From reaction to prevention: India’s five-year turn against radicalisation

For much of independent India’s history, the security response to communal violence and terrorism
was essentially reactive: an attack occurred, intelligence agencies investigated it, police made
arrests, and security forces moved in after violence had already begun.
Over the past five years, however, India’s counter-terrorism architecture has been moving towards a
different philosophy — detect radicalisation early, disrupt recruitment before violence occurs,
intervene with vulnerable individuals, and build resilience within communities.
That shift is important because the nature of the threat has changed. Terrorism is no longer only
about men crossing borders with weapons. Radicalisation can begin in a neighbourhood, a prison, a
university, a chat group or an encrypted online platform.
The rise of ISIS after 2014 and the spread of social-media propaganda created the possibility of self-
radicalised individuals operating without direct contact with a conventional terrorist organisation.
The government itself has acknowledged that online radicalisation, encrypted communications, the
dark web and cryptocurrencies have altered the security environment.
The institutional change is visible. The Ministry of Home Affairs has a dedicated Counter-Terrorism
and Counter-Radicalisation Division, operating alongside the legal and investigative machinery built
around the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and the National Investigation Agency.
More recently, the Home Ministry issued a July 2025 advisory to states and prison authorities calling
for de-radicalisation programmes and counselling in prisons. It warned that prisons can become
environments in which isolation, group dynamics and lack of supervision facilitate radicalisation. This
is the essence of the new approach: security is increasingly being conceived as prevention rather
than merely punishment.
India's experience explains why. Since Partition, the country has witnessed repeated episodes of
Hindu-Muslim communal violence. There is no single universally accepted number of "major riots"
because different databases use different definitions and death estimates. But the historical record
includes Ahmedabad in 1969, Bhiwandi and Jamshedpur in the 1970s, Moradabad in 1980, Nellie in
1983, Bhiwandi and Bombay in 1984, Bhagalpur in 1989, the violence following the demolition of the
Babri Masjid in 1992-93 and Gujarat in 2002. Academic research describes communal riots as a
recurring feature of India's post-Independence social history.
The violence was not confined to one community as victim or perpetrator. The 1984 anti-Sikh
massacre, for example, was a devastating reminder that communal violence in India cannot be

reduced to a simple Hindu-Muslim binary. The 2008 Kandhamal violence affected Christians.
Northeastern and ethnic conflicts have their own histories and causes.
The lesson is therefore larger than communal politics: when religious or ethnic identity becomes a
vehicle for political mobilisation, violence can spread rapidly once institutions lose control.
Terrorism presents a different but overlapping challenge. Islamist terrorist organisations have
carried out some of India's most devastating attacks, including the 1993 Mumbai serial bombings,
the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks and numerous attacks connected to jihadist
organisations operating in or from Pakistan. The rise of ISIS and Al-Qaeda-inspired networks
subsequently added the danger of online recruitment and individual radicalisation.
But it would be analytically wrong to equate terrorism with Islam or Muslims. India has also suffered
terrorism and insurgency from Khalistani extremists, Maoists, northeastern insurgent groups and
other separatist organisations. The official record itself treats terrorism, Left-Wing Extremism,
insurgency and communal violence as distinct security problems.
Indeed, the government's own counter-terrorism statistics show how dramatically the security
landscape has changed. Ministry of Home Affairs data placed terrorist incidents at 259 in 2018, 160
in 2019, 113 in 2020, 164 in 2021, 196 in 2022 and 29 in 2023. Independent terrorism databases
produce different numbers because their definitions and geographical coverage differ, but they too
show a long-term decline from the peaks of the 2000s.
The government therefore argues that the country is moving from containment to dismantling the
entire ecosystem supporting terrorism — recruitment, financing, infiltration, propaganda and
logistics.
There is also a political dimension to this transformation. The BJP government has increasingly
spoken about restoring Hindu civilisational confidence, invoking Sanatan Dharma, India's ancient
cultural traditions and, among sections of its political constituency, the idea of a Hindu Rashtra.
Supporters regard this as an attempt to restore dignity to an identity they believe was weakened by
centuries of foreign rule, first under various Islamic dynasties and later under British colonialism.
But history becomes dangerous when it is converted into collective blame. The Mughal period
cannot be reduced to Aurangzeb alone, just as British rule cannot be reduced to religious
oppression. India's Muslim population is not responsible for the actions of medieval rulers, nor
should contemporary Indian Muslims be treated as inheritors of guilt for terrorism committed by
extremist organisations. That distinction is essential to the success of any counter-radicalisation
strategy.
India is home to roughly 1.4 billion people, with Hindus forming the overwhelming majority and
Muslims constituting the country's largest religious minority. The last completed Census, in 2011,
recorded Muslims at about 14.2% of the population. There is no credible basis for treating the entire
Muslim population as a security constituency. Nor is there credible evidence that Muslims as a
community are engaged in a coordinated effort to increase their numbers through conversion or an

organised "anti-India" campaign. Radicalisation is an ideology, not a religion.; That is precisely why
preventive security must distinguish between ordinary religious belief and violent extremism.
The five-year transformation is therefore potentially more significant than another increase in police
powers. The objective is to identify vulnerable individuals before they become terrorists; monitor
recruitment networks rather than merely arrest recruits; disrupt terror financing before money
reaches an attacker; work with families and community leaders; counsel prisoners exposed to
extremist ideology; and give people vulnerable to extremist recruitment alternative social identities
and opportunities.
The same philosophy can be seen in India's campaign against Left-Wing Extremism. The
government's 2015 National Policy and Action Plan combines security operations with development,
infrastructure, connectivity, rights and entitlements. The government says LWE violence has fallen
sharply and that 60 districts were freed from the problem over the five years to 2024.
That is the model India increasingly appears to be applying more broadly: security plus development,
intelligence plus intervention, enforcement plus rehabilitation.
The challenge will be maintaining the delicate constitutional balance. Preventive security can
become counterproductive if ordinary dissent, religious conservatism or political opposition is
casually labelled radicalisation. Surveillance without accountability can generate alienation —
precisely the condition extremists exploit. (IPA Service)