin to the Medici clan of Renaissance Florence. Prince Karim was unquestionably the world’s most successful social venture capitalist, a true cosmopolitan humanist in the best traditions of the Islamic enlightenment his grandfather Sir Sultan Aga Khan midwifed in the Victorian Dickensian Bombay of the late 1890’s.

I knew nothing about all this when I was a little boy and saw the pictures of a young Prince Karim with his wife Sally, an English lady who wore a saree but spoke perfect Urdu. The name Aga Khan was spoken frequently in our house as my maternal grandfather had done legal work for Sir Sultan and his son Aly Solomon in pre-partition Bombay and Poona.

The founder of Pakistan was also born in an Ismaili clan in Karachi in 1876 and Sir Sultan was born a stone’s throw from my father’s house on a hilltop mansion called Honeymoon Lodge in 1877. As a boy, my cronies and I used to roam the hills with our Dyna air-guns and once crept up to peer in the shuttered windows to see if it was haunted. I even thought the Aga Khans were somehow related to our local dictators du jour Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan LOL! Thankfully they were not.

Trump and Musk have signed the death sentence for untold poor children in the Third World’s most desperate hearts of darkness. The only hope the world’s poor kids have for survival against the war launched on them by the planet’s richest man and most powerful President is the exquisite Aga Khan Development Network, founded by Sir Sultan’s socioeconomic community institutions in 1920’s Bombay/Kutch/Sind and that metastasized into Prince Karim’s unique AKFED four decades later. How many Indians know that a Muslim leader was the President of the League of Nations in the late 1930’s when the storm clouds of war darkened over Europe?

The Aga Khan’s family were diplomats and peacemakers in the pinnacle of the game of nations over the past 100 years. Prince Karim rescued the Ismailis of Uganda from Idi Amin’s pogroms and resettled them in his friend Pier Trudeau’s Canada. He alone helped the Ismailis of Salamiya survive the horrors of Baathist Syria. The Fatimid Caliphate founded Al-Azhar University and the first mental health hospital in the Islamic world six centuries before witches were publicly burnt at the stake in Europe and yes, America (Salem).

RIP Prince Karim, I loved you and mourn you as your people do all over the word. Your life honoured the luminous bloodline into which you were born.

The article Prince Karim Aga Khan was a beacon of hope for the world’s poor! appeared first on Arabian Post.

Since Assad’s regime fell in early December, clashes have intensified in northern Syria between the US-backed Kurdish fighters and the Turkish proxy force Syrian National Army (SNA). Following the regime change in Syria, Turkey has become the most important regional actor in the country. By providing support for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army Ankara has been consolidating its power over Syria. Turks think that this is the right time to get rid of the small statelet of Syrian Kurds often referred to as Rojava sitting next to its borders. The Kurdish people, often referred to as the largest stateless ethnic group in the world, have faced centuries of marginalization and persecution. Scattered across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, the Kurds share a cultural, linguistic, and historical bond but remain divided by political borders imposed after World War I. In Syria, their plight has been particularly stark with decades of oppression and neglect under the Arab nationalist Baath regime. Kurds in Syria have long been treated as second-class citizens. Stripped of citizenship rights in the 1960s, many were rendered stateless and denied access to education, property ownership, and other fundamental rights. Syrian Kurds, who make up about 10-15% of the population, had been more suppressed and less visible than Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

From the beginning of the Syrian war, the main Kurdish political party in Syria, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) chose to side with neither Assad nor the anti-regime opposition groups and instead sought to secure its position in the north. In 2012 it unilaterally declared the establishment of an autonomous region called Rojava (Western Kurdistan), formed of three territorially separate cantons: Afrin, Kobane, and Manbij. Turkey’s regular military interventions endangered the PYD’s position in North and North-East Syria, but the latter continued to maintain an efficient and well-organized administration even under dire situations, with a commitment to bottom-up democracy, gender equality, and minority rights. This is exceptional in the Middle East, where hopes for democracy have been largely crushed since the Arab Spring.  Currently, this Kurdish project in Syria is fighting for its survival as they face Turkish mercenary groups like SNA and direct Turkish attacks in the form of artillery shelling and airstrikes. Turkey’s key objective in Syria is simple: liquidating multiethnic, Kurdish-led governance along its border, and pushing the Kurdish population back into the Syrian desert by establishing a twenty-mile-deep “safe zone.” There, it will also resettle Syrian refugees in formerly Kurdish settlements as a way of both satisfying domestic anti-refugee sentiment and entrenching ethnic change along its border.

Turkey has been continuously attacking not only Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases but generally every kind of Kurdish structure in its vicinity. Syrian Kurds have been regularly targeted by Turkey and its allied militias. Through regular shelling of Kurdish positions and military campaigns like Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch. Syrian Kurds are on top of the Turkish hit list as they are the major obstacle in Ankara’s expansionist policies in Syria. Turkey justifies its fierce hostility towards Kurdish forces in Syria by arguing that Kurdish-controlled regions in northern Syria are terrorist dens and shelters for the outlawed PKK which has launched a guerrilla campaign against Turks since 1984. But Turks failed to provide any evidence that Kurds have launched any terror attacks against Turkey from Syria. The real motive behind these kinds of onslaughts launched by Turkey is to drive out the Kurds from these areas and get the pro-Turkish population settled there. It is evident from the fact that in its previous operation in Afrin, Turkey engaged not in counter-terror, but in ethnic cleansing. In its multiple reports, Amnesty International has reported that Turkish military forces and their allied armed groups. Have displayed a shameful disregard for civilian life, carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians, during the offensive into northeast Syria.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the main fighting force of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava) since the beginning has been an important ally of the West in the fight against ISIS. They have done the bulk of the fighting on the ground against ISIS. It should be remembered that Syrian Kurds are still holding thousands of ISIS operatives in the prisons controlled and guarded by them. The new regime in Damascus led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham offers to take over guard duty at Al-Hol prison camp, where thousands of Islamic State fighters and their families remain under guard, is ridiculous, it’s equivalent of a hunter offering to guard its prey. The situation would be worse, however, as the thousands of Islamic State fighters would spread out not only across Syria and the Middle East but also into Europe with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan happily extorting concessions from weak European and NATO leaders in exchange for promises not to turn on the wave of illegal immigration.

Ankara’s neo-Ottoman approach in the region has been clearly visible through its engagement in the Syrian conflict after 2011. All of Turkey’s strategic targets and demands since the start of the Syrian conflict like the ousting of the Assad regime, preventing a Kurdish autonomous region, declaration of a no-fly zone, creating a buffer zone along the eastern part of Euphrates River, and protecting radical Islamist groups in Idlib, have been a part of this approach. But Syrian Kurds who are a beacon of liberalism and democracy in the troublesome Middle East should not be allowed to fall prey to the expansionist policies of Turks if this valuable ally of the United States is not provided with the required assistance in time. The West will lose its credibility as a reliable ally.

The article Syrian Kurds Should Not be Left at the Mercy of Turks appeared first on Arabian Post.

There is no geopolitical risk premium in Brent crude even though history just went fast forward and literally ballistic in the Middle East as the IDF bombed Hamas into the Stone Age, decapitated Hezbollah’s command/communications networks, killed Nasrallah, forced Iran’s most valuable proxy militia to sue for a ceasefire in Lebanon, destroyed Iran’s Russian S300 anti-missile defense systems and escalated its air assault on the Houthis in Yemen.

The late summer and autumn of 2024 will go down in history as Israel’s Umm Maarik (the mother of all battles) that is now changed the balance of power, or tawazun al quwa in the Middle East in the most decisive, even more seismic stroke since the Six-Day War.

The guns have not fallen silent in the battlefields of the Levant, yet the political shock waves will be amplified when Trump restarts his “maximum pressure” policy on a weakened and vulnerable Iranian regime as soon as he moves into the White House next month. Iran has lost Hamas and Hezbollah as its deterrent shield against Israel.

The Assad regime in Syria, Iran’s oldest and faithful ally in the Arab world has crumbled. The successor regime in Syria will never forgive the Ayatollahs, Hezbollah and Putin for helping Assad murder 500,000 Syrians in the bloodiest civil war in the Arab world since Algeria in the 1990’s.

Economists estimate that Ali Khamenei squandered $200 billion in Iran’s oil wealth in payments to Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and the Houthis. The Supreme Leader’s return on his failed imperial project? A cosmic zero. It is the tragedy of the Iranian people that they exchanged the pragmatic/secular regime of the Shah for the medieval theocratic madness that has now repressed them for 45 years. The mullahs must now answer for their crimes before the Iranian people. Zan, zindagi, azadi!

Trump knows that regime change in Iran is no longer a pipe dream as the youth of Persia have revolted en masse thrice in the past decade. Khamenei is on his deathbed and the IRGC’s top generals will not accept his son Mojtaba, the ultimate Aga Zadeh as his heir. In an ideal world, President Pezeshkian would invite Raza Cyrus Pahlavi to return to Iran as a secular constitutional monarch, abolish the Mullahcracy and return Iran to the civilized world it once graced. How many people in the Islamic world know that the current Nobel laureate in peace is Nargis Mohammadi, an Iranian mother of three, who led the world’s only women-led revolution against the mullahs and is now imprisoned in Evin by her tormentors.

This is a moment for a supreme diplomat to bring peace after a generation of war in the killing fields of the Middle East. Yet I doubt if the Trump Cabinet contains a Dr. Kissinger or Prince Metternich while the Israeli Cabinet seems full of rabid zealots whose venom disgraces the ideals of Judaism. What a pity, what a world.

The article Pity of war and peace in Middle East appeared first on Arabian Post.

While on my recent visit to Iraqi Kurdistan, I visited several frontline positions of the Peshmerga forces, where they are facing the Iraqi Army and active ISIS cells. Firstly, I visited Brigade 14 headquarters near Dibak, approximately 60 km from the Kurdistan capital, Erbil. There, I met with Brigadier General Almi Mzuri; he is a seasoned soldier who worked in the Iraqi Army for a long time in different senior positions but, in 2014, joined Peshmerga forces to save Kurdistan from ISIS onslaught. General Mzuri fought on other fronts like Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul. He advised that his brigade is responsible for the Makhmour sector, including the Qarachoq mountains, and his units are very vigilant as there is constant movement of ISIS cells. From the Brigade HQ, I continued visiting the Peshmerga border posts in the Qarachoq mountains. I was amazed to see that in addition to 24-hour manual observation by the soldiers, advanced electronic surveillance, such as HD CCTV cameras with night vision capabilities, was also done. On all the border outposts I visited, one thing I found in common was that Peshmerga soldiers, despite lacking heavy weapons, are highly motivated and determined to finish off ISIS remnants.

The Peshmerga, meaning “those who face death”, are the armed forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Peshmerga has a long history of fighting and resistance. First, it was against the British colonial administration and then against the Iraqi central government. It continued years of guerrilla warfare with the advantages offered by northern Iraq’s mountainous terrain and weather conditions. Its members developed a reputation as fearsome fighters in decades-long battles against Saddam Hussein’s armies, especially his elite force, the “Republican Guards.” The Peshmerga is a highly effective and well-trained military force that defends Kurdistan and North Iraq. We know that when the Iraqi military melted away after putting up only minimal resistance to ISIS in 2014, it was the Peshmerga alone that stopped the expansion of the Islamic State and even rolled it back. The Peshmerga is a proven humanitarian force that provides security to all ethnicities and is also an integral partner in the fight against terrorism. During the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Peshmerga helped the United States in their mission to capture Saddam Hussein. They also captured Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden’s messenger Hassan Ghul in 2004. For the decade since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US poured billions of dollars into training the Iraqi Army, while the Peshmerga was not provided with the sophisticated weaponry for fears it would accelerate Kurdish moves towards secession. But now it is Peshmerga only, which delivers results on the ground. But looking back to years when Peshmerga forces did not enjoy the training or funds given to the Iraqi Army, things could have been quite different if they had been paid attention.

The Iraqi Federal government invests way more resources in Popular Mobilization Forces, AKA Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī than in Peshmerga. Even though the Peshmerga play a proactive role in securing Iraq, the PMF has often tried to get Iraq involved in an external conflict. PMF units, which were formed to combat ISIS in 2014, are loyal primarily to Iran. They have also built up a much vaster arsenal than the Peshmerga has ever had, including drones, cruise missiles, and even short-range ballistic missiles. They have fired several of the former at Israel during the present Israel-Hamas war. Such attacks run the risk of dragging Iraq into ongoing wider regional conflict, which most Iraqis do not want. Meanwhile, the Peshmerga is continuing anti-ISIS cooperation with the Iraqi Army in the disputed territories. They are currently working together to plug the security gaps that have existed between them since 2017, which ISIS remnants have repeatedly exploited. The constructive cooperation is another example of how the Peshmerga is a factor in Iraq’s stability and contributes to its security.

Ideally, Peshmerga troops operating in joint brigades with the Iraqi Army against ISIS in the disputed territories should have access to some of the more advanced equipment operated by the Iraqi Army, such as tanks and artillery. But instead of assisting, Baghdad is trying to block any arms transfer to Erbil by the United States-led international coalition. At the very least, Baghdad should not oppose or hinder the US from supplying drones, artillery, or anything else that would enhance the Kurdish force’s capabilities against ISIS and bolster Iraqi Kurdistan’s security against other threats like drones and rockets. Short-range air defences are essential for protecting critical infrastructure in Iraqi Kurdistan, such as the Khor Mor gas field, from aerial attacks. It is not that Peshmerga doesn’t have any internal problems. While I was conducting an interview with Mr Shoresh Ismail, Minister of Peshmerga Affairs in Kurdistan’s capital Erbil I was advised that they are taking all the required steps to address them. The Peshmerga forces have undergone comprehensive modernization and unification since 2019. The reforms aim to transform traditionally party-affiliated units into a unified professional military force under the direct command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. The Kurds realized that in the long term, the Peshmerga would get greater international assistance and more advanced weapons only if all the units of Peshmerga are united under the ministry. No one will ever call the Peshmerga a militia again if they are fully under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.

Kurdistan is the most convenient and safe base for the anti-ISIS coalition anywhere in the region. That is why, previously, over half the senators in the US Congress voted to arm the Kurds directly. In the past, Kurds were considered a destabilizing element in the Middle East, challenging the status quo. Seemingly forgotten by the international community until 2014, these heroic forces have made the world realize their essential contribution to stabilizing the region and fighting radical Islamists. It is high time that the Peshmerga, who are all-weather friends of the US-led international coalition, should be supported and strengthened.

The article Peshmerga Making Solid Contributions to Stabilize Volatile Region appeared first on Arabian Post.

The push for decarbonization continues, but numerous challenges persist, including economic instability, evolving energy demands and infrastructure constraints. As industries adapt to a changing landscape, several trends are emerging that will shape the sector’s trajectory. From shifts in the geopolitical balance to breakthroughs in low-carbon technologies and the increasing influence of artificial intelligence (AI), 2025 presents critical opportunities and risks for stakeholders across the energy value chain.

Drawing on Rystad Energy’s depth of expertise, we are looking into our crystal ball and exploring 12 significant trends that will shape the energy world in the coming year. Each trend offers a roadmap for understanding the forces that will influence global energy strategies in 2025.

“We’re moving from a time of energy scarcity to a time of energy abundance,” says Rystad Energy CEO and founder Jarand Rystad. “Capacity additions in both fossil fuels and renewables will outpace increases in demand next year. Similarly, in the face of an oversupplied oil market, OPEC+ may need to extend its production cuts far into 2025 to protect oil prices. The era of China driving oil consumption growth is over, with the country’s peak diesel in the rearview mirror, gasoline demand plateauing and coal consumption leveling off, as it is globally. 

This is echoed in the electricity market, with 90% of the power consumption growth in 2025 coming from renewables, while nuclear and gas share the remaining 10%. The intermittency of renewable power capacity has triggered record periods of negative prices, intensifying the need for reliable energy storage. As such, 2025 could be a breakout year for energy storage systems. Of the expected 1,350 terawatt hours (TWh) of growth in global power demand, consumption by data centers – primarily fueled by AI – is likely to grow by 13% in 2025. This equals about 3% of total electricity consumption growth, similar to the growth from the 20 million new electric vehicles (EVs) expected. 

“The new Trump administration will impact domestic and global energy priorities, including pulling any levers available to increase domestic crude production, even though the industry is unlikely to respond to this stimulus. However, President Trump might have more success in accelerating liquified natural gas (LNG) infrastructure investments, the results of which will not be felt for several years. These dynamics underscore the importance of careful navigation as the sector balances short-term challenges with long-term opportunities.”

+++

1.      Geopolitical uncertainty will persist in 2025

Shaped by both economic challenges and geopolitical turbulence, 2025 is set to be a year of heightened uncertainty. The US-China dynamic, under a new US administration, will take the spotlight. At the same time, ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine will command attention on the global stage. Rising instability across the Global South, the continued fracturing of international alliances and the transformative impact of AI will further redefine the global order.

Economically, the threat of a global trade war sparked by US tariffs looms large, potentially stalling growth and fueling protectionist policies. A key question is how quickly advanced nations can rein in inflation, especially as trade barriers complicate the efforts of central banks. Meanwhile, governments are expected to pivot toward addressing mounting deficits. Adding to these challenges, China’s economic slowdown – driven by a struggling real estate sector and subdued consumer confidence – risks creating significant ripple effects worldwide.

2.      Upstream sector poised for a more quiet year

Global upstream investments are projected to decline by 2% next year, signaling a plateau after the robust growth seen earlier this decade. Deepwater investments are expected to increase by 3%, driven by developments in Suriname, Mexico and Türkiye. Offshore shelf investments are predicted to grow by 2%, fueled by activity in Indonesia, Qatar, and Russia. Rystad Energy forecasts a decline of around 8% in shale/tight oil investments in 2025, due to a combination of lower activity and reduced unit prices.

Global liquids demand is estimated to grow by about 1 million bpd, and the faster pace of non-OPEC+ supply growth is leading to an oversupplied market, putting downward pressure on oil prices. Non-OPEC+ oil supply is expected to increase by approximately 1.4 million bpd, with both tight oil and deepwater contributing to this growth. NGL and other liquids are also projected to grow next year, adding more than 300,000 bpd. Leading into 2025, the OPEC+ balancing act will make or break oil prices, seeking to manage its market share expectations alongside non-OPEC+ growth and slowing demand.

3.      Refinery margins to remained squeezed by seasonal demand dips

Thin refinery margins are likely to persist, particularly during the seasonal demand lull in the first quarter. Margins in Asia may find some support later in the second quarter as refinery maintenance takes hold. However, the outlook for demand growth – especially in China – remains subdued, driven by the rising share of EVs and gains in fuel efficiency.

This prolonged weak-margin environment has already contributed to refinery attritions in China, the US and Europe – a trend that is expected to continue through the new year. Delays in commissioning additional capacity are also increasingly likely. These factors could result in product tightness in the second half of 2025, potentially driving a degree of recovery on margins.

4.      US shale oil producers won’t be moved by “Drill, baby, drill”

Donald Trump has come out unambiguously in favor of encouraging more oil and gas production in the US. While executives may be encouraged by the supportive rhetoric, they are less likely than ever to boost budgets towards more drilling, especially as a potential oversupply of oil looms over the market and well productivity stagnates. Third-quarter 2024 reports, released around the election, show that management teams remain focused on shareholder returns and acquisition-driven inorganic growth rather than expanding through drilling activity. For now, ‘Shale 4.0’ investor priorities are expected to outweigh ‘Trump 2.0’ policy considerations in US producer boardrooms. Looking ahead, investors are unlikely to accept reduced near-term returns alongside declining capital efficiency, which a shift back to a high-production growth model would entail.

5.      US LNG exports could become a key bargaining chip in global trade

Trump’s push for deregulation and energy dominance could accelerate US LNG exports by fast-tracking permitting and infrastructure expansions, reinforcing US oil and gas production as well as LNG export growth. The domestic and global LNG market is already feeling the effects of the Biden administration’s moratorium on new non-FTA LNG approvals, which has helped tighten global balances in the medium term. Trump has vowed to reverse the pause when he takes office, which would benefit developers with pending projects. However, accelerating these projects could worsen the global LNG supply glut in the medium term if markets face a ‘too much, too soon’ situation.

The potential for oversupply in global markets could destabilize prices, especially if trade tensions with China reignite, which would have negative consequences for US producers and LNG developers. US LNG projects rely on securing consistent demand from China. Additionally, Trump faces a delicate balance between boosting US LNG exports to Europe and managing his stance on Russia. With Europe’s growing LNG demand, Trump sees an opportunity to reduce Russian influence, but swiftly ending the Ukraine war, as he has repeatedly claimed, may require easing sanctions. Regardless, Trump’s energy agenda in 2025 is likely to reshape US and global energy markets, but careful balancing of market fundamentals and geopolitics will be crucial.

6.      Supply chain challenges still impacting global energy markets

High investment levels in oil and gas and new energies add another complication to an already beleaguered supply chain in 2025. Geopolitical tensions and increased protectionism will result in large changes in the global supply chains supporting energy transition with equipment and services. Within offshore oil and gas, bottlenecks around floating production, storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs), subsea kits, drilling rigs, and other vessels will continue to inflate and delay capital projects. In North America, increased capital optimization and efficiency is fueling further overcapacity and putting pressure on earnings for oilfield service companies.

In new energies, overcapacity in the manufacturing sector for batteries and solar PV will continue to build and fundamentally drive prices down. However, protectionism and tariffs will lead to rising costs for importers and force more home-shoring and offshoring of manufacturers. Overall, increased divestments, mergers and acquisitions will be the result across the energy supply chain, as suppliers position themselves for the new world order.

7.      Much more electricity will be needed to keep pace with AI and EV boom

Global power demand is entering a period of accelerated growth, fueled by industrial decarbonization efforts, the rise of EVs and the rapid expansion of data centers. Rystad Energy forecasts that global electricity demand from data centers will more than double by the end of the decade, reaching 860 terawatt-hours (TWh). Consequently, tech companies have emerged as some of the largest offtakers in the power purchase agreement (PPA) market, as they scramble to secure enough carbon-free power.

To meet round-the-clock power needs, some technology players have also been turning to additional baseload sources, including signed agreements to purchase power from conventional nuclear power plants. Interest is also being shown in new small modular reactor (SMR) technologies, despite higher development costs and a lingering need to prove technical feasibility. It is, therefore, evident that sourcing as much electricity as possible from renewable energy sources should be prioritized. Growth in solar and wind capacity is expected to reach a new record in 2025, adding close to 1,000 TWh of electricity that will cater to some of the increasing demand.

8.      Low carbon energy markets poised to flourish

Numerous ambitious climate plans have emerged from the COP29 summit, including net-zero and coal phase-out commitments from Indonesia, Mexico and the EU, backed by 25 countries. This keeps exponential growth scenarios for low-carbon energy very much on the agenda. However, 2025 could be another reality check for renewables and cleantech, with shifting policies favoring fossil fuels, green energy stocks under pressure, and uncertainty about funding and subsidies.

Battery and solar PV markets are likely to remain oversupplied, while regional biofuel markets show recovery potential as blending obligations take effect. The EU’s carbon market will take some big steps toward maturation with accelerated free allowance phaseouts and implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). This paves the way for final investment decisions on projects involving low-carbon hydrogen and carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS).

Despite headwinds, solar PV is set to grow by about 600 TWh in 2025, matching oil’s annual primary energy growth for the first time. Given solar’s superior efficiency over crude oil, this represents two-to-three times more useful energy than oil. Falling capture prices remain a challenge, but record-low battery storage costs offer timely solutions.

9.      A defining year for the global climate conversation

By February, countries must submit their “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), outlining climate actions through 2035 aimed at limiting global warming. COP30, to be held in Belém, Brazil next November, will test whether these plans translate into measurable progress, especially amid challenges like political shifts, inflation and competing priorities.

While $300 billion annually in climate finance by 2035 was pledged at COP29, this tally falls far short of the $1.3 trillion needed. Finalizing rules for carbon trading under Article 6 will be key to boosting credibility and unlocking new markets. Tools like Amazon Bonds and embedding climate goals into economic planning will also be in focus. Set in the Amazon, COP30 will serve as both a progress report and a chance to align ambition with action, driving the energy transition, mobilizing capital and the path to a sustainable future.

10.  CCUS policy support boosts growth despite infrastructure hurdles

The CCUS market is poised for rapid growth in 2025, with a wave of final investment decision (FID) approvals expected to meet project timelines. This momentum stems from supportive policies and funding in Europe, increasing carbon dioxide removal (CDR) credit activity, and post-US election market clarity. Key challenges remain, including a gap between CO₂ capture demand and infrastructure readiness, which could delay projects. To address this, we anticipate progress in CO₂ storage regulations, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, and faster permit approvals in North America and Europe.

The successful implementation of the Northern Lights project in Norway has highlighted the potential of cross-border CCUS initiatives, paving the way for enhanced international collaboration and bilateral agreements. We also expect a strengthening of public-private partnerships, especially in building the infrastructure needed to transport CO₂.

11.  Hydrogen sector faces a reality check in 2025, with cancellations rising

Heading into the new year, the hydrogen sector is bracing for a downturn. While some key FIDs were made in 2024, project cancellations have also been on the rise. Key auctions in Europe and Japan will support the progress of selected projects in 2025, but others will continue to face challenges and cancellations. This year will provide more clarity on political support and commitment for hydrogen, especially with Trump returning to the White House in the US and with elections looming in Germany – two major markets for clean hydrogen. We expect a more pragmatic approach in the clean hydrogen sector, as the cost premium for renewable hydrogen and derivatives remains largely unchanged. Additionally, 2025 will see continued progress from China and India, as they advance their clean hydrogen and derivatives agendas.

12.  Shipping sector pushes for change; greener solutions gain focus

Decarbonizing the shipping industry remains a major challenge due to its heavy dependence on fossil fuels and the complexity of introducing effective regulations at a global level. Transitioning to low-carbon alternatives such as green methanol or clean ammonia is vital but requires significant investment in new technologies and infrastructure. In the short-to-medium term, there is growing interest to move forward with LNG and biofuels as these are cheaper and already available.

A global carbon tax could accelerate this transition, but its success hinges on consistent adoption and enforcement across nations. Key measures include fostering international cooperation through organizations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to establish uniform tax rates and regulations. Revenue from these taxes should be reinvested in developing green technologies, upgrading infrastructure, and providing subsidies for early adopters. Support for developing nations, including financial aid and technical assistance, is essential. Transparency and robust data-sharing mechanisms are crucial for ensuring progress and accountability in this global effort.

Contributors to this report are: Jorge Leon, Head of Geopolitical Analysis, Aditya Saraswat, Senior Vice President, Upstream Research, Valerie Panopio, Senior Analyst, Commodities Markets – Oil, Matthew Bernstein, Senior Analyst, Shale Research, Emily McClain, Vice President, North America Gas & LNG Markets, Audun Martinsen, Head of Supply Chain Research, Carlos Torres Diaz, Head of Power Markets Research, Artem Abramov, Head of Clean Tech Research, Lars Nitter Havro, Head of Energy Macro Research, Yvonne Lam, Head of CCUS Research, Minh Khoi Le, Head of Hydrogen Research, Oddmund Fore, Head of Shipping & Offshore Markets, all of Rystad Energy

The article Shaping energy markets in 2025: 12 trends to watch appeared first on Arabian Post.

Shoresh Ismail Abdulla is the Minister of Peshmerga affairs in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Peshmerga are the military forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and one of the most capable forces in the region, which pushed back ISIS from its strongholds. Currently, Peshmerga is also playing a vital role in counter-terror operations against ISIS. In an interview, Abdulla speaks about the reemergence of ISIS in the context of developments in Syria, planned reforms of Peshmerga, and expectations from the incoming United States administration of President-Elect Donald Trump.

Question: What role are Peshmerga forces playing in countering ISIS? Is the threat of ISIS still imminent?

Abdulla: To understand the role played by the Peshmerga in countering terrorism, we have to dig into the past of this force. Historically, Peshmerga, to save the people and the region, fought with the brutal Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein and other terror groups. So, when ISIS emerged as a significant threat in 2014, we already had the expertise to deal with this kind of force. We confronted ISIS with all our strength, and while doing that, we also made a lot of sacrifices. For example, we had more than 10,000 injured and 2,000 martyrs in the fight against ISIS. But combined with our experience and determination, we were able to defeat ISIS and stop this terror group’s expansion.

Yes, the threat posed by ISIS is far from over, and this extremist group remains the most prominent threat to the stability and peace of the region.

Q: Do you think they still can capture large territories?

A: Their fighting tactics have changed. Islamic State is still carrying out its operations through its cells very frequently, and even after losing the large territory it once controlled, we are observing very high military activities from ISIS. As the ideology of ISIS is still very much present, it has the potential to re-emerge as a significant threat. The recent developments in Syria will provide favorable conditions for ISIS to strengthen themselves.

Q: Still, many units (Unit 70 forces are affiliated with the PUK, and the KDP controls Unit 80 forces) of Peshmerga are affiliated with the political parties of Kurdistan. Will all the units be unified under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs anytime soon? What is the biggest hindrance to unification?

A: There is no hindrance as such. The process of unifying all the Peshmerga units is underway. We are receiving support for this effort from the coalition forces led by the United States. There is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two biggest parties of Kurdistan, KDP and PUK, to unify the Peshmerga forces by the end of 2026.

Q: How is the Peshmerga modernization progressing? It is often stated that Peshmerga forces lack heavy weaponry and air power. Is there any plan in place to address these issues?

A: We have taken these reforms very seriously. A separate Directorate was established under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, which oversees 35 points of planned reforms. Some critical areas, such as establishing a transparent chain of command, training, and logistics, are prioritized in the modernization process. We are receiving continuous support from the US and other coalition forces. The Federal government in Baghdad is preventing us from procuring heavy and advanced weapons. Baghdad is not even providing ammunition for the armaments we already possess. This behavior of the Federal government of Iraq is strange as Peshmerga forces have also fought against any threat Iraq faces. Our forces have defended the Kurdistan region and Iraq, and we expect more cooperation from Iraqi authorities.

Q: Recently, Peshmerga forces received some artillery pieces (105mm M119 howitzers) from the United States. However, Baghdad has opposed this kind of weapons transfer by the US, arguing that the Iraqi national Army should only possess heavy weapons.

A: We already possess some heavy weapons, and in the past, the Iraqi government didn’t oppose it. Recently, some people have objected to weapons being transferred to Peshmerga forces by the United States. Prejudices and narrow thought processes drive these objections. There is a misinformation campaign being run that possession of heavy weapons by Peshmerga forces can be a threat to the Iraqi Army. But the matter is that Peshmerga has never been a threat to anyone. Also, it should be remembered that when the Iraqi National Army was not able to fight ISIS and fled, we were the only force that defended Iraqi territory and saved the innocents from ISIS. Hence, I would say that strong Peshmerga forces are also in Iraq’s interest.

Q: What assistance should the international community provide you in the fight against terrorism?

A: We expect that each country that is part of the international coalition against terrorism should enter into bilateral agreements with the Iraqi federal government, and we should also be included in such agreements. We are playing an essential role in the fight against terrorism in this region. I am not saying that we should be included as a third party in these bilateral engagements. However, it should be considered that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as per the Iraqi constitution, is an autonomous region of Iraq. Hence, we should be part of every agreement about counter-terror efforts.

Q: Do you think the policies of US President-elect Donald Trump’s administration will affect the region differently, especially Kurdistan?

A: We can’t say with certainty whether the policies of the new US administration will change or not. But the officials chosen to serve in the new administration—almost all of them—have had positive views about the Kurdistan region and the Peshmerga in the past. We believe that policies in the United States are decided at an institutional level after considering the ground realities.

The article Syria developments might see ISIS bounce back appeared first on Arabian Post.

The dramatic events of last week in Syria have only boosted President Erdogan’s role as the preeminent regional powerbroker in the heart of the Arab Levant as Turkish armed/financed Sunni militias engineered their collapse of the 54-year-old Assad dynastic tyranny in Damascus. Syria is once again a de facto Turkish protectorate, as it was in the five centuries since Sultan Selim Yavuz vanquished its Mamluk rulers and conquered Egypt, Syria and the Hijaz for the Ottoman sultanate. Selim deposed the titular Abbasid Caliph in Cairo and became Islam’s first Turkish Amir Al Momineen or Commander of the Faithful. The Ottoman caliphate lasted from 1517 to 1924 when Kemal Atatürk abolished it, which was supported by Jinnah but opposed by Gandhi (go figure!). Atatürk declared a secular Turkish Republic and purged the Turkish language of its Arabic alphabet and literary heritage.

No Turkish nationalist has ever been able to explain to me why none of the 32 Ottoman Sultan Caliphs who ruled the Middle East from Istanbul ever made the pilgrimage to Makkah between 1517 and 1924. So the rise of the AKP and now President Erdogan’s triumph in Syria, exactly a century after the last Ottoman Caliph went into exile to Paris only proves one thing to me, the Empire strikes back!

Turkey’s national security interest necessitates a stable Syria because Ankara wants 3.7 million Syrian refugees on its soil to return home. Yet if Trump withdraws the American combat units fighting the remnants of ISIS with Kurdish STF militia, there is no doubt that the Turkish military and its allies in Damascus will attack the PKK allied Kurdish statelet of Rojava. Erdogan has made it clear that the Syrian Kurds will not be allowed the autonomous status enjoyed by the Iraqi Kurds since the early 1990’s.

Can France, Russia, Iran or the US prevent the fall of the Syrian Kurd statelet, which now controls the oil and gas fields of Deir Ezzor that once produced 400,000 barrels a day and provided 40% of the Assad regime’s revenues before the civil war? I doubt it, even though Kurdish forces played a critical role in the defeat of ISIS’s terror state in Raqqa.

It is highly probable that Trump will outsource combat missions against ISIS in the Syrian Jezira to the Turkish military, the second biggest armed force in NATO and betray the Kurdish cause, a recurrent theme in the history of the world’s biggest ethnic group without a state of their own. After all, the last thing the West wants or needs is another catastrophic civil war in Syria at a time when 5 million Syrian migrants live in the EU states/Britain.

I remember being in Paris on Bastille Day in 2008 when President Sarkozy and the exquisite Carla Bruni hosted Dr. Bashar and Asma Akhras as chief guests, even though anyone who knew anything about Syria knew that the gentle eye doctor inherited a murderous Alawite dynastic dictatorship. The British even foisted a meeting with the despicable Assad on the late Queen at Buckingham Palace and Vogue ran a fawning fashion profile on the mass murderer’s wife, an ex-J.P. Morgan Banker from Acton. Even Erdogan courted the Assads and went on family vacations with the Syrian power couple who would not hesitate to butcher 650,000 people after the 2011 popular uprising. The world’s chancelleries must apologize to the Syrian people for the red-carpet treatment they accorded to this dictator who poisoned children. So must the Arab League which recently rehabilitated him just before he fled Syria. Hopefully the Assads will enjoy their long winter vacations with the Putins in his Moscow dacha.

The West, the Gulf and Turkey all have a strategic interest in the economic reconstruction of Syria, whose GDP is now a pitiful $6.2 billion, with a full one third of its economic output generated by the production/sale of Captagon. Yes Assad with its torture chambers and mass executions, also ran a narco state beyond Don Pablo Escobar’s wildest dreams.

Erdogan is the king maker in Damascus but he will also have to negotiate with Moscow on Russia’s air/naval bases in Tartus and Latakia as well as with Iran, which has its own restive Kurdish minority. Hezbollah, Hamas and Assad were all Iran’s proxy dominoes, who have all now fallen. The epicenter of these seismic events will now move to Iraq, where Erdogan has used the Turkish Air Force to bomb targets in the Qandil Mountains.

Turkish steel, cement and construction stocks have soared on the Borsa Istanbul. Mr. Market, obviously discounts Turkey as the midwife of Syria’s future economic rebirt

The article Turkish delights and the empire strikes back in Syria appeared first on Arabian Post.

The late summer and autumn of 2024 may well go down in history as the Berlin Wall moment for the Middle East as the collapse of the nightmarish Assad dynastic dictatorship will have a seismic geopolitical fall out across the region. Iran has lost its land bridge/weapon supply conduit to its proxy militia Hezbollah, itself decapitated and militarily degraded by the IDF in Lebanon. Baathist Syria was Iran’s oldest ally in the Arab world, a relationship forged by Hafez al-Assad with Ayatollah Khomeini in a bid to end his diplomatic isolation after Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords with Israel and his ideological archrival Saddam Hussein launched a bloody war of attrition in a failed attempt to crush the Iranian revolution in 1980.

Syria, with its 70% Sunni majority has reverted to its Ottoman historical DNA as a de facto Turkish province, though the HTS militia has done its best to reassure minorities like the Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Christians and Ismailis that their rule will not target Assad regime allies. Since HTS is led by a former Al Qaeda emir with the nom de guerre of Abu Mohammad Al Jolani and is a US/EU/UN designated terrorist organization, it is naive to expect Syria to morph into a secular, liberal, Jeffersonian democracy that protects the rights of women and political dissidents. HTS’s track record in Idlib was marked by documented cases of torture, arbitrary arrests and mid-night executions, though their slaughter of opponents is nowhere near the scale of the murderous to Assad dictators.

I wonder why the moral outrage of the Ivy League human rights activists was not triggered even though Assad butchered 600,000 human beings in the Syrian civil war and created 12 million refugees in a country of 24 million people.

Iran is unquestionably the biggest loser in the Levant’s geopolitical game of chicken, with Russia also weakened since it failed to preserve an Arab state that had been its ally since the Brezhnev era in the USSR of the early 1970’s.

The biggest winner in the events of last week is President Erdogan, who has replaced Iran as the new imperial power broker of Syria. This is a perilous moment for the Syrian Kurds whose statelet of Rojava in Northeast Syria faces an existential threat from a resurgent Turkish power play.

Russia may well lose its naval bases in Tartus and Latakia, and thus the last vestige of the Tsarist imperial dream for warm water ports on the Mediterranean. Iran has lost its proxy militia empire in the Arab world and the mullah regime must now confront its domestic enemies with its political legitimacy torn to shreds. Israel has taken advantage of the geopolitical convulsions in Syria to increase its buffer zone on the other side of Mount Hermon, a strategic prize beyond the occupied Golan Heights.

The fate of Syria now depends not only on the management of power equations among its various rebel militias and ethno-religious minorities but also the calculus of realpolitik between Israel, Turkey, US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar.

The death rattle of the Ottoman Empire and the restless ghosts of Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot now haunt the Syria they once awarded to the Quai d’Orsay as a League of Nations mandate more than 100 years ago. The merciless Great Game in Bilad-al-Sham continues!

The article What next in Syria’s geopolitical game of chicken? appeared first on Arabian Post.

Donald Trump’s recent critique of Bangladesh on social media, branding it as a nation rife with “barbaric violence” against religious minorities and claiming it exists in a “total state of chaos,” has drawn significant attention. This statement, made just days before the US presidential election, appears to be an effort to appeal to Hindu-American voters, a demographic that has increasingly urged Trump to address issues related to Hindu and minority rights abroad. While the timing of these remarks suggests a political strategy aimed at garnering support, they could also carry profound implications for US-Bangladesh relations should Trump return to office. Under his leadership, US foreign policy could shift dramatically, potentially ushering in a new era for bilateral relations that have recently flourished under the current administration.

Under President Joe Biden, US-Bangladesh relations have undergone a significant reset following years of tension. The recent political upheaval in Bangladesh, which culminated in the removal of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, led to the establishment of an interim government headed by Nobel Laureate Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus. Yunus is widely viewed in Washington as a reformist leader due to his vocal criticism of Hasina’s authoritarian governance. This alignment with US interests in promoting democratic values has resulted in a warm reception from the Biden administration, which has swiftly pledged support in the form of development assistance, humanitarian aid, and technical expertise aimed at stabilizing Bangladesh and fostering political and economic reforms.

However, the ascension of Yunus as chief adviser presents a complex challenge for US-Bangladesh relations if Trump were to return to power. Yunus is known for his liberal ideals and established connections with key figures in the Democratic Party, including the Clintons. His open criticism of Trump during the latter’s presidency could hinder any potential collaboration between the two leaders. Trump’s foreign policy is often characterized by a transactional approach, where partnerships are evaluated based on immediate benefits rather than ideological alignments. Yunus’s progressive stance and opposition to Trump could complicate any future engagement between Washington and Dhaka, potentially shifting US policy away from supporting Yunus’s administration.

Since the establishment of the interim government, the Biden administration has concentrated on ensuring stability and fostering development in Bangladesh. The strategy has centered around bolstering Bangladesh’s resilience through financial aid and humanitarian support, which aligns with a broader vision of cultivating long-term partnerships to maintain influence in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in countering Chinese expansion.

In contrast, Trump’s foreign policy framework is generally less inclined toward aid-based partnerships. Known for his scepticism regarding nation-building, Trump would likely prioritize a transactional relationship with Bangladesh focused on trade and countering Chinese influence. Under a Trump administration, US support for humanitarian initiatives and political reform in Bangladesh may be deprioritized, leaving the country to navigate significant economic challenges without the same level of backing it has received under Biden.

During Trump’s first term, economic ties between the US and Bangladesh flourished, with American companies significantly increasing their investments in the country. Bangladesh emerged as an essential trading partner, bolstered by Trump’s focus on trade and economic pragmatism. A second Trump administration might revive this emphasis on trade and investment, although the current economic challenges facing Bangladesh could complicate this dynamic. The country’s recent economic downturn could limit its ability to sustain robust bilateral trade, presenting hurdles for Trump’s trade-centric approach.

Moreover, labour rights issues in Bangladesh may pose additional barriers to investment under a Trump administration. The US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which promotes American investment overseas, requires stringent labour standards for project funding. If Bangladesh does not improve its labor practices, it could miss out on crucial investment opportunities, further straining economic relations.

Another key aspect of Trump’s foreign policy was his aggressive stance on countering Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. During his presidency, the US viewed Bangladesh as a strategic partner in this effort, emphasizing cooperation in areas such as maritime security and military training. Hasina’s government had managed to balance relations between the US and China, but with Yunus now at the helm, this balance could shift. Yunus may pursue stronger ties with China, potentially leading to friction with a Trump administration that prioritizes alignment with India and countering Chinese influence.

The ideological differences between Yunus and Trump could create a tense diplomatic environment. While Yunus might seek to cultivate a partnership with Beijing, Trump could demand a more cooperative stance from Bangladesh regarding US interests in the region. Should Yunus tilt towards China, it may cool US-Bangladesh relations, impacting Bangladesh’s participation in US-led initiatives aimed at maintaining Indo-Pacific stability.

Despite the potential for a shift in US policy under Trump, there remains a pathway for compromise. Recognizing the importance of US support, Yunus’s administration might aim to reassure Washington that its outreach to China will not undermine its partnership with the United States. By framing its relationship with the US as mutually beneficial, Bangladesh could emphasize that American assistance is crucial for its stability and development, thus reinforcing its position as a reliable partner.

In this context, Bangladesh could also highlight the strategic advantages of maintaining a strong US partnership, which would align with both Washington’s and New Delhi’s interests in regional stability. If Yunus’s government can demonstrate that US investment and aid contribute to a more stable Bangladesh, it may appeal to Trump’s transactional mindset, showcasing the ways in which American support can enhance Bangladesh’s role as a strategic partner.

The article Trump’s Critique of Bangladesh and Its Implications for US Relations appeared first on Arabian Post.

M A Hossain

As the United States approaches its 2025 presidential inauguration, the potential impact on US foreign policy is under close examination, particularly concerning the Global South. The countries in these regions—spanning across Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia—face unique challenges and opportunities based on whether the next US president will be Donald Trump or Kamala Harris. The candidates’ distinct approaches to international relations, trade, security, and diplomacy will shape the Global South’s future in numerous ways.

A Trump administration would likely return to a more protectionist economic stance, with substantial tariffs potentially imposed on imports, particularly from China, and possibly affecting goods from other countries as well. This shift could disrupt trade relations for several countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America that heavily rely on exports to the US Industries such as textiles, electronics, and agriculture, which serve as crucial economic pillars in these regions, could face significant challenges due to supply chain disruptions and reduced US demand. This outcome might lead to a slowdown in economic growth, a reduction in job opportunities, and increased economic volatility.

Conversely, Kamala Harris is expected to uphold many of the Biden administration’s “Worker-Centric” trade policies that emphasize collaboration, multilateralism, and targeted sanctions rather than sweeping tariffs. Harris would likely support initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, promoting economic engagement with nations in the Global South. This approach could offer more stability and help Global South countries maintain trade partnerships with the US, reducing the risks of sudden disruptions that a Trump presidency might bring.

The ongoing US-China rivalry is a central issue for many nations in the Global South, particularly in Southeast Asia, where countries often try to balance their economic relations with China and security ties with the US. A Trump presidency is expected to intensify pressure on these countries to align more closely with the US in its competition with China. Trump’s confrontational approach to China would make it harder for Southeast Asian nations to maintain a balanced stance, potentially leading to greater geopolitical instability in the region.

Harris, on the other hand, would likely pursue a competitive stance toward China but through a consultative, less confrontational approach. Her policy would give Global South nations more flexibility to navigate the US-China rivalry without needing to choose one side. This balanced approach could benefit countries like India, the Philippines, and other nations in the Indo-Pacific region, allowing them to engage with both superpowers on their terms while leveraging their strategic importance in the region.

A Trump presidency is likely to emphasize a transactional approach to security alliances, as seen during his previous term, where he pressed allies like Japan and South Korea for greater financial contributions. A similar stance could reduce US security commitments to countries in the Global South, which might prompt these nations to strengthen their defense capabilities independently. For instance, South Korea has considered enhancing its nuclear capabilities as a countermeasure if US support declines. Trump would stop all US military engagement globally, especially in Ukraine and Israel. In regions like North Atlantic Nations,  Southeast Asia and Africa, Trump’s approach could mean reduced US security assistance, prompting countries to seek new security partnerships or reassess their defense strategies.

In contrast, Harris’s administration would likely continue to support security alliances, following the Biden administration’s approach of bolstering alliances through cooperation. Her approach would prioritize stability, especially in sensitive regions like the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, offering countries in the Global South a more predictable security relationship with the US. For Africa and Latin America, Harris’s administration could continue supporting counterterrorism, anti-narcotics operations, and defense collaborations, ensuring that US military engagement in these areas remains robust.

The influence of US soft power in the Global South would diverge depending on which candidate takes office. Trump’s blunt and at times isolationist approach has previously undermined trust among global leaders, reducing the US’s diplomatic reach in some areas. Many leaders in the Global South may be wary of aligning too closely with a Trump-led US due to his tendency to withdraw from international institutions and agreements. Although some authoritarian regimes might appreciate Trump’s less interventionist stance, others could view his approach as too unpredictable, potentially straining diplomatic ties.

A Harris administration would likely prioritize multilateral diplomacy, particularly on issues like climate change, which disproportionately affect countries in the Global South. By engaging with these nations on global challenges, Harris could strengthen diplomatic ties and reinforce US influence through a more inclusive approach. This multilateral approach could be attractive to Global South countries, which would benefit from participating in international platforms that address shared issues and promote stability.

Under Trump, India and the Philippines might deepen their ties with the US, though their relations would hinge on different factors. Trump’s rapport with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could strengthen the bilateral relationship, while Southeast Asian countries might face more economic challenges due to potential tariffs. A Harris presidency, however, could offer a more structured diplomatic route, potentially benefiting India due to Harris’s South Asian heritage. Southeast Asian nations may find Harris’s policies more predictable, allowing them to continue diversifying trade partnerships without severe disruptions.

Trump’s policies on immigration could strain diplomatic ties in Latin America, while economic disruptions from potential tariffs might push countries in the region to seek alternative trade partners or bolster regional alliances. Harris’s approach would likely emphasize sustainable development initiatives, infrastructure investment, and climate action, aligning well with Latin American priorities. Her policies could encourage economic cooperation focused on social and environmental goals, strengthening the region’s resilience.

In the Middle East, Trump’s strong alliances with countries like Israel could lead to policies that prioritize US allies, potentially increasing punitive measures against Iran. The abandonment of multilateral diplomacy could stop conflicts and Trump would exert political pressure for Two State solution. Harris, on the other hand, would likely adopt a more balanced approach, fostering conflict while supporting US alliances. For Africa, Harris’s presidency could continue anti-terrorism initiatives, supporting security partnerships that contribute to stability in the region. Her focus on diplomatic engagement and development assistance would likely strengthen ties with African nations, facilitating the US defense industrial complex to profit.

The global economic landscape could shift significantly depending on the outcome of the US presidential election. Trump’s protectionist policies and tariffs could destabilize international trade, particularly affecting export-driven economies in the Global South. Although such disruptions might encourage countries to innovate and diversify their supply chains, they could also dampen economic growth, especially in regions like Southeast Asia and Latin America.

A Harris presidency would probably focus on initiatives that promote the digital economy and environmental sustainability, benefiting Global South countries investing in green technology and digital infrastructure. Her administration might pursue trade agreements centered on critical minerals, technology, and sustainable development, supporting the long-term growth of nations focusing on green infrastructure.

The impact of the 2025 US  presidential election on the Global South will depend heavily on whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris becomes president. A Trump administration might create a more transactional, unpredictable environment, with aggressive economic protectionism and intensified US-China competition likely causing disruptions. This scenario could strain alliances and heighten diplomatic challenges for the Global South.

On the other hand, Harris’s approach would offer a more predictable and consultative framework, allowing Global South nations to engage with the US without needing to make drastic adjustments. Her focus on multilateral diplomacy and environmental initiatives could foster stability, creating opportunities for economic growth and resilient partnerships. However, the conflict-ridden nations will be pushed towards more volatile situations by Harris’s administration.

In anticipation of these potential shifts, countries in the Global South may seek new partnerships, prioritize stability-oriented policies, and weigh the costs and benefits of engagement with the US, striving for adaptability and resilience in an increasingly polarized world.

The article Trump vs. Harris: What the 2025 US Election Means for the Global South appeared first on Arabian Post.

Middle East has turned into a ticking time bomb as Iran and Israel stand on the verge of a full-blown war. A lot has transpired between the two countries since the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing Gaza war. Israel is more than a thousand miles away from Iran. They do not share any border and there are no significant bilateral claims between them. And yet they are arch enemies.

Michael Faulker in 1950 famously said that, “In the Middle East, past is never dead. It’s not even past.” Surprisingly, not so long ago, the Israel-Iran equation was quite cordial and friendly. Under the Pahlavi dynasty which governed Iran (from 1925) until the 1979 revolution, Iran and Israel were on the same team. When Israel was established in 1948, Iran was the second Muslim-majority nation to recognize it, after Turkey. After Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected as Iran’s PM in 1951, the relations soured for a brief period. He tried to distance from the West and broke off relations with Israel. But in 1953, Mosaddegh’s government was deposed in a coup orchestrated by the US and UK intelligence services. Reza Shah Pahlavi was reinstated.

Arms, Oil and anti-Arabism: Shah wanted to improve Iran’s relations with the US, and he knew very well that the road to Washington passed via Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, as a part of its Periphery Doctrine, Israel reached out to the non-Arab (but primarily Muslim) nations in the region – Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, to counterbalance the threat posed by pan-Arabism. The Iran-Israel alliance at that time was dictated by simple logic – both the nations had Arab enemies in common, and the enemy’s enemy can be my friend. In 1959, the Shah granted de facto recognition to the Jewish state and in 1960s, Israel opened its embassy in Tehran. Due to its conflict with the Arab world, energy security remained a major concern for Israel. Iran supplied more than 90% of Israel’s oil imports from the mid-1950s till the late 1970s. In a 1963 deal, Tehran offered Israel the first rights to oil produced by Iran’s national oil corporation – NIOC (National Iranian Oil corporation), with Israel agreeing to buy at least 50% of its oil from the corporation. Additionally, the joint Israeli-Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline was also used to transport Iranian oil to European markets.

Tehran and Tel Aviv also had extensive military and security cooperation, but it was largely kept under wraps. As per a 1985-CIA dossier (declassified in 2011), Israel’s main defence exports to Iran included small arms, mortars and ammunition. Besides providing maintenance

support for the Iranian air force and army, Israel also offered technical support for Iran’s infant defence industry. The two allies had a convenient barter-trade arrangement – arms for oil! Interestingly, Iranian security and intelligence service – SAVAK was also partly trained by Mossad, alongside CIA.

1979 Islamic revolution: In 1979, west-backed Shah’s monarchy was toppled in a bloody revolution and the Ayatollahs took over. The legitimacy of the new theocratic regime was based on its commitment to ideals of Shia Islam and its opposition to West led by America (labelled as Great Satan). Ali Shariati, known as the main ideologue of Iranian Revolution asserted that followers of true Islam must fight the West which was marked by excessive materialism and moral degradation.

Besides adopting a fundamentally anti-West position, the new regime prioritized the Palestinian cause. Iran’s Shia regime apparently became more Palestinian than the Palestinians – most of whom are Sunni Muslims. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat was the first foreign leader to visit Iran, just a few days after the revolution. The Israeli embassy was officially turned into the Palestinian embassy and the keys were ceremoniously handed to the Palestinian delegation. In May, Habib Elghanian, the head of Iran’s Jewish Association was the first Iranian Jew to be executed for alleged espionage. On 7 August 1979, Khomeini proclaimed the last Friday of Ramadan to be Quds (Jerusalem) Day to assert the Palestinian claim over Jerusalem. Since then, huge anti-Israel demonstrations are held across Iran on this day every year. Thus, by supporting the Palestinian cause, Iran assumed a moral high-ground in the Muslim world where many Arab states have mended fences with Israel.

Tensions soured in the early 2000s as Iran developed long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs. In 2005, when the newly-elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Israel should be “wiped off the face of the earth”, it was a tipping point in Israel-Iran relations (or whatever was left of it). Under moderate conservative President Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), there was there was some hope for peace. Talks resumed and finally in 2015, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as Iran nuclear deal was signed between Iran and P5+1 countries. While the international community welcomed the historic détente, Israel and Gulf Sunni monarchies opposed the deal.

The talks fell apart as Donald Trump replaced Obama in the White house. On May 8, 2016, Trump formally declared the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran deal. The same evening, Israel launched an airstrike in Damascus, Syria targeting arms depot belonging to Hezbollah and Iran. Since then, both the countries have been fighting a shadow war.

The writer is a New Delhi-based researcher.

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As Bangladesh navigates the current turmoil, the path to economic recovery seems increasingly difficult, requiring prompt and decisive action from the interim government to bring stability and restore confidence among both the public and investors.

The political unrest has introduced uncertainty, which is directly affecting economic growth. Both local and foreign investors are hesitant to commit their funds in a country where the future appears uncertain. This creates a negative feedback loop: political instability weakens investor confidence, leading to reduced investment, which in turn hampers economic growth. The ripple effect spreads across industries and businesses, with smaller enterprises being particularly vulnerable to these shocks.

Since early 2022, Bangladesh has been battling high inflation, driven by global supply chain disruptions and compounded by domestic policy challenges. By July 2024, inflation had skyrocketed to 11.66 percent, the highest in 13 years, with food inflation reaching a staggering 14.10 percent. For millions of low-income households, this situation has become untenable, as the soaring cost of essential commodities places a heavy burden on their already stretched finances.

The persistence of inflation is primarily linked to ongoing supply chain disruptions and shortages, both of which have been exacerbated by the political turmoil. The disruption in the transportation and distribution networks, fuelled by protests and strikes, has caused severe delays and scarcity of goods in the market. The result is a continuous upward spiral in prices, making everyday necessities unaffordable for the average citizen. For many, the rising cost of living has depleted their financial reserves, pushing them further into economic hardship. Addressing inflation should be a top priority for the interim government as it strives to stabilize the country’s macroeconomic environment.

Another key issue adding to the country’s woes is the alarming rate of youth unemployment. As of 2024, about 41 percent of young people aged 15-24 in Bangladesh are neither in education, employment, nor training (NEET), a figure almost double the global average. The high level of youth unemployment has exacerbated social tensions, with many young people feeling disenfranchised and alienated. This economic frustration is contributing to the broader sense of instability, as disillusioned youth are more likely to participate in protests and social unrest.

The lack of job opportunities for young people not only stifles economic growth but also poses long-term challenges for the country’s development. If Bangladesh cannot create more opportunities for its young population, it risks losing the potential benefits of its demographic dividend. Addressing youth unemployment should be a key focus of the interim government’s economic recovery efforts.

The macroeconomic challenges are compounded by the ongoing political unrest. Since 2022, foreign exchange reserves have been dwindling, export growth has slowed, and remittance earnings have shrunk. These factors, combined with the inflationary pressures and rising unemployment, paint a bleak picture for the nation’s economic outlook.

Small businesses, in particular, are struggling to stay afloat in this uncertain environment. Many have been forced to scale back operations, reduce productivity, or close down entirely due to the disruptions caused by political instability. This not only affects business owners but also has a knock-on effect on employees, suppliers, and the wider economy. The importance of restoring stability cannot be overstated-without it, the chances of economic recovery are slim.

The RMG sector, which accounts for around 80 percent of Bangladesh’s total exports, has been severely affected by the political unrest. Worker protests over low wages, unpaid salaries, and inadequate benefits have led to widespread disruption in the industry. On September 12, 2024, alone, 219 garment factories in Gazipur and Ashulia were shut down due to protests, with several factories being vandalized or set ablaze after negotiations between workers and factory owners failed.

While there have been accusations of external political elements fuelling the unrest, the root of the problem lies in the longstanding grievances of the workers. The minimum wage of Tk 12,500, set by the government in 2023, has been seen as inadequate by workers, and many factory owners have yet to meet even this baseline requirement. The demands for higher wages and better working conditions have been ignored for years, and the growing frustration among workers is now boiling over into mass protests and industrial action.

The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) held a meeting on September 14, 2024, to address the ongoing crisis in the sector. Attended by industry leaders and advisers from the interim government, the meeting highlighted the need for urgent action to resolve the workers’ grievances and restore stability to the industry. Major General Moin Khan of the 9th Infantry Division of the Bangladesh Army, who also attended the meeting, acknowledged the legitimacy of the workers’ demands but stressed the importance of resolving the unrest to protect the industry. The army has pledged its support to maintain law and order in the sector.

Addressing the unrest in the RMG industry is crucial, not only for the economy but also for Bangladesh’s reputation as a reliable exporter on the global stage. The interim government must take swift action to mediate between workers and factory owners, ensuring that a fair and sustainable wage agreement is reached. The minimum wage board’s recent decision to review workers’ wages, taking inflation and the rising cost of living into account, is a step in the right direction, but more needs to be done to restore trust and stability in the sector.

One of the key tools available to the interim government in addressing the economic crisis is monetary policy. The recent appointment of a new central bank governor has raised hopes that monetary tools will be more effectively used to curb inflation. Stabilizing prices through better market management, and coordinating monetary, fiscal, and tariff policies, is essential to restoring economic stability.

At the same time, the government must focus on improving foreign exchange reserves, increasing remittance inflows through formal channels, and boosting exports. These measures are critical to restoring confidence in the economy and ensuring that Bangladesh remains competitive on the global stage, despite the political turmoil.

While the interim government’s primary focus must be on addressing the immediate economic challenges, long-term structural reforms are also necessary for sustained economic recovery. The banking sector, for example, has long been plagued by high levels of non-performing loans, poor governance, and regulatory weaknesses. Strengthening transparency, improving regulatory oversight, and enhancing financial practices are essential steps to restore confidence in the banking system.

Similarly, reforms in the taxation system are crucial for increasing government revenue. Bangladesh’s tax-to-GDP ratio, currently at 7.8 percent, is among the lowest in the world. Expanding the tax base, improving tax compliance, and enhancing the efficiency of tax collection should be key priorities for the government. These reforms must also include efforts to curb corruption within the tax administration and ensure a fairer and more equitable system.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent two-day state visit to Mongolia was not only a significant moment in the bilateral relations between Moscow and Ulaanbaatar, but also an event that resonated on the international stage. Mongolia, a nation that ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), became the subject of global attention due to its refusal to comply with the ICC’s warrant for Putin’s arrest. This visit highlighted not only Mongolia’s assertion of sovereignty, but also the strategic importance of Russian-Mongolian relations amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.

The backdrop of Putin’s visit was the ICC’s arrest warrant for the Russian leader, issued over a year ago in connection with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Since the warrant was issued, Putin had avoided traveling to any country with obligations under the ICC’s jurisdiction. Mongolia’s decision not to adhere to the ICC’s mandate raised eyebrows, especially in Europe, where several diplomats had hoped Ulaanbaatar would comply.

Despite threats of sanctions and criticism from European countries, Mongolia stood firm. Kyiv expressed particular outrage, condemning Mongolia’s decision as a “blow to all.” Ukrainian authorities believed that Mongolia had ignored the “clear signal” sent twice regarding the warrant. However, Mongolia’s refusal to comply with the ICC’s directive underscored its determination to prioritize national sovereignty over international pressure. Notably, legal experts have pointed out that the ICC has no effective mechanisms to penalize Mongolia for its non-compliance.

The situation draws attention to the broader geopolitical context. While the ICC may express discontent, it lacks the power to impose significant sanctions on non-compliant states. Furthermore, the United States, which does not recognize the ICC’s authority, has remained notably silent on Mongolia’s decision, further complicating the international reaction. Washington’s non-recognition of the ICC mirrors Moscow’s stance, and the U.S. has even employed measures to restrict the ICC’s influence, with some of its judges and prosecutors being designated as blocked individuals by the US government.

While the ICC issue attracted headlines, the primary focus of Putin’s visit was to strengthen the comprehensive partnership between Russia and Mongolia. The timing of the visit is critical. The geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically since Putin’s last visit to Mongolia in 2019. The pandemic, escalating tensions between Russia and the West, and the decline of Western hegemony have all played roles in reshaping both regional and global dynamics.

One of the major highlights of the visit was the focus on expanding political, economic, and cultural ties between the two nations. Both sides discussed a wide range of topics, including cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and agriculture. Several agreements were signed to enhance trade and investment, with specific attention to sectors critical to Mongolia’s economy, such as energy and transportation.

A key point of discussion was the Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline, an extension of Russia’s Power of Siberia 2 project. This pipeline, set to transport natural gas from Russia to China via Mongolia, has the potential to further solidify Mongolia’s strategic importance in the region. Although there had been skepticism regarding the project’s inclusion in Mongolia’s development plans, Putin expressed optimism, noting that the project documentation had been completed and submitted for government review.

Energy cooperation was a central theme during the visit, reflecting the deep interdependence between Russia and Mongolia in this sector. Mongolia imports over 90 percent of its gasoline and diesel from Russia, making energy security a top priority for Ulaanbaatar. The discussions during Putin’s visit included agreements on petroleum products, aviation fuel, and the reconstruction of Thermal Power Plant 3 in Ulaanbaatar, all aimed at securing Mongolia’s energy needs.

While energy was a cornerstone of the discussions, the visit also explored other areas of potential collaboration. The two sides agreed to expand student exchanges and scientific cooperation, with a particular emphasis on supporting Russian-language education in Mongolia. These efforts aim to strengthen cultural ties and foster a more in-depth understanding between the two nations.

Another notable aspect of the visit was the signing of a memorandum on epidemic safety, focusing on plague control, and another on environmental cooperation, specifically regarding the preservation of Lake Baikal and its tributary, the Selenga River. These agreements highlight the growing importance of environmental sustainability and public health in the bilateral relationship.

Putin’s visit to Mongolia also carried significant historical and symbolic weight. The Russian president marked the 85th anniversary of the victory at Khalkhin Gol, a battle in 1939 where Soviet and Mongolian forces successfully repelled Japanese aggressors. This event remains a crucial chapter in Mongolia’s history, symbolizing the enduring bond between the two nations.

The visit concluded with a mutual commitment to strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and Mongolia. President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh of Mongolia expressed his gratitude for the visit and emphasized the importance of collaboration in areas such as energy, transportation, culture, and healthcare.

Looking ahead, the two nations are poised to deepen their cooperation. Khurelsukh is expected to visit Russia in the near future, with plans to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan in October and the 80th anniversary celebrations of the victory in World War II in Moscow in 2025. Additionally, the signing of a temporary free trade agreement between Mongolia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is anticipated before the end of 2024, which could further boost trade and economic interaction.

Vladimir Putin’s visit to Mongolia was a pivotal moment in the ongoing relationship between Russia and Mongolia. While the visit highlighted the ICC’s waning influence on the global stage, it also underscored the strategic importance of the two countries’ partnership. As the world continues to experience profound geopolitical shifts, the strengthening of Russian-Mongolian relations serves as a testament to the resilience of traditional alliances and the growing importance of Asia in global affairs. Through this visit, both nations have demonstrated their readiness to collaborate in the face of modern challenges and to pursue mutually beneficial opportunities for growth and stability.

The article Mongolia Visit Highlights Putin’s Strategic Moves and ICC Defiance appeared first on Arabian Post.

Recent bold attacks carried out by Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) rocked Pakistan. A large number of people and security personnel were killed in the province of Balochistan when separatist insurgents attacked police stations, railway lines and highways, and security forces camps. The assaults were the most widespread and ferocious in years by ethnic militants fighting a decades-long insurgency to win secession of the resource-rich southwestern province, home to major China-led projects such as a port and a gold and copper mine.

These attacks were carried out on the anniversary of the death of Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed by Pakistan’s security forces in 2006. Bugti, a former governor and chief minister of Balochistan, joined the separatist movement in 2005 and was killed in a military operation in August 2006 near his hometown of Dera Bugti. Since then, every year on his death anniversary Baloch insurgents intensify their attacks especially on Pakistani security forces.

But this year the scale and intensity of the attacks was mammoth. In addition to attacks on security forces, migrants from Punjab Pakistan’s biggest, most prosperous and politically dominant province were targeted as well. Most probably the separatist movement wants to send the message that outsiders are not safe in Balochistan.

The Pakistan military establishment which in fact takes all important policy decisions for the country has vowed to launch military operations in Balochistan in response to the recent attacks. But practically launching an operation in Balochistan is going to be a nightmare for the mighty Pakistani Army for the following reasons.

Balochistan is a large area with a scattered population, which is a major disadvantage for the government. The government cannot provide foolproof security, while nationalist armed groups can easily launch guerilla attacks and hide in the vast geography of the province. Tracking down a band of guerrilla fighters in the biggest province of Pakistan in terms of area will be next to impossible.

Balochistan’s borders with Iran and Afghanistan is a porous one and poorly guarded. This makes it convenient for Baloch insurgents for carrying on cross border movement of both men and material. Also, Pakistani authorities don’t have very cordial relations with its neighbours and can’t chalk out a joint strategy with them to put a check on Baloch insurgents movement across the border.

To effectively monitor and dominate Balochistan a mobilization of forces in big numbers is required. At this point in time Pakistan is not in position to spare that level of forces. The army is tied up at multiple fronts. Pakistan can’t afford to move forces from LOC and International Border with India and with growing tensions with Afghan Taliban forces can’t be redirected from Durand line. Additionally, in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province Pakistani Taliban AKA TTP has heavily engaged Pakistani security forces. Hence, General Headquarters (GHQ), Rawalpindi finding it hard to increase its troop level in Balochistan.

Baloch armed groups have increased their capabilities many folds in every dimension. For example- Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) biggest Baloch armed group. Is the most organized insurgent group with an elaborate structure and numerical strength of 3,500 to 4,000 fighters. Over the years, BLA has improved its communication capabilities and armaments significantly. The longevity and resilience of the insurgents is undoubtedly a strength, as they have learned to adapt and respond to various counterinsurgency methods of the state. On ground these groups are capable enough and can give a bloody nose to Pakistani army through guerrilla tactics like- Ambush, IED Blast, Sniper fire, and Suicide attacks.

Despite having such vast natural wealth, much of the population of the province lives below the poverty line this has created a deep sense of resentment among the locals towards the Pakistani state. Sizable section of the Baloch society considers Pakistani deep state as looters which are exploiting their land and using it as a colony. With such a strong anti-Pakistan feeling prevalent in Baloch society it will be very tough for the Army to gather credible intelligence about the insurgents from the locals. Without proper ground information any military operation is doomed to fail.

Islamabad has always sought to consolidate more power and maintain complete control of Balochistan through its security forces by eliminating the traditional and local structures to reinforce state power. But in the process, the Pakistani Army has further weakened the state and advanced the hardliners position. So, by launching military operations in the name of a crackdown on insurgency won’t make much of a difference in fact it might ignite another fierce phase. At the core of the ethno-nationalist armed insurgency is the deep-rooted feeling of oppression among the Baloch people. The Pakistani deep state has always labelled these insurgencies as the handiwork of foreign intelligence agencies. But the truth is that forceful occupation and looting of vast natural resources have fuelled the call of Baloch nationalism. Let’s hope Pakistani generals sitting in GHQ, Rawalpindi come to their senses

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After lengthy negotiations in Doha, Hamas has named Yahya Sinwar as its new Political chief, replacing Ismail Haniyeh who was assassinated in Teheran. Since 2017, Sinwar has served as the group’s leader inside the Gaza strip. He now becomes overall leader of its political wing. Sinwar’s promotions undermines more pragmatic and senior figures in Hamas with wider exposure to the international political arena and geopolitical landscape of the region, such as former politburo head Khaled Meshaal. Following the death of Haniyeh, who had strong relations with Iranian officials, the most prominent name to be considered as his successor was Khaled Meshaal. The appointment of Sinwar came as a big surprise because many did not take into account the Iran factor. Initially, it was thought Khaled Meshaal would resume his role as chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, an office he previously held between 1996 and 2017 prior to Haniyeh. But Iranians purportedly vetoed this and put all the weight behind Sinwar candidature.

Meshaal’s vocal criticism during the 2011 Arab Spring of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a close ally of Teheran made him a deeply unpopular figure among Iran’s top leadership. In addition to this Meshaal had made statements in the past opposing Hamas growing dependence on Tehran. Hamas is predominantly a Sunni Islamist organisation, while Iran is a hard-line Shiite regime, they found common ground only in their opposition to Israel. That’s why the alignment between Iran and Hamas has fluctuated in the past many times. Most importantly in 2012, differences over the Syrian civil war introduced a major rift in their relationship. Hamas tacit support for Sunni rebels in Syria was at odds with Iran’s allegiance to the Assad regime, leading to a temporary withdrawal of Iranian support. For years, ever since Jordan expelled the Hamas leadership from Jordanian capital Amman, in 1999, Hamas had maintained the headquarters of its external leadership in Damascus. But in January 2012, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal abandoned the group’s Damascus base after airing the group’s views about the Syrian civil war. Although in June 2022, Hamas and Syria announced their decision to restore ties. But the Syrian regime and Iranians were always suspicious about Hamas’ moderate faction led by Khaled Meshaal.

On the other hand, Sinwar forged close relations with Iranians since becoming head of Hamas in Gaza in February 2017 taking over from Ismail Haniyeh, who became head of the political bureau. In the March 2021 elections, Sinwar was again elected head of Hamas in Gaza. His focus remained on strengthening military capabilities for Hamas’s armed wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. For that immense military aid was required. He formed an alliance with Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Resulting in Iran providing a steady flow of weapons, funding, and military training, which undoubtedly facilitated the group’s military operations, including its recent attack on Israel. Importantly, Iran helped Hamas to design and produce rocket systems that match the capabilities and material available in Gaza in vast numbers. In return Sinwar chose to make his factions sort of an Iranian satellite revolving around its orbit. Sinwar saw himself as the Gaza Strip’s self-appointed emperor. He distanced his faction from the political leadership abroad, aligning more closely with Hamas’ local military command.

Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, Hamas top military commander in Gaza, reportedly do not follow directives from their politburo headquartered in Doha. Both have decided to go rogue and lead a faction within Hamas far from the political leadership and closer to Iran, where financial and military aid is more generous. For Iran, which always seeks influential and loyal proxies in the Middle East, Sinwar and Deif represented prime acquisitions. Iran found Hamas political leadership, which was also aligned with Turkey and Qatar, unreliable and not loyal enough. Tehran sought loyalists fully committed to the ayatollahs’ regime, controllable through financial and military aid.

The recent appointment of the new political chief was mainly the power play between Meshaal’s faction, which is closer to Sunni countries, and Sinwar’s faction, which is closer to the pro-Iranian axis. Ultimately, the internal struggle was resolved in favour of the latter.  Hamas as a group always maintains a degree of political and strategic independence, primarily focusing on Palestinian interests. It is not an Iranian proxy, like-Hezbollah which takes direct orders from Tehran but rather an ally of convenience, with a shared common enemy in Israel. But with the rise of Sinwar as the overall chief, Hamas has chosen the way of Hezbollah to become a proxy group rather than an organisation committed to a cause.

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Recent peace talks in Doha, Qatar, in the ongoing tensions in the Middle East have reignited a glimmer of hope of a temporary respite. Led by mediators from the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, these negotiations aim to broker a long-awaited ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. However, scepticism surrounds the talks, particularly because Hamas, the organization governing Gaza, is notably absent from the table. Hamas insists that any ceasefire must follow the roadmap proposed by US President Joe Biden on May 31, 2023. This roadmap outlines a three-step process aimed at reducing violence, exchanging prisoners, and rebuilding Gaza.

Biden’s plan is a strategic proposal developed in coordination with Israel. The first step requires the withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas in Gaza over six weeks, during which Hamas would release additional Israeli hostages taken during the October 7 attack. Simultaneously, Israel would free some Palestinian prisoners. The second phase involves the full release of all Israeli hostages and the complete withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Gaza. The third and final phase includes the reconstruction of Gaza, prioritizing housing for those whose homes have been destroyed, as well as providing additional relief to civilians affected by the conflict.

The Biden administration believes that successful implementation of this roadmap could prevent Iran from directly intervening, thereby avoiding a broader regional conflict. The hope is that temporary relief from violence will provide a foundation for future peace efforts. However, this optimism is overshadowed by a complex web of regional dynamics and unresolved grievances that have perpetuated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for decades.

Recent incidents further complicate the situation, notably the killings of prominent leaders from Hamas and Hezbollah, which have heightened tensions. On July 31, Ismail Haniya, Hamas’ political leader, was reportedly killed in a covert operation in Tehran, Iran’s capital. On the same day, Fuad Shukur, a senior commander of Hezbollah, was assassinated in Lebanon. Hamas and Iran have both accused Israel of orchestrating these assassinations. While Israel confirmed Shukur’s killing, it has denied involvement in Haniya’s death. These incidents have created a volatile atmosphere, as both Iran and Hezbollah have vowed to retaliate, raising the risk of a wider regional war.

Iran’s pledge to respond to Haniya’s death, combined with Hezbollah’s promise of revenge, has placed the entire region on edge. There is growing concern that a larger-scale conflict could erupt at any moment, with Israel as the primary target. In response, the United States, along with its European allies—France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—has sought to prevent such an escalation. These nations issued a joint statement warning Iran against attacking Israel, emphasizing that any aggression could trigger a major regional security crisis. Despite these diplomatic efforts, Iran has maintained its right to retaliate for what it views as an unprovoked attack on its ally.

Beyond the high-level geopolitical manoeuvres and strategic interests, the human cost of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is profound, particularly in Gaza. The ongoing Israeli airstrikes and military operations have resulted in the deaths of countless Palestinian civilians. Gaza, already suffering from a blockade and economic hardships, has seen its infrastructure further devastated by repeated Israeli bombardments. Schools, hospitals, and homes have been reduced to rubble, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian crisis.

The killing of Ismail Haniya, whether by Israel or other actors, has only intensified the suffering of the Palestinian people. Amidst the violence, civilians—women, children, and the elderly—continue to bear the brunt of the conflict. International organizations and humanitarian groups have called for an immediate ceasefire to allow aid to reach those in need, but Israel has thus far shown little inclination to halt its military operations.

One of the fundamental challenges in achieving peace in the Middle East is the deep-seated mistrust between the parties involved. Israel and Hamas, as well as their respective allies, have been locked in cycles of violence for decades. Attempts at ceasefires or peace agreements have repeatedly broken down, often due to provocations, miscommunications, or the refusal of one side to compromise on critical issues such as borders, settlements, and the status of Jerusalem.

The United States, while trying to play the role of mediator, has historically been seen as biased toward Israel, undermining its credibility in the eyes of many Palestinians and their supporters. Nonetheless, Washington’s involvement remains crucial, as the US has significant leverage over Israel, particularly in terms of military aid and diplomatic support. The success of the current talks in Doha largely depends on whether the US can pressure Israel to abide by the terms of the ceasefire and allow meaningful reconstruction efforts in Gaza.

At the same time, regional powers like Iran and Turkey, both of which support Hamas, must also be engaged in any long-term peace process. Without their buy-in, any ceasefire agreement risks being short-lived. Iran, in particular, has significant influence over both Hamas and Hezbollah, and its involvement will be crucial in preventing further escalation.

The Palestinian struggle for self-determination remains at the core of the conflict. For Palestinians, peace cannot merely be the cessation of hostilities but must also include justice—an end to the occupation, the recognition of Palestinian sovereignty, and the right of return for refugees. Any peace agreement that fails to address these fundamental issues will not hold, as it will be seen as legitimizing Israel’s continued control over Palestinian land and resources.

International support for Palestinian rights has grown in recent years, with many civil society groups, human rights organizations, and even governments calling for an end to the occupation and the establishment of a viable, independent Palestinian state. These voices argue that sustainable peace in the Middle East is only possible if the Palestinian people are given the same rights and freedoms that others in the region enjoy.

As peace talks unfold in Doha, the world watches to see whether they will bring temporary relief or pave the way for a more lasting resolution. While the Biden roadmap offers a structured plan for de-escalation, its success depends on the willingness of all parties—Israel, Hamas, and their regional allies—to engage in genuine dialogue and compromise. However, the road to peace in the Middle East is fraught with challenges, and the deep historical, political, and social divisions between Israelis and Palestinians cannot be ignored. Peace, if it comes, will require not only diplomatic efforts but also a commitment to justice and equality for the Palestinian people.

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On August 1, 2024, Bangladesh took a decisive step in its fight against terrorism and extremism by officially banning the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir. This action, undertaken under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009, follows widespread unrest and violent protests related to the quota system for government jobs, which the government has attributed to the instigation by these fundamentalist groups. The turmoil led to the deaths of at least 150 people, prompting the government to take severe measures to restore order and security.

The ban was formalized through a gazette notification from the Public Security Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Citing Section 18(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the notification stated that the government had sufficient evidence of Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Chhatra Shibir’s involvement in recent acts of violence and terrorism.

The government underscored its decision with references to previous verdicts by the International Crimes Tribunal, which found several Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) leaders guilty of severe crimes during the 1971 Liberation War. The tribunal’s findings included charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, particularly implicating former Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer Ghulam Azam.

Additionally, the government’s notification referenced a 2013 High Court ruling, later upheld by the Supreme Court in 2023, which declared JeI’s registration with the Election Commission illegal. This judicial backdrop provided a strong legal foundation for the government’s recent actions. The Law Minister, Anisul Huq, confirmed that JeI and its affiliates would no longer be permitted to engage in political activities under their existing names, marking a significant shift in the political landscape of Bangladesh.

International reactions have been mixed. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, a government newspaper in Russia, published a headline stating, “Bangladesh Declares Jamaat-e-Islami a Terrorist Organisation,” highlighting that JeI has been banned in Russia since 2003.

The history of Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh is marked by its contentious role during the 1971 war of independence. Founded by Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, JeI was notorious for its opposition to Bangladeshi independence and collaboration with Pakistani forces. The party and its associated groups, including the Razakar, Al-Badr, Al-Shams, and the Peace Committee, were implicated in numerous atrocities against Bengali freedom fighters and the Hindu community. Initially banned by the government of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Jamaat-e-Islami was later allowed to resume activities in 1976 under the military regime of General Ziaur Rahman.

Despite its controversial past, Jamaat-e-Islami has found defenders on the international stage. The United States has historically advocated for JeI’s inclusion in the political process, opposing bans and supporting the party’s right to participate in elections. This stance contrasts sharply with the support from the Soviet Union and India for Bangladesh’s independence and their condemnation of JeI’s actions during the Liberation War.

The unrest that catalyzed the recent ban began on July 17, when student protests demanding reforms in the quota system for government jobs were allegedly hijacked by Jamaat-e-Islami and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has known connections to Al Qaeda. The protests escalated into widespread violence, causing significant damage to public property and disrupting the internet, resulting in economic losses estimated at over $7 billion.

Following the announcement of the ban, Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) activists attempted to mobilize protests across the country. In anticipation of further unrest, law enforcement agencies have been instructed to seal the offices of the banned organizations and their publication house. This response is aimed at preventing Jamaat-e-Islami and its affiliates from regrouping and continuing their activities under different guises.

The reaction from Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) was swift and defiant. On July 30, Jamaat chief Shafiqur Rahman condemned the decision, labelling it as illegal, unauthorized, and unconstitutional. He argued that the 14-party alliance led by the Awami League did not have the authority to ban another political party, warning that such actions could lead to political chaos and the erosion of state order.

The decision to ban Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and its affiliates Islami Chhatra Shibir has been met with mixed reactions. Supporters of the move argue that it is a necessary step to combat terrorism and ensure national security. They believe that JeI’s history of violence and extremism justifies its exclusion from the political arena. Critics, however, are concerned about the implications for political freedoms and the potential for increased repression of dissenting voices. They warn that banning a political party, even one with a controversial past, sets a dangerous precedent that could be exploited to silence opposition.

The coming months will be crucial in determining the long-term impact of this decision. The government will need to manage the immediate fallout and address the root causes of unrest and discontent. Effective communication and transparent governance will be key in maintaining public trust and preventing further violence. Additionally, the international community will be watching closely, with some likely to support the ban as a necessary security measure, while others may criticize it as a violation of democratic principles.

In summary, the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir represents a significant development in Bangladesh’s ongoing struggle against terrorism and extremism. It reflects the government’s commitment to maintaining security and order, even as it raises important questions about the balance between security and political freedom. The outcome of this decision will shape Bangladesh’s political landscape and its approach to counterterrorism for years to come.

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Dubai lost a national treasure and I lost an old/cherished friend on July 8th. Dr. Ram Buxani had come to Dubai as a teenager in 1959 by ship and witnessed the meteoric growth of the emirate from an obscure Gulf trading port to one of the world’s most happening urban hubs, Arabia’s most globalized and networked haven.

Dr. Ram’s social and business career was an adventure straight out of the Arabian Nights. He rose to become the Chairman of ITL Cosmos and one of India’s leading businessmen, philanthropist and social venture capitalist in the Gulf. He co-founded a private bank in India with the Hinduja family after obtaining a license from then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in the early 1990’s. He was founder and one time Chairman of both the India Club and the Indian High School in Dubai. He had a deep and profound love for Sindhi language, culture, literature, drama and folklore as he was born in the province that was India in the early 1940’s but Pakistan two decades later when I was born in Karachi, once the Sindhi Jerusalem.

I spent countless hours in Dr. Ram’s office in the heart of Bur Dubai’s Meena Bazaar and his villa in Jumeirah listening to my friend relate anecdotes about the history of Dubai, the global Sindhi diaspora and the making of modern India.

Dr. Ram Buxani met every Indian Prime Minister who visited the UAE on a state visit, from Indira Gandhi to Narendra Modi. He was as brilliant a raconteur as he was a connoisseur of art, literature and aesthetics. His memorial service on July 12th was both a moment of profound sadness at seeing his bereaved family as well as deep joy at the celebration of his amazing life. The Indian Ambassador to the UAE quoted exquisite poetry to mourn the passing of this rare human being. The Indian Consul General in Dubai read out testimonials to Dr. Ram’s community service and philanthropy from no less than six predecessors. His daughter sang a wistful song about a father’s lost love and one of his granddaughters reduced me to tears when she spoke about her love for Nana, who had encouraged her to publish her first book at the age of 12.

Dr. Ram’s own book “Taking the High Road” is a vivid account of his memories and adventures in the Dubai I remember so well from my boyhood in the 1970’s. It was really a milestone for me when Dr. Ram first called me to his office to have tea and discuss the global financial markets as I remember when he used to be the chief guest at our school prize distribution ceremony, only my modest scholastic talents were insufficient to ever be handed out a prize by him – and now, he was asking me to inflict my views on rates, currencies and macro themes to him while his CFO took notes.

Dr. Ram taught me that all enlightened souls embrace humane values and view the human family from a prism that scorns communal bigotry and seeks the divine in the quest for ultimate knowledge. RIP, my dear friend.

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As global economic dynamics shift, emerging economies seek new opportunities for growth and influence. A notable development is the BRICS coalition, originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With its recent expansion, the BRICS framework has introduced the concept of BRICS+, aiming for deeper and more flexible economic integration. This article explores the differences between BRICS and BRICS+, and examines the potential benefits for Bangladesh should it join this influential group.

Recently, BRICS welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, demonstrating its commitment to broader inclusion. This expansion enhances BRICS’ global influence, making it a more formidable economic bloc. Currently, 15 more countries have expressed interest in joining, including Bahrain, Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Senegal, and Venezuela.

The expansion of BRICS offers short-term benefits, like an enlarged platform and increased international influence. However, it also presents long-term challenges, including the need for clear criteria for new members and potential difficulties in reaching consensus among a larger group. BRICS+, with its emphasis on regional integration, promises greater economic dividends through more flexible and dynamic cooperation mechanisms.

In the investment sphere, BRICS+ can generate significant multiplier effects by enhancing the potential GDP growth rates of core BRICS economies and their regional partners through connectivity projects. These projects, financed by regional development banks and institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB), can boost long-term trade potential and foster stronger intra-regional growth impulses. Enhanced regional connectivity can lay the foundation for sustained economic growth across the Global South.

BRICS+ offers substantial benefits in terms of anti-crisis stimuli. Coordinated efforts and investments through regional integration arrangements and development institutions can amplify economic stimuli, boosting demand in core BRICS economies and their regional partners. This coordinated approach can lead to a more robust and resilient economic environment, supporting sustained growth and stability.

Bangladesh’s interest in joining BRICS aligns with its strategic objectives of diversifying economic partnerships, enhancing its role in regional and global trade, and securing a stable and sustainable growth trajectory. With robust economic growth, increasing industrialization, and a strategic geographic location, Bangladesh is a promising candidate for BRICS membership.

Over the past decade, Bangladesh has achieved remarkable economic progress, maintaining an average GDP growth rate of around 6-7%. The country is emerging as a key player in the global textile industry, being the second-largest apparel exporter after China. This robust economic performance underscores Bangladesh’s potential as a valuable addition to the BRICS alliance.

One of Bangladesh’s strategic objectives is to diversify its economic partnerships. By joining BRICS, Bangladesh can access a wider range of economic opportunities and reduce its dependency on traditional markets in the West. This diversification is crucial for mitigating risks associated with global market fluctuations and ensuring long-term economic stability.

Joining BRICS could open new avenues for investment in Bangladesh. The BRICS countries, with their significant economic resources, could provide substantial financial and technical assistance. Enhanced access to the New Development Bank (NDB) would facilitate infrastructure development projects, crucial for sustaining Bangladesh’s growth momentum. Such investments can drive significant improvements in infrastructure, boosting economic productivity and competitiveness.

Bangladesh could benefit from technological transfers and industrial collaborations with BRICS countries, particularly in areas such as information technology, renewable energy, and manufacturing. Such partnerships could enhance Bangladesh’s industrial capabilities and foster innovation, driving long-term economic growth. The exchange of technology and expertise can accelerate Bangladesh’s transition to a more industrialized and technologically advanced economy.

As a member of BRICS, Bangladesh would gain a stronger voice in international forums, contributing to shaping global economic policies. This enhanced geopolitical influence would support Bangladesh’s aspirations to play a more prominent role in regional and global affairs. Being part of BRICS would also enable Bangladesh to collaborate more effectively with other major emerging economies, amplifying its impact on global economic and political decisions.

China, a key player in BRICS, has expressed strong support for Bangladesh’s bid to join the alliance. During a visit to Bangladesh, Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Relations of the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s Central Committee, reaffirmed China’s commitment to fostering extensive cooperation with Bangladesh. He assured that China would positively consider Bangladesh’s inclusion in BRICS and support its economic growth through various means, including continued market access and assistance with the Rohingya crisis.

In April 2024, Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira visited Bangladesh and expressed Brazil’s serious consideration of Bangladesh’s interest in joining BRICS. He highlighted shared principles and positions between the two countries, reinforcing the potential for Bangladesh’s inclusion. This diplomatic engagement underscores the growing recognition of Bangladesh’s economic and strategic importance within the BRICS framework.

Bangladesh’s strategic objectives include diversifying its economic partnerships, enhancing its role in regional and global trade, and securing a stable and sustainable growth trajectory. Joining BRICS could facilitate new avenues for investment, technological collaboration, and enhanced geopolitical influence.

BRICS membership could provide Bangladesh with access to significant financial resources for infrastructure development. The New Development Bank (NDB) and regional development banks within the BRICS framework could play a crucial role in financing projects that enhance connectivity and economic productivity. Such investments are vital for sustaining Bangladesh’s growth momentum and achieving its Vision 2041 goals of becoming a high-income country.

Bangladesh could benefit from technological transfers and industrial collaborations with BRICS countries. Partnerships in information technology, renewable energy, and manufacturing could drive innovation and industrial growth in Bangladesh. Access to advanced technologies and expertise from BRICS nations can accelerate Bangladesh’s transition to a more industrialized and technologically advanced economy.

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On June 25, Liu Jianchao, the visiting Minister of the International Relations of the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s Central Committee reaffirmed China’s commitment to fostering extensive cooperation with Bangladesh. During a courtesy call on Bangladesh President Mohammed Shahabuddin at the Bangabhaban, Liu emphasized China’s dedication to bolstering development ties and assured that China would continue to support Bangladesh’s growth in various sectors.

The relationship between Bangladesh and China is deeply rooted in history. President Shahabuddin expressed his hope for a stronger development partnership with China in the coming years. He also sought China’s support for Bangladesh’s bid to join the BRICS alliance, an intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates.

“China always attaches great importance to bolster the development ties with Bangladesh. It will always be beside Bangladesh’s development,” Liu stated, underscoring China’s enthusiasm for a collaborative future. He praised Bangladesh’s notable progress in infrastructure, information technology, communication, energy, and tourism. This recognition from a major global player like China highlights the significant strides Bangladesh has made in these fields.

President Shahabuddin reciprocated the sentiment, acknowledging China as one of Bangladesh’s most crucial development partners. He highlighted China’s instrumental role in implementing mega projects such as the Padma Bridge Rail Link, Karnaphuli Tunnel, and Elevated Expressway. These projects have been pivotal in accelerating Bangladesh’s economic development and enhancing its infrastructure.

Liu Jianchao informed Bangladesh that China is in favour of the expansion of BRICS and will strongly support Bangladesh in becoming a partner country. He also assured that China would positively consider allowing “Duty Free Quota Free” (DFQF) facilities to Bangladesh beyond 2026.

Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Hasan Mahmud reported that the Chinese minister also assured Bangladesh of continued Chinese support for a durable solution to the Rohingya crisis through repatriation. The foreign minister expressed satisfaction with the increased party-level engagements between the Bangladesh Awami League and the Communist Party of China.

While thanking the Chinese government for allowing DFQF market access for 98% of Bangladeshi products into the Chinese market, Hasan requested China to continue the DFQF access beyond 2026, when Bangladesh will graduate from the LDC status. He also emphasized more exports from Bangladesh, especially pharmaceuticals, ceramics, leather, and agricultural products, to China to reduce the trade imbalance.

Mentioning the last meeting between Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August 2023, Hasan requested Chinese support for Bangladesh to become a partner country of BRICS.

Bangladesh’s interest in joining BRICS aligns with its strategic objectives of diversifying economic partnerships, enhancing its role in regional and global trade, and securing a stable and sustainable growth trajectory. With robust economic growth, increasing industrialization, and a strategic geographic location, Bangladesh stands as a promising candidate for BRICS membership.

Over the past decade, Bangladesh has achieved remarkable economic progress, maintaining an average GDP growth rate of around 6-7%. The country has emerged as a key player in the global textile industry, being the second-largest apparel exporter after China. The government’s Vision 2041 aims to transform Bangladesh into a high-income country by leveraging industrial growth, technological innovation, and human capital development.

Joining BRICS could open new avenues for investment in Bangladesh. The BRICS countries, with their significant economic resources, could provide substantial financial and technical assistance. Enhanced access to the New Development Bank (NDB) would facilitate infrastructure development projects, crucial for sustaining Bangladesh’s growth momentum.

BRICS membership would enable Bangladesh to diversify its trade partnerships beyond its traditional markets in the West. Increased trade with BRICS nations could reduce dependency on any single economic bloc, mitigating risks associated with global market fluctuations.

Bangladesh could benefit from technological transfers and industrial collaborations with BRICS countries, particularly in areas such as information technology, renewable energy, and manufacturing. Such partnerships could enhance Bangladesh’s industrial capabilities and foster innovation.

As a member of BRICS, Bangladesh would gain a stronger voice in international forums, contributing to shaping global economic policies. This enhanced geopolitical influence would support Bangladesh’s aspirations to play a more prominent role in regional and global affairs.

Earlier in April 2024, Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira visited Bangladesh and expressed his country’s positive consideration of Bangladesh’s interest in joining BRICS. “Bangladesh is a country we closely monitor, with shared principles and positions. We will strongly and positively consider its inclusion in BRICS from our side,” Vieira remarked during a joint media briefing with Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister, Hasan Mahmud.

Foreign Minister Mahmud reiterated Bangladesh’s interest in joining BRICS, emphasizing the country’s strategic objectives and economic potential. This support from Brazil, a key BRICS member, underscores the potential for Bangladesh to gain entry into this influential group of emerging economies.

The recent engagements between Bangladesh and China, along with Bangladesh’s aspirations to join BRICS, reflect the country’s proactive approach to enhancing its global economic partnerships and securing a sustainable growth trajectory. China’s continued support and cooperation will play a vital role in Bangladesh’s development journey.

As Bangladesh moves forward with its Vision 2041, the collaboration with China and potential BRICS membership could provide significant impetus for achieving its economic goals. The focus on infrastructure development, technological innovation, and diversified trade partnerships will be crucial in transforming Bangladesh into a high-income country and a key player in the global economy.

China’s support for Bangladesh’s bid to join BRICS is not just a diplomatic gesture but a strategic alignment of interests. The collaborative projects already in place between the two nations serve as a testament to what can be achieved through mutual cooperation. The Padma Bridge Rail Link, Karnaphuli Tunnel, and Elevated Expressway are just a few examples of the infrastructural marvels that have not only enhanced connectivity within Bangladesh but also positioned it as a critical player in the regional economic landscape.

The article Bangladesh Seeks China’s Backing for BRICS Membership Bid appeared first on Arabian Post.

Even by Israeli standards, Uri Tzafon (Awaken North) is a far-right fringe group. Amid mounting tension with Lebanese Shiite political group and militia, Hezbollah, along the Lebanon-Israel border, Uri Tzafon is calling for Israeli settlement of southern Lebanon.

The group has yet to gain traction. Uri Tzafon’s membership is in the low teens. Less than 300 people attended the group’s recent online conference. Few, if any, of the 80,000 Israelis who were evacuated in October from their homes in northern Israel because of daily exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and the Israeli military have expressed support for Uri Tzafon. On the Lebanese side of the border, 90,000 people were forced to leave their homes.

Ultra-nationalists, including Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, proponents of annexation of Palestinian lands and an all-out war with Lebanon, have steered clear of a group that, even for their taste, is an outlier. Uri Tzafon’s fringe status is telling in a country that is accelerating annexation of the West Bank, and many call for reoccupation of Gaza. Even so, Uri Tzafon echoes a principle that is becoming more prominent among Israelis, including soldiers serving in Gaza. The principle is whoever attacks Israel risks losing their land.

The group finds Biblical justification for its claims in Deuteronomy 3:25. Describing Moses’ appeal to God to allow him to enter the Promised Land, the chapter quotes the prophet as saying, “Let me go over and see the good land beyond the Jordan—that fine hill country and Lebanon.”

Last week, Uri Tzafon sent drones and balloons into southern Lebanon carrying eviction notices to the region’s residents. “The announcements make clear to the residents that they are in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people, and that they are required to evacuate immediately,” the group said in a statement. Uri Tzafon’s fortunes could change if nine months of cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in the wake of Hamas’ October 7 attack and Israel’s response escalate into a full-fledged war.

Israel has increasingly insisted that the presence of Hezbollah on its border is no longer tenable. Based on United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 adopted in 2006 to end the then war, Israel is demanding that Hezbollah redeploy to north of the Litani River, 30 kilometers from the border. “We are approaching the point where a decision will have to be made, and the (Israeli military) is prepared and very ready for this decision,” Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said while touring an army base in northern Israel.

In his first sit-down interview on Israeli television since the Gaza war erupted, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the military’s focus could shift to Lebanon because the “intense phase of the war with Hamas is about to end.”

The prime minister said the shift would be, “First of all, for protection purposes, and secondly, to bring our residents home as well. If we can do it politically, that would be great. If not, we will do it in another way, but we will bring everyone back home – all the residents of the north and the south.” Netanyahu was referring to Israeli evacuees from the Lebanese border as well as areas adjacent to Gaza.

In December, Netanyahu threatened to do to Lebanon what Israel has done to Gaza. “If Hezbollah chooses to start an all-out war, then it will, by its own hand, turn Beirut and southern Lebanon… into Gaza,” Netanyahu said.

Hezbollah has rejected any discussion of border arrangements until a ceasefire in Gaza is implemented. Last week, Israel said it had finalised plans for a Lebanon offensive after Hezbollah drones successfully evaded Israeli air defences and penetrated the country’s airspace to film military installations and critical infrastructure.

In response, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned that his group would fight with “no rules and no red lines.”

Nasrallah added, “The enemy knows well that we have prepared ourselves for the worst… and that no place across the Zionist entity will be spared by our missiles and drones.”

Raising the stakes, Lebanese whistleblowers reportedly revealed that weapons, including a highly explosive and toxic white powder known as RDX, arriving on flights from Iran were stored at Beirut airport. The whistleblowers alleged that there was an increased presence of Hezbollah commanders at the airport. Lebanon’s Hezbollah-backed caretaker Public Works and Transport Minister Alli Hamieh was quick to deny the allegation.

With Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant visiting Washington for talks with Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and other senior officials, the Biden administration appears to have another chance to avoid an escalation that could provoke a regional Middle East war. “The meetings with the senior (US) government officials are critical for the future of the war” in Gaza and Lebanon, Gallant said as he departed for Washington.

Last week, President Joe Biden’s Middle East envoy, Adam Hochstein, failed to reduce tensions in talks in Jerusalem and Beirut. Gallant’s visit comes amid a public spat between Biden and Netanyahu after the Israeli prime minister accused the president’s administration of holding up arms shipments to Israel.

US officials said they don’t know what Netanyahu is talking about. If Netanyahu is correct, resuming the shipments could be the carrot US officials dangle to achieve Israeli restraint in Lebanon. It would allow Netanyahu, pressured by his far-right coalition partners and mass protests calling for his resignation, to project himself as having stood up to the United States.

Uri Tzafon’s antecedents suggest that one ignores the group at one’s peril. Its call for settlement of southern Lebanon echoes a call by Gush Emunim or Bloc of the Faithful, the original ultra-nationalist West Bank settlers’ movement that called for the return to the “homeland of the tribe of Asher” during the 1982 Lebanon war. Asher is one of Judaism’s ten lost tribes.

Like Uri Tzafon, Gush Emunim was a fringe group created in 1974. Fifty years later, West Bank settlers are a powerful political force in Israel. Ben Gvir and Smotrich are among the 750,000 Israelis that live in West Bank settlements today.

Daniella Weiss, a one-time Gush Emunim leader, and Yehudit Katzover, a settlement activist in the 1970s and 1980s, were among the speakers at the Uri Tzafon conference. “There are many obstacles, but we will bang our heads against the wall, and the wall will break. In Lebanon as well,” said Weiss, who is on the frontline of the campaign to resettle Gaza.

Weiss and Katzover “are one of the success stories of Israel’s last half-century – and if they’re joining the movement to settle South Lebanon, who are we to call them delusional?…  They’ve already proved that in Israel, today’s delusions are tomorrow’s policy and the next day its reality,” said Israeli journalist Anschel Pfeffer.

This post first appeared on The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey

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Bangladesh’s economy faces multiple challenges, said the International Monetary Fund in its latest report. Bangladesh’s economy is suffering from liquidity shortage and high inflationary pressure as its currency lost value by 38.23 percent from BTk85 per US dollar in March 2022 to BTk117.5 per dollar in June 2024.

“Stubbornly high international commodity prices and continued global financial tightening have amplified macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Although the current account remains compressed, a sudden reversal of the financial account has kept foreign exchange (FX) reserves and the Taka under pressure. In response to these pressures, the authorities have recently undertaken bold exchange rate reforms,” IMF said in its communique on Monday.

Bangladesh’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth slowed to 4.8 percent in the first half of the financial year 2024, while headline inflation reached a decade high of 9.7 percent year-on-year in April 2024, it observed.

“Looking ahead, real GDP growth is projected at 5.4 percent in FY24, owing to the ongoing import compression and policy tightening, and will pick up to 6.6 percent in FY25 as imports rebound and FX pressures ease,” IMF said.

“Inflation is projected to remain elevated at approximately 9.4 percent in FY24 but is anticipated to decline to around 7.2 percent in FY25, on the back of the continued tighter policy mix and projected lower global food and commodity prices. Following the exchange rate realignment, gross international reserves (GIR) are projected to gradually increase. Nonetheless, uncertainties around the outlook remain high and risks are tilted to the downside.”

In a recent economic update, the World Bank said, “Persistent inflation eroded consumer purchasing power, while investment was dampened by tight liquidity conditions, rising interest rates, import restrictions, and increased input costs stemming from upward revisions in administered energy prices.”

Bangladesh’s Current Account Deficit narrowed in FY23 and moved into surplus in the first seven months of FY24, driven by import suppression measures, World Bank noted. “But the Balance of Payments deficit widened to US$ 8.2 billion in FY23 and US$ 4.7 billion in the first seven months of FY24, as the financial account deficit widened further. Continued intervention in the forex market by Bangladesh Bank, resulted in gross foreign exchange reserves declining by US$4.0 billion so far in FY24, reaching US$ 20.8 billion in February 2024.”

The IMF has granted immediate access to about US$928 million under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF), following an economic review. The IMF Executive Board also concluded the second review of Bangladesh’s arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), making available about US$220 million to support Bangladesh’s ambitious climate change agenda.

The ECF/EFF arrangement has helped to prevent disruptive adjustments to restore macroeconomic stability and to protect the vulnerable, while laying the foundations for strong, inclusive, and environmentally sustainable growth. The concurrent RSF arrangement has supplemented the resources made available under the ECF/EFF to expand the fiscal space to finance the authorities’ climate investment priorities, help catalyze additional financing, and build resilience against climate risks.

Antoinette M. Sayeh, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair of the IMF, said, “Bangladesh’s economy is navigating multiple macroeconomic challenges. Even in the difficult environment, programme performance has been broadly on track and the authorities remain committed to undertaking the necessary policy actions and reforms. The IMF-supported programme is helping to safeguard macroeconomic stability and protect the vulnerable, while helping to accelerate economic reforms to deliver strong, inclusive, and green growth.

“Near-term policies should focus on rebuilding external resilience and bringing down inflation. The authorities’ recent actions to realign the exchange rate and implement the new exchange rate arrangement are welcome. Periodic reviews of the crawling peg would be important to ensure its effectiveness. Continued monetary and fiscal policy tightening would help to rein in inflation. Should external and inflationary pressures intensify, a further tightening in policies is warranted.

“Efforts to raise tax revenues and rationalise expenditure, including by reducing subsidies are crucial to generate the much-needed fiscal space to enhance social, development and climate initiatives. Sustained efforts to strengthen public financial and investment management, along with enhanced state-owned enterprise oversight are essential to improve spending efficiency and mitigate fiscal risks.

“Sustained structural reforms are required to achieve Bangladesh’s goal of reaching upper middle-income country status by 2031. Diversifying exports, attracting more foreign direct investment, and strengthening governance are key.”

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