By Girish Linganna

The prisoner-hostage exchange between Israel and Hamas has been completed successfully, and many are calling it a major victory for peace. Twenty Israeli hostages returned home in exchange for about 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, aid started flowing back into Gaza, and guns fell silent after months of devastating conflict. But anyone familiar with Middle Eastern peace processes knows that swapping prisoners is the easy part. The real test of whether this ceasefire can transform into lasting peace has only just begun, and history suggests we should not be too optimistic.

The current peace plan is structured in three phases. The first phase, which we have just witnessed, involved the hostage exchange and a temporary halt to fighting. The second phase demands something far more difficult—the complete disarming of Hamas, including verified destruction of weapons, closure of underground tunnels, and constant international inspections. The third phase envisions rebuilding Gaza’s governance structure under international supervision, eventually paving the way for a Palestinian state. On paper, it sounds reasonable. In practice, it faces obstacles that have destroyed every previous peace attempt in this region.

Phase 1 succeeded for straightforward reasons. Both sides had done prisoner exchanges before, so the process was familiar and relatively simple to execute. Israel wanted its hostages back and needed to show the world it supported peace efforts. Hamas wanted its prisoners released and humanitarian aid restored without appearing to have surrendered. The entire process was transparent, with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey acting as mediators, the United States providing guarantees, and international organizations like the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs managing the logistics. When both parties get what they want through a well-understood mechanism, success becomes much more likely.

But everything changes when we move beyond exchanges to actual disarmament and governance. Hamas has already made clear it has no intention of surrendering its weapons. For Hamas, those weapons represent survival as an organization and proof that armed resistance forced Israel to negotiate. Asking Hamas to disarm completely is like asking it to commit organizational suicide. Why would any group voluntarily give up the very thing that gives it power and relevance, especially when it believes those weapons are the only reason Israel came to the negotiating table?

The disarmament phase also requires an intrusive verification system that Gaza has never successfully implemented. Inspectors would need to check warehouses daily, monitor tunnel entrances, audit government purchases, and ensure that construction materials like cement and steel pipes are not diverted to rebuild military infrastructure. Israel’s experience with dual-use restrictions—items that can serve both civilian and military purposes—shows how complicated and controversial this becomes. Every bag of cement becomes a potential security threat. Every water pipe could be turned into a rocket. This level of scrutiny inevitably slows reconstruction, frustrates ordinary Palestinians trying to rebuild their lives, and creates resentment about foreign powers controlling every detail of Gaza’s economy.

The governance challenge in Phase 3 is equally daunting. The plan calls for Gaza to be managed temporarily by technocrats—experts chosen and approved by international powers—under something called the Board of Peace. The European Union wants to join this board, but fundamental questions remain unanswered. Who exactly will these technocrats be? What authority will they really have? How will they collect taxes, pay salaries, or enforce laws if Hamas still controls neighbourhoods through fear and parallel governing structures? The Palestinian Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank, has a troubled relationship with Gaza and limited credibility there. Creating a functioning government from scratch, in a place where Hamas has ruled for years and still has weapons and loyal supporters, is an almost impossible task.

Three powerful forces have both the ability and the motivation to sabotage this peace process before it reaches completion. First, Hamas itself benefits from keeping things unstable. Even if it publicly agrees to cooperate, it can maintain shadow networks—secret salary payments to loyalists, control over smuggling tunnels, illegal taxes at border crossings, and hidden weapon stockpiles. Hamas does not need to launch a major attack to undermine peace. Small provocations, occasional rocket fire, or planting bombs to test boundaries can be enough to trigger Israeli military responses, which then give Hamas an excuse to abandon the peace process while blaming Israel for aggression.

Second, Israel’s far-right political groups strongly oppose any plan that could lead to an independent Palestinian state. These groups represent a significant portion of Israel’s governing coalition, and they use multiple tactics to block progress. They pressure the government to avoid making concessions, push for new settlement construction in disputed areas, pass laws that prevent land transfers, and organize provocative actions designed to bring Israeli security forces back into places they had withdrawn from. They also run sophisticated media campaigns portraying international peace monitors as foreign meddlers interfering in Israel’s sovereign decisions. When enough Israelis believe that UN inspectors or European observers are biased against their country, it becomes politically impossible for Israeli leaders to cooperate fully with international verification systems.

Third, Iran has strategic interests in keeping Israel distracted and weakened without spending much of its own resources. It does this by supporting proxy groups—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi rebels in Yemen, militias in Syria and Iraq—and by funnelling money and weapons into Gaza through smuggling networks that are extremely difficult to completely shut down. Iran does not need Hamas to launch a major war. It just needs enough instability to justify its own regional influence and prevent the kind of Israeli-Arab normalization that would isolate Iran diplomatically. Even under international inspections, Iran has proven skilled at smuggling weapons components that can be assembled later or hiding dual-use materials that pass through checks but get repurposed for military use.

These three actors have different goals and use different methods, but the result is the same—they create chaos that makes the ambitious governance plans of Phase 3 look naive and unworkable. None of them wants the peace process to fully succeed, and all of them have tools to prevent it.

So what would it actually take for this peace plan to work? First, weapons verification cannot be a one-time event but must become a permanent system with daily inspections, real-time monitoring of border crossings, and financial audits that track every major purchase. Funds for reconstruction should be released gradually, only after verified progress, and held in escrow accounts where international auditors can prevent diversion to militant groups. Biometric payroll systems, where government salaries are verified through fingerprints or facial recognition, can help ensure money goes to actual civil servants rather than Hamas operatives pretending to be bureaucrats.

Second, there must be real consequences for violations. If Hamas fires rockets or refuses to allow tunnel inspections, aid must stop immediately and mediating countries must apply unified diplomatic pressure. If Israeli settlers provoke violence or the government blocks peace monitors from doing their work, there must be clear penalties, not just expressions of concern. The reason Phase 1 succeeded was that both sides feared losing what they wanted—hostages or prisoners. The same fear of immediate, certain consequences must apply throughout the remaining phases.

Third, the international community must accept that this process will take years, not months, and requires sustained attention even when Gaza is not making headlines. Peace processes fail most often not from dramatic betrayals but from gradual erosion—rules get bent slightly, violations get overlooked to keep talks moving, monitoring becomes less strict over time, and eventually the whole structure collapses. Preventing this requires the kind of long-term, boring, bureaucratic persistence that international attention rarely sustains.

We need to be honest about what kind of peace is actually possible here. If peace simply means no large-scale fighting between Israel and Hamas for a while, then that goal has been temporarily achieved. But this is fragile, conditional peace that depends entirely on both sides continuing to see benefit in restraint. It could evaporate with one major provocation from either side.

If peace means a Gaza without armed militant groups, governed by responsible civilian authorities who can collect taxes, maintain law and order, and rebuild infrastructure safely, then we are very far from success. That kind of peace requires not just signatures on documents but years of verified disarmament, construction of new governing institutions, and gradual building of trust between communities that have been killing each other for generations.

The prisoner exchange was designed to succeed, and it did. But the next phases were not designed with the same realistic understanding of what motivates the key players or what makes compliance more attractive than violation. Unless the international community applies the same transparency, clear incentives, unified pressure, and constant verification that made Phase 1 work, the peace plan will likely join the long list of Middle Eastern peace agreements that briefly raised hopes before collapsing into renewed violence.

The path to lasting peace exists, but it is extremely narrow. It requires strict enforcement, immediate punishment of violations, years of patient international supervision, and willingness to acknowledge that some powerful groups on both sides do not want this peace to succeed. The question is not whether peace is possible but whether the international community has the discipline and persistence to actually achieve it. (IPA Service)

The article A House Built On Sand: The Fault Lines In Trump’s 20 Point Gaza Peace Plan appeared first on Latest India news, analysis and reports on Newspack by India Press Agency).

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By Girish Linganna

In a move that would have seemed unthinkable just a few years ago, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi arrived in New Delhi on October 9 for an eight-day official visit that marks a watershed moment in India’s foreign policy. His meetings with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, followed by visits to Islamic seminaries in Agra and Deoband, represent India’s most significant engagement yet with the Taliban regime. New Delhi has agreed to set up full fledged embassy in Kabul, this is a major turn in India-Taliban relations., This visit signals a pragmatic recalibration driven by shifting regional dynamics and India’s own security imperatives. Yet this approach comes with thorny questions about how India reconciles engagement with a regime notorious for its oppressive treatment of women and regressive policies.

Understanding who Amir Khan Muttaqi is helps explain the complex web India now navigates. Born in 1970 in Helmand province, Muttaqi’s life story mirrors that of many Taliban leaders who came of age during Afghanistan’s decades of conflict. At just nine years old, he fled to Pakistan following the Soviet invasion, receiving his education in refugee schools while joining the fight against the communist government. When the Taliban movement emerged in 1994 and swiftly captured Kandahar from feuding warlords, Muttaqi joined their ranks, quickly rising to become Director General of the city’s radio station and a member of the Taliban’s High Council. By March 2000, he held the position of Education Minister, a role he kept until American forces arrived. His involvement in the 2019 negotiations with the United States and his subsequent appointment as acting Foreign Minister after the Taliban’s 2021 return to power demonstrate his enduring influence within the movement.

India’s history with the Taliban has been fraught from the start. The 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 to Kandahar forced then-External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh into difficult negotiations with Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil. A telling encounter from 2000, documented in Avinash Paliwal’s book on India’s Afghanistan policy, illustrates the challenges India faced. When Taliban representative Mullah Abdul Saleem Zaeef met India’s ambassador to Pakistan, Vijay K. Nambiar, in Islamabad, the friendly atmosphere yielded nothing substantive. Nambiar concluded that genuine understanding between India and the Taliban remained impossible, with Pakistan’s influence over the movement creating an insurmountable barrier to meaningful engagement.

Since the Taliban’s return to Kabul in August 2021, India has pursued what officials describe as cautious engagement. Just hours after the last American troops departed, Indian ambassador to Qatar Deepak Mittal met with Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha. Stanekzai, interestingly, had trained at the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun during the 1980s as part of a bilateral defence programme. This meeting, held at the Taliban’s request, came after Stanekzai publicly emphasized India’s regional importance and expressed desire to maintain Afghanistan’s cultural, economic, political, and trade ties with India.

Despite these diplomatic overtures, India has not hesitated to voice concerns about the Taliban’s governance. When the Taliban announced a cabinet devoid of women and minority representation, India called for an inclusive government. In September 2021, India officially recognized the Taliban as those holding power across Afghanistan, a carefully worded acknowledgment that fell short of formal recognition. India’s strategy has centered on distinguishing between the Taliban regime and the Afghan people, focusing humanitarian efforts on ordinary Afghans while maintaining limited official contact with their rulers. This approach manifested in December 2021 when India sent essential medicines to Afghanistan, followed by the deployment of a technical team to Kabul in June 2022 to oversee humanitarian projects and maintain embassy operations.

The relationship has progressed through fits and starts. India expressed concern when the Taliban banned women from universities in December 2022. The Afghan embassy in India announced its closure in late 2023, citing lack of support from the Indian government. Yet engagement continued with Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri meeting Muttaqi in Dubai in January 2025, and External Affairs Minister Jaishankar speaking with him by phone in May 2025 after India and Pakistan agreed to halt military strikes following the Pahalgam terror attack.

The question naturally arises: why engage now, and why so publicly? The answer lies in a dramatically altered regional landscape. Pakistan, once the Taliban’s primary backer, has become an adversary. Iran faces its own challenges and diminished influence. Russia remains preoccupied with its war in Ukraine. The United States under Donald Trump’s second term has adopted a different approach to Afghanistan. Most significantly, China has moved to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Taliban, exchanging ambassadors and positioning itself as a major player in Afghanistan’s future. India recognizes that stepping back now risks surrendering years of investment and influence in a country critical to its security interests.

India’s support has been substantial and visible. The country has sent fifty thousand metric tonnes of wheat, hundreds of tonnes of medicines and earthquake relief supplies, pesticides, over one hundred million polio vaccine doses, Covid vaccines, and hygiene kits for drug rehabilitation programmes. Both countries have discussed sports cooperation, particularly in cricket, which enjoys immense popularity among Afghan youth. They have also agreed to utilize Iran’s Chabahar port to facilitate trade and deliver humanitarian aid, while India has committed to continuing development projects across all thirty-four Afghan provinces.

The Taliban, for its part, has requested that India issue visas to Afghan traders, patients, and students. This presents challenges given India’s lack of formal recognition, security concerns about travellers from Afghanistan, and the absence of functioning visa operations at its Kabul embassy. Yet the very fact that such practical matters are being discussed reveals how far this relationship has evolved from the hostility of earlier decades.

India now walks a tightrope between pragmatic engagement and principled opposition to the Taliban’s treatment of women and minorities. The global context has forced Delhi’s hand, but the path ahead remains treacherous. Each meeting, each humanitarian shipment, each cricket match discussed must be weighed against the regime’s continued oppression. Whether India can maintain this delicate balance, pursuing its strategic interests while not abandoning its values, will define not just its relationship with Afghanistan but its broader role in a rapidly changing region. (IPA Service)

The article The Price Of Pragmatism: What India Gains (And Loses) By Courting The Taliban appeared first on Latest India news, analysis and reports on Newspack by India Press Agency).

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By Girish Linganna

US President Donald Trump has raked up a hornets’ nest in New Delhi by claiming that $21 million in US aid to India—from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an independent US government agency responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance, approved earlier by Joe Biden, was used to influence India’s last Lok Sabha election. His statement has led to accusations from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) about foreign interference in the country’s politics.

At an event in Miami on Wednesday (February 19), Donald Trump questioned why $21 million had been spent to boost voters’ turnout in India. He suggested that the money may have been used to support a different candidate in the election and to dislodge the present incumbent. Trump also said the Indian government should be informed about this, calling it a “major revelation”.

BJP politicians have urged a thorough investigation into the involvement of US-backed organizations in India’s internal affairs. They claim that such groups as the USAID, George Soros’ ‘Open Society Foundations’ (OSF), and the ‘National Endowment for Democracy’ (NED) are deeply embedded within India’s system. These organizations, often linked to covert operations, are believed to influence various sectors, including politics, media and civil society. The politicians argue that their activities should be closely examined to ensure transparency and protect India’s national interests.

A BJP leader has urged an investigation into individuals and organizations linked to USAID, claiming that it is essential to uncover the true purpose of its activities in India. He alleged that influential groups, often referred to as ‘Deep State assets’, were working behind the scenes to shape public opinion by influencing politicians, social leaders, academics, think tanks, media and the civil society. He says these groups are particularly focussed on promoting an anti-government narrative targeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He emphasized the need for transparency to prevent external forces from interfering in India’s internal affairs.

Since 2014, critics of the government have often claimed that Prime Minister Modi, and the BJP, are a threat to minorities and lower-caste communities. This view has been echoed in reports by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which has even mentioned such BJP leaders as Home Minister Amit Shah and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath.

BJP politician Rodrigues shared this perspective in an interview with the Russian media outlet, Sputnik. The BJP leader claims that groups linked to USAID and George Soros have tried to take advantage of political and religious divisions in India, whenever possible. During the COVID pandemic, some major media outlets overstated the challenges faced by the Modi government in managing the crisis.

The BJP leader pointed out that, during the farmers’ protests and the anti-Citizens’ Amendment Act (CAA) protests during Prime Minister Modi’s second term, some organizations and American influencers backed the anti-government narrative. He stated that USAID was a key supporter of World Vision, a Christian humanitarian organization, which has been accused of being involved in illegal religious conversions in India.

George Soros, a billionaire investor and philanthropist, funds organizations in India through his Open Society Foundations (OSF). His initiatives focus on human rights, democracy and media freedom. Critics argue that his influence shapes political narratives, while supporters see his work as promoting transparency and social justice.

An investigation by Disinfo Lab—(the disinfolab.org), a research group that investigates misinformation, foreign influence and hidden agendas in media and politics and analyses funding sources, propaganda networks and efforts to manipulate public opinion—claims that USAID funds have been directed to groups involved in Kashmir’s separatist movement—the USCIRF, Islamist organizations and anti-Hindutva groups. The report also states that Soros-backed OSF has helped distribute USAID money to other organizations that oppose PM Modi.

The partnership between USAID and India goes back to the 1950s when the US started providing food aid to support India’s food programmes. This assistance continued for many years and, finally, ended in 2012. Until 2021, USAID played a key role in funding India’s National Family Health Survey (NFHS), which gave it access to important data about Indian families. In 2011, India’s Election Commission partnered with the USAID-supported International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to share, and adopt, best practices for elections.

Since 2014, USAID has partnered with India in various initiatives, including promoting cashless payments and helping the Indian Railways work towards net-zero emissions. In 2023, USAID provided approximately $175.71 million in funding to India. This included $7.43 million for programmes related to democracy, human rights and governance, as reported by USAspending.gov.

USAID’s role in India—both in government and civil society—juxtaposed besides claims that it tried to remove PM Modi, has led to political controversy. The ruling BJP and the Opposition Congress have both accused each other of working with foreign influences. Both parties have called for an investigation into USAID’s activities. On Thursday (February 20), a day after Trump’s statement, the Congress also demanded a ‘White Paper’ on the issue.

The CEO of Usanas Foundation, a think tank, told Sputnik that USAID’s ties with 15 Indian government agencies, civil society groups and think tanks revealed a possible risk of foreign influence on India’s open and democratic system. The CEO explained that Indian organizations registered under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) can work with foreign groups. However, what counts as ‘interference’ is a complicated—and widely debated—topic.

“We need to find out which politicians, community leaders, or media outlets they may have contacted to influence voters’ turnout. It is possible that those receiving USAID support could spread its agenda to Indian voters through social media and face-to-face meetings,” the CEO said. He expressed concern about hidden foreign influence in India’s bureaucracy and pointed out that officials with family in the US could be at risk of pressure or blackmail. He also noted that receiving US training might make them more vulnerable to such influence.

The CEO suggested that there was a slight chance that the Deep State and USAID were involved in bringing down the previous Congress-led UPA government by backing the Anti-Corruption Movement before the 2014 election. The think tank chief suggested that the Deep State might not have received the support it expected from the Modi government. As a result, it might have changed approach and worked towards removing the BJP in the 2019 and 2024 elections.

However, the reports claiming that India received $21 million from USAID to influence voter turnout in elections have been proven false. The Indian Express investigated this claim and found that no such funds were given to India. Instead, a total of $23.6 million was allocated to Bangladesh under USAID’s ‘Elections’ category.

This fact was further confirmed by India Today’s Data Intelligence Unit (DIU), which independently verified the details. According to their findings, of the total amount given to Bangladesh, $18.1 million was provided to the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), an international organization that supports democratic processes. The remaining funds were distributed among other agencies involved in electoral support programmes.

In simple terms, the claim that India received money from USAID for its elections is incorrect. The actual funding was directed towards election-related initiatives in Bangladesh, and not India. (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

Donald Trump’s re-election as U.S. President could have a big impact on India-US relations, especially in areas like technology, chips, and semiconductors. As he begins his second term on January 20 next year ,, both countries will face a mix of opportunities and challenges that could shape their tech and economic ties in new ways.

In recent years, semiconductors have become a key part of the global economy and a major area of focus for many countries. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed weaknesses in the global supply chain, showing how heavily the world depends on a few producers. This has pushed countries to reduce their reliance on others and invest more in making semiconductors locally.

Trump’s government has strongly advocated for reducing dependence on Chinese manufacturing and encouraged shifting supply chains to friendly countries, a strategy called “friend-shoring.” This approach fits well with India’s “Make in India” program, which aims to turn the country into a global center for manufacturing.

India is working hard to grow its semiconductor industry by introducing policies and incentives to attract investments. The goal is to create a strong foundation for semiconductor production and development in the country.

The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme has played a big role in boosting manufacturing in India. It provides financial rewards to companies that start production units in the country. For example, companies like Dixon Technologies are now important players, making smartphones and computers for global brands under this program. This progress is likely to grow even more with increased focus on India-US cooperation in the semiconductor industry.

Trump’s re-election creates both opportunities and challenges for the semiconductor industry. While his focus on making the economy more self-reliant sounds promising, it could also mean new tariffs and trade restrictions, which might make global business more complicated. During his campaign, Trump suggested adding high taxes, like a 25% tariff, on products imported from countries like Canada and Mexico. These measures could increase the costs of making semiconductors since the industry depends on parts and materials from around the world. However, this also gives India a chance to step up as a good option for semiconductor manufacturing. With its skilled workers and investor-friendly policies, India could attract more businesses in this sector.

The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), started in January 2023, has become a key part of India-US partnership in advanced technology areas. The second iCET Summit, held in July 2024, showcased the progress achieved in semiconductors, clean energy, and advanced technologies. Both countries have agreed to strengthen their partnership by focusing on sharing technology, working together on research and development, and building systems that support innovation. This initiative is set to play an important role in shaping the future of India-US partnerships in advanced technology.

In the coming years, an important area to watch will be how the semiconductor supply chain develops. For a long time, a few major companies have controlled the industry, with Taiwan’s TSMC being a global leader in chip manufacturing. But the global situation is changing, and countries like India and Japan are becoming key players in the semiconductor supply chain. TSMC is working to localize its supply chain and grow its presence in the US and Japan, showing how the industry is shifting. The company’s choice to work with Asian suppliers like Taiwan’s Kinik and Japan’s Ebara for important manufacturing solutions highlights the increasing importance of regional partnerships in the semiconductor industry.

India is making early efforts to develop its own Electronics Manufacturing Services (EMS) industry, which is worth noting. Government subsidies and incentives have encouraged companies like Dixon Technologies to set up operations. Dixon now produces smartphones for brands like Motorola and Xiaomi, as well as PCs for companies like Acer and Lenovo. These efforts are part of a larger plan to build a self-sufficient semiconductor industry in India. The goal is to rely less on imports and strengthen the country’s ability to produce semiconductors locally.

Trump’s re-election brings uncertainty about the future of the US CHIPS and Science Act. This act is designed to promote semiconductor manufacturing in the US by offering large investments and incentives. Trump’s criticism of the Act and his plans for new tariffs could create challenges for the semiconductor industry. However, this also gives India a chance to become a stronger partner for the US in advanced technology fields. India can attract investments and encourage partnerships by aligning its policies with the US’s friend-shoring approach, helping to boost innovation and growth.

In summary, Donald Trump’s second term as US President is likely to significantly influence India-US relations, especially in the areas of technology, chips, and semiconductors. Although there are some challenges and uncertainties, there are also great opportunities for collaboration and growth. Both countries can use their strengths to create a strong and innovative semiconductor industry that supports their economies and strengthens their partnership. As the global semiconductor industry keeps changing, India and the US are in a good position to adapt to these shifts and work together to reach their common goals. (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

On Wednesday (June 26), NATO selected Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as its new leader. This decision comes amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and uncertainties about the future role of the United States in the alliance, according to reports from Reuters and AFP.

Rutte’s selection was finalized after Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, his only competitor, withdrew from the race last week because he could not gather enough support. Rutte strengthened his campaign to become NATO’s new leader last year by co-leading an international coalition that will provide F-16 fighters to Ukraine and train Ukrainian pilots.

Rutte will begin his new role on October 1, taking over from Jens Stoltenberg of Norway, who has held the position for 10 years. Rutte has been a strong critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a firm supporter of Ukraine. He has gained extensive experience in political negotiations during his almost 14 years as the Dutch prime minister. At 57, Rutte has played a key role in pushing for Europe’s military support for Ukraine since Russia invaded it in 2022. He believes defeating Moscow on the battlefield is essential for achieving peace in Europe.

Rutte’s perspective is strongly shaped by the 2014 downing of an airliner over Ukraine with 196 Dutch victims among the 298 killed, an incident the Netherlands holds Russia responsible for. He emphasised that NATO should be strong enough to challenge Moscow and warned other European Union leaders against naivete about Putin’s Russia, according to the South China Morning Post.

In September 2022, seven months after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Rutte had told the United Nations, that if they did not stop Putin right away, he would not stop at Ukraine. This war was about more than just Ukraine; it was about upholding international law.

Rutte became the Dutch prime minister in 2010 and, eventually, the longest-serving one before announcing last year that he would leave national politics. After the MH17 flight, en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was struck by a Buk missile and shot down over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, he shifted from focusing mainly on domestic issues to becoming a key player in the EU, significantly influencing discussions on immigration, debt and the Covid-19 response.

Under his leadership, the Netherlands has boosted its defence budget to meet the NATO requirement of spending over 2% of its GDP. The country has supplied F-16 fighter jets, artillery, drones and ammunition to Kyiv, while also making significant investments in its own military.

Rutte strongly supports Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whom he remembered meeting in Kyiv five years ago. In his final months in office, Rutte also signed a 10-year security agreement with Ukraine, ensuring Dutch support despite criticism from far-Right leader and election winner Geert Wilders. Rutte has built strong connections with different leaders from the UK and the US.

Many people think he was especially good at working with US President Donald Trump, who is running for re-election. Rutte, who is known as ‘The Trump Whisperer’ for his skill in handling former US President Donald Trump, is often praised for saving a 2018 NATO summit by persuading Trump on defence spending and displayed typical Dutch straightforwardness by openly disagreeing with the president in the Oval Office.

In a moment that later went viral, Trump said it would be “positive” whether or not the EU and the US reached a trade deal. Rutte, who was visiting, laughed and interrupted, saying, “No! It’s not positive. We need to figure something out.” This experience might be important because the possibility of Trump returning has worried NATO leaders. The former president had previously questioned whether the US would help defend other members if they were attacked.

At last year’s Munich Security Conference, Rutte advised leaders to stop “complaining about Trump” and focus on increasing their spending on defence and ammunition production, no matter who wins the US election.

Rutte believed Zelensky had a mission and that Ukraine’s advancement was largely due to his mindset. On Wednesday, June 26, Kyiv congratulated Rutte on his appointment, while Russian forces reported steady progress in eastern Ukraine.

At the same time, despite cautioning about the threat from Putin, he indicated that the Russian supremo might not be as powerful as he seemed. Kremlin, however, has stated that Rutte’s new role would not change equations for Russia and NATO was still an enemy. (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

Russia is now working more closely with Iran, North Korea, and China, sharing sensitive technology that could pose a threat to the United States. and its allies even after the Ukraine war ends, say American defense and intelligence officials. The rapid growth and strength of security ties between U.S. adversaries have surprised even American intelligence analysts. According to reports from WSJ, Russia and its Axis allies have put aside past disagreements to challenge what they see as a US-dominated global system.

In a sign of their growing military relationship, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un announced on June 19, in Pyongyang, that they had agreed to help each other if either country was attacked. Their relationship is an alliance between the two authoritarian nations. Russia started increasing its cooperation with North Korea, Iran, and China after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Early losses on the battlefield and Western sanctions forced Russia to seek new sources of weapons. These partnerships have evolved into joint production deals, technology sharing, and providing workers. The agreements are boosting Moscow’s long-term capabilities and could also benefit Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing.

For decades, the former Soviet Union exported billions of dollars in weapons to the developing world. Now the relationship is partially reversed, as Moscow scours the globe for material to sustain its Ukraine war, now in its 28th month.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Tuesday, alongside Secretary of State Antony Blinken, that Russia’s war in Ukraine is supported by China, North Korea, and Iran. According to the Wall Street Journal, he mentioned that these countries want the US and NATO to fail. If Russia wins in Ukraine, it could make the West more vulnerable and the world more dangerous.

Iran has helped set up a factory in Russia’s Tatarstan region to produce deadly armed drones. US officials believe this factory is now running and can make thousands of Iranian-designed Shahed-136 drones each year. They also expect it to start producing other types of drones. A US defense official stated that Russia will still have this capability after the war. What started as a simple deal has now turned into a sharing of knowledge.

Iran can see how well its drones, which Russia is using against Ukraine, perform in actual combat. The worry is that Iran might bring all the lessons learned from this back to the Middle East. A senior Biden administration official said that China and Russia are also collaborating to produce nonlethal drones within Russia. The thing is, it’s deniable because it is just sharing technology and the production of commercially available drones.

On June 19, when Putin and Kim announced their closer military ties, they didn’t specify whether the new agreement means they will fight for each other in a war or if it simply promises other types of support. The United States and South Korea believe Russia might give North Korea space technology and other advanced systems in exchange for artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles. They believe North Korea has already supplied these weapons to support Russia’s war on Ukraine. It is believed that North Korea is also sending workers to Russia to help run weapons production lines. In return, Russia has been giving North Korea large amounts of fuel oil. The worry is that Russia’s support could include military help in the future.

Current and former U.S. officials said that the growing security ties between Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China do not yet form a formal military alliance like NATO in the West. Instead, these ties involve separate bilateral agreements between Russia and each of the three other countries. Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA and White House official, recently said that for Russia, North Korea, and even China, such cooperation is more a convenient arrangement based on shared interests and goals right now, rather than a deep alliance. However, the beginnings of a new alliance are forming, showing signs of wider strategic and diplomatic cooperation.

According to Western officials and customs data, China has been leading efforts to strengthen trade ties with countries sanctioned by the US, such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, as a way to protect them against Washington’s financial actions. Last month, US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told lawmakers that China and Russia are conducting military exercises for the first time that seem to focus on Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its territory.

In March, Moscow used its veto in the U.N. Security Council to stop the United Nations from continuing to monitor international sanctions on North Korea. This move was to avoid scrutiny of the weapons pipeline between Pyongyang and Moscow. According to a US defense official, the weapons pipeline from Tehran is proving to be the most helpful to Moscow, making Iran Russia’s main weapons supplier. Besides helping build the drone factory in Tatarstan, Iran has sent hundreds of drones and other weapons to Russia. The two countries are in advanced talks for Iran to sell short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.

Iran has, however, denied supplying weapons to Russia. But Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, said that in many areas where Iran was once the student, it is now becoming the master. For the first time in history, Iran is more than just a junior partner to Russia.

Current and former U.S. officials said that China has done everything except supply weapons to Russia. Washington has warned that providing weapons would lead to American economic sanctions. US officials said that help from Beijing allowed Russia’s defense production to recover faster than American intelligence agencies expected after Moscow’s early setbacks in Ukraine and Western sanctions aimed at restricting its access to weapons.

Officials said that China has sent large amounts of dual-use equipment to Russia, including machine tools, microelectronics for the defense industry, optics for tanks and armoured vehicles, and turbo engines for cruise missiles. China is helping Russia enhance its satellite and other space-based capabilities for use in Ukraine. “They are very careful, but they are coming very close to crossing the line,” a defense official said. “They have been doing everything they can to support the Russians, mindful of the consequences.” (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

The US President, Joe Biden, is facing political challenges as he attempts to navigate the demands of both the Israel lobby and its critics. This has led to perceptions of his weakness and ineffectiveness. With the election just six months away, Biden is struggling with a significant foreign policy issue.

On Monday (6th of May), White House spokesman John Kirby expressed concerns about operations in Rafah that could potentially endanger over a million innocent people. Kirby also highlighted Biden’s belief that the hostage deal offered the best solution to prevent such risks while ensuring the release of the hostages.

Several days have passed, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are still conducting an operation in the southern Gazan city of Rafah, with no visible progress towards reaching a resolution.

According to analyst Hasan Unal, this incident reflects the complex relationship between the White House and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Unal argues that President Joe Biden faces the difficult task of trying to satisfy both pro-Palestine factions within his party and the right-wing leadership in Israel. To delve into the strategic and humanitarian consequences of these recent developments, Professor Hasan Unal, an expert in political science and international relations at Bashkent University, participated in a discussion on Sputnik’s Fault Lines program on Wednesday (8th May) as reported by Sputnik a Russian Media House.

Israel may have preferred if Hamas had rejected the proposed deal, as recent reports indicated that the Palestinian group had accepted a proposal facilitated by the US, Egypt, and Qatar. Unal suggests that Hamas accepting the deal would have provided justification for Israel, particularly the Netanyahu government, to carry out a military operation in Rafah. However, as Hamas accepted the proposal, it has put Israel in a challenging position. Unal sees this as a tactical victory for Hamas.

Unal clarified that despite Hamas’ tactical victory, it does not necessarily mean that Israel will be deterred. He emphasized that the United States holds significant leverage over Israel, possibly more than any other country in the world. While the Israeli lobby carries substantial influence in the United States, it is important to note that the United States itself wields significant power and influence over Israel.

He highlighted historical instances where the United States exerted pressure on Israel. For example, he mentioned the Suez Crisis of 1956, during which the US, along with the Soviet Union and international authorities, called on Israel to halt its occupation of Egyptian territory in the Sinai Desert. Additionally, Unal cited the US’s role in pushing for a compromise during the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978 and former President Ronald Reagan’s directive for Israel to cease its bombing of Beirut in 1982. These incidents demonstrate the United States’ past efforts to rein in Israeli actions through diplomatic means.

In 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker achieved a delay in granting loan guarantees to Israel. This delay was contingent upon Israel agreeing to temporarily halt its construction of settlements or colonies in Gaza and the West Bank, which were deemed illegal. However, both Baker and former President George H.W. Bush encountered strong opposition from organizations like AIPAC and other pro-Israel interests due to this decision.

AIPAC stands for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. It is a prominent lobbying group in the United States that advocates for strong U.S.-Israel relations and supports Israel’s policies and interests. After losing his bid for reelection the following year, President George H.W. Bush, along with subsequent U.S. leaders, has displayed limited inclination to confront or oppose Israel.

According to host or the program moderator, Jamarl Thomas, President Biden’s attempts to appease Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have seemingly yielded little favor for him. The US president finds himself in a challenging position, torn between an unhappy base and an Israeli leadership that appears to view him with disdain (or contempt), as reported by Sputnik.

Thomas pointed out that while distressing images of babies hanging out of buildings during the attack were circulating, President Biden delivered a speech that Thomas found deeply problematic. He criticized Biden for invoking the Holocaust in his speech, implying that referencing historical events from many years ago does not justify or excuse the ongoing genocide and tragic situations, such as babies hanging out of buildings, that were unfolding at the same time.

Thomas argues that President Biden is in a difficult position, trying to please both sides but ending up losing support from both. Israel and the Israel lobby view any pressure Biden puts on them as a rejection of their interests, while some members of his own party criticize him for being too aligned with Israel.

Unal agreed that President Biden is not skilled at managing the situation and seems confused about what steps to take. Unal also stated that Israel does not view the Biden administration as a serious entity. Unal further commented on the role of multipolarity in the conflict, highlighting that other global powers are now significantly involved in the situation, which is unprecedented. He specifically noted China’s increased interest in the Middle East, particularly regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which was not as prominent in the past.

Beijing recently facilitated a meeting between officials from Hamas and Fatah with the aim of fostering reconciliation between the two major Palestinian groups. Similarly, Moscow hosted a similar summit in February, emphasizing the importance of resolving the longstanding Palestine-Israel conflict and garnering support from Arab nations.

Fatah is a political party and a major Palestinian nationalist movement. It was founded in 1959 and is considered one of the key factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Fatah is led by the Palestinian President, currently Mahmoud Abbas.

During a period in April when Israel and Iran engaged in reciprocal attacks, it was reported that the United States urged China to leverage its influence in order to dissuade Tehran from retaliating following an attack on its consulate in Damascus. Analysts pointed out that this incident highlights the increasing influence of Moscow and Beijing, while the leader of the United States faces challenges in projecting global power effectively. (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

As the polling for the 18th Indian Lok Sabha elections began on April 19, New Delhi is closely monitoring the growing conflict between Iran and Israel. The situation in the Middle East is creating risks for energy, security, and trade that could affect India, now the world’s most populous country.

Harsh V Pant, vice-president of studies and foreign policy at the Observer Research Foundation, told SCMP that India faces significant consequences depending on how the situation develops, which might compel the country to make some tough decisions. Pant cautioned that trade and energy security are crucial concerns. He warned that if the conflict escalates, it could impact the well-being and economic stability of Indian citizens.

US officials reported on Friday that Israel attacked Iran as a response to Tehran’s drone strikes on April 12. These drone strikes were retaliation for an earlier Israeli attack on a diplomatic location in Syria. Analysts note that India’s quick calls for calm after the drone strikes, along with Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s conversations with both his Iranian and Israeli counterparts, show New Delhi’s deep concern about the situation.

At a public event on Monday, Jaishankar emphasized the government’s worry about a “highly sensitive area” and called for peace. He added, “For the rest of the world and especially for India, we are looking for ways to reduce the tension.”

India, with a population of 1.4 billion and as the third-largest oil consumer globally, imports more than 80% of its oil from the Middle East to satisfy its domestic needs. With strategic oil reserves only sufficient for one to three months, India’s need for energy imports is both significant and immediate.

India relies heavily on the Middle East for its energy requirements, primarily for oil and natural gas. These resources are crucial for powering the country’s vehicles, generating electricity, and supplying energy to various industries. The Middle East is a key supplier due to its vast oil reserves, making it essential for India to maintain stable relations with countries in this region to secure its energy needs.

Natural gas is a type of fossil fuel primarily composed of methane. It’s found underground and is used as a source of energy for heating, cooking, and electricity generation. It’s also used as a fuel for vehicles and as a raw material in the manufacture of plastics and other commercially important organic chemicals. Natural gas is valued for its efficiency and clean burning compared to other fossil fuels, producing fewer pollutants and greenhouse gases.

India’s trade ministry has decided not to take any immediate policy actions regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, choosing instead to monitor the situation further before making any decisions. Analysts say that if the conflict worsens, many of India’s interests could be at risk, especially with potential instability in the Red Sea. The situation became more pressing when Iran’s Revolutionary Guards captured a cargo ship with Indian sailors near the Strait of Hormuz on April 13, highlighting the direct impact on India.

Iranian forces released a female crew member, Ann Tessa Joseph, who returned home on Thursday. Diplomatic efforts continue to ensure the safe return of the other 16 crew members. About 100,000 Indians live in Israel, and 4,000 in Iran. A recent agreement that made it easier for Indian construction workers to go to Israel is now uncertain. The first group of workers travelled to Israel in early April.

According to SCMP, Talmiz Ahmad, a former Indian diplomat with extensive experience in West Asia, said that a full-scale war between Israel and Iran is still unlikely. If a full-scale war were to happen, it would not only affect India but would also have serious repercussions for the entire world, said Talmiz Ahmad, a former Indian diplomat who has served as ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE.

According to Talmiz Ahmad in an interview with This Week in Asia on Friday, as reported by SCMP, Israel’s response was quick and forceful, primarily to protect its interests and maintain its image. He mentioned that this action is unlikely to have a significant impact beyond Israel and Iran. India’s main concern would be if the conflict spreads across the region. However, if the conflict remains between Iran and Israel, it will likely be minor.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, India has significantly deepened its strategic relationships with Israel in areas such as defense, agriculture, and technology. In 2017, Prime Minister Modi made a landmark visit to Israel, the first by any Indian prime minister. This trip set the stage for a dramatic increase in trade between the two countries, with bilateral trade nearly doubling from $5.56 billion in 2018-19 to $10.7 billion in 2022-23.

Jon Alterman, Senior Vice-President and Director of the Middle East Program at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, noted in a report by SCMP that trade between India and Iran has decreased over the past decade. The relationship has become less strategic compared to when Iran was a key supplier of crude oil to India. Over 9 million Indians reside across various countries in the Middle East. India has maintained a careful balance in its relations with both Israel and Iran, avoiding taking sides for many years.

According to Alterman, a major conflict in the Middle East could significantly threaten the safety of millions of Indians working there and disrupt India’s trade. Alterman further explained that New Delhi should concentrate on India’s global position. As major powers are more driven by competition, how India positions itself while maintaining flexibility is becoming more complicated. (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

The anticipated docking of a Chinese scientific vessel in the Maldives this week has heightened tensions among Beijing, Delhi, and Malé. The ship Xiang Yang Hong 3 is officially visiting the Maldives to change its crew and stock up on supplies, which is a completely harmless visit says Beijing.

In Delhi, however, the ship’s visit is viewed differently. At the very least, it’s considered disrespect to India. At its worst, there’s concern that the ship might be gathering information that could later help the Chinese military with submarine activities. However, experts on China have dismissed these worries.

“The Chinese vessels conduct scientific research in the Indian Ocean. Their operations in international waters are completely lawful,” Zhou Bo, a retired Senior Colonel from the People’s Liberation Army, informed the BBC.

“Occasionally, these ships require restocking of essentials such as fuel, food, and water. Thus, docking at a port in another country is a standard procedure. Therefore, the Indian government should not create unnecessary trouble over it. The Indian Ocean does not belong to India,” stated Mr. Zhou, currently affiliated with Tsinghua University in Beijing.

However, this isn’t the first instance of China, which vies with Delhi for sway in the Indian Ocean amidst a prolonged disagreement over their border in the Himalayas, dispatching one of its vessels near Indian territorial waters.

In 2014, two Chinese naval submarines stopped at Colombo, and over the last two years, two Chinese research ships have made visits to Sri Lanka, near the southernmost point of India, actions that have significantly irked India. These visits occurred while China, having lent billions of dollars to Colombo, made major advances in its relationship with Sri Lanka.

The research vessel, Xiang Yang Hong 3, had initially intended to stop in Colombo for supplies before heading to the Maldives. However, that plan has been put on hold for the moment, as stated by Tharaka Balasuriya, the junior foreign minister of Sri Lanka.”Over this year, we aim to enhance our technology and skills to equally participate in these research endeavours,” he informed the BBC.

Nonetheless, Colombo’s move to halt the visits of research ships is viewed as a reaction to India’s firm opposition to the presence of Chinese vessels. India’s objections, however, haven’t significantly influenced the situation in the Maldives. The nation, made up of about 1,200 coral islands and atolls in the heart of the Indian Ocean, has historically been within India’s sphere of influence. Yet, Mohamed Muizzu, who assumed the presidency in November and is viewed as pro-China, aims to shift this balance.

His campaign was built on the ‘India Out’ slogan, demanding that Delhi remove approximately 80 Indian military members stationed on the island. India maintains that these forces are in the country to service and manage three reconnaissance and rescue planes that Delhi donated several years back.

The government of the Maldives has given Delhi a deadline to pull out its soldiers by March 15, just two days prior to the nation’s parliamentary elections. After discussions in Delhi the previous week, the foreign ministry of the Maldives announced that India had consented to “substitute the military staff,” with the initial group set to depart by March 10 and the remaining by the second week of May.

In December, the administration under Mr. Muizzu also declared its decision not to extend a hydrographic survey contract with India, which the prior government had agreed to for charting the seabed within Maldivian territorial waters.

In fact, relations have soured to such an extent that no senior leaders from the Maldivian government were present at a recent celebration hosted by the Indian High Commission in Malé for India’s 75th Republic Day.

In a twist to regional geopolitics , China warmly welcomed Mr. Muizzu during his five-day official visit to Beijing last month. Following his visit, several high-ranking Chinese officials have made trips to the Maldives. Mr. Muizzu has also unveiled a number of infrastructure projects in the Maldives funded by China.

The abrupt change in Malé’s stance towards China has sparked worries in Delhi, which considers the island nation to be of strategic importance. Given its rapidly growing naval capabilities, China would likely seek access to such a strategically vital location, a development India aims to prevent.

“The Maldives is definitely important; it’s like India’s southern ocean side,” explained Shyam Saran, who previously served as India’s foreign secretary, in a conversation with the media house. “Just like we were really worried about what was going on in Sri Lanka, we’ll be really worried about what might happen in the Maldives,” said Mr. Saran.

But it’s not only Delhi that’s concerned about the ties with Malé. The opposition party in the Maldives, the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), and others are pushing for Mr. Muizzu’s government to change direction. They argue that making a big neighbour like India upset is not good for the country. Last week, the MDP mentioned they were even thinking about starting the process to impeach Mr. Muizzu.

Being a small island country, the Maldives relies heavily on India for the majority of its food supply, construction of infrastructure, and progress in technology. Additionally, numerous Maldivians travel to India for medical care.

“Many people here believe that the government has pushed its antagonism towards India too far and that it’s completely unwarranted,” said Aik Ahmed Easa, a lawyer in Malé associated with the opposition MDP, in a statement to the Media House. “The Maldives is a tiny nation, but the situation is turning risky as we find ourselves caught in the competition between major Asian powers,” he stated in simpler terms.

According to experts, China has expansive strategic goals and is expected to deploy additional naval vessels to the Indian Ocean region for purposes such as oceanographic research or safeguarding its economic interests. For India, the task at hand is how to effectively counter China’s increasing assertiveness in a region that Delhi regards as its own territory.

According to Mr. Zhou, Chinese aircraft carriers and their accompanying ships are likely to eventually reach the Indian Ocean. If India obstructs the resupply of these vessels in a third nation, such as Sri Lanka, it would greatly anger Beijing, he explains. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

Artificial intelligence has made tremendous strides in recent years—from beating human champions at chess to revolutionizing self-driving cars and setting up life-like virtual assistants. Now, AI is putting its creative hat on and venturing into the world of content generation. While AI shows great promise for automating routine, and mundane, writing tasks and producing large volumes of content, its use also raises important questions about originality, quality and its impact on jobs. The question whether—or even when—AI will eventually replace human intervention in writing is being hotly debated even as we write this piece.

Let us take a closer look at how AI is shaping the future of content and the challenges it present.

On the positive side, AI content holds potential benefits for productivity and economies of scale. With the help of AI, businesses can generate basic articles, blog posts, social media updates and other forms of written work much more quickly than humans can. This allows companies to inundate their websites and online channels with a constant stream of fresh content to engage customers.

In recent times, AI algorithms that are capable of producing not only articles, but even poetry and novels have emerged. These AI-generated pieces often demonstrate impressive linguistic capabilities and can closely resemble varied scholastic writing styles. This development has been greeted with both excitement and concern by authors and creative writing buffs. However, leading publishing companies like Amazon, as well as admission officers of leading universities, have strong reservations—and rules—against using AI for books written by aspiring authors and SOPs written by aspiring students.

From a commercial point of view, there are open questions around how to integrate AI creativity while respecting copyright and paying creators for their work. Some debate whether AI should even be termed an ‘author’ or assigned legal rights over its writing. These issues take on greater importance as AI systems become more general and human-like in their abilities.

While the final output can still be riddled with errors, biases, or simply plain bad or basic writing, and even though the programme, at present, has not been creating as much as collating data and replicating common patterns, a future may not be too far off when artificial intelligence processes even more data, ‘learns’ from it and gets more adept at writing at frightening speed.

In spite of these apparent advantages, the idea that AI will one day completely make human intervention in creative writing defunct remains a matter of debate. Creative writing is an immersive human endeavour involving intuition, emotions and subjective thought processes based on analysing deeply personal experiences. It involves crafting content that resonates with readers at an emotional level, building empathy and connection between creator and consumer.

These attributes are intrinsically tied to the human condition, making it challenging for AI to replicate human experience and feelings with the same authenticity and depth. Creative writing is not merely an exercise in stringing words together, but involves exploration and simulation of ideas, expression of unique angles of thought and, mostly, ability to capture the spirit of human existence. It requires wide imagination, intuition and a profound understanding of the intricacies of language.

Although AI algorithms have the capacity to mimic different styles of writing, they often lack the creativity that thrives on capriciousness and extrapolation of imageries and sensitivities of original writing that stems from the human mind’s capacity to think outside the box, challenge conventions and generate fresh ideas. AI algorithms, instead, rely on patterns collated from existing data. It can generate content that conforms only to existing and established structures, but is yet to produce path-breaking work.

Another plus point for AI, for the first time, is that it makes it feasible for companies to automatically localize content for different regions and languages. Language has always proved to be a significant barrier in consumption of media content. However, AI-based translation apps have significantly broken down these barriers. State-of-the-art machine algorithms can provide real-time translations of text, audio and video content, allowing media organizations to cater to a global audience, facilitating cross-cultural communication and enabling a wider range of viewers to access content.

A recent article in Nieman Reports says that, in the months immediately following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, tens of thousands of Ukrainians displaced by the war who fled to Finland had a great deal of difficulty understanding local public broadcasts in Finnish. The broadcaster, Yle—which served news in English, Russian and Swedish, besides the local language—had no journalist who knew the Ukrainian language. It circumvented the problem by employing AI to translate news for its new hordes of listeners in a significant instance of AI taking over the Newsroom.

Going beyond translation, new AI content models, such as GPT-3, demonstrate an impressive ability to write coherently on virtually any topic based on a few examples or prompts. There is one school of thought which says that, with further refinement, AI systems may one day mimic—or even surpass—human creativity. Proponents argue this will free up people to focus on more complex tasks while delivering personalized content at Internet speed and scale. Consumers could see an explosion in the variety and volume of information and entertainment at their fingertips.

However, AI content raises valid issues about originality, bias, transparency and ethics. While AI systems can regurgitate and remix facts, their content eventually derives from training data which may mirror unwanted human prejudices. Regulators have pushed for better oversight of AI to address problems, such as toxic language models and ‘deepfake’ content that aims to mislead rather than inform.

For media and content industries, AI promises both opportunities and threats to jobs. On one hand, tasks like routine article generation can be handed off to AI, freeing up people for more strategic roles. However, many content creation jobs, such as journalism, copywriting or public relations services, may ultimately be replaced over time as AI systems master narrative, personality and different styles of discourse. This could undermine livelihoods if transitions are not properly managed.

In conclusion, while AI shows great potential to augment content creation, its use also triggers debates that societies are only starting to grapple with. As with other transformative technologies, both opportunities and challenges will arise as AI stretches the boundaries of authorship and creativity. With open dialogue and foresight, we can help ensure that the promise of AI outshines its perils for writers, consumers and content industries of tomorrow. Only time will tell if AI can pen its way into our hearts as a true creative collaborator, or a competitor. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post AI-Generated Content Holds Promises As Well As Perils first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

The interim Budget 2024 has not made mention of any measure or recommendation to address the very serious bottleneck that has been gripping India’s maritime trade for weeks now—the Red Sea crisis! This crisis is also known as the United States-Iran proxy war that began on October 19, 2023, when the Houthis from Yemen launched a series of attacks targeting southern Israel and the ships in the Red Sea which it claimed were linked to Israel.

India is heavily reliant on the Red Sea trade route that is used to reach four regions—Europe, North America, North Africa and West Asia. Goods amounting to billions of dollars pass through this route. Exports from India through the Red Sea are valued at Rs 18 lakh crore (around USD 217 billion), besides imports worth around Rs 17 lakh crore (USD 205 billion).

Now, all of this trade has been hit. The reason…? Ships are avoiding the Red Sea route. Instead of going via the Suez Canal, they are being redirected to the southern tip of Africa, going around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds another 6,500 kilometres and at least two extra weeks of sailing time to the journey.

Indian exports have been getting delayed with shipments being held up and traders counting their losses mostly because of the delays. The time taken to move the goods from one place to another has increased substantially. Shipments are delayed by almost a month—from anywhere between 21 days and 28 days. Some ships have also been restrained from leaving dock.

In fact, since the Red Sea crisis began, 25% of India’s outbound shipments—exports sent directly through warehouses—were held back. These goods have not left India at all. And that is because exporters have not been able to find ships to take them. And those who could find ships had to take the longer route. About 95% of cargo ships from India have taken this much longer Africa route and they will continue to do so in the foreseeable future as there is no resolution in sight.

The Indian Navy is on the job and is doing its bit to mitigate the crisis. They have been manning the waters in and around the Red Sea, securing vital routes and rescuing sailors under threat. In the Indian Ocean alone, the Navy has conducted at least nine operations in recent days. They have rescued commercial ships. But, despite India’s strong presence and defences, the shipments have not stabilized.

Experts are projecting losses. In the last financial year, India had overall exported goods worth USD 451 billion, out of which exports worth more than $30 billion could be impacted because of the Red Sea crisis—almost 7% of India’s exports. The latest trade numbers from the government are not out yet. But it is clear that a prolonged disruption will hurt India and its economic growth.

Ratings agency Fitch says that, if Red Sea disruptions were to persist, the resulting downward revisions to its India forecast would, probably, be significant and dent its 4% growth forecast for Asia in 2024.

Otherwise, in the light of the January 2024 economic assessment by the ministry, India has achieved notable advancement despite facing challenges from the pandemic and starting with an economy riddled with imbalances and a troubled financial sector. It now ranks as the world’s fifth-largest economy, boasting a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimated at about $3.7 trillion for fiscal 2024, with the conversion rate being roughly Rs 83 lakh crore for every trillion US dollars.

The government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has laid down a solid groundwork for India’s journey towards becoming ‘Viksit Bharat’, or a developed country by 2047, with a Budget of ₹47.66 lakh crore announced by Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman on Thursday. This Budget aims to boost every sector of the economy.

For fiscal 2024-25, India’s draft Budget includes a defence spending of Rs 6.21 lakh crore, marking a 4.72% increase over the previous year’s Budget and a slight decrease of 0.37% from the revised Budget for 2023-24. This year’s defence allocation accounts for 1.89% of the country’s projected GDP for fiscal 2024-25. In fiscal 2022-23, India had dedicated Rs 5.25 lakh crore to defence spending, which marked an increase from Rs 4.78 lakh crore in 2021-22, and Rs 4.71 lakh crore in 2020-21.

The defence ministry has articulated that, in the light of the current global political dynamics and the twin objectives of achieving self-reliance and enhancing export capabilities, the defence Budget has been set at Rs 621,540.85 crore for the fiscal year 2024-25, accounting for 13.04% of the overall Budget. This statement underscores the intent behind the augmented capital expenditure, which is to rectify critical capability shortfalls through modernization efforts. Moreover, it underscores the goal of bolstering the sector’s self-sufficiency through these investments.

Finance Minister Sitharaman has unveiled a new initiative aimed at promoting deep technology in the defence sector. Deep technology encompasses groundbreaking scientific and technological advancements capable of catalysing significant transformative shifts across various sectors. This domain typically involves innovative R&D in such areas as artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, blockchain and quantum computing.

Detailed specifics about the program, however, were not immediately disclosed. The initiative is expected to deliver substantial financial assistance, rewards and backing to the defence industry, particularly benefiting startups and medium and small enterprises (MSMEs) engaged in this sector.

The Budget details include revenue expenditures of Rs 2.82 lakh crore, capital investments amounting to Rs 1.72 lakh crore and pensions totalling Rs 1.41 lakh crore. The Budget for upgrading military capabilities has seen a 5.78% increase from that of last year. India is in the process of modernizing its military forces through the procurement of advanced fighter jets, helicopters, naval vessels, tanks, artillery, rocket systems, missiles, unmanned technologies and a variety of other warfare technologies.

The Budget allocation is set to support various projects, including an upgrade of the existing Sukhoi-30 fleet, purchase of new aircraft, procurement of high-performance engines for MiG-29s, acquisition of C-295 transport planes, missile systems, carrier-based fighters and submarines.

The Budget documents reveal that the armed forces did not spend Rs 5,372 crore of the Rs 1.62 lakh crore capital Budget allocated in the previous year. In fiscal 2022-’23, facing border tensions with China, the armed forces spent an extra Rs 21,000 crore over their initial Budget to urgently buy equipment and improve infrastructure in the border areas.

For fiscal 2023-’24, it was noted that the spending on regular expenses went over by Rs 28,548 crore compared to those in the previous year’s Budget. This increase mainly covered salaries and benefits, transportation costs, ex-Servicemen’s health scheme and expenses for the Rashtriya Rifles.

A considerable portion of this year’s defence Budget is earmarked for the acquisition of advanced weapons systems produced within the country. This investment is anticipated to positively influence the nation’s GDP, create job opportunities, promote capital investment and boost the local economy.

The Border Roads Organisation (BRO), vital for the development of India’s border infrastructure, has received an allocation of Rs 6,500 crore. This represents a 30% increase from the previous fiscal (2023-’24) and a 160% rise from two years ago (2021-’22), reflecting the government’s proactive approach to addressing security challenges along the India-China border and its commitment to strengthening border infrastructure capital expenditure of Rs 1.62 lakh crore allocated.

This year marks a period of fewer large-scale missions for India’s space exploration efforts, reflected in a modest Budget increase of 4%. Nonetheless, the sector may see significant support through a new Rs 1 lakh crore fund designed to foster private sector engagement in space R&D through interest-free loans for a duration of 50 years. While detailed information was sparse, the scheme is expected to significantly aid the burgeoning private space industry in India, which includes around 200 startups. Funding for IN-SPACe, the authority established in 2020 to oversee the sector, received a 24% increase in its operational Budget.

For 2024, the Department of Space has received a slight 4% budget enhancement in the 2024-’25 Budget, with its allocation rising from Rs 12,545 crore to Rs 13,043 crore. The Indian space agenda this year is set to concentrate on groundwork for lunar (Chandrayaan) and crewed space missions (Gaganyaan), among other initiatives, by conducting necessary pre-launch activities and achieving key development milestones.

The Budget for space technology initiatives—encompassing the Gaganyaan crewed space mission, the creation of new launch vehicles and various other space missions—experienced a 27% boost. This enhancement signifies greater financial backing for these particular space projects this year relative to last year.

In the previous year, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) celebrated the successful Chandrayaan-3 mission, which included the soft landing of a robotic explorer on the lunar surface. ISRO also launched the Aditya L-1 mission for solar observations and the XPoSat mission to study neutron stars and blackholes. Additionally, India became a participant in the Artemis Accords, joining forces with the United States on its mission to return humans to the Moon by 2025.

In 2024, notable planned activities include an unmanned Gaganyaan mission test flight, the third launch attempt of the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) and the collaborative venture between NASA and ISRO, the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mission. ISRO’s team is also dedicating efforts to the advancement of propellants, satellite propulsion systems, new spacecraft launchers and the commercial transfer of these innovations to the private sector. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

Elon Musk announced that the first person has received a Neuralink brain implant, which is a significant step forward in the advancement of “brain-computer interface” technology. This technology has the potential to assist individuals with conditions like paralysis to interact with their environment.

In a recent tweet on Monday, Elon Musk shared that the patient who received the Neuralink brain implant the day before is now in a stable condition and recovering smoothly. This indicates that the surgery was a success and no major technical issues were encountered.

Musk did not provide any specific information about the patient. In September of last year, Neuralink mentioned that they were seeking a trial participant who was experiencing quadriplegia.

Quadriplegia is a condition characterized by paralysis or loss of function in all four limbs and the torso. It typically results from a spinal cord injury or neurological disorder. Individuals with quadriplegia often require assistance with daily activities and may experience limited mobility and sensation below the level of injury.

The term “torso” refers to the central part of the human body, which includes the chest, abdomen, and pelvis. It is the region between the neck and the hips, where vital organs such as the heart, lungs, liver, and intestines are located.

Musk also mentioned that the initial findings indicate promising “neuron spike detection.” This suggests that the Neuralink device is able to detect signals from individual neurons within the brain. This advancement has the potential to decode higher-quality brain signals, which is quite exciting. Musk did not disclose the specific number of neurons that the Neuralink device is capable of detecting. Additionally, researchers noted that the company did not provide sufficient safety and efficacy data necessary to assess the success of the implant.

Neurons are special cells in the brain that act as messengers, sending electrical signals to communicate with each other. Through connections called synapses, these signals can pass from one neuron to another, forming a network of communication lines in the brain. This network allows information to be transmitted and processed, enabling us to think, move, and feel. Understanding how neurons function is crucial for scientists to develop new ways to enhance brain health and treat neurological conditions.

The human implantation news has been seen as a groundbreaking advancement that can enhance the lives of individuals with severe disabilities and paralysis. However, it also calls for careful examination and regulation from an ethical standpoint. Following Musk’s announcement, social media was flooded with memes (humorous images, Videos on social media platform) depicting fictional human-robot hybrids. However, it is important to note that the primary purpose of this technology is to assist individuals who have limited movement and functionality. Even for individuals who could benefit from this technology, it is anticipated that it will take several years for the development and availability of this technology.

There are a few other companies in the field of brain-computer interfaces that Neuralink competes with. One of these competitors, Synchron, has created a device similar to a stent that is implanted inside the jugular vien, on the surface of the brain, but not inside the brain tissue itself. Precision Neuroscience, another company in this field, has conducted temporary implantations of its microelectrode array in six patients. This allowed them to collect test data before removing the device. The microelectrode array is incredibly thin, only one-fifth the thickness of a human hair, and is designed to be placed on the surface of the brain.

The jugular vein refers to one of the major blood vessels in the neck, in close proximity with brain , that carries deoxygenated blood from the head and neck back to the heart. It is an essential part of the circulatory system, playing a crucial role in maintaining blood flow and oxygenation throughout the body.

A microelectrode array refers to a small device composed of tiny electrodes that are arranged in a specific pattern. This array is designed to be placed on or near the surface of the brain to detect and record electrical signals from neurons. It allows researchers to study brain activity and can be used in various applications related to neuroscience and brain-computer interfaces.

According to Blackrock Neurotech, they have successfully implanted their previous-generation device in numerous patients. These individuals have reportedly been able to perform activities such as eating, sending emails, and controlling robotic arms using their thoughts. The company claims that these implants have been proven to be safe and effective.

Neuralink, a company established in 2016, was valued at $3.5 billion in its most recent equity financing round in November, as per PitchBook, a data provider.

Neuralink, led by Elon Musk, aims to develop a product called “Telepathy” that would allow individuals to control smartphones or computers using their thoughts. During an interview on X, Musk mentioned this as one of the goals of Neuralink. The company has also released videos showcasing monkeys with implanted devices successfully controlling a cursor and playing the classic video game “Pong.”

Neuralink’s implant consists of a small chip, about the size of a quarter, which is surgically placed in the skull. This chip is connected to numerous thin, threadlike electrodes that are implanted directly into the brain. These electrodes are responsible for transmitting electrical signals generated by the neurons. However, there is still uncertainty about how the brain will react to these implanted threads over an extended period. It is possible that tissue growth around the electrodes could potentially degrade the quality of the captured electrical signals.

According to Jacob Robinson, the founder and CEO of Motif Neurotech, Neuralink’s ability to complete the first surgery within six months of announcing trial recruitment showcases their agility and highlights the demand for their product. Motif Neurotech, a company developing its own brain implant for the treatment of depression, recognizes the significance of Neuralink’s achievement and hopes to contribute to the field of neurotechnology in the future. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

As a fallout of French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to India as the Chief Guest at the country’s 75th Republic Day celebrations on January 26 this year, India and France have agreed to bolster their collaboration in the defence and aerospace sectors, finalizing the Indo-French defence industrial roadmap and many other equally strategic agreements. Macron is the fifth French president to be invited as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day after President François Hollande (2016), Nicolas Sarkozy (2008), Jacques Chirac (1998), Valery Giscard d’Estaing (1980) and Jacques Chirac as PM (1976). This, incidentally, was Macron’s third visit to India, after earlier visits in 2018 and 2023.

Foreign secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra, addressing a press conference in New Delhi on Friday, said the new roadmap would spur Indian and French collaboration in co-development and co-production in defence sector projects, such as critical military hardware and platforms. However, the comprehensive roadmap does not only cover the field of defence, but also those of science, technology, healthcare, education, training, research, public administration and sustainable agriculture. To celebrate innovation, the year, 2026, has been dubbed the ‘India-France Year of Innovation’.

Macron’s visit follows Prime Minister Modi’s trip to France in July 2023, where he was the Guest of Honour at the Bastille Day Parade. The recent interaction between Modi and Macron is their fifth since May. France ranks as India’s second-biggest supplier of arms. Notably, it was the sole Western country that refrained from imposing sanctions on New Delhi following India’s nuclear tests in 1998.

At the G20 meeting held in Delhi in September in 2023, the Ministry of Defence had actively sought advice from industry professionals to develop a collaborative strategy with France. Their goal is to enhance defence industry partnership with cooperation in such fields as maritime technology, ground combat equipment, robotics, autonomous vehicles, different systems and cyber security. The two countries had earlier agreed to pursue the roadmap when Prime Minister Modi visited France for the Bastille Day celebrations.

Before Macron’s arrival, the French Embassy in Delhi had said in a statement that these talks would focus on strengthening bilateral relations and establishing new ventures in multiple key sectors. Additionally, the visit was expected to focus on enhancing business connections and cross-investments as part of France’s ‘Make it Iconic’ national branding campaign, which considers India a key target country. But the focus of the defence industrial roadmap—signifying a landmark agreement—that was agreed on during Macron’s current visit is on air, maritime and terrestrial warfare; collaboration in space missions; artificial intelligence (AI) technology, robotics, autonomous vehicles; and cyber defence, besides other areas.

Preceding Prime Minister Modi’s trip to the Bastille Day festivities, India had, initially, agreed to the purchase of 26 Rafale-M fighter jets for its 45,000-ton INS Vikrant aircraft carrier and co-produce three Scorpene-class submarines, a deal valued at approximately Rs 80,000 crore ($9.62 billion). But Macron’s current visit did not see a major announcement on the purchase of these Rafale marine aircraft, or Scorpene-class submarines from India. Asked about where these deals now stood, Kwatra said, “The visits are not focused on individual transactions.”

However, aerospace giant Thales has announced plans to establish an avionics maintenance, repair and operations (MRO) facility in Delhi with the goal of bringing reliable high-tech capabilities to India to support the modernization and indigenization of India’s aerospace and defence sectors. Thales provides state-of-the-art equipment and systems aboard the Rafale fighter jets, underscoring its role in enhancing India’s defence technology capabilities. The company recently opened its second state-of-the-art facility in Bengaluru—a sign of its deeper involvement with India’s aerospace and defence sectors.

During their discussions, Modi and Macron engaged in conversations about global issues, with special focus on addressing the Gaza conflict issue. The leaders explored different aspects, such as terrorism and humanitarian concerns, demonstrating their joint commitment to navigating complex geopolitical challenges. Kwatra stated that the discussions also involved a thoughtful exchange of views on the changing security dynamics in the Red Sea. Both leaders recognized the potential disruptions and existing developments in this strategically important region, reaffirming their dedication to mutual understanding and cooperation.

With the aim of enhancing space situational awareness, preventing collisions in space, earth monitoring and remote-sensing, the two countries also agreed on a letter of intent (LoI) to increase cooperation in the field of defence space. New Space India Ltd (NSIL) also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with France’s Arianespace to boost satellite launch capabilities that underscores the shared goal of space technology advancements. According to another announcement that Kwatra made, Tata and Airbus are poised to establish a final assembly line (FAL) for production of H125 helicopters in India with significant emphasis on locally made components.

France has been keenly interested in expanding collaboration with India in the areas of space and nuclear technology. India and France have been working together since the 1960s, demonstrating the long-term nature of their relationship. Much of their collaboration has focused on creating propulsion technology, a significant symbol of their teamwork over the years. The opening of France’s CNES office in Bengaluru in 2013 strengthened the long-lasting relationship between the two. An agreement signed in April 2015 took their partnership to a higher level, and then a joint plan for space cooperation in 2018 highlighted their commitment on different areas of space exploration.

The Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, which started in 2018 when President Macron visited India, is a big step forward. It involves working in collaboration between India’s ISRO and France’s CNES on many aspects of space exploration. France plays a key role by providing important parts and equipment for India’s growing space projects.

In 2019, India-France space activities increased, especially after President Macron’s visit, which led to forming a group focused on India’s human spaceflight mission. In 2019, a significant deal was made to set up a maritime surveillance centre in India. This goes along with India’s big plans for missions to Mars, Venus and asteroids. They also worked together on such satellites as SARAL and Megha Tropiques, showing the vast range of their partnership.

The first India-France Strategic Space Dialogue in 2023 focused on important areas of collaboration, including joint satellite missions, such as Trishna; understanding the ocean better; payload accommodation on satellites; ground station support; and working on sending humans to space.

India-France Student/Tourist Exchange: Macron’s trip also emphasises France’s commitment to opening up more avenues for Indian students, artists, investors and tourists. There will be particular emphasis on initiatives that encourage student exchanges, aligning with President Macron’s goal of hosting 30,000 Indian students by 2030.

Macron, on the social media site X (formerly Twitter), announced that France’s goal was to welcome 30,000 Indian students to that country, which would facilitate visa processes for Indians who had once studied in the country. The other announcements were regarding the introduction of the Young Professionals Scheme, encouraging the exchange of individuals aged 18-35, and an extension of validity to five years for Schengen visas for Indian students pursuing their Masters degrees in France. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

The involvement of Iran in the escalating conflict between Israel and Gaza has been somewhat downplayed and indirect. However, in the last week, a series of direct retaliatory actions by Iran have sparked fresh discussions about Tehran’s strategic objectives.

There is growing speculation about whether China might be requested to intervene as a mediator between Iran and its neighbouring countries. This comes as analysts suggest that Iran’s decision to launch air strikes against non-state groups in Pakistan and Iraq earlier this week was based on a possible misjudgement. Tehran presumably believed that neither nation would be inclined to respond with retaliatory actions.

In retaliation for Iran’s missile and drone strikes, which targeted purported bases of Israel’s Mossad in northern Iraq and a separate ethnic Baloch insurgent group located in western Pakistan, both Pakistan and Iraq have withdrawn their ambassadors from Tehran. They have also expelled Iranian envoys. These attacks, conducted by Iran against the group fighting in its southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan province, occurred on Monday and Tuesday.

According to Abdul Basit, a senior associate fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, Iran’s assumption that Pakistan wouldn’t retaliate, fearing entanglement in the broader Middle East conflict stemming from the Israel-Gaza war, was certainly a miscalculation on Iran’s part.

Indeed, Basit indicated that Pakistan was compelled to respond. He suggested that not retaliating would have projected an image of weakness to India, its longstanding adversary, and to the Taliban insurgents who are currently battling Pakistani security forces from positions in Afghanistan.

Iran has described its air strikes in Pakistan, Iraq, and on Islamic State (ISIS) positions in Syria as a response to terrorist attacks that occurred on its soil in December and January. On January 3, twin suicide bombings by ISIS in the southeastern Iranian city of Kerman resulted in the deaths of at least 90 individuals. The attackers were traced by Iranian investigators back to Afghanistan.

Ali Alfoneh, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, conveyed to media that the current scenario poses a challenge for Iran, given its lack of interest in entering into a confrontation with the Taliban government. However, Alfoneh noted that to maintain its reputation and fulfill its promise of retaliation, Iran chose to strike at various non-specific targets in Iraq and Syria, and, in a somewhat unexpected move, also in Pakistan.

Alfoneh, author of “Political Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Demise of the Clergy and the Rise of the Revolutionary Guards Corps,” suggested to the media that Iran’s selection of targets is subject to various interpretations. However, factors like the ease of striking these targets and the anticipated minimal repercussions were likely considerations in Iran’s decision-making process.

However, he mentioned that the situation with Pakistan is “somewhat distinct”. Iran has generally refrained from direct involvement in the Israel-Gaza conflict, choosing instead to act through its allies in the so-called Axis of Resistance. This includes the continuous assaults on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, carried out by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Experts believe that Iran’s strikes in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria are intended to convey messages to its rivals. According to Guy Burton, an independent analyst and former instructor of international politics at the University of Kurdistan Hewler in Arbil – the northern Iraqi city hit by Iran on Monday – one of the key messages is Iran’s demonstration of its status as a regional power with the ability to take decisive action when it deems necessary.

The air strikes by Iran also underscored certain vulnerabilities in the region, such as Iraq’s incapacity for retaliation. Furthermore, a third message from Iran, according to Burton, is its capability to indirectly target American and Israeli interests, while likely indicating its preference to avoid escalating the situation into a more direct conflict.

Burton, the author of “China and Middle East Conflicts: Responding to War and Rivalry from the Cold War to the Present,” suggests that Tehran is likely weighing how much they can escalate confrontations without triggering internal dissent. Such domestic unrest could potentially impact the regime’s standing and stability.

Realistically, given its current economic challenges, the Iranian regime is not in a position to handle the potential repercussions of an escalated conflict. Certainly, Tehran is likely deliberating on the extent to which they can intensify confrontations without causing internal unrest that could lead to opposition, potentially jeopardizing the regime’s stability and position, as noted by Burton, author of “China and Middle East Conflicts: Responding to War and Rivalry from the Cold War to the Present.”

The timing of the US and UK air strikes against the Houthis, occurring just days apart, not only diminishes Western criticism of Iran’s air strikes but also highlights that both sides are capable of similar military strategies. Analysts suggest that to avoid further escalation of Iran’s misstep, China might need to step in diplomatically. This would involve leveraging its strong ties with Pakistan and its political influence with both Iran and Iraq.

During a regular press briefing on Thursday, Mao Ning, spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, expressed Beijing’s earnest desire for both parties to remain calm and restrained, to prevent any further escalation of tensions. Mao Ning further stated that China is ready to contribute positively to de-escalate the situation if both parties desire it. China has significant investments in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, particularly the Gwadar port on the Indian Ocean, which is linked by land to its southwestern Xinjiang region. Similarly, China has made considerable investments in the oil and gas sector of Iraq.

Beijing holds the role of a strategic ally to Tehran and served as the key facilitator in an agreement reached last March. This agreement was pivotal in reinstating diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, ending a seven-year break in relations.

According to Singapore-based Basit, considering its economic and strategic stakes, China cannot afford to remain a passive observer in the face of rising tensions. He also noted that this situation is as much a test of China’s diplomatic clout and influence in these regions and countries as it is a potential threat to its economic investments, should tensions escalate further.

Contrary to Pakistan, Iraq couldn’t respond militarily to Iran, as its Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government is heavily influenced by a political coalition aligned with Tehran, known as the Coordination Framework (CF).

Al-Sudani is facing increasing pressure from his coalition partners to remove the 2,500 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq. This comes in the wake of clashes between the U.S. military and Shia militias backed by the CF, which began with the onset of the Israel-Gaza conflict on October 7.

Analysts have noted that while he has publicly consented, Al-Sudani has not established a timeline and appears to be delaying action.”Iraq remains a fragile state, lacking the strength to resist external influences, be it from other countries or non-state entities. This includes Iran-backed militias which also possess a local base and support within the country,” Burton observed.

Since most of China’s investments in Iraq are in the southern region, as opposed to the Kurdish north affected by Iran, Beijing might be less motivated to engage in diplomatic efforts. Rather, the Chinese authorities would probably view attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan province unfavourably, “particularly if they were seen as impacting Chinese interests in that area,” Burton suggested.

If China were to attempt to “curb Iranian actions,” specifically in areas where its own interests are at stake, it might encounter resistance, with Iran potentially leveraging its relationship with India. Similar to China’s involvement in developing Pakistan’s Gwadar port, Iran aims to advance the Chabahar port, with support from India, following an agreement between the two nations this Monday.

Thus, Tehran might perceive any disruptions at Gwadar as a beneficial scenario for them and Chabahar, Burton noted. “The Chinese and Iranians do not agree on everything,” he added. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

The serial production of Russia’s new glide cluster bomb, Drel, is expected to commence before the year’s end. In light of this, it’s important to understand the characteristics of the Drel and assess whether it will be utilized in Russia’s ongoing special military operation. In Ukraine or in future elsewhere.

Rostec, Russia’s leading weapons manufacturer and a state-owned corporation, has announced that the Drel (Drill) bomb has successfully completed all the tests required by the customer. The company also stated that details regarding the bomb’s potential use in the Russian special military operation are kept secret.

In simple terms, a glide bomb, also called a stand-off bomb, is designed with special controls that let it glide smoothly through the air, making its flight path longer and flatter compared to regular bombs. A cluster bomb is a kind of bomb that can be dropped from the air or launched from the ground. It opens up in the air to scatter many smaller bombs over a wide area.

“Flatter,” in this context, means having a more level or horizontal flight path. Unlike regular bombs that drop steeply after being released, a glide bomb with a flatter trajectory travels a longer distance horizontally before reaching the ground. This makes its flight path more elongated and less steep.

Based on open source , the Drel bomb measures 3.1 meters (122 inches) in length and weighs 540 kilograms (1,190 pounds).

The design of the Drel bomb enables a fighter plane to release it without having to fly into the area protected by the enemy’s air defenses. This bomb is likely to be used with the Su-57, a fifth-generation fighter jet, and the Su-34, a versatile fighter-bomber.

The Drel bomb works on a “fire and forget” concept, meaning it can be launched and then it operates on its own. It has 15 smaller bombs inside and is made to hit a range of ground targets like tanks, artillery, air defenses, radar sites, and command centres. It finds its way using Russia’s GLONASS satellite system and other guiding tools. GLONASS is Russia’s global navigation satellite system, similar to the U.S. GPS, providing accurate location and timing information worldwide.

Developers of the bomb assert that its design and technology greatly reduce the chances of it being picked up by enemy radar systems.

Alexander Kochkin, the executive director of Tekhmash, explained to Sputnik using simple terms that the Drel bomb can fly on its own to cover the necessary distance and strike targets at the correct time.

He also stressed that if any part of this bomb doesn’t find a target, it will safely destroy itself soon after. This ensures it won’t be a threat to local people once hostilities have ceased.

The planned mass production of the Drel bomb will contribute to Russia’s growing collection of precise glide bombs. This collection already features models like the UPAB-1500, UPAB-500B, and KAB-250LG, along with the FAB-250, FAB-500, and FAB-1500. These munitions or weapons are currently being used by the Russian army in their special operation.

The UPAB-1500B, weighing 1,525 kilograms (3,362 pounds), is engineered to destroy heavily fortified ground targets, including command centres. Meanwhile, the 390 kilogram (859 pound) PAB-500B is specialized in annihilating stationary ground and maritime targets such as bridges, military-industrial complexes, warships, and transport ships. This information comes from Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms exporting agency.

The highest heights from which the UPAB-1500Bs and the PAB-500B bombs can be dropped are 15 kilometres (9.3 miles) and 14 kilometres (8.6 miles), respectively.

The KAB-250LG, weighing 256 kg (564 pounds) and having a laser guidance system, can destroy targets like railway hubs, military factories, ships, storage buildings, and airport facilities from up to 10 km (6.2 miles) high.

Last year, the advanced FAB-1500M, a high-explosive glide bomb, was added to the Russian army’s arsenal. This highly accurate bomb weighs 1,500 kg (3,300 pounds) and comes with a special gliding and correction system. It’s usually used with Su-34 fighter-bombers. Forbes magazine even talked about this big bomb in one of their articles.

The media outlet reported that, in contrast, Ukraine’s glide bombs, which are the American-made Joint Direct Attack Munitions-Extended Range, have a weight of only 500 pounds (226 kg).

Russian experts have said that using these bombs, especially the FAB-1500M, with UMPC modules helps Russian forces destroy enemy positions very effectively in the special operation area. They think these bombs are really good at damaging important Ukrainian military buildings near the front line. Additionally, these experts highlighted that it’s difficult for anti-aircraft systems to stop these types of munitions. The UMPC module is a guidance system that enhances the accuracy and effectiveness of bombs in hitting their targets.

The New York Times, quoting anonymous Ukrainian soldiers, reported that since March, they’ve faced the extra powerful impact of Russian glide bombs. These bombs, which weigh half a ton and are dropped from planes, are strong enough to break through underground shelters.

The soldier, known only as “the Kit,” described how they received the glide bombs in pairs, totalling eight in an hour. He likened the noise to that of a jet swooping down, similar to the sound of “hell’s gate” opening. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Russia’s Powerful Cluster Bomb Drel May Be In Military Operations Soon first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

Pakistan’s efforts to purchase advanced stealth fighters from China could compel India to expedite its air force upgrade, possibly through the acquisition of F-35 jets from the United States. This move would be aimed at maintaining tactical air superiority along its frontiers, according to experts.

Pakistan Air Force’s top official, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber, stated on January 2 that they have started the process to buy the Chinese FC-31 Gyrfalcon, a modern stealth fighter jet, and expect to get it soon.

He didn’t give details on the number of Chinese fighter jets the Pakistan Air Force is purchasing or their delivery timeline. However, there is speculation from some experts that as many as 36 planes might be received by the end of this decade.

Mustafa Hyder, who heads the Pakistan-China Institute in Islamabad, mentioned that Pakistan’s decision to buy the FC-31 Gyrfalcon highlights the growing military and defense partnership with China in South Asia, mainly against India, who they both view as a common challenge. He also said this move shows their combined effort to counter any threats from India.

“Harsh V. Pant, a professor at King’s College London, told SCMP that the deal might prompt India to more actively consider purchasing F-35s. Additionally, he noted that India is speeding up its Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft program, aiming to develop its stealth fighter by 2032,” as reported by SCMP.

The FC-31 Gyrfalcon is also known as the J-31 or J-35, as it hasn’t received an official name from Beijing yet. This is due to the absence of formal orders for the aircraft.

The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation is still working on prototypes of the Gyrfalcon, but it’s widely anticipated that the Chinese navy will adopt it within the next five years, likely under the name J-35. This is expected for use on China’s expanding number of aircraft carriers.

Air Chief Baber called the aircraft “J-31,” which probably refers to its land-based version. This model has been actively promoted by China to foreign governments that can’t get advanced military technology from Western countries due to political reasons. China has chosen not to offer its operational fifth-generation J-20 “Mighty Dragon” fighter jet for international sales.

Since the 1960s, India has been involved in multiple conflicts with both China and Pakistan, related to disputes over their borders, which extend over more than 6,800 kilometres.

Each of the three nations – India, China, and Pakistan – has a significant collection of nuclear weapons, which could make South Asia a central location for a potential global conflict in the future.

Frank O’Donnell, a senior research adviser at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, a think tank in Seoul, noted that Pakistan deploying a fifth-generation stealth fighter, which the Indian Air Force currently lacks, would provide Pakistan with a tactical edge, especially in air-to-air combat situations.

Pakistan’s strong military ties with China allow it to obtain and incorporate advanced aircraft much faster than India, which has a more slow-moving bureaucratic system.

According to Frank O’Donnell, who is also associated with the Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think tank, despite the Indian Air Force acquiring 36 Rafale jets from France’s Dassault Aviation recently, its modernization hasn’t matched the rate at which its existing fleet is aging. Consequently, the IAF currently has about 30 to 32 squadrons, well below its target of 42 squadrons.

It is anticipated that India will shortly declare the purchase of an additional 26 Rafale jets for use on its aircraft carrier.

O’Donnell mentioned that for advancement in this area, India needs to show political will to make its defense procurement process more efficient and to clear bureaucratic hurdles, something which hasn’t been adequately demonstrated so far.

The Indian Air Force faces a deficit of around 200 aircraft, which is needed to address the combined challenges from China and its ally Pakistan. This gap is only expected to be reduced by half by the mid-2030s, according to the IAF.

In reaction to India’s purchase of Rafale jets, Pakistan bought 25 Chengdu J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” aircraft in 2022. The last group of these planes was officially added to their fleet at the ceremony on January 2, where PAF Chief Baber spoke.

Analysts suggest that while Pakistan’s main reason for buying advanced Chinese fighter jets is to defend against India’s larger military, China views this as a chance to respond to India’s increasing political and defense ties with the United States, especially within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which also involves Japan and Australia.

Mustafa Hyder of the Pakistan-China Institute mentioned to SCMP that India has received financial and military backing to serve as a balance against China in Asia, moving away from its usual policy of non-alignment.

It’s becoming more evident and successful how China and Pakistan are joining forces to protect their security interests and sovereignty, and to counter India’s dominance. India doesn’t seem too concerned about Pakistan getting Chinese stealth jets, as the FC-31 is still under development.

Pant from King’s College London pointed out, “It’s key to note that the FC-31 is still being developed. It’s somewhat behind schedule, and in the long run, this deal could be more beneficial to China than to Pakistan.”

Pant, who leads the strategic studies program at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, explained that Pakistan had to turn to China for advanced fighter jets to replace its old fleet of 75 American F-16s. He noted this was because Pakistan recognizes the difficulties in its long-term relationship with the U.S.

O’Donnell suggested that Washington would probably not be very surprised by Pakistan’s intention to acquire the J-31. He believes this is expected, considering Pakistan’s history of significantly incorporating Chinese military equipment.

Pakistan and China have collaborated to manufacture about 150 JF-17 “Thunder” lightweight fighters for the Pakistani Air Force, aiming to replace its old French Mirage planes. The most recent Mk III model of the JF-17 boasts capabilities of the 4.5-generation standard.

Pakistan has purchased Type-054 guided-missile frigates and Type-041 diesel-electric submarines from China. O’Donnell mentioned that these submarines are widely anticipated to be a key component of Pakistan’s future naval nuclear capabilities.

O’Donnell added that if the J-31 deal goes through, the United States would likely see it as further evidence of the deepening and enduring military relationship between China and Pakistan. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

On December 24, 2024, NASA’s Parker Solar Probe is set for a historic journey, edging closer to the Sun than any other man-made object before. Achieving record-breaking speeds of 195 km/s (435,000 mph), it will be the fastest artificial object in history. The probe aims to approach the Sun at a distance of just 6.1 million km (about 3.8 million miles), a feat unparalleled in human engineering. Dr. Nour Raouafi, who leads the project, told BBC that this mission is akin to virtually touching a star, highlighting its extraordinary significance.

No man-made object has ever traveled as fast or come as near to the Sun as this – it will be just 6.1 million km or 3.8 million miles away from the Sun’s surface.

Dr. Nour Raouafi, the scientist working on the Parker project, said it’s almost like we’re landing on a star. He also mentioned to BBC , that this is a huge milestone for everyone. It’s as significant as the Moon landing in 1969, according to the scientist from Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The Parker Solar Probe, launched by the US space agency in 2018, is on a bold mission. It aims to approach the Sun closely and repeatedly. By late 2024, it’s expected to get within just 4% of the distance between the Sun and the Earth, which is about 149 million kilometres or (14.9 crore kms ) 93 million miles. Distance between Earth and Sun is approximately 150 million Kms (15 Crore Kms )

Parker, a space probe, faces a big challenge. When it’s closest to the sun, the front of the spacecraft will likely heat up to 1,400 degrees Celsius. Its plan is to quickly move in and out, using instruments protected by a heavy heat shield to study the sun’s surroundings. Scientists are hoping this will lead to important discoveries, especially about the corona, which is the outer layer of the sun’s atmosphere.

The sun has a strange heating pattern. Its surface, the Photosphere, is about 6,000 degrees Celsius, but its outer layer, the corona, can get over a million degrees. Normally, you’d expect it to get cooler the further you are from the sun’s center. Also, in the corona, particles like electrons and protons suddenly speed up a lot, creating a very fast wind that moves at about 400 kilometres per second, which is really fast.

Scientists still don’t fully understand these phenomena, but it’s crucial for making better predictions about the sun’s actions and “space weather.” This weather involves strong releases of particles and magnetic fields from the sun that can interfere with communication on Earth and even cause power failures. This kind of solar activity also creates radiation that is harmful to astronauts. This is particularly important to consider as we’re planning to send astronauts back to the Moon and set up a permanent station there, as Dr. Raouafi pointed out.

Parker recently made a close pass by the Sun on 29th Dec 2023 and has three more such passes scheduled for this 2024. After these, it will use Venus’ gravity on November 6 to change its path for a significant event on December 24.

Dr. Nicky Fox, who now leads NASA’s science division and was previously the main scientist on the Parker mission, discussed the upcoming December 24 flyby. She highlighted that the probe would spend a longer time in the sun’s corona than in any previous mission.

Speaking to BBC News, she mentioned that they’re not sure what they’ll discover, but they will be looking for waves in the solar wind that might explain the heating. Dr. Fox expects to detect various types of waves, which could help understand different theories that scientists have debated for a long time.

2024 will be the most important year for Parker’s mission. After December 2024, it won’t be able to get any closer to the Sun because its path won’t pass by Venus anymore, which helps to adjust its route for a closer approach. Also, getting closer to the Sun could mean less protection from its large shield, making the back of the spacecraft too hot to handle.

To clarify, December 2024 marks a crucial moment for the Parker mission as it will be at its nearest safe distance to the Sun. This close approach in December is due to well-planned movements and the path the spacecraft follows. After December, Parker will no longer be able to use Venus to change its path for a closer approach. Therefore, this month signifies the closest point Parker can safely get to the Sun without its shield being overwhelmed by the Sun’s intense heat. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Unprecedented Solar Proximity Is Being Made Possible In December This Year first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

The Indian defence manufacturing sector has advanced significantly, largely due to the government’s ‘Make in India’ policy and emphasis on self-sufficiency. But difficulties that can hinder development in 2024 need to be addressed. So like all significant nations, India has an Army, Navy and Air Force and these wings need among other essentials, ground vehicles, naval vessels, C4ISR, fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, weapons and ammunition, protection and training and unmanned systems.

The Indian defence market is growing. It is expected to increase at 4 percent annually. India’s rivalry with China needs constant modernization of military equipment, cutting imports and market growth. Geopolitical tensions—as well as terror threat perceptions—have pushed India to expand its perimeter, security, naval and aviation capabilities. The country’s defence budget has steadily expanded.

Military budget for 2024 could be $84 billion—a whopping 13 percent rise from 2023. This increase will support market expansion over the projection period. Also, with the ‘Make in India’ initiative, India seeks self-sufficiency in defence and allied areas, thereby opening up new prospects for market players.

The increased emphasis on modernizing aircraft capabilities will stimulate segment growth—including HAL Tejas LCA Mk-1A, Dornier 228, HAL Dhruv ALH/Rudra and HAL Light Combat Helicopter deliveries. India’s initiatives in manufacturing and operational self-sufficiency generate considerable opportunities for regional suppliers. India will keep spending on AMCA, LCA Mk-2, 3-ton-class Indian Multi-Role Helicopter and AWACS.

The Indian Air Force will buy 114 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) worth approximately $18-$20 billion. The IAF wants to keep expanding its air defence capabilities and invest in key capabilities by obtaining local and foreign-produced systems—such as Akash SAM, S-400 and MRSAM IAI. Such programmes will support segment growth.

The Ministry of Defence had an exceptional year in 2023, experiencing a sharp rise in defence exports— an unparalleled $1.95 billion, nearly $365 million more than in the previous year. Simultaneously, defence production surpassed the milestone of $12.2 billion for the first time. The Indian government has set a target of $25 billion in defence production by 2025, with $5 billion coming from exports.

Through Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and ammunition production factories, the Department of Defence Production (DDP) has created vast manufacturing capabilities for producing various pieces of defence equipment including heavy transport vehicles, weapons and ammunition, tanks, armoured vehicles, helicopters, fighter planes, military ships and submarines.

The IAF promotes ‘Make in India’ via targeted, sustainable, established indigenization programmes. The current focus is on reducing reliance on imported defence technology. Light Combat Aircraft, Akash missiles and Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) have all been introduced recently. It actively supports and closely coordinates with the Defence Ministry on LCH, RPA, medium-power radars, low-level tracking radars and other systems, its actions in line with that of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

The Strategic Partner Model also aligns with ‘Make in India. Shipyards have also followed the ‘Make in India’ model. The Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC)-1 is India’s largest and most sophisticated military ship, built by Cochin Shipyard Limited. Submarines, destroyers, frigates, replenishment oilers, research vessels, diving support vessels and tugs are being built in India. Such advances will lead to increased indigenous development of various defence technologies.

The Indian defence market is moderately consolidated, with several prominent firms having market shares including Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), DRDO, Rostec and Airbus SE. The ‘Make in India’ policy has fostered the formation of partnerships between foreign and indigenous enterprises. This has enhanced the capacities of Indian companies. Recent partnerships have benefited HAL, Safran, Elbit Systems Ltd, Tata Motors, Bharat Forge, General Dynamics, Russian companies, L&T, Boeing and Mahindra.

India is also working to improve its domestic manufacturing capabilities to broaden the variety of local defence equipment it can make, and reduce reliance on foreign procurement. Some state-owned enterprises are developing indigenous technologies to boost local players’ market share.

But there are issues galore! Imports, for example. India still relies largely on imports for vital defence technologies and components, notably high-end systems, such as fighter planes, submarines and missiles. Because of this reliance, India is subject to supply chain disruptions and geopolitical pressures.

Then there are infrastructure bottlenecks. The Indian defence manufacturing ecosystem is underdeveloped regarding infrastructure, such as testing facilities, production lines and trained labour. This might result in delays, inefficiencies and increased expenses.

Financial constraints: While defence spending is increasing, it remains restrained compared to that of other big powers. This reduces resources available for R&D, upgrading and procuring new technology. There are also bureaucratic obstacles which complicate and delay procurement, discourage private participation and hinder development and deployment of new technology. It is critical for speedier expansion to streamline the procurement process and reduce red-tape.

Attracting Private Capital: To close the technology gap and encourage innovation, the Indian defence sector needs to attract more private investment. Private players can be enticed by creating a suitable climate with clear policies, incentives and long-term contracts.

Skilled Labour Shortage: The Indian defence industry faces a skills deficit, notably in such fields as aeronautical engineering, cyber security and robotics. Investing in education and training programmes is critical for closing this gap.

MSMEs Integration: Micro, small and medium-size companies (MSMEs) can be important in supplying components and subsystems to bigger military manufacturers. However, properly integrating MSMEs into the supply chain necessitates improved access to money, technology and market opportunities.

Geopolitical Uncertainty: The current global geopolitical environment, including the war in Ukraine and tensions with China, can disrupt supply chains and raise the cost of defence equipment. India must establish alternative sources for vital technology and minerals to offset these risks.

Threats to Cyber Security: Cyber attacks on the defence sector are becoming more common, with the potential to disrupt operations and compromise sensitive data. Strong cyber security measures are crucial to safeguarding key infrastructure and information.

Cost-Quality Balance: While cost-effectiveness is critical, sacrificing quality can have major implications for national security. Finding the correct mix between price and performance is a major problem for India’s defence industry.

Addressing these difficulties requires a collaborative effort by government, industry and academia. India can build a robust and self-sufficient military manufacturing ecosystem that can satisfy the country’s strategic demands in the coming years by investing in infrastructure, technology and people resources. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

India and the UAE recently completed their first transaction in rupees for crude oil from the Emirates. A major shift in how global trade is conducted, typically done in dollars, this step is a significant boost to the growing trade between India and the UAE, which is likely to surpass the $100 billion target within a few years. Businesses and traders from both countries welcomed this move as an important part of their cooperation. It opens the door for better economic partnership and simplifies international financial dealings.

After the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed in 2022, trade between the UAE and India increased to $85 billion. The UAE became India’s third-biggest trading partner and the second-biggest export market in the fiscal year 2022-23. In turn, India ranked as the UAE’s second-largest trading partner.

For India, which is the third-largest energy consumer in the world, using its own currency for payment is a significant step in its strategy to reduce reliance on the widely-used dollar and to increase the global use of the Indian rupee. This aligns with the BRICS, of which India is a member, strategy to shift away from the US dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

Experts in the oil industry mention that using the rupee for trade payments is a step by the world’s fifth-largest economy to broaden its oil supply sources, reduce the cost of transactions, and position its currency as a practical option for settling trade deals.

Experts in currency matters explain that trading using the rupee removes the necessity of converting into another currency for import or export payments, and aids in preserving foreign exchange reserves. Making the Indian rupee more widely used internationally could lower India’s borrowing costs and help establish the rupee as a recognized payment medium for global trade transactions. As the rupee gains popularity in international trade transactions, it might eventually reach the status of a strong currency, similar to the US dollar.

The initiative to use the rupee for payments is in line with the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) decision on July 11, 2022, which permits importers to make payments in rupees and allows exporters to receive payments in the local currency. Since then, India has taken measures to enhance the role of the rupee in international payments, authorizing over a dozen banks to conduct trade settlements in rupees with 18 different countries. India has been actively persuading other major oil exporters, including Saudi Arabia and Russia, to accept the Indian rupee for their trade transactions.

During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to the UAE in July, the Central Bank of the UAE and the Reserve Bank of India signed two agreements. The first agreement aimed to create a structure for using local currencies in international transactions, while the second focused on connecting their payment systems. After the deal with the UAE on rupee settlements, the Indian Oil Corporation paid for one million barrels of crude oil from Abu Dhabi National Oil Company using Indian rupees. Some of India’s oil imports from Russia have also been paid for in rupees.

India’s Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal said that India has been working with the UAE to increase bilateral trade to a $100 billion target. Speaking at the 11th Meeting of the UAE-India High-Level Joint Task Force in Abu Dhabi, where multiple MoUs were signed across various sectors, Goyal predicted a substantial increase in investments in public markets, manufacturing, and services soon. He emphasized the boundless potential of these collaborations, saying, “Even the moon is not the limit.”

During the fiscal year 2022-23, from April 2022 to March 2023, India imported 232.7 million tonnes of crude oil for $157.5 billion from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and including the UAE, with the Middle East accounting for 58 percent of the total imports. Less than 15 percent of India’s oil needs are met by its own production. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Bengaluru-based Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst)

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By Girish Linganna

In 2016, India suddenly stopped using two types of banknotes, which made up 86% of all the money in use. This was done to fight corruption and hidden wealth.

Known as Demonetisation, this action led to chaos at banks and ATMs. Critics argued it harmed those with low incomes and disrupted India’s large cash-based economy. Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood by the decision, stating it reduced hidden wealth, improved tax adherence, and enhanced transparency.

Seven years after the ban, cash is still widely used in India, raising questions about the effectiveness of the move. The Reserve Bank of India reports that in 2020-21, the amount of cash in use grew by 16.6%, which is higher than the 12.7% average growth rate of the previous ten years. The cash-to-GDP ratio, a measure of cash usage, reached over 14% in 2020-21 before dropping slightly to 13% in 2021-22.

Meanwhile, digital payments are also increasing, helped by more people using smartphones and debit cards, and the government’s digital distribution of welfare benefits.

The rise in digital payments in India is mainly due to the Unified Payments Interface (UPI). This system allows quick and easy transfers between bank accounts using financial apps. In the last year, the value of UPI transactions exceeded one trillion dollars, which is about a third of India’s total economy. India saw an impressive 89 million transactions, making up 46% of all digital payments worldwide, as reported by ACI Worldwide and Global Data in 2023.

The fact that both cash and digital payments are growing at the same time is often called a “currency demand” paradox. The Reserve Bank of India’s latest annual report explains that this is surprising because cash and digital payments are usually seen as alternatives to each other, so their simultaneous increase doesn’t seem to make sense. People are using ATMs less and the speed at which money is being passed around in the economy has decreased.

Despite this, many in India still see cash as an important way to save for emergencies and as a way to keep value. As of March 31, the larger currency notes (500 and 2,000 rupees) made up over 87% of all banknotes in use, as per the Reserve Bank of India. Interestingly, the central bank stopped using the 2,000-rupee note, the highest value note, which was introduced after the 2016 currency ban.

Before the pandemic, a study showed that people liked using cash for small buys and digital methods for bigger ones. A recent survey by LocalCircles, a community social media platform, revealed that many people prefer cash for things like buying groceries, eating out, takeaways, paying for help, personal services, and home repairs.

According to a paper by the Reserve Bank of India, the greater preference for cash could be due to lower interest rates on bank savings, the extensive informal and rural sectors, and more direct cash benefits given during the pandemic.

Politics and real estate also play a role in the ongoing use of cash. Undeclared money is still a significant source of funding for political parties during elections. For instance, income tax authorities recently discovered about 3.5 billion rupees (around $42 million) at locations connected to an opposition MP. In 2018, Prime Minister Modi’s administration introduced electoral bonds, which are limited-time, interest-free bonds of set values, with the aim of reducing illegal cash and increasing transparency in political funding. However, critics argue that these bonds have actually reduced transparency due to their secretive nature.

Most of the undeclared wealth is still found in the real estate sector. A survey by LocalCircles in November reported that 76% of people who purchased property in India over the past seven years used cash for the transaction, with 15% paying more than half of the total amount in cash. Only 24% stated they didn’t use cash, compared to 30% two years earlier. The importance of cash in real estate deals is linked to property developers depending on the backing and favour of politicians, as discovered in a study by the Financial Experts

India isn’t alone in seeing both digital and physical cash grow together. The European Central Bank, in a 2021 report, mentioned a “paradox of banknotes”. They observed that although the usage of banknotes for shopping appears to be declining, the demand for euro notes has been rising continuously. Despite expectations of a decrease due to more digital payments, the actual demand for cash hasn’t fallen, with the number of euro notes increasing since 2007. Sweden stands out as an exception, being the world’s leading cashless society.

In India, cash is still a fundamental part of daily life for many. Seena, an auto-rickshaw driver in Bangalore, notes, “Most of my customers still pay in cash. Cash will never disappear.” (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

A coalition of 10 countries, with the United States at the helm, will struggle to prevent Yemen’s Houthi rebels from targeting ships in the Red Sea. That is not to say that both parties don’t have a shared interest in avoiding an escalation that could potentially spiral out of control. The Houthis claim their assaults on ships linked to Israel, be they commercial or military, are to exert pressure on Israel to cease the Gaza conflict.

Also, the attacks enjoy support within Yemen, bolstering the Houthi rebels’ recruitment drive for new fighters. Gregory Brew, an analyst at the Eurasia Group, says Houthi actions will not cease until Israel’s Gaza campaign ends. Then, too, it may persist. Since October 7, over 20,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza from Israeli bombings and artillery shelling.

The Houthis seized cargo ship ‘Galaxy Leader’, linked to Israel, on November 19. They shared a video showcasing the capture. Now, it has become a tourist attraction for Yemenis. The group then targeted several ships navigating through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow path that leads to the Red Sea and onward to the Suez Canal.

About 30 percent of global container ship traffic relies on the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Sanam Vakil, deputy head of the Middle East North Africa programme at Chatham House, says the Houthi presence in northern Yemen places them in a crucial geopolitical bottleneck and that the international community should take this into account.

While Houthi attacks haven’t resulted in injuries or deaths, the impact on global shipping is telling. Over 12 shipping firms, including Mediterranean Shipping Company, CMA CGM of France, and AP of Denmark, have suspended shipping through the Red Sea. Roughly 12 percent of the world’s seaborne oil and eight percent of liquefied natural gas traverse through the Bab el-Mandebt, mainly bound for Europe. The attacks also impact commodities such as grain, palm oil, and manufactured goods. Several companies are opting to sail around the southern tip of Africa, adding nearly nine days to the voyage and increasing costs by at least 15 percent.

Meanwhile, the United States has applied sanctions on 13 individuals accused of financing the Houthis. A maritime coalition with 10 nations, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Seychelles, and Bahrain, has been formed to discourage the Houthis. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, based out of Aden after a nine-year war with the Houthis, has criticized the Red Sea attacks. But it faces a dilemma as it doesn’t want to be seen as supporting Israel.

Iran, which supports the Houthi rebels, has been cautious not to escalate the Gaza conflict to the wider region. The reality is there are constraints to Iran’s influence on the Houthis. Eleonora Ardemagni of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) isn’t convinced Iran has too much influence on the Houthis. The Houthi also pursue an independent agenda. Before October 7, the Houthi faced internal challenges but their backing for Gaza has gained them widespread support. Vakil says the Houthi have longstanding ideological issues with Israel. The Houthi want to make a global impact with strength and strategic positioning.

The Houthi state media has reported over 1,000 protests, boycotts, and recruitment efforts since the war on Gaza began. Despite war-weariness from a decade of civil war in Yemen, backing Hamas has helped the Houthi to recruit new fighters who join to fight in Gaza but are deployed against the Yemeni government stronghold of Marib.

Chances are the Red Sea attacks could be a diplomatic tactic targeting Saudi Arabia. The Houthi and Saudi Arabia have been in talks for a ceasefire, following a UN-mediated truce in 2022. Saudi Arabia backs Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Tensions in the Red Sea and disruptions to oil trade would negatively impact Saudi Arabia. The attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea puts pressure on Saudi Arabia to return to the table.

That said, the effects of the attacks on global shipping in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea have brought in the United States and its allies but this hasn’t had much of an effect on Houthi belligerence. Houthi spokesperson Mohamed Abdulsalam said the Red Sea “operations” were in support of Gaza. On November 26, the Houthis launched two ballistic missiles that landed close to a US warship. The US is reluctant to escalate the crisis. It has refrained from retaliatory action against the Houthi. The Houthi, too, don’t want to cross a certain dangerous threshold. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Red Sea Risks: Houthi Strikes Impact Global Shipping Costs first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have carried out hijackings, missile strikes, and drone attacks on ships, leading Danish shipping and logistics company AP Moller-Maersk and German shipping and container transportation firm Hapag-Lloyd to temporarily suspend shipments via the Red Sea.

The announcements made on Friday by AP Moller-Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd indicate that large companies are now recognizing the security risks in the Red Sea region. However, there could be potential effects on global oil markets and the cost of energy for consumers. The extent of the disruption will depend on how major international actors respond to the impending crisis, according to experts.

According to a statement from Maersk, their decision to pause shipments through the Red Sea is based on their worries about the increasingly dangerous security situation in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The recent attacks by missiles and drones on commercial ships pose a major risk to the safety and security of the crew members onboard, the statement mentioned.

Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd jointly control around 25% of the global shipping fleet. The increased instability in the Red Sea can be attributed to the conflict between Israel and Gaza, which started on October 7. Over the past 10 weeks, during which Israel has been conducting airstrikes on Gaza, the Houthi rebels have launched attacks on at least eight ships in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. This strait separates Eritrea and Djibouti from the Arabian Peninsula.

With a width of just 29km (18 miles) at its narrowest point, the Bab el-Mandeb strait plays a crucial role in international trade. Approximately 10% of the world’s seaborne crude oil passes through this strait, making any disruptions a global concern.

The Houthis have been attacking ships that have some ownership connection to Israelis or that transport goods to Israel through the Red Sea. In November, they claimed to have seized the Galaxy Leader cargo ship, which they believed to be Israeli-owned. However, Israel stated that the ship was actually owned by a British company and operated by a Japanese team, with no Israelis on board. The ship was originally bound for India.

The rebels, who have held significant territory in Yemen since 2014, have vowed to persist with these attacks until there is a comprehensive truce in Gaza. Their objective is to increase the consequences for the US and other nations that provide assistance to Israel in different capacities.

These acts of aggression also indicate that the Houthis are a formidable presence in Yemen and a significant member of the alliance known as the “axis of resistance.” This alliance includes Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Syrian government, as well as several groups in Syria and Iraq that are supported by Iran. The Houthis are demonstrating their growing boldness and determination in this group.

There is limited evidence to indicate that the Houthi attacks will cease in the near future. This raises concerns about the impact on the oil market. According to Colby Connelly, a senior analyst at Energy Intelligence, an energy information company based in Washington, the attacks have had a noticeable but not significant impact on the oil market.

With the continuation of these attacks, the markets have increasingly paid attention. As a result, the prices of crude oil have risen towards the end of the week, reaching levels higher than those observed in the previous days. This is mainly due to the fact that these attacks show no signs of stopping unless a more forceful effort is made to put an end to them, as explained by Colby Connelly.

As tensions escalate, it is uncertain how this crisis in the Red Sea will unfold. According to Paul Sullivan, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, if the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is limited in terms of oil traffic due to regional tensions, there is a high possibility that the price of oil to certain locations will increase. This is primarily because of the added premiums on insurance and the products themselves, as a result of the crisis and potential conflict.

Considering the current situation, it is uncertain, but not likely, that such a scenario will occur. However, in a region of escalating tensions, unexpected outcomes are possible. If the situation deteriorates to the extent that various cargoes need to be redirected around Africa, it could result in significant changes to cargo contracts, including those involving oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). As a consequence, prices would face upward pressure. Although the recent decline in oil prices may provide some relief, it is not expected to last long, as stated by Sullivan.

One of the complexities of this situation is the unpredictable nature of Houthi missile and drone attacks. These attacks do not adhere to a clear pattern, making it challenging to anticipate their next move. As Colby Connelly stated, the Houthis’ actions are increasingly making it difficult to predict their future actions.

If the Houthis were to attempt to blockade the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, it would have significant ramifications. Colby Connelly explained that the consequences would involve increased shipping insurance risks, expenses related to alternative routes, and the potential for disruptions in supply chains, among other factors. However, he also expressed doubt regarding the Houthis’ capability to carry out such an action. Furthermore, he emphasized that any attempt to do so would inevitably provoke a swift and forceful response.

The disruptive actions of the Houthis in the Red Sea have the potential to draw increased scrutiny and pressure from various actors such as China, India, Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iran, and Western powers.

China opposes any disruption to global trade, including in strategic routes such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal, due to the negative impacts it would have on its economy. As a result, there is a possibility that China, at its own request, might exert pressure on the Houthis to reduce their aggressive actions in the Red Sea. Amin Mohseni, a senior economics lecturer at American University, shared this perspective with the media house.

It is worth mentioning that several countries, including the US, UK, China, Germany, Spain, Italy, France, Saudi Arabia, and Japan, already have military bases in Djibouti, which serve to constrain the Houthis’ aggressive actions in the Red Sea over the long term. Additionally, there is interest from both Russia and India in establishing their own military bases in the region, further reinforcing the efforts to limit the influence of the Houthis.

Sullivan believes that certain global players may increase their presence in the region to safeguard uninterrupted shipping from Yemeni actors. He suggests that China and possibly India could deploy more assets to protect their oil interests, and NATO could strengthen task forces to ensure the freedom and security of navigation. Sullivan also expects the US to become more involved as tensions escalate in the region.

Despite the ongoing conflict between Israel and Gaza, with a high number of Palestinian casualties exceeding 18,700, the Houthis are likely to remain committed to influencing the situation as much as they can. The ongoing violence in Gaza is expected to result in a sustained high level of risk in the Red Sea region. As a result, both the shipping industry and the global community should be prepared for new economic challenges to emerge. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Attack On Ships Poses Threat To Trade Through Red Sea first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Attack On Ships Poses Threat To Trade Through Red Sea appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

Speaking at a conference held at the Maldives President’s Office after a Cabinet meeting on Thursday (December 14, 2023), Maldives’ Under Secretary for Public Policy, Mohamed Firuzul, said that the archipelagic nation would not renew the earlier government’s agreement on the Third Joint Hydrographic Survey of Maldives’ waters signed with India on June 8, 2019.

That was the time when Prime Minister Narendra Modi was visiting the Maldives at the invitation of then President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. The agreement allowed India to study and chart reefs, lagoons, coastlines, ocean currents and tide levels while conducting a hydrographic survey of the Maldives’ territorial waters. This is the first bilateral agreement that the Maldives’ newly elected government is rescinding.

A hydrographic survey is the science of measurement and description of features affecting maritime navigation, marine construction, dredging, offshore wind farms, offshore oil exploration and drilling and related activities. Ships carry out hydrographic surveys in a country’s territorial waters to study various features of a water body using such methods as sonar. Traditionally, it was ships that used to conduct such surveys with a sounding line (or through echo sounding). But, nowadays, these surveys are being conducted by means of aircraft and sophisticated electronic sensor systems in shallow waters.

The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) says such surveys help map out the depth of the waters, shape of the seafloor and coastline, location of likely obstructions and physical features of water bodies for ensuring efficient and safe maritime transportation. Surveys are, often, also conducted to gauge the route of undersea cables—such as those used for telecommunications or ones associated with wind farms and HVDC power cables.

The Indian Naval Ship (INS) Darshak conducted the First Joint Hydrographic Survey in February and March 2021. The second survey was carried out by the INS Sutlej from April 18 to May 24, 2022. The Third Hydrographic Survey by the Maldives National Defense Force (MNDF) and Indian Navy was carried out by Indian Naval Ship Investigator (INS Investigator) from January 19 to February 26, 2023, when it examined northern Maldives covering the Thiladhanmatee and Ihavandhippolhu atolls and GallandhuKandu. Even before the agreement was signed, Indian Navy ships have been making several trips across the Maldives for the survey since 2018.

Firuzul announced that Muizzu’s Cabinet—as well as the President—wanted to keep information and data about the country’s territorial waters secure within the country and that the government was looking at building the capacity for such exercises in the armed forces (MNDF). He added that budget allocations would be made for developing resources to carry out such activities within the MNDF.

The decision comes barely two and a half months after Mohamed Muizzu, 45, of the People’s National Congress (PNC), was elected as the President of Maldives on September 30, 2023, riding on his pledge of putting into effect the country’s ‘India Out’ policy. Muizzu had come to power as a proxy for a China-friendly predecessor, Abdulla Yameen, who was ousted by Solih in 2018 and later convicted of money-laundering and sentenced to five years in jail.

Before coming to power, Muizzu had created a campaign buzz around his promise to evict Indian troops from the archipelagic nation. When India’s Minister for Earth Sciences, Kiren Rijiju, called on President Muizzu representing India at Muizzu’s inauguration ceremony held on November 17, the President had brought up the issue of Indian military personnel present in the Maldives for operating aircraft for emergency evacuations on medical grounds, disaster relief operations and countering drug-trafficking activities. Muizzu, however, had then proclaimed that he would achieve his ends through peaceful and diplomatic means.

India holds key maritime interests in the archipelagic nation, one of its significant neighbours in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and ties between the two countries—mainly in defence and security—have been on the upswing over the past few years. There are currently around 77 Indian military personnel, besides two HAL Dhruv helicopters and Dornier 228 maritime patrol aircraft stationed in the Maldives. India has also assisted the Maldives in tackling the Covid-19 pandemic and the adverse effects of climate change.

Prime Minister Modi had his maiden meeting with President Muizzu on the sidelines of the COP28 World Climate Action Summit in Dubai on December 1, 2023. They had discussed ways to boost India-Maldives relations across different sectors, such as economic relations, development cooperation and people-to-people ties. The Maldives is India’s key maritime neighbour in the IOR and occupies a special place in the Prime Minister’s vision of ‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and India’s ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Maldives Decision Not To Renew Hydrographic Survey Pact Is A Jolt To Indian Maritime Strategy first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

In October this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi led a significant meeting to evaluate the advancement of India’s Gaganyaan Mission and to define the future of the nation’s space exploration efforts. Expanding on the achievements of such previous space missions as Chandrayan-3 and Aditya L-1, the Prime Minister has set ambitious targets for India, which include establishing an Indian Space Station, called the Bharatiya Antariksha Station, by 2035 and sending the first Indian astronaut to the Moon by 2040.

To ensure that humans are adequately prepared for extended space missions, including lengthy journeys to Mars which can take up to seven months, scientists are actively studying the impact of space on human well-being. This research encompasses investigations into the effects of the space environment on various aspects of health, including sexual health.

Recent research funded by NASA suggests that exposure to high levels of Galactic cosmic radiation, associated with such astronomical events as supernova explosions, refers to the highly energetic particles present in space. Highly energetic particles refer to particles that possess a significant amount of energy. In the context of space, these particles can include cosmic rays, which are typically high-energy protons, electrons and atomic nuclei. These particles can travel at very high speeds and have the potential to cause damage to living organisms and materials they come into contact with.

These particles can pose significant health risks to astronauts, including impairing vascular tissues and potentially resulting in conditions like erectile dysfunction, along with the microgravity conditions experienced in space, can negatively impact vascular tissues. This impairment of vascular tissues can result in erectile dysfunction. What is concerning is that the research indicates that, even after astronauts return to Earth and undergo an extended recovery period, these issues with sexual function can persist.

As manned missions to space are scheduled for the near future, the research emphasizes the importance of monitoring astronauts’ sexual health upon their return to Earth. Justin D La Favor, a co-author of the study from Florida State University, states that these findings highlight the need for close observation in this area.

Earth’s magnetosphere shields us from cosmic radiation, but astronauts on the ISS rely on artificial shielding. Despite this, they still encounter a week’s worth of cosmic radiation in space that is equal to a year’s worth of the same on Earth’s surface. However, when astronauts embark on missions to the Moon and Mars, they will have significantly less shielding from these particles compared to their experience on the ISS or that of astronauts planned for Gaganyaan.

The research team highlights that erectile dysfunction, which affects a significant portion of men over the age of 40 and has a considerable impact on overall life satisfaction, still lacks clear understanding regarding its implications for space travel. The research team also discovered that even minimal exposure to cosmic rays led to an elevation in oxidative stress. This elevation in oxidative stress can be harmful to cells, proteins and DNA—potentially causing damage. Oxidative stress occurs when there is an imbalance in the body, leading to harmful molecules, called ‘free radicals’, causing damage to cells and important molecules. This can contribute to health issues and the ageing process.

We are susceptible to oxidative stress in such conditions as chronic inflammation, exposure to environmental pollutants, smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, poor diet, certain medical conditions, such as diabetes and cancer, and neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and the ageing process.

Oxidative stress is linked to a higher chance of erectile dysfunction due to how the body responds to damage in blood vessels. Exposure to cosmic rays, causing oxidative stress, is thought to impact the artery supplying blood to erectile tissue. Microgravity also has a similar, though less pronounced, negative effect on erectile function. The body fights oxidative stress by producing antioxidants naturally. The team’s study suggests that using certain antioxidants as a treatment could enhance the function of tissues exposed to cosmic rays.

“Despite the adverse effects of galactic cosmic radiation staying for a long time, we have learnt through our research that, by specifically targeting the redox and nitric oxide pathways in tissues, we could, possibly, treat erectile dysfunction,” the research team stated. Redox is a term formed from ‘reduction’ and ‘oxidation’, involving chemical reactions with electron transfer in the body. Targeting these reactions is possible through interventions, such as employing specific antioxidants. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

Israel has conflicting goals of neutralizing Hamas and rescuing its civilians kidnapped during the October 7 storming of its territory in a surprise—and vicious—attack after they broke through the heavily guarded perimeter fence, landing by sea and using paragliders, killing about 1,200 people and taking 240 hostage. In order to achieve both objectives, Israel opted to halt its military operation against Hamas in exchange for the release of some of those hostages. The truce is off now as Israel has started pounding Gaza localities saying Hamas did not honour the conditions.

There is a significant threat to Israel’s l right to defend itself that needs to be considered. It is referred to as the ‘terrorist veto’. And, as time goes by, Israel’s chances of overcoming this threat is becoming increasingly slim, despite the resumption of hostilities on Friday. The term, ‘terrorist veto’, refers to the tactic employed by Hamas groups to hinder, or prevent, a country’s ability to defend itself by exploiting international pressure and humanitarian concerns.

Many believe that the underlying purpose of these hostage negotiations as far as Hamas is concerned is to divert international attention and evoke strong emotions in order to indefinitely halt hostilities, restrict Israel’s military actions and regroup to lick their wounds of war. Regardless of the label given to this pause—truce, ceasefire, or whatever term may apply—the strategic consequences undeniably favour Hamas. By using innocent people as bargaining tools and using fellow Gazans for shielding themselves, Hamas seeks to prevent Israel from eliminating the terrorist threat it poses.

If Hamas manages to maintain a limited presence in Gaza and rebuild it to its pre-October 7 state, it can be considered a success for the group. However, this outcome essentially acts as a veto by them regardless of whether those in favour of the military pause try to downplay its significance. This result is labelled as a ‘veto’ since it enables terrorists to dictate terms and hinder progress towards a resolution.

“Regardless of whether those in favour of the military pause try to downplay its significance” implies that the military pause contradicts the goals of its supporters. This is evident in Hamas’s success in surviving and rebuilding Gaza, which goes against the intended outcome of neutralizing the terrorist threat posed by Hamas through the temporary halt in military operations.

If the Hamas veto prevails, other groups like Hezbollah and the mullahs in Tehran (the main adversaries here) can shield themselves from the consequences of their terrorist acts. What is even worse is that this veto could be adopted by nations with aggressive tendencies, leaving victims unable to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Taiwan can be considered a potential victim in this new scenario.

US President Joe Biden and others claim they are not attempting to hinder further military action, but their policies are having precisely that impact. According to CNN on Wednesday last week, Biden’s approach is based on three pillars: release of hostages, increase in aid to Gaza and planning for post-war scenarios. Notably, there is no mention of eliminating Hamas. Meanwhile, some Democratic senators are pushing for conditions on aid to Israel, aiming to limit its military operations—a stance Biden has supported.

The heads of major UN agencies have termed an “outrage” the cutting off of essential supplies to 2.2 million Palestinians and, time and again, called for a permanent ceasefire on humanitarian grounds. Following the October 7 attack, Israel had closed its border crossings with Gaza, blocking off food, water and medicine supplies from the territory. All fuel deliveries to the territory were cut off until late-November, arguing it could be stolen by Hamas and used for military purposes.

Regardless of the arguments supporting the extension of the initial or subsequent pauses, Israel could face three potential negative outcomes if it stops, or restricts its military campaign.

First, despite strong statements from many Israelis, both in and out of the government, the country’s determination is waning. Right after October 7, Jerusalem may have been open to hearing US military advisers warn that pacifying resistance in Mosul and Fallujah—cities in Iraq that experienced significant resistance and conflict, particularly during the Iraq War—took between nine months and a year.

This would serve as a comparison or benchmark for the potential challenges that Israel may have faced in achieving its objectives. Initially, Israelis may have been ready for a prolonged struggle, but it seems unlikely after this initial pause. A decline in Israeli resolve makes it unlikely that Hamas will be completely eliminated.

Those supporting a ceasefire argue that, when Israel convinced a million Gazans to relocate south before their initial campaign, it set the stage for higher ‘civilian’ casualties in subsequent operations. While Hamas and Iran were responsible for placing Gazans in danger initially, unfair blame from the international community is likely to weigh on Israelis, weakening their determination.

Second, because Hamas, Iran and their allies stand to benefit more militarily from the pause than Israel, the human toll on the Israeli military will increase. This, in turn, may lead to growing domestic opposition against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives. Quantifying the exact number of Israel Defense Forces casualties resulting from the pause might be challenging, but it could surpass the count of released hostages.

And third, if there are more pauses or restrictions, it gives Hamas’s allies around the world more time to pressure their governments to oppose Israel. As a result, many governments may push Israel to accept much less than what Netanyahu has stated as his goals.

After the conflict, the White House is suggesting that the Palestinian Authority take control of Gaza. However, this overlooks the poor track record of the authority in the West Bank, where it has been ineffective, corrupt and secretly supportive of terrorism. Some sources even claim that Hamas is now more popular in the West Bank than in Gaza.

If Palestinian Authority control is extended, Israel could face the same threat that intensified on October 7. Israel Defence Force (IDF) views that every prolongation of the truce gives leeway to Hamas to consolidate in Gaza strip which Israel is not ready to allow. This contrast in the objective of the two contending groups is the main reason why the truce could not be prolonged. For bringing about any lasting solution, the present status on the objectives has to be changed. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Israel And Hamas Have Different Objectives About What To Achieve During Truce first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

Ever since militant group Hamas’s most audacious attack ever to be launched from Gaza blindsided Israel on October 7 this year, people have been questioning who the brains are behind masterminding this deadly strike. Notwithstanding their varied and checkered backgrounds and antecedents, they all have one thing in common: They are all on Israel’s ‘most-wanted’ list as targets of assassination!

Yahya Sinwar, founder of Hamas’s security service Majd, is believed to be the chief planner behind the terrorist attacks that took place on October 7. During these attacks, a large number of Hamas fighters crossed the border into Israel from the Gaza Strip. These attacks resulted in the deaths of over 1,200 individuals, while 240 people were taken captive.

Majd looks after internal security, investigates agents suspected to be working for Israel and tracks down Israeli intelligence and security services officers. Sinwar, the highest-ranking Hamas leader in Gaza is currently a top target for the Israeli army. Israel has made a commitment to eliminate him and dismantle the group, despite the fact that there are several other senior commanders within it.

Sinwar, known for being both charismatic and highly intelligent, is also regarded as brutal and ruthless in his leadership style. Born in 1962, he grew up in the Khan Younis refugee camp located in the southern part of the Gaza Strip. Sinwar was an early member of Hamas, joining the group when it was established in 1987. Sinwar earned the infamous nickname, ‘Butcher of Khan Younis’, due to his ruthless actions against Palestinians whom he believed were collaborating with Israel.

Sinwar was arrested thrice. In 1988, Sinwar was convicted by an Israeli court and received four life sentences. His charges included the killing of two Israeli soldiers and the murder of multiple Palestinians. During his time in prison, he learned Hebrew and delved into the writings of renowned Israeli figures to understand their perspective. Israeli doctors are believed to have saved his life by successfully removing an abscess near his brain.

In 2011, Sinwar was released from prison after serving a 22-year sentence. He, along with over 1,000 Palestinians, was freed as part of a prisoner exchange agreement to facilitate the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who had been captured by Hamas and held captive for over five years. Sinwar returned to Gaza and took on the role of ensuring communication between Hamas’s military and political divisions.

In 2015, the US blacklisted Sinwar as an “international terrorist”. In 2017, however, he regained his position as one of Hamas’s top leaders and assumed leadership of the group’s political bureau in the Gaza Strip. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Sinwar of intentionally putting Palestinian civilians at risk during the conflict with Israel.

Mohammed Deif is in charge of Hamas’s military division—Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Israel holds him accountable for masterminding multiple suicide attacks, as well as the deaths of numerous Israeli soldiers and civilians. To Palestinians, he is ‘The Mastermind’ and to Israelis, ‘The Cat with Nine Lives’.

Deif was imprisoned by the Israeli authorities in 1989, following which he played a significant role in establishing the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, with the aim of capturing Israeli soldiers. This group has been responsible for carrying out suicide attacks within Israel. Deif is also believed to be one of the brains behind engineering the extensive Hams tunnel network in Gaza and is accused of orchestrating and leading the attacks that occurred on October 7. He, too, is on the list of those to be eliminated by the Israeli Army as part of their ongoing military operation.

Deif has been on Israel’s ‘most-wanted’ list since the 1996 bus bombings in which tens of Israelis were killed, and the capture—and subsequent killing—of three Israeli soldiers in the mid-1990s. Although he was briefly detained in Israel in 2000, he managed to escape during the chaotic period of the second intifada—a Palestinian political uprising—that occurred between 2000 and 2005. Since then, there has been very little information about his whereabouts. There are three known pictures of him: one is dated; in another, he is masked; while the third picture is that of his shadow.

Deif is believed to have miraculously survived seven assassination attempts, the most serious ones in 2002, resulting in severe injuries and the loss of his family members. Although the Israeli security forces yet again failed to eliminate Deif during a 2014 attack on the Gaza Strip, his wife and two of his children were killed. It is reported that Deif has lost an eye, a foot and part of his arm and has difficulty speaking. As a security measure, he avoids public appearances and is rumoured to change his location every night, staying in different buildings.

Marwan Issa, the ‘Shadow Man’ and Deif’s right-hand man, is the ‘deputy commander-in-chief’ of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. He was born in a Gaza refugee camp. Limited information is available about his early life, but it is believed that he was affiliated with the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization from which Hamas sprang.

During the first intifada (1987-1993), Issa was imprisoned in Israel for five years. In 1997, he faced arrest and detention by the Palestinian Authority, but his release came about when the second intifada commenced in 2000. Issa, too, has managed to survive numerous assassination attempts orchestrated by Israel, including one in 2006 when he was injured. Israeli warplanes struck his house twice and killed his brother during incursions into Gaza in 2014 and 2021.

He is believed to have played a significant role in the most recent attack on Israel, besides others. Issa is still considered a high-priority target on Israel’s ‘wanted’ list.

Due to the presence of two key Hamas leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal, in Qatar rather than in Gaza, it would be challenging for Israel to completely eradicate the organization. Ismail Haniyeh, often recognized as the top leader of Hamas, was also born in a refugee camp in Gaza. He attended a school affiliated with the United Nations and later pursued studies at the Islamic University of Gaza. It was during this time that he reportedly became acquainted with various Palestinian independence movements.

In 1989, as Israel cracked down on the first Palestinian intifada, Haniyeh was put behind bars and exiled to a no-man’s land stretching between Israel and Lebanon in 1992. In 1993, he was appointed as the dean of the Philosophy department and, four years later, he assumed the role of personal secretary to Hamas’s founder and spiritual leader, Ahmed Yassin.

Following Hamas’ victory in the 2006 legislative elections, Haniyeh was appointed as the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority by President Mahmoud Abbas. However, his tenure was short-lived as he was removed from his position only a year later. This change occurred as Hamas initiated a violent takeover in the Gaza Strip, aiming to oust Abbas’s Fatah party. Despite the dismissal, Haniyeh refused to resign, leading to a situation where Hamas governed the Gaza Strip, while Fatah was responsible for the occupied West Bank.

In 2017, he was elected as head of Hamas’s political bureau. A year later, the US State Department designated Haniyeh a “terrorist” and, since then, he has been living in Qatar.

Born in the West Bank in 1956, Khaled Meshaal, thought to be one of the founders of Hamas, pursued a Physics degree at Kuwait University. He later resided in Syria and Jordan and played a crucial role in establishing the Hamas political division. Eventually, in 1996, he assumed the position of chairman. Meshaal openly advocated for violent actions against Israel and miraculously survived an assassination plot by the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, in 1997, while he was living in Jordan.

He made his first trip to Gaza through Egypt in 2012 to commemorate Hamas’s 25th anniversary, marking his first visit to the Palestinian territories in 45 years. Later, in 2017, he resigned as Hamas’s leader to allow Haniyeh to take his place and Haniyeh was chosen as the head of Hamas’s political division, replacing Meshaal. Currently, Meshaal serves as the head of Hamas’s political bureau. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

After being sworn in as the new president of the Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu, 45, has formally asked India to withdraw its military personnel from the Indian Ocean archipelago. This request was made during a meeting between Muizzu and India’s Minister for Earth Sciences, Kiren Rijiju, who was present at Muizzu’s swearing-in ceremony on November 17. The Muizzu administration is currently also reviewing approximately 100 agreements, including defence and security pacts, signed with India during the tenure of the previous president, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih.

It is clear that New Delhi is displeased with the situation. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who had attended Muizzu’s predecessor, Solih’s inauguration in 2018, decided this time not to attend Muizzu’s swearing-in ceremony. Instead, Rijiju was assigned to represent India. Ibrahim Khaleel, the Maldivian Minister for Strategic Communication, characterized the meeting between Muizzu and Rijiju as “very positive”. As of now, India has not provided an official response to Muizzu’s request.

The Maldivian people had given Muizzu of the People’s National Congress (PNC) a strong mandate and elected him as the new president on September 30, 2023. His victory marked a significant shift in the nation’s foreign policy and raised concerns about the delicate balance of power in the region. True to his election promise, Muizzu has now requested India to withdraw its security personnel from archipelagic nation and expressed the hope that India will respect the democratic will of the Maldivian people.

Continuing along the lines of the ‘India Out’ campaign led by former President Abdulla Yameen (2013-2018), which accused President Ibrahim Solih (2018-2023) of jeopardizing Maldivian sovereignty by allowing Indian military personnel into the country, Muizzu had incorporated the removal of Indian security personnel from the island country into his campaign strategy.

Maldives is an archipelago comprising 1,192 islands situated in the Indian Ocean. It is strategically located near the East-West shipping route, which serves as a crucial passage for the transportation of oil from the Gulf to various regions, including East Asia, South Asia and South-East Asia.

India and the Maldives have a longstanding and multifaceted relationship that spans several decades. On the other hand, Chinese interests in the Maldives are a more recent development. China established its embassy in Malé in 2011, marking a significant step in Sino-Maldivian relations. The bond between China and the Maldives grew rapidly with heavy borrowings from China to fund its infrastructure projects, particularly during the presidency of Abdullah Yameen of the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), who moved the country into Beijing’s orbit, attracting Chinese investment and influence that surpassed those of India.

Opposed to his predecessor Solih’s professed close ties with the country’s ‘Big Brother’ and his ‘India First’ policy, Muizzu’s poll campaign boldly adopted the slogan ‘India Out’, promising to remove Indian troops and military assets from the Maldives as soon as he assumed office. He was vocal about his ‘Malé First’ foreign policy, indicating that there would be a shift away from the historically close ties that have bound the Maldives and India together.

India has been a long-time friend of the Maldives and played a critical role in providing the country with defence and security support. Muizzu and his coalition have strong reservations that India’s over-arching influence over the Maldives’ defence apparatus threatens its sovereignty and that India harbours sinister plans of establishing a permanent military presence in the archipelago.

Under President Solih’s leadership, India’s relationship with the Maldives had experienced a positive momentum as he realigned the nation’s relations with long-time benefactor India. India actively engaged in the development of Maldivian infrastructure and witnessed an increase in defence cooperation with the archipelago. This cooperation seems to be facing difficulties at the moment.

This is not the first occasion when a Maldivian president has requested India to withdraw its military personnel from the group of islands. Back in 2018, Yameen had declined to extend a contract that allowed India to have two naval helicopters stationed in the Maldives as a gift and also insisted on the departure of Indian security personnel from the nation.

In contrast to Yameen, who made the request towards the end of his presidency and was subsequently removed from power in the election that ensued, Muizzu has just assumed presidency. Additionally, Indian investment in the Maldives was considerably smaller back in 2018 compared to that in the present times. India’s interests and involvement in the island nation have now significantly increased.

During a press conference on Sunday, Mohamed Firuzul Abdul Khaleel, Undersecretary for Public Policy, disclosed that there were currently 77 Indian military members stationed in the Maldives. Out of these individuals, 24 are involved in helicopter operations, 25 are dedicated to the operations of a Dornier aircraft, 26 are assigned to a second helicopter’s operations and an additional two individuals are responsible for maintenance and engineering tasks related to these aircraft.

According to a Maldivian analyst residing outside the country who spoke with a media outlet, India was initially supposed to provide training to Maldivians for operating and maintaining the helicopters. However, the analyst suggests that India may have intentionally delayed this process in order to prolong the presence of its personnel in the archipelago.

The Maldivian analyst noted that, while India’s defence partnership with the Maldives serves its own security interests, the expulsion of Indian security personnel is expected to have a more significant impact on the Maldives than on India. Due to the inadequacy of the Maldivian security apparatus in protecting its extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from illegal activities, such as fishing, drugs and weapons trafficking, as well as extremism, India has been fulfilling the role of its primary security provider.

An EEZ is an area extending up to 200 nautical miles (approximately 370 km) from a country’s coastline, where the nation holds special rights and jurisdiction over the exploration and use of marine resources. Within this zone, the country has exclusive rights to exploit and manage the natural resources, such as fishes, minerals and oil; it also has control over the regulation of such activities as fishing, drilling and research.

India has not only contributed to the development of the Maldives’ defence infrastructure by establishing a coastal surveillance radar system, a military hospital and training facility for the Maldivian National Defense Force (MNDF), but it has also supplied various pieces of military equipment, including aircraft, helicopters, sea ambulances, a landing craft assault ship and interceptor boats, among others, to its neighbour.

Significantly, India has played a crucial role in providing training to the Maldivian forces. Notably, India has fulfilled around 70 per cent of the training needs of the MNDF. According to a research website, India has trained over 1,400 MNDF personnel in the last decade alone. This accomplishment is noteworthy considering the relatively small size of the Maldivian military force, which comprises approximately 4,000 personnel. In addition, India actively participates in joint patrolling and surveillance operations within the Maldivian EEZ and collaborates on conducting joint naval exercises.

Muizzu, who is believed to have a pro-China stance, potentially intends to decrease the Maldives’ reliance on India by seeking more support from China for infrastructure development and trade. However, terminating contracts does come with consequences for the Maldives. An example of this occurred in 2012 when President Mohamed Waheed Hassan abruptly ended a contract that his predecessor Mohamed Nasheed had signed with India’s GMR Group for the development and management of Malé airport. This decision backfired as a Singapore Arbitration Tribunal ruled that the Maldives was obligated to compensate GMR with $271 million in damages.

India has been the primary responder during political, security and humanitarian emergencies in the Maldives due to their close geographical proximity. In November 1988, Indian troops successfully pre-empted a coup attempt instigated by foreign mercenaries. Moreover, India played a significant role in providing relief during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, addressing the water crisis in 2014 and assisting during the Covid-19 pandemic. In fact, the Maldives was the first country to receive India’s Covishield vaccines in January 2021. Additionally, many Maldivians seek education and medical treatment in India.

Muizzu’s strong demand for India’s departure was largely seen as a tactic during his campaign and not taken seriously. They believed that the practical realities of governing the country would compel him to soften his stance and reduce his demands. Nevertheless, Muizzu has been exceptionally persistent in pursuing the matter since his election. He wasted no time in initiating discussions on the withdrawal of Indian personnel with the Indian high commission in Malé after his victory. He formally pressed this demand during his meeting with Minister Rijiju and even mentioned it in his inaugural speech, albeit without specifically mentioning India.

One positive aspect amid a generally negative bilateral situation is that the new Maldivian president has recognized the value of Indian helicopters for the people of the Maldives. Following the Muizzu-Rijiju meeting, the Maldivian government issued a concise press release in the Dhivehi language, which solely mentioned the formal request for India to withdraw its security personnel. Subsequently, another press release in English highlighted the importance of the two Indian helicopters in conducting numerous emergency medical evacuations for the benefit of Maldivians.

India and the Maldives have apparently agreed to explore feasible solutions for ongoing cooperation. It remains uncertain which stance the Maldivian diplomacy will ultimately adopt—that mentioned in the Dhivehi press release, or the English one.

In terms of defence cooperation with neighbouring countries, India will have to modify its approach. While covert agreements might be simpler to secure, they will likely face opposition from opposing political parties. Additionally, India should strive to engage with parties and politicians across the political spectrum in neighbouring countries regardless of their affiliations. In this regard, India can draw valuable lessons from Chinese diplomacy in South Asia. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post India Need To Move With Caution In Dealing With The Muizzu Govt In Maldives first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

During President Biden’s high profile summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping last week, his national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, briefed him on an unrelated matter, namely, the escalating tensions in the Middle East.

With less than a year remaining for the 2024 election, President Biden is faced with the challenge of managing both the intensifying conflict in Ukraine, which is gradually reaching a stalemate, and a delicate peace agreement with China. As Biden runs for a second term, the multiple problems are making it harder for him to show American voters that he is focused on the issues that matter most to them at home

While attending meetings in California aimed at demonstrating America’s backing for nations in the Asia-Pacific region, President Biden was confronted with explicit demands. The discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping revolved significantly around the two ongoing wars, and leaders from around the world, participating in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit {APEC}, expressed their apprehensions about these conflicts both privately and publicly.

President Biden, drawing from his past role as the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and his dedication to protecting democracy, aims to present himself as a strong leader. He uses his extensive foreign policy experience to bring stability to the world. People who know him well say he enjoys being seen as a leader on the global stage.

The majority express primary concern for domestic affairs, particularly the economy. Biden’s potential electoral setback is attributed to his utilization of U.S. resources and influence in conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. According to a recent CNN poll, just 36% believe the 81-year-old president, marking his birthday on Monday, is an “effective world leader.”

According to Democratic pollster Ben Tulchin, what happens in other countries usually doesn’t strongly influence voters. But, he thinks Biden can use his foreign policy efforts to highlight the differences between him and Trump, his main opponent in 2024. Tulchin said, “It’s like a good comparison. It’s significant that Trump is dealing legal issues in four criminal cases and Biden is handling international matters.”

Biden is making an effort to convince people that events far away from the U.S. matter to them. If support for Ukraine weakens, Russia might become more aggressive towards other European countries, possibly leading to U.S. military involvement. Tensions in the Middle East, particularly with Iran, could draw the U.S. into a conflict there. Increased issues with China might result in a costly trade war for Americans. If there’s a direct military clash with Beijing over Taiwan or another matter, it could lead to even more serious consequences for the U.S. and its allies.

John Kirby, spokesperson for the National Security Council, emphasized the importance of continually reminding people that what happens in other countries can have a big impact on the United States. It’s crucial to make sure everyone understands how events abroad can affect people here at home.

According to polls, some people might not be interested in these perspectives as they are more concerned about prices at home. Republicans are using this to their advantage. Some Republicans, including Trump, argue that Biden is not being tough enough on China. Others say the U.S. shouldn’t continue providing billions of dollars to Ukraine.

Rep. Michael McCaul, who leads the House Foreign Affairs Committee, from Texas, said the APEC meeting was not useful. He criticized Biden for agreeing to Beijing’s request to remove a Chinese police institute from an export blacklist to gain China’s support in combating fentanyl production. Trump, in his speech, claimed, “Throughout Biden’s presidency, he has been one long sellout to Beijing.

The Biden administration is paying a lot of attention to China because they see it as a rival that could change global rules. The U.S. and China disagree on issues like Russia’s war on Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas. They are also competing to be leaders in high-tech fields. Relations got strained earlier this year when there were concerns about a possible Chinese spy balloon over North America. To address this, top officials from the U.S. government visited Beijing to try to improve things.

During the meeting with Xi on Wednesday, the administration aimed to address tensions, and Biden mentioned that he and Xi agreed to communicate directly when issues arise. At a conference happening simultaneously with APEC, business leaders liked the idea of having more stable relations. Leaders of important partner countries also backed this, discussing other global crises.

Anwar Ibrahim, the prime minister of Malaysia, said at a business conference that working together and trusting each other is essential to address significant issues like climate change, Ukraine, and Gaza. He highlighted that it’s not helpful for countries like Malaysia to view global issues and major powers through the lens of the Cold War.

Friends and allies wish for less tension, and if things stay calm with China, the Biden administration can focus on more crucial issues and domestic plans, like boosting American manufacturing to counter Beijing. U.S. officials also mention that it would offer Biden more time to address his China policy while campaigning, as Republicans are likely to criticize him on this.

Dennis Wilder, a former U.S. intelligence officer who is now a senior fellow at Georgetown University, said, “They want to go into the campaign saying they’re managing the Chinese.”

Because the president has consistently supported Israel, he’s facing more complicated political issues. A recent poll by the Wall Street Journal found that many Americans prefer the U.S. not getting involved in the region, even though a lot of voters support Israel. Additionally, more and more young people, who are a crucial Democratic group and weren’t big fans of Biden initially, disapprove of how he backed Israel’s response to Hamas’ attack.

In the coming weeks, Congress needs to figure out what to do about Biden’s ask for around $106 billion in national security funds for Israel, Ukraine, and other matters. Senate Republicans are seeking adjustments to U.S. border policy as a condition for backing the package, but discussions between the two parties haven’t resulted in an agreement yet.

In the past, presidents had to campaign during global crises. For example, George W. Bush led the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9/11 attacks and narrowly won re-election in 2004. Biden, during his 2020 campaign, pledged to put an end to long-lasting wars. Lyndon B. Johnson chose not to seek re-election in 1968 because he grew increasingly upset about the Vietnam War.

In his speeches this week, Biden aimed to demonstrate the tangible impact of his diplomatic efforts by urging companies worldwide to consider investing in the United States.

Speaking to a group of CEOs, Biden mentioned that when you do business with the U.S. and our companies, you can expect good things: high standards, fair practices, protection for workers, excellent ideas and innovations, and a commitment to taking care of the Earth. He added, “You can count on getting quality.”

People close to Biden say that he can manage both his work within the country and dealing with other countries. They connect the president’s frequent trips to how well the administration has handled the economy. Ben LaBolt, the communication director for the White House, mentioned, “Building strong connections with other countries has contributed to securing America’s economic recovery and growth.”

Biden’s team is focusing on what they call a “foreign policy for the middle class.” This idea was thought up by Sullivan, who is in charge of national security. It came about after Trump won against Hillary Clinton in 2016.

People in the government say this approach mixes foreign policy with goals at home to attract investment and create jobs. They highlight laws supporting clean energy and semiconductor manufacturing as examples of Biden’s accomplishments.

At the same time, this method makes it harder for the U.S. to use common commercial diplomatic tools to win over other countries, such as lowering tariffs and making it easier for them to access the big American market.

Biden has faced challenges in competing with China for influence in the Asia-Pacific region due to concerns that trade with other countries may harm American workers. Officials were eager to start the trade aspect of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework this week. It involves an agreement among over a dozen countries with some basic trade rules.

In 2024 presidential elections, China policy may not matter much, but the West Asian situation will matter if it accentuates. A large number of Democratic Party supporters, especially young are strongly opposed to Biden’s strident pro-Israel policy.. The pro-Sanders section of the Party are also vocal against the US President’s continued assistance to Israel despite the killings of civilians in Gaza strip. The issue may assume importance more in the coming days if the President continues with his present policy of giving full backing to the Prime Minister Netanyahu. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post US President Joe Biden Facing Backlash In His Own Party Over Total Support To Israel first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article US President Joe Biden Facing Backlash In His Own Party Over Total Support To Israel appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

In a significant development toward easing the ongoing conflict in Gaza, a meeting took place on Thursday at an elegant white-domed palace in Qatar. The Prime Minister of Qatar, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani, hosted the spy chiefs of the United States and Israel, namely CIA Director William J. Burns and Mossad chief David Barnea. This gathering marked a hopeful moment after a month of intense, behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

Qatar, despite its small size, played a substantial role in mediating discussions. Following the meeting, the White House announced a daily four-hour ceasefire to facilitate humanitarian relief, with the potential for a hostage exchange in the future.

The Prime Minister explained his involvement in the intricate and evolving negotiations during an extensive interview on Wednesday, conducted in the very palace where the intelligence chiefs convened the following day. He remarked, “This marks a positive initial stride that we aspire to strengthen in the days ahead. We are optimistic that it can pave the way for a more enduring and sustainable resolution.”

Thursday’s progress involved an agreement for regular humanitarian breaks, aiming to alleviate the severe hardships faced by Palestinian civilians in Gaza. This was a partial response to global calls for a cease-fire. Israeli reports emphasized facilitating the evacuation of Palestinians to southern Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu likely recognized that without some concession, Israel could jeopardize recent diplomatic strides with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, along with risking the unwavering support received from the United States for the war against Hamas.

What could happen next is an agreement for Hamas to release over 100 foreign civilian hostages and the Israeli women and children abducted on October 7. In return, more than 100 Palestinian children and women reportedly held in Israeli prisons would gain freedom. However, negotiations for the hostage release are at a standstill, as Israel insists that Hamas releases captives in Gaza first.

The hostage situation is more intricate than what was previously shared, as per Qatari and U.S. officials. Some captives might be held by groups other than Hamas, and finding them in the complex network of caves beneath Gaza and securing their release might necessitate a pause in the fighting, lasting at least three days, possibly longer, as informed Qatari officials suggest.

Mohammed, who also serves as the foreign minister, has the delicate task of mediating in the ongoing conflict. At first glance, it might appear an unlikely role, as Qatar often faces criticism from supporters of Israel for hosting Hamas leaders and allowing positive media coverage of the group. However, insights from the Qatari prime minister, supplemented by discussions with other high-ranking Qatari and U.S. officials, reveal that the reality is much more intricate. The Qatari channel to Hamas, it seems, has been crucial for both Americans and Israelis.

Qatar presents a paradox in the Persian Gulf. It shelters Hamas leaders, considered terrorists by the United States and Israel, much like it hosted the Taliban. Despite this, Qatar maintains a strong pro-American stance in its foreign policy, hosting the significant air base at al-Udeid, a key hub for U.S. Central Command. Decades ago, Qatar made a strategic decision to leverage its extensive natural gas reserves, resulting in considerable wealth for the emirate. Some of this wealth has been used to attract American universities and schools to Qatar, contributing to a modern educational system that is fully accessible to women.

When it comes to Hamas, the straightforward reality is that without Qatar as an intermediary, the United States and Israel would lack a reliable channel to negotiate the release of hostages or engage in any discussions involving the terrorist group. Consequently, chiefs of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, have been frequent visitors to Doha for over a decade. Despite criticisms from some quarters, Qatar seems to have been, in the words of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “a reliable partner in peacemaking.”

Critics of Qatar point to its initial pro-Hamas statement on Oct. 7: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds Israel solely responsible for the ongoing escalation due to its ongoing violations of the rights of the Palestinian people.” Groups like the Middle East Media Research Institute and other pro-Israel organizations highlight this initial comment as proof that Qatar supports terrorism. However, Qatari officials assert that they soon recognized the inaccuracy of this first statement, made before the full details of Hamas’s actions became clear, and subsequently amended it.

The Prime Minister was clear. The violence against Israeli civilians on Oct. 7 was “horrific,” he told me. “Nobody could justify it.”Starting from the second day of the conflict, Qatar began utilizing its communication channel with Hamas political leaders to attempt the release of hostages. One challenge was that Hamas asserted it had only captured Israeli soldiers, while other groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad and an informal militia called the “shabiha” claimed responsibility for the remaining hostages.

Hamas has consistently stuck to their story since Day One, stating, ‘We didn’t take any civilians. Our mission was to take the soldiers for a prisoner exchange,’” shared a senior Qatari official who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject. He described the situation on Oct. 7 as “a mess,” with “thousands of people jumping the fence and kidnapping people.”

The Prime Minister of Qatar emphasized that he couldn’t verify Hamas’s assertion that other groups had captured the civilians: “To be an objective mediator, my principle throughout this entire event has been that I will not believe any words from anyone until I see things in front of me.”

In the initial days, it wasn’t clear that Israel was inclined towards hostage negotiations with Hamas. On October 7, Israel endured 1,400 deaths, and the hostages were additional victims of that shocking attack. Israel appeared more focused on the security of the state itself rather than individual concerns. However, as pressure mounted from hostage families and the Biden administration, Israel eventually supported the indirect hostage talks.

A test of the effectiveness of the Qatar-Hamas channel emerged on Oct. 20 with the release of two Americans, Judith Raanan and her daughter Natalie. A six-hour cease-fire was agreed upon, allowing them to travel to the International Committee of the Red Cross. However, delays occurred when Hamas demanded that Israel not monitor the transfer. The situation escalated when Hamas spotted surveillance drones and insisted on their removal.

The situation appeared poised for a broader release of hostages on Oct. 25. However, two days later, Israel initiated its ground invasion of Gaza, prompting Hamas to withdraw from the deal. The escalating death toll and destruction caused by Israeli bombing further solidified Hamas’s stance. The widespread destruction occurring daily is a dynamic factor on the ground. The requests from yesterday may not be relevant today,” remarked Mohammed.

Establishing communication has become increasingly challenging. Initially, the Qatari prime minister could reach out to Hamas political leaders in Doha, who would then contact military leaders in Gaza via cellphones. However, Hamas reported that Israeli bombing had destroyed two cell communication nodes, rendering regular calls impossible. The situation exacerbated when Israel temporarily severed all communication channels.

The response, which previously required two to three hours, now extends to 12 to 48 hours,” clarified the unidentified Qatari official. The delay in communication added another layer of complexity to the hostage-release agreement, which included 10 to 15 items related to timing and transfer arrangements.

The broader challenge, extending beyond the release of hostages, revolves around how the war will conclude and who will govern Gaza “the day after.” The Prime Minister of Qatar holds a pessimistic outlook.

The preferable situation involves a single government overseeing both Gaza and the West Bank. A transition from the current state to this unified governance would be necessary. However, I’m uncertain whether the countries in the region would be willing to engage in such a process given the extent of destruction and loss of life,” he elaborated.

The process of transitioning could be facilitated if the Palestinian Authority expresses its willingness to play a role in governing Gaza post-Hamas, contingent on the United States renewing its commitment to a two-state solution.

Mohammed conveyed that he has urged his Israeli contacts: “We’ve consistently emphasized the necessity to shift away from hostility. We firmly believe that by addressing the hostage situation, we can contribute to progressing towards practical solutions to bring about an end to the war.”

The United States and Israel have, on multiple occasions, sought assistance from Qatar, as affirmed by both U.S. and Qatari officials. In 2012, Qatar agreed to host Hamas with the approval of the U.S. and Israel when Hamas left Syria amid the onset of the civil war there.

In 2017, upon requests from Israel and the United States, Qatar expelled five Hamas members planning an attack on Israel, according to several Qatari officials. Prior to the recent conflict, Israel and Qatar had a collaborative relationship regarding Gaza. In 2017, as the Gazan economy faced challenges due to power shortages and unemployment, Qatar, in coordination with Israel and the United States, provided financial aid. Doha initiated monthly payments ranging from $25 million to $30 million to cover fuel supplies, aid for impoverished families, and salaries for civil servants in Gaza.

The coordination was direct with Israel. … Every dollar’s destination was known to them,” clarified the unidentified Qatari official. He further mentioned that Qatar cautioned the Israelis, stating, “We are not inclined to persist unless there’s a potential for a long-term agreement guaranteeing an improved life in Gaza.” However, they were requested to extend the temporary program for a bit longer.

A Qatari official mentioned that on September 28, 10 days before the onset of the recent war, Israel and Qatar engaged in discussions regarding a long-term solution for Gaza. Israeli officials proposed testing Hamas’s reliability for three months by offering more job opportunities in Israel. They informed Qatari officials that the question of subsidy payments would be discussed later.

Subsequently, the anticipated discussion never took place. Instead, Hamas initiated its violent terrorist attack, prompting Israel to respond with an offensive that, according to Hamas’s reports, resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 civilians.

The Prime Minister of Qatar expressed his commitment to continue collaborating with his Israeli contacts. “We advocate for stability, peace, and firmly believe that the most potent factor for the safety and stability of both Israelis and Palestinians lies in achieving a peaceful resolution to this conflict.”

However, he expressed concern that if the current Gaza war concludes similarly to previous ones, Israel and the region may confront an even more severe conflict in a few years. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Qatar Is Playing A Key Role In Facilitating The Release Of Hostages first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article Qatar Is Playing A Key Role In Facilitating The Release Of Hostages appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

As Israel grieved in the aftermath of the October 7 tragedy, where more than 1,400 citizens lost their lives due to the actions of Hamas terrorists, US President Joe Biden visited Tel-Aviv to pledge American support. However, during an appearance with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Biden also emphasized the need for caution. He drew parallels to the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, where there was a mix of seeking justice and making mistakes.

In recent weeks, many have compared the events of October 7 to September 11, suggesting that Israel could benefit from studying the American response. However, it is important to note that the comparison often extends to the entire US “war on terror”, which spans decades, making it somewhat unwieldy. What Israel is currently facing more closely resembles the specific challenge that the US encountered immediately after the 9/11 attacks, primarily addressing the issue of the al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan. While not a perfect analogy, this more limited comparison is more analytically useful.

Over the past 15 months, investigations have been conducted into the core assumptions that guided the US effort in Afghanistan, especially the decisions made by the George W Bush Administration in the initial weeks and months following the trauma of 9/11. Despite the differences between the events of 2001 and October 7, and the vast disparities between a global superpower and a nation of nine million surrounded by adversaries, the early US response to 9/11 offers valuable lessons that could be applied to Israel today.

These lessons include the importance of careful planning and setting realistic goals, understanding one’s own strengths and capabilities and knowing when to collaborate with others. Furthermore, for a country in Israel’[s situation, strategic thinking about allies, adversaries and their motivations is crucial.

There are notable differences between the situation that the US faced after the 9/11 attacks and the one currently confronting Israel. Following 9/11, US President George W Bush compared jihadi terrorism to Nazism and communism, terming an “existential threat to the US and the democratic world”. However, this was largely rhetorical hyperbole. In contrast, Hamas poses a significantly more severe threat to Israel than the al-Qaeda did to the US. Over the past 30 years, Hamas has consistently expressed its intention to eliminate Israel and, on October 7, it demonstrated its capacity to carry out large-scale and previously unimaginable acts of violence.

After 9/11, the US declared a “global war on terror”, which justified a comprehensive US-led war against the Afghan Taliban, even though the Taliban had no direct involvement in, or advanced knowledge of, the 9/11 attacks. In contrast, Israel has made it clear that its primary adversary is Hamas.

The initial phase of the US mission in Afghanistan relied on the Northern Alliance, an Afghan proxy army, with US forces primarily conducting aerial operations. Israel, however, does not have the same luxury and has deployed ground troops in a densely populated urban setting, where distinguishing between the enemy and innocent civilians is challenging.

It is essential to remember that the early US war in Afghanistan achieved remarkable tactical success, swiftly depriving the al-Qaeda of a safe haven and toppling the Taliban from power in just two months. It is uncertain whether Israel will experience similar success in its situation.

However, these differences do not render the analogy irrelevant. Just as the US experienced a profound national trauma after 9/11 that disrupted its national security assumptions, Israel went through a similar experience on October 7, necessitating an immediate and robust response.

The war in Afghanistan commenced less than a month after 9/11 and the Bush Administration did not invest much time in planning for the post-Taliban government. American officials, as well as al-Qaeda leader Osama-bin-Laden, were surprised by the swift defeat of the Taliban. Bin-Laden had expected the US to become embroiled in a prolonged conflict in Afghanistan, but, when the Taliban surrendered and the al-Qaeda remnants were cornered in the Tora Bora cave complex by US and Northern Alliance forces, bin-Laden apologized to his followers for leading them to the brink of destruction.

Israeli leaders should pay attention to the subsequent US actions after the initial success in Afghanistan in 2001. The decision to invade Iraq lacked strategic coherence, alienated such crucial allies as France and Germany and diverted attention and resources away from the much-needed post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Despite the US stating that their priority was to establish a stable and secure Afghanistan, they lacked the expertise and resources to achieve this goal. Even under ideal circumstances, the US would have faced challenges in effective nation-building in Afghanistan. But, with focus diverted to Iraq, this task became insurmountable.

Israel should take a lesson from the US and refrain from any impulse to engage militarily with Iran or the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel should focus on Gaza and prioritize minimizing the military threat from Hamas. Specific, achievable tasks—such as eliminating Hamas’s military and political leadership and destroying their arms caches and tunnel network—should be the primary objectives. Going beyond these goals could lead to a prolonged and unresolved conflict.

In the case of Afghanistan, the US military’s confidence led to the belief that American troops could not only win the war, but also establish peace—a task far beyond the core competence of the US military and civilian agencies, such as the State Department and USAID. The US presence in Afghanistan, while well-intentioned, often incited terrorist attacks and military reprisals that harmed innocent Afghans.

Similar to its American counterpart, the Israeli military is a formidable war machine with the necessary weaponry and technology to deal significant blows to its adversaries. However, it is ill-equipped—both culturally and tactically—to manage a long-term military occupation of the Gaza Strip. Israel should assess its strengths and determine which allies, including the US and Arab states with peace agreements, can provide support. Collaboration with the UN and the Palestinian Authority, led by President Mahmoud Abbas, should also be considered. Despite Israeli mistrust of the UN due to a perceived anti-Israel bias, it may be the most suitable global organization with the expertise and credibility to lead effective post-conflict stabilization efforts in Gaza. Any plan for Gaza’s post-conflict phase should take the UN into account.

There are potential lessons for Israel in understanding the USA’s misjudgement and mishandling of the Taliban after 9/11. Even though the Palestinian Authority publicly condemns Israel’s offensive in Gaza, it help deal with the situation once the war clouds settle. Israel should do everything it can to avoid turning the Palestinian Authority, which has recognized Israel and pledged support for a two-state solution, into an enemy. The Palestinian Authority’s limited authority and rampant corruption will make this difficult, but there are public steps that can be taken to build goodwill.

Unfortunately, Tel-Aviv seems bent on taking the opposite path. Before October 7, there string of settler-led violence in the West Bank, which has only intensified since the attack. Israeli leaders are turning a blind eye to this violence as many of them sympathize with the settlers—an important segment of the current government coalition. This inaction is both morally wrong and politically ill-advised. Israel cannot hope to rely on Palestinian Authority support for help in administering post-war Gaza if it continues to allow settlers to attack Palestinian villages and their residents with impunity.

Israel needs to halt the West Bank violence immediately and put in place confidence-building measures, such as effecting limitations on settlement growth, granting West Bank Palestinians more permits to work in the country, releasing tax revenues that Israel collects for the Palestinian Authority and freeing Palestinian political prisoners.

But, over and above, Israel must address the underlying issues that spur support for Hamas. That means sitting down with the Palestinian Authority and negotiating a political resolution to their differences. Just as the US should have accepted that the Taliban had a role to play in Afghanistan’s future, so too must Israel make tough political choices to end its conflict with the Palestinians. Ultimately, this would be the guarantee for the country’s safety.

This will not be straightforward. Prime Minister Netanyahu has dedicated years to portraying the Palestinian Authority in a negative light and subjecting it to humiliation. Should Netanyahu step down—something that a majority of Israelis desire once the conflict is resolved, as indicated by recent polls—it would contribute to the efforts of repairing relations.

Many Palestinians might perceive a Palestinian Authority-led administration in Gaza as a collaborating regime. However, it is important to remember that, when the US entered Afghanistan, the prevailing belief in Washington was that Afghans would resent the US presence. Surprisingly, most Afghans actually welcomed the US forces and saw them as liberators. It is unlikely that the situation in Gaza will unfold the same way, even though many Palestinians would be relieved to be free from Hamas.

The majority of Palestinians do not have intentions to engage in acts of terrorism against Israelis; they simply desire normal lives. Israel should avoid actions that further alienate them, as a heavy-handed occupation would only fuel more resentment. It is possible that some of the young boys who were searching through the rubble in Gaza after the Israeli airstrikes in 2014 may have grown up to become the young men involved in the tragic events on October 7.

The situation in Gaza presents numerous challenges. Both Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians will undoubtedly endure suffering and loss. However, it is crucial to recognize that every nation has the right to defend itself against terrorism, and Israel is no exception. In the aftermath of 9/11, the US engaged in a war with the al-Qaeda, seeking justice. Subsequently, US leaders made a series of counter-productive and poorly considered decisions that squandered the early successes in Afghanistan, resulting in a difficult and protracted conflict. If Israel were to make similar missteps in its battle against Hamas, it could face similarly dire consequences. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Israel Will Be Doing A Terrible Blunder If It Extends The War To Iran And Lebanon first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article Israel Will Be Doing A Terrible Blunder If It Extends The War To Iran And Lebanon appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

Along the border between Lebanon and Israel, a missile expert from Hezbollah is currently preparing for a war situation with a level of intensity and readiness he has never experienced before. Dressed in black tactical pants, green camouflage attire, and armed with a pistol, the officer from the Iran-backed Shiite militia wears a weary expression that alternates between moments of excitement and anxiety. He expresses unwavering high morale and a strong belief in the imminent battle.

Because he interprets the surprise raid by Hamas on October 7th, resulting in 1,400 Israeli casualties and prompting an Israeli ground incursion into Gaza, as a signal for a broader and long-anticipated conflict against Israel and its strong American ally. This conflict would involve every regional armed faction associated with Iran’s self-proclaimed “Axis of Resistance.”

On October 7th, we can label it as the day when the decline of Israel commenced, and this significantly boosts our morale,” states Hassan, a Hezbollah veteran with 22 years of experience. Hassan from Hezbollah assures that when they receive the order to support Hamas against the Israelis, you will witness a significant change. Their goal is to put an end to the Israeli actions resulting in massacres against the Palestinians.

Certainly. From Yemen to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, the Iran-backed factions, which have been nurtured and armed for decades by the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have already been put into action.

The most prominent component of this “axis” is Lebanese Hezbollah, which has gained extensive combat experience during a decade-long involvement in the Syrian conflict. They are believed to possess a formidable arsenal of over 150,000 missiles, which has maintained a state of mutual deterrence with Israel for years.

However, during Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s long-awaited public statement on Friday, there were no instructions given for a full-scale Hezbollah attack on Israel, despite the anticipation. While Mr. Nasrallah’s passionate language criticized American “hypocrisy” and emphasized the paramount importance of the fight against “these Zionists,” it concealed a deliberate attempt to balance and address the conflicting objectives and motivations of Iran, Hezbollah, and the other factions.

Hezbollah has been steadily increasing its operations on a daily basis, strategically taking calculated risks to engage Israeli troops and support Hamas. Mr. Nasrallah emphasized their readiness for any situation and called on the Americans, or anyone else who wishes to prevent a regional war, to swiftly cease the aggression on Gaza.

Iran has praised the Hamas assault, which utilized years of covert Iranian assistance, including arms, funding, and weapons technology, to carry out the most significant attack on the state of Israel since its establishment in 1948.

The brutal attack led to an intense Israeli retaliation, with over 10,000 airstrikes and missile strikes, accompanied by a ground offensive aimed at eradicating Hamas entirely. The conflict has resulted in a reported death toll of around 9,000 people in Gaza since October 7.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are of the Shiite faction, have launched three separate volleys of missiles and drones, covering a distance of over 1,000 miles towards Israel. Additionally, Shiite militias supported by Iran in Syria and Iraq have carried out numerous assaults on American military forces deployed in those regions.

Hezbollah has intensified its confrontations with Israel, resulting in a growing loss of life on both sides and an expansion of hostilities into each other’s territories. This escalation includes a recent series of coordinated strikes on Thursday, targeting 19 Israeli locations.

Fabian Hinz, an expert on Iranian and regional missile capabilities at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Berlin, suggests that if Israel does not succeed in ousting Hamas from Gaza during a ground incursion and instead withdraws, it could represent a significant victory for the broader ‘Axis of Resistance.’

According to him, Iran-backed militias have historically assessed their advancements based on previous conflicts that led to the development of enhanced deterrence and capabilities against Israel, while avoiding actions that could jeopardize the existence of any particular group.

However, Mr. Hinz believes that the sheer magnitude of the Hamas attack could turn out to be a significant misjudgement. It may disrupt the gradual course of events and trigger such a robust Israeli retaliation against Hamas that no subsequent action, not even from Hezbollah, might be able to halt it.

This meticulously developed deterrence, which allowed Hamas to accumulate tens of thousands of rockets and maintain the capability for a ground incursion, was essentially risked and lost by Hamas in that attack,” Mr. Hinz remarks. According to him, if the ‘axis’ cannot dissuade the Israelis from entering Gaza, it represents a significant setback in a high-stakes scenario.

The Palestinian cause and Iran’s strong opposition to Israel have been fundamental elements of Iran’s leadership ideology since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iranian officials proudly point out that Palestinian fighters, who once relied on rudimentary tools like stones, knives, and slingshots, now utilize rockets, ballistic missiles, and drones supplied by Iran, illustrating a transformation that Iran has replicated among its proxy militias.

Last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian issued a warning, emphasizing that all parties in the region have their fingers on the trigger, coinciding with the movement of Israeli tanks into Gaza.

Iran has consistently disavowed any direct involvement in the Hamas raid. However, in the ongoing conflict, Hamas leaders have appealed to Hezbollah and Iran for increased support. Nicholas Blanford, a Hezbollah expert based in Beirut affiliated with the Atlantic Council, suggests that the Iranians are unlikely to put Hezbollah in a precarious position for the sake of Hamas. Ultimately, Hezbollah plays a pivotal role in Iran’s deterrence strategy.

According to Mr. Blanford, the author of “Warrior of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel,” instructing Hezbollah to engage with Israel without regard to the consequences could lead to significant damage to Hezbollah’s capabilities, and there’s no assurance that they could rapidly reequip and rearm as they did after the 2006 conflict, jeopardizing their role as a deterrent force for Iran.

Mr. Blanford observes a prevailing sense of restraint at the moment, but he believes that’s a rational assessment. He suggests that the Iranians typically approach situations logically, but the circumstances in Gaza might alter their calculus.

He also anticipates increased activity along the Lebanon-Israel border, including drone attacks, minor incursions, and ambushes, to maintain ongoing tensions. Mr. Blanford highlights that Hezbollah has various options before committing to an all-out war, ranging from subtle strategies to more overt actions.

Yemen’s Houthi forces have seen their rockets and drones intercepted and shot down, whether by American warships in the Red Sea, Israel, or having them land in Egypt or Jordan. However, Abdelaziz bin Habtour, the prime minister of the Houthi government in control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, stated this week that Houthi forces would persist in their strikes as part of the broader ‘Axis of Resistance.’ He emphasized the existence of a unified ‘axis,’ indicating coordination among the involved parties, a joint operations room, and a shared command structure for these activities.

According to Nadwa al-Dawsari, a Yemen specialist at the Middle East Institute in Washington, this represents Iran’s support for the Houthis coming to fruition. The Houthis were originally guerrilla fighters in the remote northern regions of Yemen, but they have received training and support from the Iranians for at least the past two decades. This assistance has included the presence of IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Quds Force commanders on the ground to help them advance their missile and drone technology. According to her, Iran has played a crucial role in shaping the capabilities and strength of the Houthi group.

Simultaneously, engaging in the conflict against Israel as part of Iran’s broader “axis” also benefits the Houthis within Yemen, where they have faced increasing criticism for their ineffective governance during a period of relative peace over the last year and a half.

Internally, the Houthis find the need for war to justify their control over the population without effective governance. In this context, the current situation is seen as an ideal opportunity, as it allows the Houthis to enhance their popularity and bolster their recruitment of fighters.

Nearer to Israel, along Lebanon’s southern border, a missile expert from Hezbollah named Hassan, known as a “true believer” by friends, remembered sharing with the Monitor in Beirut back in August his deep concern: “My biggest fear is to pass away without witnessing the liberation of Palestine – but it seems to be drawing nearer.”

After the events of October 7, what did Hassan convey to his family as he departed for the southern front?”I told my family: Please pray for me. If it’s God’s will, I might become a martyr on the path to Palestine.” (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Hezbollah’s Intensified Preparations Suggest Impending War With Israel first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article Hezbollah’s Intensified Preparations Suggest Impending War With Israel appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

China’s position on the Gaza conflict has left Israel disappointed. As Israeli forces have carried out airstrikes and ground operations in response to Hamas’ early October attack, Beijing has consistently accused Israel of exceeding the bounds of self-defence in its retaliation. Furthermore, China vetoed a U.S.-led United Nations resolution that reaffirmed the “inherent right of all states.”

However, this was not always the situation. Prior to the substantial impact of the U.S.-China rivalry, which altered the dynamics between these superpowers and their alliances, China and Israel had warm relations and military connections so intimate that Washington felt compelled to intervene.

In recent decades, that partnership has waned due to Israel’s increasing reliance on the United States and the inherent conflicts in China-U.S. relations, which have eroded the once-strong strategic bond between China and Israel. As the ongoing competition between China and the United States shows no signs of abating and may even escalate in the near future, experts suggest that additional tensions between China and Israel are likely inescapable.

The ongoing conflict between Israel and Gaza adds an extra layer of complexity to Israel’s relationship with Beijing. Israel’s foreign ministry expressed its profound disappointment with China’s failure to condemn Hamas. Israel’s envoy to the UN also expressed shock and criticized the veto by China and Russia of the American proposal at the UN Security Council.

As early as January 1950, Israel stood as the first Middle Eastern country to officially acknowledge the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, which had been founded just months earlier. This diplomatic recognition reciprocated the Chinese Communist Party’s positive reception of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. However, any efforts to establish contact were disrupted a few months later by the outbreak of the Korean War, as Beijing allied with North Korea in the conflict against UN forces led by the United States.

The rift between China and Israel deepened as China sided with Arab nations in Middle Eastern conflicts, while Israel aligned with the United States to counter communism during the Cold War. Nonetheless, both sides retained a degree of informal communication, such as exchanging letters at the level of prime minister between China’s Premier Zhou Enlai and Israel’s Levi Eshkol.

The relationship between China and Israel started to open up in the 1980s, a period when Beijing was improving its relations with Washington. During this time, Israel, alongside other U.S. allies, engaged in increased trade and arms deals with China. Notably, Israel began selling advanced weaponry to China even before the formal establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992.

One of the notable instances in the 1980s was the technology transfer involving Israel’s Python-3 air-to-air missiles. The People’s Liberation Army not only purchased these missiles for equipping its fighter jets but also acquired a license to domestically produce them. Over time, using the technology from the Python missiles, China developed the PL-8 missile family, which included ground-to-air and ship-to-air variants.

At the same time, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) imported multiple advanced Israeli radars, including the EL/M-2032 planar array radar system. This radar system was integrated into their J-7 fighters, which were Chinese-produced variants of the MiG-21. The inclusion of the multimode fire-control radar markedly enhanced the aircraft’s situational awareness and its capability to effectively engage aerial targets with air-to-air missiles.

There were allegations that Israel shared certain technology and design principles from its discontinued prototype fighter, the Lavi, which contributed to the development of China’s fourth-generation fighter aircraft, the Chengdu J-10.

Despite both parties denying direct collaboration, the J-10 exhibits noticeable similarities to the Lavi, including features like its delta wing, double canard setup, and air inlet design. Although classified as an indigenous Chinese design, there was a widely held belief that the J-10’s development was influenced by the knowledge and technology transfer associated with the Lavi project.

China’s favourable relationship with the Western world came to an abrupt halt following the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. The United States and the majority of its European allies announced their intentions to halt military technical cooperation projects with Beijing and later implemented a ban on arms sales to China.

However, Israel, similar to China, remained outside the Wassenaar Arrangement on weapon export controls established in 1996. Israel chose to keep its defence collaboration with China discreet and, at times, confidential. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that arms exports from Israel to China remained within the range of $28 million to $38 million annually throughout the 1990s.

During that era, notable instances include the sale of Python-4 missiles and the initial transfer of Harpy anti-radiation drones. Some military experts from the United States and Russia also suggested that China’s vehicle-mounted HJ-9 anti-tank missiles might have been developed with similarities to Israeli Mapats (Man-Portable Anti-Tank System) missiles, as the two missile systems bore a striking resemblance, although no concrete evidence has been established to confirm this.

The connection between Israel and China was ultimately severed after multiple interventions by the United States. In 1996, Israel had agreed to provide China with four sets of advanced Phalcon airborne early warning and it  control systems (AEWC) for a total of $1 billion, intended to be installed on Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft. The initial installation on one of the planes was finished in early 2000, but the U.S. government cancelled the delivery.

Even though Israel insisted that the Phalcon system did not incorporate American technology, Washington held apprehensions that China’s possession of this advanced airborne early warning and control system (AEWC), featuring a range of 400km and complete 360-degree coverage, could potentially erode U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific area. This concern was particularly focused on China’s ability to gain an edge in a potential offensive action regarding Taiwan.

Under increasing pressure from the United States, Israel eventually terminated the Phalcon deal in July 2000. This decision strained Israel’s ties with China while also complicating its relationship with the U.S. Israel agreed to compensate China with $350 million and made efforts to rebuild its relations with the U.S.

A similar situation occurred in 2005 when China sent its Harpy drones back to Israel for upgrades. Despite the fact that the Harpy did not contain any U.S.-made components, the U.S. raised objections to the deal. The Israeli loitering munition is designed to target enemy radar systems, and the upgrade would have included a datalink and sensors for improved ground control. Eventually, the deal was cancelled, and defence exchanges between Israel and China came to a halt.

Liu Zhongmin, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at Shanghai International Studies University, noted, “The United States has consistently been the primary obstacle limiting the development of China’s relations with Israel. Israel’s inability to free itself from U.S. influence sometimes requires sacrificing its relationship with China to preserve the special U.S.-Israel alliance.”

Following the incidents related to the Harpy and Phalcon, there has been a notable lack of information concerning arms trade and military technology exchanges between Israel and China. In 2011, Israel’s defence minister visited China, and the chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) visited Israel, marking a restart of military exchanges between the two countries.

The PLA fleet made its first port call to Israel in Haifa, and the exchanges primarily focused on non-traditional security areas like counterterrorism, anti-piracy efforts, humanitarian relief, and disaster prevention, according to Chinese military commentator Song Zhongping.

Song emphasized that cooperation between China and Israel has become exceedingly sensitive due to China being viewed as America’s main adversary and the target of containment and control. This sensitivity affects not only Israel’s arms sales and technology transfers to China but also the reverse aspect, involving Chinese military supplies to Israel. This is due to Israel’s significant receipt of U.S. military aid, and the use of such funds is subject to restrictions.

Israel has been the largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign aid since World War II, receiving over $260 billion from 1946 to 2023, as per inflation-adjusted figures from the USAID Data Service. Notably, U.S. aid, which was originally primarily for economic support, shifted increasingly toward military purposes from 1997, particularly at the start of this century. In 1999, the U.S. government committed to providing $2.67 billion in military aid annually to Israel for the next decade. This annual amount was raised to $3 billion in 2009, and for the third 10-year memorandum of understanding starting in 2019, it was increased to $3.8 billion per year.

At present, nearly all of the aid provided by the United States to Israel comes in the form of military assistance. In 2022, approximately 99.7 percent of U.S. aid was directed toward the Israeli military, and these annual grants accounted for roughly 16.5 percent of Israel’s overall defence budget, as reported in a U.S. Congressional research document.

In the Phalcon incident, the U.S. wielded its influence by threatening to withhold a portion of Israel’s annual aid if the deal with China proceeded. This influence extends beyond the military realm. Starting in 2015, Israel participated in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, granting construction and a 25-year management contract for a privately owned port in Haifa Bay to the Shanghai International Port Group, effective from 2021. However, after repeated warnings from the U.S. that China might use the port for espionage on U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet warships that could dock nearby, the original Haifa port was sold to an India-led consortium in 2022, following an I2U2 Group summit involving the United States, India, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This move was considered a success in U.S.-backed efforts to counter China’s strategic moves.

Additionally, the Israeli government blocked a joint bid by the China Railway Construction Corporation and an Israeli company for two Tel Aviv light rail lines after both the Trump and Biden administrations exerted pressure to exclude Chinese involvement. Israel’s staunch position on the Palestinian issue, staunchly supported by the United States, has consistently been a fundamental point of divergence between Israel and Beijing. China has traditionally been a proponent of Palestinian independence and advocates for the two-state solution, an approach that Israel often views as favouring Palestine.

Moreover, Israel is concerned about China’s expanding “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Iran. At the outset of the U.S.-China trade war, there was notable growth in trade, investment, and collaboration between China and Israel. Beijing placed a high value on Israel’s innovations and technologies.

However, as the trade war intensified, Washington heightened its pressure on Israel to restrict or prohibit cooperation with China in research and technology to address potential concerns. The U.S. consistently emphasized that a significant portion of Israel’s technologies, whether in the military or civilian sector, incorporated American technology, and it insisted on preventing such high-tech exchanges. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post China-Israel Relations Are Changing Substantially In The Wake Of Gaza War first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article China-Israel Relations Are Changing Substantially In The Wake Of Gaza War appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

Israel has reinforced its air defences in the Red Sea region using Navy missile boats due to multiple missile and drone attacks by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, the army announced on Wednesday. The deployment of these vessels took place on Tuesday, as it was deemed necessary in response to the situation. This move is part of heightened defence measures in the area, following an incident where a missile and two drones were launched from Yemen towards Israel.

An extra target was successfully intercepted early on Wednesday near Eilat, Israel’s southernmost city along the Red Sea. Eilat, a popular resort city typically inhabited by around 50,000 residents, has seen a significant increase in population due to the arrival of tens of thousands of evacuees from Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip and towns at the Lebanese border. These areas have been subjected to heavy bombardment in recent weeks.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has verified the presence of multiple tiers of air defence systems in the region to safeguard against Houthi assaults. Additionally, the US military maintains a deployment in the Red Sea area and successfully intercepted several Houthi missiles and drones bound for Israel just two weeks ago. IDF spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari issued a warning, stating that Israel might retaliate against these attacks, perceived by Jerusalem as being orchestrated by Iran.

During a press briefing on Wednesday morning, Hagari emphasised that Israel was currently operating at an extremely high level of defence readiness and had expanded its naval presence, which not only offered substantial protection in maritime areas, but also possessed offensive capabilities. Hagari also mentioned that, on Tuesday, the Arrow air defence system was effectively used to intercept a surface-to-surface missile fired by the Houthis, marking the first operational use of this long-range system during the ongoing conflict with Hamas.

The Arrow and Iron Dome are both Israeli air defence systems, but serve different purposes. The Arrow is designed to intercept ballistic missiles, including long-range threats from such countries as Iran. It operates at higher altitudes, targeting missiles in space. On the other hand, the Iron Dome is tailored for short-range threats, such as rockets and artillery shells, with a focus on intercepting them in the lower atmosphere.

The systems also differ in terms of interception altitude, range and the types of threats they can effectively counter. In essence, the Arrow deals with long-range ballistic missiles, while the Iron Dome handles short-range, lower-altitude threats.

Yemen’s Houthi militia, known for their slogan, “Death to America and Death to Israel; Curse the Jews and Victory to Islam”, has claimed responsibility for at least three separate attacks since Hamas’s assault on southern Israel on October 7, resulting in a tragic loss of approximately 1,400 lives, primarily civilians. The group’s spokesperson, Yahya Saria, stated that these attacks were carried out in response to the demands of the Yemeni people.

In a video released on Wednesday, the group showcased missiles and drones launched from within Yemen towards Israel. However, none of these projectiles reached their intended targets and images on social media revealed the wreckage of one such cruise missile in southern Jordan, near the Saudi border.

In the previous week, two drones originating from Yemen struck cities in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, with one causing injuries to six individuals near a hospital in the border town of Taba. Additional projectiles launched from Yemen towards Israel were intercepted and neutralized by the US and Saudi Arabia.

Israel accuses the Houthis of operating at the behest of Iran, in conjunction with other regional entities attempting to divert Israel’s military focus away from the conflict in Gaza. “They’re trying to distract us from the Gaza conflict. Nevertheless, our primary focus remains on the fighting in Gaza,” stated Hagari.

Despite persistent denials from Iran, there is a growing body of evidence indicating that it has been supplying the Houthi rebels with firearms, rocket-propelled grenades, missiles and various other weapons via maritime routes. Independent experts, Western countries and UN investigators have successfully traced components found on other intercepted ships back to Iran.

Originating from a clan with roots in Yemen’s northwestern Saada province, the Houthis are adherents of the Zaidi branch of Shi’ite Islam, shared by approximately 25% of the country’s population. Following the unification of North Yemen and South Yemen in 1990, the Houthis initiated a series of rebellions, ultimately seizing control of Sana’a, the capital, in 2014, sparking an ongoing civil conflict.

In 2011, a wave of protests during the Arab Spring led to the ousting of Yemen’s ruler, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had held power for three decades. Following a transition agreement supported by the US, President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi assumed leadership and negotiations were on for a constitutional assembly and new elections. However, the Houthi group opposed a proposed federal system that emerged from these talks.

In 2014, the government reduced fuel subsidies, prompting protests, and the Houthis displaced Hadi’s government, which still maintains authority in the eastern part of the country. Iran, a predominantly Shi’ite nation, provided assistance to the Houthis, while Saudi Arabia, a predominantly Sunni country, supported the government. The ongoing conflict has inflicted severe hardships on ordinary Yemenis, who describe life as nearly unbearable due to airstrikes, economic collapse and worsening hunger.

The Houthis initiated frequent attacks on Saudi Arabia following its intervention in Yemen’s conflict in 2015. Experts suggest that the Houthis receive training, technical knowhow and progressively advanced weaponry—such as drones, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles—from Iran and its Lebanese partner, the Shi’ite militant group, Hezbollah.

The Houthis have shown solidarity with the Palestinian cause and issued warnings to Israel. They assert the possession of a liquid-propellant missile called Toufan, which could potentially have a range of 1,350 to 1,950 kilometres, a distance that could, in theory, bring Israel within reach, although with some limitations. Yemen and Israel, with Saudi Arabia in between, are approximately 1,580 kilometres apart at their closest proximity.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations have made efforts to broker a lasting ceasefire in the eight-year-long conflict. The Houthis expressed their willingness to participate in political settlement discussions led by the UN, with conditions. However, the negotiations hit a roadblock when a divide emerged between Saudi Arabia and its oil-rich Gulf neighbour, the UAE, which started backing factions competing for control of the country. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Israel-Hamas War Extends To Yemen As Iran-Backed Houthis Start Drone Attacks first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article Israel-Hamas War Extends To Yemen As Iran-Backed Houthis Start Drone Attacks appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

The conflict in Gaza is taking a devastating toll on civilians. According to the Gazan health ministry, the death toll has exceeded 8,000 people, with over 3,000 of them being children. This number of child casualties surpasses the annual child death toll from all wars in each of the previous three years. Additionally, satellite imagery analyzed by a renowned media house suggests that more than 10 percent of Gaza’s housing has been destroyed, leaving over 280,000 people without homes to return to. While urban warfare tends to be highly destructive, Israel’s actions in Gaza have distinctive features.

Conflict in urban areas is invariably tragic. In 2004, the initial U.S. assault on Fallujah resulted in the deaths of approximately 600 civilians, accounting for 0.2% of the city’s population. In comparison, the ongoing conflict in Gaza has a civilian casualty rate of 0.3%. A subsequent assault on Fallujah later that year claimed the lives of approximately 800 more civilians and caused extensive damage to the city’s buildings.

Fallujah is a city in Iraq, located in the Al Anbar Governorate, to the west of Baghdad.

Similarly, a battle for Sadr City, located as a suburb of Baghdad, is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of nearly 1,000 people in March and April 2008. This occurred in a population of around 2 million, a size similar to that of Gaza.

The most significant urban conflict in recent times was the operation to retake the city of Mosul, which had been captured by the Islamic State (IS) group. This operation was led by an American-led coalition, in collaboration with Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces. During 2016-17, at least 9,000 civilians lost their lives in Mosul, as reported by Airwars, a non-profit organization that monitors civilian casualties. This figure represents 0.6% of the population at that time. It’s worth noting that over 80% of the damaged buildings in Mosul were residential structures.

Mosul is a city in Iraq, located in the Nineveh Governorate in the northern part of the country.

The Kurds are an ethnic group with their own distinct language and cultural identity. They primarily inhabit a region known as Kurdistan, which spans across parts of several countries in the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.

Kurdish forces typically refer to armed groups or military units composed of Kurdish fighters. These forces are often involved in conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, where the Kurdish population resides in several countries, including Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.

These instances may suggest that, in terms of destruction, the ongoing conflict in Gaza is not extraordinarily severe when viewed through a historical lens, at least not at this stage. However, there are significant distinctions to consider. The most prominent one pertains to the treatment of civilians. In Mosul, the Islamic State attempted to hinder civilians from escaping by firing at them and setting up obstacles along exit routes. Despite these obstacles, a substantial number of civilians managed to leave. Between October 2016 and June 2017, nearly 900,000 individuals departed, which accounted for nearly half of the city’s population before the war.

Even Russia, during its siege of Mariupol in Ukraine from February to May 2022, engaged in negotiations for humanitarian pauses, allowing some civilians to exit the city. In contrast, Israel has thus far declined requests, coming from entities such as the European Union and others, to implement similar pauses in the conflict in Gaza.

Israel continues to conduct airstrikes in southern Gaza, although these strikes are less extensive than those in the northern areas. According to Amos Fox, an authority on urban warfare who has extensively studied the situation in Mosul, the locals find it difficult to escape, and the fighting is constrained within urban areas, making it more costly in terms of both lives and infrastructure than previous conflicts.

Even the civilians who have relocated to the southern region are confronted with a deepening humanitarian crisis. Gaza’s healthcare system is only equipped with 3,500 beds, according to Médecins Sans Frontières, a humanitarian organization, which falls far short of the demand for medical care.

1. In Mosul, the World Health Organization managed to set up trauma stabilization points close to the front lines, providing critical medical assistance within 10-15 minutes, with larger field hospitals an additional hour away. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have a limited number of “humanitarian affairs officers” integrated into their fighting units, responsible for addressing the local population’s needs. However, these resources are insufficient to cope with the demands and extensive suffering resulting from a ground offensive.

Israeli politicians have stated that they won’t send aid to civilians until all hostages are released, although officials recognize that this stance may evolve as the offensive progresses.

2. Another distinction lies in the extent to which civilian and military infrastructure are intertwined in Gaza. In the case of Iraq, the Islamic State had control over Mosul for a relatively brief period of just over two years before efforts to liberate the city commenced. Yet, within this short timeframe, the group managed to establish complex and layered defenses, drawing from Western military principles. Rupert Jones, a retired British major-general who served as the deputy commander of the anti-IS coalition, pointed out the sophistication of these defenses.

Hamas is considered a Palestinian organization that was founded in Gaza in 1987. Its roots can be traced back to the establishment of the welfare organization Mujama al-Islamiya, known as the “Islamic Center,” founded by Ahmed Yassin in 1973. Over the course of five decades, Hamas has become deeply integrated into Gaza’s social fabric and has been in control of the Gaza Strip for 16 years. Its defensive structures have been established around, and sometimes beneath, the civilian infrastructure within the territory. In 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza from Palestinian rivals, its fighters were largely recruited from the local population.

3. A third distinguishing factor is the tactics employed. Israel’s military authorities claim to prioritize the protection of civilians. However, Israel’s intense bombardment of Gaza during this conflict has exceeded historical standards. In the first six days of the war, Israel dropped 6,000 bombs on the territory, a rate of ordnance that surpasses American and Western counter-terrorism campaigns. To provide a comparison, in Mosul, during the most intense period of bombing, the American-led coalition dropped 7,000 bombs over two months. As a former deputy commander of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Gaza Division stated on October 30th to the Financial Times, “When our soldiers are manoeuvring, we are doing this with massive artillery, with 50 airplanes overhead destroying anything that moves.”

Tactics in the Gaza conflict are influenced by Israel’s perception of the war’s significance, their view of Hamas as an existential threat, and the lack of affinity between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Palestinian civilians. This differs from other conflicts like Mosul or Marawi, where the dynamics and stakes were different, and there was a varying level of connection between the military and the local population.

In Mosul, Iraq’s political leadership, including the prime minister, stressed the importance of prioritizing civilian protection. Lieutenant-General Basim al-Tai, a high-ranking Iraqi officer, assumed responsibility for the humanitarian efforts and was deeply committed to safeguarding the well-being of the Mosul population, as noted by General Jones. Caroline Baudot, an adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, concurs that the commander’s intentions regarding civilian protection in Mosul were exceptionally clear.

Nevertheless, examining various sections of Mosul provides valuable insights. The eastern part of the city, often seen as more intellectual and sophisticated, experienced fewer damages. In contrast, the western old city, where ISIS made its final stand, was perceived by Iraqi forces as more conservative and sympathetic to the extremist group, resulting in significantly greater destruction. “Your approach to fighting influences your planning, actions, and even the post-conflict reconstruction,” notes Ms. Baudot. When operating on your own territory, as opposed to foreign territory, the level of consideration for civilians may vary.

In this conflict, the role of medical facilities has become a subject of contention. In previous conflicts, Palestinian hospitals and civilian relief centres were marked as non-strike areas on Israeli military maps. Israel claims that any previous hits on these facilities were unintentional. However, in the current war, Israel has ordered the evacuation of northern Gaza, including hospitals, citing their alleged use as Hamas command posts. According to the laws of war, hospitals can lose their special protection if they are used for military purposes. Even in such cases, military forces can only attack them after providing due warning and a reasonable time limit.

4. Regarding the fourth and final distinction, it pertains to the nature of battlefield intelligence. At the beginning of this conflict, the IDF likely possessed extensive intelligence on Hamas’s infrastructure in Gaza, gathered over several years. However, many of these targets would have been struck in the initial week of the campaign. Subsequently, air forces must transition to “dynamic” targeting, which involves identifying and attacking targets that were not known at the war’s outset and need to be developed within a relatively short period. Experts note that this phase is where most instances of civilian harm tend to occur.

In Mosul, the cooperation of local civilians, despite their strong opposition to ISIS, proved invaluable as they provided a wealth of human intelligence (HUMINT) – information relayed by sources on the ground – to assist Iraqi forces in locating ISIS fighters. However, in the 2017 battle for Raqqa, a Syrian city under ISIS control, commanders faced a different situation. They had fewer infantry forces on the ground and, as a result, were “deprived of local information.” Consequently, they became heavily reliant on aerial surveillance, which couldn’t provide insight into the interiors of buildings, as indicated in a report by the RAND Corporation, a think-tank.

Israeli intelligence previously faced a significant failure in Gaza, as it missed several indicators of Hamas’s preparations for the October 7th attack. While the IDF has access to advanced electronic intelligence, supported by American aircraft patrolling the eastern Mediterranean, Hamas is likely to have an advantage in ground intelligence. This is because locals are likely to provide a continuous stream of human intelligence (humint) to Hamas as the IDF advances. This reversal of the humint situation, compared to what was seen in Mosul, means the IDF will need to systematically contend with better-planned and prepared defenses, potentially leading to more civilian casualties. The past three weeks have been challenging for Gaza’s civilians, and the upcoming weeks could prove even more difficult. (IPA Service)

The post Urban Warfare In Gaza Poses A Gruelling Challenge For Israel first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article Urban Warfare In Gaza Poses A Gruelling Challenge For Israel appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

Just hours after Hamas initiated its attack on Israel on October 7, India’s Prime Minister was one of the first global leaders to react. In a strongly worded statement, Narendra Modi condemned the “terrorist attacks” and expressed India’s unwavering support for Israel during this challenging time.

The Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar promptly retweeted the statement. A state minister from Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also cautioned in a tweet that India could potentially face a situation similar to what Israel is currently dealing with if it doesn’t confront politically motivated radicalism.

While Modi’s words aligned with the messaging of many Western governments, they signified a shift in India’s stance from its past positions. It took a few days for the foreign ministry to subtly recall India’s longstanding dedication to the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. On Friday, India opted not to support a UN resolution for a “humanitarian truce” in Gaza and chose to abstain from the vote.

For many observers, both Modi’s prompt comments and India’s stance on the UN resolution underline the substantial shift in the India-Israel relationship since his assumption of power in 2014. This transformation is prominently exemplified by the cordial relations between the two countries’ prime ministers.

According to Nicolas Blarel, an associate professor of international relations at Leiden University and author of “The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy,” Modi has consistently expressed support for Israel, but this is the first time there has been an immediate and unbalanced pro-Israel response without a subsequent statement to balance it. Israel seemed to interpret Modi’s statement as strong and unwavering support. Israel’s ambassador, Naor Gilon, expressed gratitude to India for its “100% support” during a conversation with reporters in Delhi last week.

This sentiment wasn’t limited to just the upper levels of the Indian government. Azad Essa, a journalist and the author of “Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between India and Israel,” noted that this messaging sent a clear signal to the entire right-wing online community in India.

Following the aftermath, Indian internet fact-checking organizations, AltNews and Boom, started noticing a surge of disinformation being spread by Indian social media accounts. This disinformation included fabricated stories about actions attributed to Palestinians and Hamas, which were sometimes shared millions of times. Furthermore, these false narratives often exploited the conflict to promote Islamophobic views, a trend that has been used to marginalize India’s Muslim population since the BJP came into power.

Facebook groups associated with the BJP also began to promote the idea that Hamas represented a similar Muslim threat to what India faced in the troubled, primarily Muslim region of Kashmir. Palestinians were broadly labelled as jihadists. Messages circulated on WhatsApp encouraged Hindus to arm themselves and boycott Muslims, warning that “in the future, India could also face conspiracies and attacks like Israel, and the possibility of cruelty against Hindu women cannot be ruled out.”This narrative also found its way onto some of India’s most provocative news channels. For instance,  the right-wing host of India’s Republic TV, told viewers, “The same radical jihadist Islamist terrorist ideology that Israel is a victim of, we are also victims of… Israel is fighting this battle on behalf of all of us.”

The Hindu nationalist groups seemed to respond to this as a call to take action. Recently, these groups gathered outside the Israeli embassy in Delhi, offering their assistance in fighting against Hamas. Among them was Vishnu Gupta, the national president of Hindu Sena, who claimed that he and around 200 men had volunteered to support the Israeli army. He attributed his confidence to the leadership of Narendra Modi. Gupta stated, “We both are victims of Islamic terror, which is why we have been supporting Israel from the beginning.” He drew a parallel between the historical takeover of Jerusalem by Muslims and the invasions of holy places in India by Muslims. He also pointed out the existence of militants in Kashmir supported by Pakistan who could carry out terrorist attacks across India. He emphasized that, unlike some other countries, India is not in the minority in this context.

Historically, India had a different relationship with Israel. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the influential Indian freedom fighter Mahatma Gandhi had opposed the establishment of the Israeli state, fearing it would lead to the disenfranchisement of Palestinians. India voted against the creation of Israel at the United Nations. During the 1970s, India made history by becoming the first non-Arab country to acknowledge the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of Palestine. In the 1980s, India extended full diplomatic recognition to the PLO and invited its longstanding leader, Yasser Arafat, for several visits. Throughout this period, India consistently upheld a pro-Palestine stance at the United Nations.

It wasn’t until the PLO initiated dialogue with Israel, under increasing pressure from the United States, that India eventually established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992.The turning point occurred in 1999 when India found itself in a conflict with Pakistan, and Israel demonstrated its willingness to provide arms and ammunition. This marked the beginning of a rapidly growing defence relationship. India now annually purchases approximately $2 billion worth of arms from Israel, making it Israel’s largest arms supplier after Russia and accounting for 46% of Israel’s total weapons exports.

However, the election of Narendra Modi marked a significant shift. Previous governments had maintained discreet dealings with Israel, out of concerns about alienating foreign allies and India’s substantial Muslim population. In contrast, Modi’s Hindu nationalist BJP government had different priorities. In 2017, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel, and this was reciprocated when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu travelled to Delhi. The images of the two leaders casually walking barefoot with rolled-up trousers along Haifa beach in Tel Aviv, described as a “budding bromance” by the Indian media at the time, were later used in campaign materials by both leaders.

This narrative conveyed a clear message: that India and Israel, as ancient civilizations, had been disrupted by external influences—implying Muslims—and their leaders had come together, akin to long-lost brothers, to fulfill their shared destiny. The ideological alignment between these two leaders was notably more visible than in the past. The BJP’s ideological roots, as well as its present membership, have long viewed Israel as a model for the religious nationalist state, often referred to as the ‘Hindu Rashtra’ that the Indian right-wing seeks to establish.

Although Modi was the first Indian prime minister to visit Ramallah in Palestine, his government has primarily focused on enhancing relations with Israel, spanning areas such as defence, culture, agriculture, and even film production. Notably, this year, Gautam Adani, the influential Indian billionaire with close ties to Modi, invested $1.2 billion to acquire the strategic Israeli port of Haifa.

Nevertheless, Modi’s foreign policy has also overseen a transformation in relations with Arab Gulf nations, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. These relationships have brought significant economic benefits to India and have laid the groundwork for a pioneering India-Middle East economic trade corridor, extending all the way to Europe. Although this corridor was announced at the G20 forum for international economic cooperation this year, it has yet to be realized.

Should the Israeli-Hamas conflict continue to intensify, experts suggest that India may adjust its pro-Israeli stance to prevent tensions with its important Gulf partners. Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, a fellow at the Middle East Institute in Delhi, mentioned that there has been a “calculated silence” from the Indian government since Modi’s initial comments. He also noted that while Modi is comfortable condemning cross-border terrorism, if the conflict escalates and other countries with which his government has relationships become involved, it will pose a significant challenge for India. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

The post Gaza Conflict Shows Modi-Led India’s Evolving Ties With Bibi’s Israel first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

The article Gaza Conflict Shows Modi-Led India’s Evolving Ties With Bibi’s Israel appeared first on Arabian Post.

By Girish Linganna

As Israel ratcheted up its ground offensive on Saturday (October 28, 2023), relentlessly pounding Gaza with airstrikes to back up a night of intense bombing, the north of the Gaza Strip was assailed “on a magnitude never witnessed before” and there was “total chaos” in the region. Although there are no specific casualty figures from the overnight bombing blitz, the number of Palestinians killed—mainly civilians, including children—by the Israeli military is estimated to surpass 8,000. Communication networks have been down since Friday night and information going out of Gaza is not even a trickle.

The 193-member UN General Assembly session in New York approved a non-binding resolution on Friday afternoon by a vote of 120-14 with 45 abstentions, calling for a “humanitarian truce” in Gaza leading to cessation of hostilities between Israel and Gaza’s Hamas rulers. This was the UN’s first response to the war. The resolution stressed the importance of upholding international humanitarian law and called for the unconditional release of all civilian captives, besides unrestricted delivery of vital supplies to Gaza.

Only 14 countries—including Israel and its closest ally, the United States, five Pacific island nations and four European countries—Austria, Croatia, Czechia and Hungary, all European Union members, voted against the resolution. Eight EU members voted for it.

India was one of the 45 nations that chose to abstain from voting in the UN resolution. In doing so, India not only refrained from supporting the international community’s call for an immediate end to the violence, but was also the sole exception in South Asia, as all the other seven nations in the region voted in favour of the resolution. India also joined the group of countries that supported a Western-backed draft amendment, aiming to explicitly condemn Hamas by name.

Another important abstention was that of Australia which argued that the resolution was “incomplete” as it did not mention Hamas as the perpetrator of the October 7 attacks, but repeated Australia’s calls for a humanitarian pause to allow food, water and medicines to pass through to Gaza. Australia also explicitly called for the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages.”

The UN adopted the resolution after it rejected a Canadian amendment, backed by the United States and several Western nations, which had proposed include language that unequivocally condemned the October 7 “terrorist attacks” by Hamas and demanded the immediate release of hostages taken by Hamas, a clause that found no mention in the resolution moved by Jordan. The resolution had sponsorship from a coalition of Arab and Islamic nations, which included such significant countries as Egypt, Oman and the UAE, and was also sponsored by Russia.

The Canadian-proposed amendment received 88 votes in favour and 55 against, with 23 abstentions. However, it did not pass because it failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority of votes from the members “present and voting”. It is important to note that nations that abstained are counted as not voting in this context. India supported the Canadian amendment and it faced opposition from all Arab nations, with the exception of Tunisia.

Shortly before the vote, Jordan’s permanent representative to the UN, Mahmoud Daifallah Hamoud, characterized Canada’s amendment to the draft resolution concerning a humanitarian crisis as an effort to gloss over Israel’s actions against the Palestinian people. He pointed out to the UNGA that they were currently observing an Israeli ground invasion.

Canadian Permanent Representative Bob Rae argued that explicitly mentioning Hamas in the resolution would be just and accurate. He asserted that the amendment was a straightforward acknowledgment of the relevant facts.

But Pakistan’s representative, Munir Akram, however, emphasised that the Canadian amendment should also include a mention of Israel in relation to the retaliatory airstrikes. He argued that, to be truly fair, balanced and just, both sides should be named. Akram suggested that it might be more appropriate not to single out any specific parties in a resolution aimed at drawing attention to the humanitarian crisis.

Israeli Ambassador, Gilad Erdan, declared that the UN lacked any legitimacy. He argued that the only way to eliminate Hamas was by uprooting them and questioned why Hamas was not being held accountable. Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, including the US, Canada, the EU and Israel. It is important to note that different countries and organizations may have varying designations and opinions regarding Hamas.

The UNGA resolution—titled ‘Safeguarding Civilians and Adhering to Legal and Humanitarian Duties’—denounced “any forms of violence targeting Palestinian and Israeli civilians, including acts of terrorism and unselective assaults”. It called on all parties to promptly and completely adhere to their responsibilities under international humanitarian and human rights laws, especially concerning the safeguarding of civilians and civilian assets.

The resolution also stressed the importance of safeguarding humanitarian workers, those injured and humanitarian facilities and resources. It called for the facilitation and encouragement of humanitarian access to ensure that crucial supplies and services can reach all Gaza Strip residents who require them. Moreover, the resolution demanded the withdrawal of Israel’s directive, as the “occupying power”, requiring Palestinian civilians, UN personnel and humanitarian workers to vacate regions in the northern Gaza Strip and transfer to the southern areas.

The General Assembly also urged the prompt and unconditional liberation of all unlawfully detained civilians, insisting on their safety, welfare and humane treatment in accordance with international law. It also reiterated that a peaceful approach, in alignment with the applicable UN resolutions, international law and the two-state solution, was the sole means to attain a fair and enduring resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

In the “explanation of vote” on the main resolution, India’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, Yojna Patel, acknowledged the serious and ongoing concern regarding casualties in the Gaza conflict, particularly among civilians, including women and children. However, she did not explicitly state the reason for India’s abstention.

The emergency session was convened using the ‘Uniting for Peace’ mandate, which empowers the 193-member General Assembly to act when the UN Security Council faces a deadlock because of the veto power wielded by its permanent members. UN General Assembly resolutions, Unlike Security Council resolutions, are not legally binding, but carry tremendous weight and moral authority.

In the past two weeks, the US, China and Russia have used their veto power to block the approval of any resolution aimed at addressing the ongoing crisis in West Asia. On October 18, the US exercised its veto power to reject a draft resolution, proposed by Brazil and the UAE, in the Security Council. This resolution had called for a “humanitarian pause”. A previous Russian draft had also fallen short of garnering the necessary nine votes for adoption.

The crisis in the West Asian region intensified when Hamas initiated an incursion from Gaza into southern Israel, resulting in over 1,200 casualties, including hundreds of civilians. In addition to capturing an unspecified number of Israeli soldiers, Hamas also kidnapped more than 220 Israeli and foreign nationals and took them into Gaza, which is a violation of international humanitarian law.

Since then, Israel has been carrying out widespread airstrikes in Gaza, resulting in 7,326 casualties (as of October 27), as reported by the Palestinian health ministry. Israel has additionally implemented a blockade, restricting the flow of essential supplies, including food, fuel, electricity, medical provisions and water. Only a limited quantity of food and medical aid is making its way into Gaza through a small number of trucks allowed in via the Rafah crossing along the border with Egypt.

Although US President Joe Biden has expressed doubts about the accuracy of civilian casualty figures in Gaza, the UN has previously validated the reliability of the death toll reported by the Palestinian authorities in Gaza. On Thursday, the Gaza Palestinian health ministry released a list of names and information about 6,747 Palestinians who had lost their lives in Gaza since the Israeli airstrikes began on October 7, with 2,655 of them being children.

This week, Prime Minister Modi engaged in a conversation with King Abdullah of Jordan, marking the first instance when India mentioned the necessity for a prompt resolution of the humanitarian and security concerns. India, as one of the most prominent developing countries, had not previously advocated for a “ceasefire” or any cessation of hostilities in this volatile region. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

In a recent political development that could potentially reshape the dynamics in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Maldives elected a new President, Mohamed Muizzu, 45, of the People’s National Congress (PNC) on September 30, 2023. Muizzu’s victory marked a significant shift in the nation’s foreign policy and raised concerns about the delicate balance of power in the region.

The archipelagic nation has already started talks with India to remove its military presence, Muizzu told Bloomberg News on Friday, says Reuters, with New Delhi and Beijing both vying for influence in the region. Muizzu had come to power on an election pledge to remove Indian troops from the island. Muizzu called the negotiations with the Indian government on removing its military presence “very successful already”, but added that Indian soldiers would not be replaced by troops from other countries and it was in no way an indication that he was going to allow China or any other country to station their military troops there.

Muizzu’s election victory came as he defeated the incumbent President, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, with 54 per cent of the votes. What is particularly striking about Muizzu’s rise to power is his affiliation with the Progressive Alliance, a coalition of political parties in the Maldives that advocates for closer ties with China and a reduction of India’s influence on the archipelagic nation.

Opposed to his predecessor Solih’s professed close ties with the country’s ‘Big Brother’ with his ‘India First’ policy, Muizzu, during his campaign, boldly adopted the slogan ‘India Out’, promising to remove Indian troops and military assets from the Maldives as soon as he assumed office. He emphasised that he wanted to see ‘Malé First’ in his foreign policy, hinting at a shift away from the close ties that have historically bound the island nation to India.

India has been a long-time friend and played a pivotal role in supporting the Maldives in terms of defence and security. The coalition which backs Muizzu has strong reservations that India’s all-encompassing influence over the island nation’s defence apparatus poses a threat to its sovereign status and that India has sinister designs of setting up a permanent military presence in the island nation.

In February 2021, India extended a $50-million line of credit to the Maldives for defence projects and the two countries signed an agreement to develop and maintain a key facility at the Uthuru Thila Falhu naval base for the armed forces of the Indian Ocean archipelago. India also offered training to the Maldivian security forces by the Indian armed forces.

In August 2022, India signed agreements with the Maldives to provide crucial military assistance—including two Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters to enhance its surveillance capabilities, a small aircraft, a warship to replace the naval patrol vessel, CGS Huravee, gifted by India in 2006, and a landing craft assault (LCA) ship, besides 24 utility vehicles, to the Maldives National Defence Force. Additionally, approximately 75 Indian military personnel have been stationed in the Maldives to operate and maintain the Indian aircraft.

In the past, India has also signed an agreement with the Maldives, which includes the following: Installing radars on each of the 26 atolls to detect approaching vessels and aircraft. The Maldives had only two indigenous coastal radars; Networking the Maldives’ coastal radar chain with India’s coastal radar system for transmitting a seamless radar picture to a central control room in India’s Coastal Command; Regular Dornier sorties by the Indian Coast Guard to check for suspicious vessels/movements and Yearly joint military exercise, Ekuverin, between the Maldives and India since 2009.

India views the Maldives as a strategic maritime partner in the IOR owing to its geographical location near key sea lanes of communication and trade. Furthermore, India seeks to counter China’s expansionist ambitions in the region, as China has made substantial investments in the Maldives, focusing on infrastructure and development projects under its ‘Belt and Road’ vision for energy and transport networks.

Even as China’s maritime expansionism in the IOR is seeking avenues to refresh ties with the Maldives depending upon what kind of development support it requires, China’s foreign ministry, earlier this month, said in a statement that it was keen to collaborate with the island nation in bolstering their “traditional bonds” and “mutually beneficial cooperation”.

The change in leadership in the Maldives, particularly Muizzu’s ‘India Out’ stance, is expected to strain diplomatic relations between Malé and Delhi. However, the extent and nature of these tensions will largely depend on the outcome of talks between Muizzu and India regarding the removal of Indian troops and assets from the country. India is yet to issue an official response to Muizzu’s demand, but it is widely anticipated that India will try to persuade him to reconsider his position and maintain status quo in cooperation and partnership between the two nations.

The outcome of these negotiations is likely to have far-reaching implications for regional security and stability, as well as for the broader balance of power between China and India in the Indian Ocean. Observers are closely watching how President Muizzu will navigate his relations with both nations and what impact his policies will have on the Maldives’ domestic politics and economy.

India has been increasing its investment and assistance to the Maldives in recent years, especially after the election of President Solih in 2018, who adopted a pro-India foreign policy. India has pledged to provide $1.4 billion in financial assistance to the Maldives, including budgetary support, currency swap and concessional lines of credit. India has also extended a $250-million soft loan to the Maldives—one of the main beneficiaries of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy—to help it tide over the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Some major projects India is undertaking/supporting in the Maldives:

The Greater Malé Connectivity Project (GMCP), which involves the construction of a 6.74-km-long bridge and causeway link that will connect Maldives’ capital, Malé, with the neighbouring islands of Villingli, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi. This is the largest infrastructure project by India in the Maldives, funded by a $100-million grant and a $400-million line of credit from India.

The Gulhifalhu Port Project, which aims to develop a commercial port and a transshipment facility in Gulhifalhu Island, near Malé. This project is expected to boost the Maldives’ trade and logistics sector and create employment opportunities. India has provided a $50-million line of credit for this project.

The Hulhumalé Cricket Stadium Project, which will build a world-class cricket stadium in Hulhumalé Island, with a capacity of 25,000 spectators. This project is part of India’s efforts to promote cricket as a popular sport in the Maldives and foster cultural and people-to-people ties between the two countries. India has provided a $20-million line of credit for this project.

These projects demonstrate India’s commitment to support the development and prosperity of the Maldives, as well as to enhance its strategic partnership and cooperation with the island nation.

The Maldives’ recent election has set the stage for a complex geopolitical dance in the Indian Ocean, with implications that extend well beyond the archipelago’s shores. As the world watches, the Maldives’ strategic importance and evolving foreign policy priorities will continue to be a topic of global interest and concern. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

Intelligence shared with the United States indicates that a group of Hamas operatives, over a span of two years, used a network of hardwired phones integrated into the tunnel system beneath Gaza to plan the unexpected and deadly attack on Israel, two reliable sources have revealed. This sheds light on why Israel and the US were caught off guard by the Hamas attack.

Hamas concealed the planning of the operation through traditional counter-intelligence methods, the intelligence shared by Israel with US officials reveals. This involved holding in-person planning meetings and avoiding digital communications, which could be tracked by the Israelis, in favour of using hardwired phones in the tunnels.

In the course of these two years of planning, they refrained from using computers or cell phones throughout the two-year planning period to avoid detection by the Israeli or US intelligence, the sources told a media house. The small, tightly knit cell operating within the tunnels utilized hardwired phone lines for communication and strategy development.

These phone lines within the tunnels enabled the operatives to maintain covert communication among themselves, ensuring that the Israeli intelligence authorities could not track their activities, the sources added. There was limited discussion, minimal exchange of information, and coordination beyond the immediate vicinity.

They maintained a low profile until the time came to activate and mobilize hundreds of Hamas fighters for the attack on October 7, when approximately 1,500 fighters crossed into Israel, resulting in at least 1,400 Israelis being killed. Despite receiving a series of strategic warnings from US and Israeli intelligence agencies, officials from both countries were not able to foresee the events of October 7.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commonly refers to the tunnels constructed by Hamas over the past approximately fifteen years as the ‘Gaza Metro’. These tunnels form an extensive labyrinth used for storing rockets and ammunition caches and serving as a covert means for militants to move undetected. Additionally, the IDF asserts that this network includes critical Hamas command and control centres.

Assessing the scope of the ‘Gaza Metro’ network in Israel is an extremely challenging task. This complexity arises from its presumed existence beneath a region where Gaza spans only 41 kilometres in length and 10 kilometres in width.

In the aftermath of the 2021 conflict, the IDF stated that it had obliterated over 100 kilometres of tunnels through airstrikes. In contrast, Hamas claimed that its tunnel network extended for 500 kilometres and only 5% of them were impacted. To put these numbers in perspective, the London Underground, which is mostly above ground, is approximately 400 kilometres long.

Tunnel construction in Gaza commenced before Israel withdrew its troops and settlers in 2005. However, it significantly escalated after Hamas assumed control of the Strip two years later, leading to increased security measures by Israel and Egypt, restricting the movement of goods and people in and out. After being kidnapped, Yocheved Lifshitz, an 85-year-old grandmother who was one of two hostages released by Hamas on Monday, was taken into a network of tunnels where she slept on a mattress placed on the tunnel floor.

According to sources familiar with the Hamas assault, the small, tightly knit cell held off on briefing a larger group of fighters above ground for the specific operation until just before the attack was launched. One of the sources mentioned that, even though ground unit commanders and fighters had undergone training for several months and were in a state of general preparedness, they were informed of the precise plans only in the days leading up to the operation.

“That’s how you maintain strict compartmentalization,” the sources added, emphasizing that a similar approach was employed in this situation. One of the sources mentioned that, while some of the training activities above ground were noticed, they did not raise significant concerns as it was thought to be routine training of individuals.

Iran has been assisting Hamas in refining their operational security tactics over time. However, according to a third source, US intelligence does not believe that Iran directly participated in planning the October 7 attack.

Israel is thought to have had prior knowledge that Palestinian militants had been utilizing hardwired communication systems before the October attack, but did not give it sufficient credence to prevent the October 7 attack. During an Israeli military operation, called ‘Operation Home and Garden’, in the city of Jenin in the northern West Bank this summer, Israeli troops encountered what seemed to be a comparable communication system.

They found secure, hardwired communication lines and closed-circuit surveillance cameras that provided early notice of Israeli troop movements, an Israeli official described. The IDF then announced it had targeted a joint operational command centre in Jenin employed by militant cells that was utilized for “advanced observation and reconnaissance” and acted as a focal point for coordination and communication among the terrorists. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

Israel confronts significant dangers while gearing up for an extensive ground incursion into Gaza.

A far-reaching mission by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) within the coastal territory is very likely to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and lead to more civilian casualties. It also jeopardizes the lives of Israeli soldiers, potentially swaying global and domestic opinions against Israel, while adding another battleground to the conflict.

The Israeli leaders have committed to carrying out Operation Swords of Iron to eliminate the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, which they hold responsible for a deadly attack on Israel on October 7th, resulting in the loss of 1,400 lives.

Israel’s Southern Command officer, Yaron Finkelman, has stated that the operation will be taking the conflict into the territory controlled by Hamas, intending to defeat them on their turf.

A ground operation, if initiated, might become an extended and intense conflict characterized by urban warfare, potentially leading to significant dangers for the civilian population in the Gaza Strip.

As per the statement, it’s reported by Hamas, that over 3,000 Palestinian civilians, with over 1,500 of them being children, have tragically lost their lives due to airstrikes. Furthermore, there are over one million people who have been displaced from their homes and are currently trapped in southern Gaza without any means of escape.

David Cortright, a retired professor from the University of Notre Dame’s global affairs school, has suggested that engaging in conflict in Gaza poses a substantial risk to Israel’s reputation. Instead, he recommends that they consider convening an international tribunal to hold those responsible in Hamas for attacking Israel accountable. Simultaneously, he suggests seeking a political resolution with the Palestinian people.

“It’s understandable that Israelis feel anger and a desire for retribution after the heinous terrorist attacks by Hamas. However, the ongoing blockade of Gaza is likely to result in more casualties and devastation, potentially escalating the conflict and inadvertently strengthening Hamas,” Cortright stated in an email.

“Currently, global sympathy and attention appear to be shifting from the innocent Israelis who fell victim to Hamas attacks to the children of Gaza who are suffering due to Israeli airstrikes,” he further commented. “This situation is precarious, and Israel should strive to navigate away from it.”

During the Gaza War in 2014, Israeli infantry battalions engaged in combat in a northern neighbourhood of Gaza City, resulting in the tragic loss of over 1,600 innocent people and leaving more than 10,000 wounded in just over a month. Despite the extended conflict, Israel ultimately withdrew without achieving any substantial strategic successes.

The impending military operation is poised to be even more lethal, as Israeli leaders are determined to completely eradicate Hamas. “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that ‘Every Hamas member is a dead man’ following the attack in Israel.  However, in a meeting with President Biden, he expressed Israel’s commitment to ‘minimize civilian casualties’ and pledged to ‘do everything it can to keep civilians out of harm’s way.’”

In 2014, Israel faced the loss of 66 soldiers during the conflict with Hamas. During that time, Israeli troops encountered significant challenges while fighting in urban areas, dealing with tunnels, booby traps, and facing threats from mines, ambushes, and snipers. This conflict lasted only a few weeks, and Israeli forces entered only certain parts of the territory controlled by Hamas.

In the current situation, Israel is committing to a comprehensive operation aimed at the complete destruction of Hamas. They have called up a record 360,000 reservists for duty. This larger-scale operation is expected to require more time and resources, which does carry the risk of more lives being affected. Hamas possesses an extensive underground tunnel network, which they could use to target Israeli troops.

Alp Sevimlisoy, a millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council, has suggested that Israeli forces should establish “small success parameters” on a district-by-district basis to overcome the numerous traps and obstacles within Gaza. He emphasizes that the initial stage should focus on gaining control of districts one by one, aiming to achieve at least 75 to 80 percent of geographical control. He predicts that this process could take several months.

In stage two, the objective is to ensure the complete elimination of the top leadership of Hamas, as stated by Sevimlisoy. The Israeli public is deeply angered by the loss of nearly 1,400 lives due to actions by Hamas and the abduction of approximately 200 hostages by the. group. This has led to broad support for initiatives aimed at defeating the militants in Gaza.  However, if the Israeli military were to experience significant losses in an extended conflict with no clear resolution, public sentiment could shift.

According to a survey conducted by the Israeli daily newspaper Maariv and published on Friday, 65 percent of the population is in favor of a ground invasion, while 21 percent are against it. Bilal Saab, an associate fellow specializing in the Middle East and North Africa at Chatham House, also warned that U.S. support might evolve with time.

According to Saab’s analysis, Saab believes that Israel is fully capable of destroying Hamas. However, it is important to consider the opinions of allies, threats from enemies, and the uncertain nature of public opinion at home before launching an offensive.

Israel has engaged in four wars with Hamas in the past, none of which have successfully eradicated the group. Despite this, Israeli military spokesperson Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus expressed confidence that by the end of the current conflict, Hamas will no longer possess the ability to harm Israeli civilians.

Israel has been engaged in daily confrontations with Hezbollah, a militant group in Lebanon along the northern border, following the deadly Hamas attacks. These clashes on the Lebanon-Israel border have been the most lethal in years and could have escalated into a full-scale war if not for the Israeli military’s focus on Hamas.

Amid the ongoing conflict, Hezbollah leaders have recently held meetings with Iran, which provides military support to both Hezbollah and Hamas. Iranian officials have issued repeated warnings that they may need to take action if the attacks on Gaza persist, as Tehran views Israel’s actions against the Palestinian people as a form of genocide.

According to state-run media, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has conveyed that time is running out, and those who seek to eliminate the resistance and Hamas from Gaza are mistaken.

Imad Harb, the director of research and analysis at the Arab Center in Washington, D.C., expressed skepticism about Hezbollah invading Israel during a time of economic turmoil in Lebanon. However, he also noted that such a decision would depend on Iran’s intentions and how the situation in Gaza develops.

If Hamas is defeated,” he stated, “it poses a threat to Hezbollah because Hamas would no longer exist.” The crisis in Gaza has ignited anger across the Arab world, leading to a display of solidarity with the Palestinian population in the face of an intense Israeli bombing campaign along the coastal strip.

This collective Arab frustration grew even stronger following a tragic explosion near a hospital in Gaza City this week, resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives, though U.S. officials assert that the evidence indicates a misfired rocket from Palestinian Islamic Jihad as the cause.

However, an extended military operation in Gaza carries a significant danger of generating heightened anger in the Middle East and North Africa, where longstanding sympathies lie with the Palestinian cause. This, in turn, could undermine diplomatic initiatives aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, potentially leading to further isolation of Israel in the region.

Imad Harb of the Arab Center emphasized that Israel has already eroded its political support among the Arab populace and was taking the risk of provoking a surge of anger by entering Gaza.

“It will undoubtedly result in significant casualties for both Hamas and the civilian population,” he commented. “People across the Arab world will exert pressure on their governments in response to this.” (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)

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By Girish Linganna

One of the saddest days in contemporary Israeli history happened during the Simchat Torah festival on October 7, 2023. Hamas militants launched an air, land and sea attack on the territory of the Jewish state exactly 50 years to the day after the Yom Kippur War, which had caused severe psychological agony among Israelis.

Hordes of armed Palestinians crossed the Israel-Gaza Strip border, infiltrating border towns and assaulting multiple military installations as rocket attacks began around 6.00 am. According to the most recent reports, they also managed to kill over 1,400 Israelis and take hostage over 150, including civilians and soldiers.

Israel’s military and political officials were caught off guard by Hamas’s ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’, and were caught completely off-guard, unable to repel it immediately. It was only several days after the incursion had begun that the Israeli forces reached the captured ‘Ground Zero’, Be’eri Kibbutz. West Bank, which has been the focus of countless Israeli counter-terrorism operations and the scene of ongoing terrorist attacks since 2022, also posed concerns. The political leadership was also preoccupied with internal and foreign policy issues, which were perceived as more important.

In retaliation, Israel initiated an operation known as ‘Iron Swords’. The Israeli response was more severe than usual in many respects due to the huge number of casualties that they sustained. Besides the extensive airstrikes that the Israeli Air Force executed against Gaza, all fuel, water, electricity and food supplies were cut off from reaching the territory. This exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation in that region. Over 2,000 Palestinians have perished and hundreds of thousands have been compelled to flee their homes.

Actively under discussion by the Israeli leadership is the execution of a ground operation. Preparatory measures have begun in earnest and will almost certainly result in a substantial increase in casualties for both parties. But, according to some assessments, intelligence was not able to foresee all of the risks involved in the strike.

Current Israeli leadership rhetoric and intentions are predominately motivated by the need to at least partially neutralize the perception of the country’s weakness since many estimates place the Jewish state’s deterrence capabilities and authority as one of the leading military powers in the Middle East based on a decisive display of force. To prevent grave domestic political ramifications, the leadership must convince its Israeli people of the government’s capacity to ensure their safety after the tragedy that befell the nation and shattered the comparatively comfortable sense of security.

Although almost any result is improbable to save Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political career, the success of ‘Operation Iron Swords’ is of the utmost importance to him. Everything that transpired on October 7 inflicted a severe blow to his image. The incumbent Prime Minister, who has governed for over 16 years, the longest among all leaders in Israeli history, built his reputation on his unparalleled capacity to safeguard the security of the state of Israel. What transpired during Simchat Torah obliterated it. This is a setback for the ruling Cabinet, the most Right-wing in Israeli history, which failed in its responsibility to defend the state’s national interests with greater rigour than others. Moreover, the coalition’s judicial reforms initiative exacerbated societal divisions and disrupted Israel’s domestic political climate.

Some critics compared the October 7 attack to the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Israel was caught off-guard by a coordinated assault from Egypt and Syria. Prime Minister Netanyahu was accused of being responsible for the security and intelligence failure that allowed Hamas to launch a surprise attack on Israel on Simchat Torah.

Simchat Torah is a Jewish holiday that celebrates the completion and the beginning of the annual cycle of reading the Torah, the first five books of the Hebrew Bible. It is observed on the last day of Sukkot, which is a festival of booths that lasts seven days.

On Simchat Torah, Jews rejoice with the Torah scrolls in the synagogue, dancing and singing with them in seven circuits, called ‘hakafot’. They also read the last portion of Deuteronomy and the first portion of Genesis, to show that the Torah is never-ending and always new. Simchat Torah is a time of joy, gratitude and renewal for the Jewish people and their sacred text.

However, despite the ongoing Israeli internal political crisis, military intervention will inevitably result in a temporary unification of Israeli society and the political elite. Benny Gantz—the former Minister for Defence and leader of one of the Opposition parties, the Blue and White—was included in the national emergency government unity and the war cabinet.

One option is to conduct a ground operation, but this may not be the best way to address the existing problems and may even cause new ones to arise. Because of the attack on October 7, Israel will have to drastically change how it deals with Gaza groups and the Gaza Strip, itself. As a result, the present conflict may have unexpectedly large ramifications on the future course of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the coming years.

It is unlikely that the fighting in Gaza will end this long conflict. However, it has already proven to be one of the most troubling for the Israeli government, reviving Holocaust concerns among Jews and shaking up the feeling of security in the country. Israel’s prior strategy towards Hamas in Gaza—which was a mixture of military containment and maintaining the movement as the civilian authority of the strip—was re-evaluated in the light of the suddenness of the attack and the massive toll it took on life. The attack created the impression that Israel was helpless, prompting a more robust response than normal and the serious consideration of a high-risk ground operation.

The Israeli leadership will inevitably have to respond to the questions that arose from the Hamas operation, regardless of the course of action taken after the hostilities end. The catastrophe has profoundly affected the security situation, further undermining confidence in the ruling coalition. Despite the current challenging circumstances, the long-term viability of the Israeli people and its state remains unquestioned, as Israeli society has historically exhibited unity amid intensifying external challenges. (IPA Service)

The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.

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By Girish Linganna

Hezbollah, The Lebanese Movement, has issued a warning, expressing full readiness to engage in combat against Israel. This follows days of exchange of fire between their fighters and Israeli soldiers along the border. Both sides have been involved in shelling and trading rocket fire across their borders since the Palestinian armed faction, Hamas, initiated an attack on Israel on October 7, resulting in nearly 1,400 casualties.

Israel’s military, meanwhile, has been evacuating 28 communities near its northern border with Lebanon because of rising hostilities with Hezbollah militants, according to the BBC. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has also deployed tens of thousands of additional soldiers along its border with Lebanon.

On Sunday, intense fighting broke out in several locations along the Israel-Lebanon frontier as the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) personnel and Hezbollah exchanged fire. The first Israeli civilian death in the current round of violence also occurred from a Hezbollah strike when a man in his 40s died in an anti-tank missile fire in the border village of Shtula. An Israeli soldier also died in a missile attack on an army post.

Last Monday, three Israeli soldiers died in an exchange of fire between Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants who had crossed over the border from Lebanon, adds BBC. On the same day, at least three Hezbollah militants were eliminated in an IDF attack on sites in Lebanon in retaliation to mortar fire.

As violence intensifies, there are concerns among observers that Hezbollah may initiate a new front against Israel, likely on the urging of its leaders and their Iranian supporters. While such a scenario could alleviate the pressure on Hamas and the suffering of civilians in Gaza, it would have severe consequences for Lebanon and come at a significant cost to Israel, analysts speaking to Al-Jazeera have said.

The year 2006 saw Hezbollah’s seizure of two Israeli soldiers along its border, igniting a large-scale military retaliation by Israel. This conflict extended over 34 days, resulting in casualties of over 1,100 Lebanese civilians and 165 Israelis. While the outcome of the war remained inconclusive, the civilian population of Lebanon bore the brunt of the suffering. The conflict led to the destruction of, or damage to, approximately 30,000 homes, 109 bridges and 78 medical facilities, as reported by the International Committee for the Red Cross.

Nicholas Blanford, an authority on Hezbollah associated with the Atlantic Council, a Washington, DC-based think tank, had estimated Hezbollah’s strength at 3,000-5,000 fighters and short-range missiles within its arsenal to target Israel. In the subsequent 17 years, Hezbollah has made significant strides in enhancing its military capabilities. According to Blanford, Hezbollah, at present, has the capability to cause much more harm to Israel than at any point since its inception in 1948.”

Blanford’s evaluation suggests that Hezbollah’s forces have expanded to encompass around 60,000 fighters, comprising both full-time members and reservists. Additionally, the group has acquired long-range rockets that could strike deep into Israeli territory, besides substantially increasing its missile stockpile, growing from 14,000 in 2006 to approximately 150,000 today.

Although the majority of these missiles are short-range, Hezbollah has also acquired Iranian precision-guided missiles with a range of 300 kilometres (186 miles). Notably, Hezbollah maintains a highly trained ‘special forces’ unit poised for potential infiltration into Israel during times of conflict. Blanford emphasised that Israeli officials have increasingly regarded Hezbollah as their primary security concern in recent years.

According to Randa Slim, who serves as director of the Conflict and Resolutions Program at the Middle East Institute, the Syrian conflict—where Hezbollah actively supported President Bashar al-Assad—provided the group with an opportunity to enhance its combat capabilities. The extended duration of the war allowed Hezbollah to acquire new skills, particularly in the domains of urban warfare and intelligence operations. Slim noted that Hezbollah’s intelligence systems saw significant improvements during its involvement in the Syrian conflict, contributing to the group’s overall combat proficiency.

Although sporadic border clashes between Israel and Hezbollah have been relatively common, Slim suggests that there is an increased risk of a major escalation at present. She points out that Hezbollah and Iran may consider opening a second front against Israel depending on the severity of the situation in Gaza. If Hamas faces the imminent threat of being eliminated, Hezbollah could become more actively involved.

Slim highlights that Iran has unified various entities into its ‘resistance axis’, forming a more cohesive and coordinated force. Hezbollah has discussed this concept, often referred to as the unification of fronts, which resembles Article 5 of NATO in the sense that an attack on one is seen as an attack on all. This represents a significant shift from the past. The increased coordination among Iran and its allied groups, along with Hezbollah’s potential to engage on multiple fronts, has heightened concerns about the likelihood of a larger conflict with Israel.

However, despite the inherent risks, Blanford suggests that Iran and Hezbollah are likely to exercise restraint. He points out that Hezbollah serves as a significant deterrent against any potential Israeli or US intentions to attack Iran. In the event of a war in Lebanon, Hezbollah would likely sustain considerable damage and Iran would lose an essential means of deterrence. However, he acknowledges that the possibility of war cannot be entirely ruled out. Iran could still activate its proxies against Israel if it deems it the most opportune time to launch an attack.

The United States is aware of these risks and has deployed two aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean, partly as a deterrent against Iranian-backed groups that might target Israel. Blanford also suggests that Israel could have its own plans, potentially capitalizing on US diplomatic efforts and military positioning to launch an initial strike against Hezbollah.

Slim highlights that Hezbollah has the capacity to ‘inflict a terrible cost on Israel’, although it remains outmatched. She suggests that the group could sustain an assault on Israel, damaging critical infrastructure, such as the Ben-Gurion airport and major electricity grids. However, Israel, with its superior military strength, could ultimately reduce most of Lebanon to rubble.

The situation in Syria, where Hezbollah was engaged in a different kind of war against various militias funded by some Arab governments, pales in comparison to confronting the powerful Israeli military. In a broader conflict, Israel is likely to employ what it terms the ‘Dahiya Doctrine’, named after a civilian neighbourhood and a Hezbollah stronghold in south Beirut. This doctrine dictates the use of disproportionate force targeting both civilian and military infrastructure.

Imad Salamey, an associate professor of political science and international affairs at the Lebanese American University, has cautioned that a war against Hezbollah could potentially lead to civil strife in Lebanon, which is already grappling with economic and political crises. He noted that the migration of mostly Shia Lebanese citizens to predominantly Christian and Sunni cities in the north could ignite sectarian tensions. This viewpoint is shared by other observers.

Critics and opponents of Hezbollah might also explicitly accuse the group, along with its perceived supporters, of contributing to involving the already troubled country in a war. Imad Salamey stated, “If (a war) happens, it won’t be like 2006. Domestic fighting and resistance will break out between communities.” (IPA Service)

The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.

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By Girish Linganna

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is really hopeful about the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which he introduced at the G20 summit in New Delhi recently. However, some people think that not all countries in this project see it as something against China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Building a smooth transportation route connecting India to southern Europe through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel would increase India’s influence and provide another option to the challenging “International North-South Transport Corridor” that goes through Iran and Russia but has faced difficulties in development.

Unlike the previous effort, the IMEC wants to create a new path that connects Israel and the eastern Mediterranean closer to India. Carice Witte, who leads the SIGNAL Group, an Israeli think tank that studies China, explained that just two decades ago, this region was thought to end at the Gulf of Aden, where the Indian Ocean meets the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia and the UAE see IMEC as a way to reach a growing and profitable Indian market. They want to reduce their dependence on oil and find new ways to make money.

In a world where multiple countries have influence, this shows that nations are building different kinds of relationships. This is what Guy Burton, a professor who studies international relations and has written about China and conflicts in the Middle East, is talking about. I don’t believe the notion that it will be against China is widely accepted in the Gulf. Even though US President Joe Biden expressed strong support for the IMEC at the recent G20 summit, it was actually India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE who were the most determined to get the agreement signed, not Washington.

Riyadh, especially, views this new corridor as a means to transform its role on the global stage. Instead of mainly exporting oil, Saudi Arabia aims to become a major center for tourism, investment, and logistics. This perspective comes from Aziz al-Ghashian, who is a Saudi political analyst and foreign policy expert. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, countries that primarily sell fossil fuels, are particularly enthusiastic about the new corridor because it aligns with their plans to make their economies more varied. So, it seems like a logical move for them.

The IMEC isn’t only about trading goods. It also focuses on making supply chains work together better. The goal is to encourage both government and business collaborations in countries along the route to create things together. They also plan to have power cables and pipes next to the proposed ports, railways, and roads. These would carry renewable electricity and green hydrogen from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to India and the European Union. Green hydrogen is considered a more eco-friendly substitute for natural gas, and it’s generated by large solar projects in these sunny countries.

They’ve also suggested building a really long fibre-optic network that would make the internet connection better between the areas in this project. During an event at the G20 summit this month, Indian Prime Minister Modi praised the new agreement, saying it lays the foundation for future generations to have even bigger dreams. Shortly after that, he had a private meeting in Delhi with Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During their discussion, they decided to speed up the process of bringing $100 billion in Saudi investments into India. This investment plan was first made in 2019 but got delayed due to the pandemic.

Around $55 billion of this money is planned to be used for building a massive new refinery and petrochemicals complex on the west coast of India. They also intend to create a strategic oil reserve in India in partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.A group of companies from the UAE, which includes DP World, a company that manages ports and free zones, has already started working on building a logistics and distribution network worth $7 billion for a planned food corridor between India and the Middle East.

Trade between India and the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, has seen a significant increase. In the financial year 2021-22, it reached $154.7 billion, which is a 77 percent increase compared to the previous year. During the same period, China engaged in trade worth approximately US$180 billion with the region in both directions.

A clear geopolitical obstacle to the implementation of IMEC is the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. While the two nations do not share a land border, they are set to be linked through a proposed railway funded by Saudi Arabia, spanning across Jordan. Jordan, which established a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and maintains a strong alliance with Riyadh, plays a pivotal role in this connection.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his enthusiasm for IMEC, describing it as a significant cooperation initiative that marks a new era of regional and global integration and collaboration, unlike anything seen before in terms of its size and significance.

Despite not having official relations, the plan can still move forward because, as Israeli analyst Witte pointed out, Israel and Saudi Arabia have been doing business quietly for years without formal normalization. The IMEC can also be accomplished in the present situation, and it doesn’t push for normalization or demand it.

According to Saudi analyst al-Ghashian, the economic corridor doesn’t necessarily mean an immediate normalization of relations between Jerusalem and Riyadh, which is currently being discussed in three-way negotiations with the US. Instead, it could make the process of normalization smoother when it eventually occurs in the future.

When dealing with a project of this magnitude, extensive scope, and intricacy, it demands a continuous and unwavering commitment from political leaders, as emphasized by Carice Witte, Executive Director of SIGNAL Group. It’s not only the tense relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia that has the potential to weaken the project.

According to Witte, the diverse objectives and viewpoints of each nation will contribute to the difficulty. Given the immense scale, wide scope, and intricate nature of the project, a persistent and robust political determination is essential.

She emphasized that it’s crucial for Israel that the IMEC extends collaboration with India beyond the realm of strong defence ties and ventures into the realm of multilateral connectivity among middle-power nations. This expansion would create various prospects in terms of business, investments, and trade. Israeli companies have already made significant contributions by providing technologies to enhance crop productivity in the water-scarce regions of the vast South Asian nation.

For President Biden, the IMEC forms a crucial component of his Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment, which is commonly viewed as Washington’s response to China’s extensive Belt and Road Initiative, aimed at expanding global trade through infrastructure development.

International relations expert Burton suggested that labelling the new corridor as a geopolitical response to Beijing is likely a viewpoint more aligned with the perspectives of the US and New Delhi, rather than the Middle Eastern countries involved.

During the IMEC memorandum signing ceremony, the US president displayed a notable degree of cordiality towards Saudi’s Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. This marked a sharp departure from the tensions that had persisted among the three nations in recent times.

Their disagreements have covered a wide spectrum, including questions about the extent of Washington’s dedication to defending the Gulf monarchies against Iran and its regional allies, the robust strategic economic ties Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have cultivated with China, and Saudi Arabia’s refusal to abandon an OPEC-plus oil production agreement with Russia amid the conflict in Ukraine.

Diplomatically, the situation took a negative turn in the early stages when Biden, during his 2020 presidential campaign, urged for Saudi Arabia to be treated as an “outcast” due to the 2018 killing and dismemberment of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Crown Prince Salman has consistently denied any connection to the incident, and the security agents convicted by Saudi courts for the murder of Khashoggi are currently serving prison sentences.

According to Saudi analyst al-Ghashian, the IMEC memorandum “indicates a positive shift in personal relations between the two leaders, but I wouldn’t characterize the situation as fully resolved.”Both the Saudis and Americans have come to the realization that they will prioritize the areas where they share agreement and strong mutual interests, rather than allowing the conflict in Russia or the personal tensions between their leaders to be the deciding factors in their relationship, he explained.

According to al-Ghashian, the United States also has its goals, but it recognizes that it cannot fulfill many aspects of its regional vision without the support of Saudi Arabia, considering the kingdom’s substantial size and political influence. India also seeks to be a part of this equation. Over the past decade, as China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, India has faced challenges in establishing alternative trade routes to Europe. This effort aims to prevent dependence on a network of Chinese-controlled ports established in nearby South Asian nations and the Middle East.

As of the conclusion of 2021, the Middle East and North Africa had received over $123 billion in investments from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The progress of Delhi’s envisioned International North-South Transport Corridor, which aims to link India to Europe through Iran’s Chabahar Gulf port, landlocked Central Asia, and Russia, has faced significant obstacles due to Western economic sanctions against Tehran and the conflict in Ukraine.

Regarding the IMEC, there is currently uncertainty about which private companies will participate, the nature of the projects they will be tasked with, and the framework of the public-private partnerships that will need to be established. Many aspects in that regard remain uncertain,” mentioned Burton, the author who also serves as an adjunct professor of international relations at the Brussels School of Governance. Even though a two-month working group has been established to address some of these issues, he believes it will be difficult because the success of this initiative heavily depends on private capital.

According to Burton, companies interested in participating will have to assess both the potential risks and profits before making a decision. This approach differs significantly from the geopolitical considerations made by their respective governments. He added that relying on a private sector-led approach may face challenges, not only financially but also from a geopolitical perspective. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru)

The post The Proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor Is Yet A Concept first appeared on Latest India news, analysis and reports on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

Xi Jinping’s absence from the recent Group of 20 summit may have been a deliberate move to prevent India from taking the spotlight. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, along with the United States and Europe, managed to find more effective ways to challenge China’s influence on the global stage as the G-20 Summit concluded on September 10 in New Delhi.

Other G-20 nations praised India’s achievement in reaching a consensus on a joint communique, which was uncertain until a few days before the major annual diplomatic event convened by world leaders. In addition to resolving the challenging matter of Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, they also granted full G-20 membership to the African Union and addressed crucial issues such as climate change and debt sustainability, which are of significant concern to emerging markets.

Ukraine expressed dissatisfaction with the ultimate result, as they perceived the compromise on language regarding the war as less robust than what leaders had achieved in Bali, Indonesia, just ten months prior. However, for the United States and its allies, facing criticism for a communique that, in substance, resembled the one from Bali and had limited real-world impact was a minor trade-off. They viewed it as a worthwhile concession to Prime Minister Modi, strengthening India’s standing as an ascending power capable of countering China’s global influence.

President Joe Biden took the lead, seeing in India his administration’s best hope of isolating China and Russia while reinforcing the United States-led world order. This outcome underscores that Washington is progressively becoming more attuned to the concerns of the so-called Global South, with India serving as its primary guide.

Milan Vaishnav, who heads the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, mentioned that some analysts see the softened stance on Russia-Ukraine as a Western concession. However, there’s an alternate perspective: Western nations were also determined to ensure India’s success. Failing to reach an agreement would have been a significant letdown for India, especially Prime Minister Narendra Modi who staked everything on the success of this summit before the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.

If we had to pick a moment that truly showcased the dynamics of the summit, it would be Biden’s meeting on Saturday, where he discussed the White House-led initiatives aimed at providing additional funding to developing countries.

In a photo op, President Biden, alongside World Bank President Ajay Banga (the first Indian American in this role), was seen with Prime Minister Modi, Brazil’s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa. These leaders are vital members of the BRICS group, excluding China and Russia. This bloc recently expanded, presenting a challenge to the advanced economies of the Group of Seven (G7).

Earlier in the day, US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer indirectly criticized China by describing these countries as “the three democratic members of the BRICS.” He emphasized that these nations, along with the US, were dedicated to the success of the G-20. Finer added that if China didn’t share this commitment, it would be regrettable for all parties involved, but even more so for China.

The United States didn’t stop at that point. They also revealed a separate agreement with India, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and additional Middle Eastern nations to establish an extensive rail and maritime network in the region. President Biden praised this as a “transformative regional investment” and sealed the deal with a three-way handshake involving Modi and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, whom the US president had previously portrayed as an outcast before the last election.

Such a declaration is undoubtedly more appealing to Middle East stakeholders compared to pressing concerns about human rights, even though the project’s specifics, such as the timeline and funding, remain uncertain. While the US denied any intention to counter China’s increasing influence in the Gulf, a French official admitted that it was crafted to offer an alternative to Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, a development they saw as a positive competition.

Xi’s decision to skip the G-20 summit, which was the first time since he assumed the presidency in 2013, marked a noticeable change in his behaviour. Last November, he portrayed himself as a statesman striving for good relations with other countries. China’s negotiators also risked coming across as overly critical by trying to hinder India’s progress, even raising minor issues like Modi’s use of a Sanskrit phrase and the US’s bid to host the G-20 gathering in 2026. The Global Times, a newspaper affiliated with the Communist Party, labelled the US as a mere imitator for its Middle East infrastructure plan.

Before the summit began, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak accused China of obstructing the advancement of a joint statement. During private discussions, Beijing introduced the topic of semiconductor access in the context of climate action, according to sources familiar with the talks. This led National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, a proponent of US export controls on semiconductor-related technology to China, to criticize the notion of using climate-related matters as leverage for unrelated issues.

Premier Li Qiang, acting on behalf of China while Xi was absent, conveyed to leaders that the G-20 should prioritize unity over division and cooperation over confrontation, as reported by the official Xinhua News Agency. This statement came after a commentary from a Chinese think tank associated with the nation’s top intelligence agency, which had criticized India for disrupting the cooperative atmosphere at the G-20 by pursuing its own agenda.

However, China eventually gave in on its resistance to the communique, and India received commendation from various quarters for facilitating a compromise. Sources familiar with the discussions revealed that the breakthrough happened when India, along with Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa, collectively presented a proposal for the wording concerning the war.

“The fact that this consensus was reached highlights India’s established position as a reliable mediator in a world marked by deep divisions over geopolitical matters such as the Ukraine conflict,” remarked Swasti Rao to a media , who is an associate fellow at the Europe and Eurasia Center at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. “It’s clear that middle-ranking powers aim to maintain a multipolar global economic order rather than getting caught up in China’s efforts to dominate it.”

Although the ultimate wording on Ukraine may have made some US allies uneasy, endorsing the compromise represented a significant chance to strengthen alignment with major democracies in the Global South. These democracies play a crucial role as pivotal nations when it comes to addressing Russia’s conflict and other global concerns. G-7 leaders openly commended the result, with Sunak emphasizing that the adopted language was “highly robust” and that “Russia finds itself entirely isolated.”

For the United States, any action that strengthens India and empowers other democracies in the Global South serves as a means to counter the influence of China and Russia, especially concerning the G-20’s goal of achieving a “comprehensive, equitable, and enduring peace” in Ukraine. Going back to May during the G-7 summit in Japan, the US and its allies faced challenges in persuading leaders like Modi, Lula, and Indonesia’s Joko Widodo to align with their stance on Ukraine, even with President Volodymyr Zelensky making an unexpected appearance. It’s worth noting that Zelensky was not invited to address India’s G-20 summit.

A high-ranking European Union representative stated that this agreement essentially rescued the G-20, as it remains the primary global platform for uniting major world powers. Furthermore, the official pointed out that it played a crucial role in narrowing the divide between the G-7 and emerging markets. This means that emerging markets are now partners in holding Russia accountable if it fails to uphold the pursuit of an equitable peace in line with UN principles.

According to other prominent European officials, China made a strategic mistake by abstaining from the summit. This decision ultimately enabled India to solidify its leadership role within the Global South and created a clear opportunity for the United States and Europe to enhance their relationships with emerging markets.

Even Russia, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attending in place of Vladimir Putin, regarded the agreement as a victory. Moscow expressed satisfaction with the role of BRICS democracies as intermediaries with the G-7, as reported by someone familiar with the situation. This emphasized China’s position as an external observer rather than an active participant.

The United States, of course, still faces the possibility of encountering challenges in its efforts to strengthen its appeal to the Global South. Before the G-20 summit, President Biden did not attend a summit hosted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia, which seemed like a snub to President Widodo. However, President Biden attempted to mitigate any negative impact during his visit to Delhi, where he briefly met with the Indonesian leader and committed to a future meeting at the White House in November, coinciding with the APEC summit when world leaders gather in the United States.

More importantly, India seized the opportunity to assert its global leadership position. Prime Minister Modi stated that a historic moment had been achieved, and his chief negotiator, Amitabh Kant, referred to India as the representative of the entire Global South.

Above all, the summit’s outcome has amplified the influence of the Global South,” Kant remarked. “It has also showcased India’s substantial capability to unite the world and take a leadership role in both developmental and geopolitical matters.” (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst based in Bengaluru)

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By Girish Linganna

The 19-ton statue of the revered Hindu god Shiva, standing as a symbol of India’s determination to influence the global order, will undoubtedly catch the attention of world leaders attending the Group of 20  Summit  in  New Delhi on September 9 and 10..

The Nataraja dancing figure, an impressive 28-foot (8.5 meters) tall sculpture crafted from precious metals like gold, silver, and iron, serves as a fitting symbol for Narendra Modi, the host of the summit. In 2014, Modi marked his ascent to power with a prayer ceremony along the Ganges River at a temple devoted to Lord Shiva, the deity associated with destruction, creation, and transformation.

More than  nine  years   later, Modi has transformed and taken control of India’s political scene. Now, he aims to make India a significant player on the global stage. His plan envisions India as a central player between the United States and China, not tied to either, and able to focus on its own goals of growing its economy and expanding its global influence.

Some of the people familiar with Modi’s strategy describe India as being opportunistic, seeking opportunities amid the growing rivalry between the United States and China, as well as Russia’s conflict in Ukraine. India has chosen not to criticize the war or participate in global sanctions against Russia. Instead, it has been acquiring Russian oil and weaponry while simultaneously working to enhance its military connections with the United States. India is also straddling two groups: it’s a part of the US-supported Quad security alliance with Japan and Australia, and it’s also a member of the BRICS bloc, which includes China and Russia.

India’s top diplomat, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, has characterized the nation’s foreign policy as a balancing act, where they aim to manage multiple aspects simultaneously while ensuring they don’t mishandle any of them.

In a 2019 lecture, he explained that to those unfamiliar or stuck in the past, the pursuit of seemingly conflicting strategies and goals might be perplexing. Instead, consider it not just as basic math but as advanced calculus.

Whatever the strategy may be, it appears to be largely effective for Modi’s government. India finds itself in a favourable geopolitical position, with the United States and its partners highlighting India as a crucial counterbalance to China. Tech giants like Apple Inc. are shifting their operations to India as they seek to diversify beyond China and tap into the expanding middle class in the world’s most populous country. Additionally, emerging powers in the Global South view India as a valuable ally for securing increased funding from wealthy nations on matters like climate change, all while avoiding taking a firm stance on Vladimir Putin’s conflict in Ukraine.

Over the past nine months, Modi has extended invitations to Russian investors to engage in India’s steel sector while also enjoying diplomatic engagements at both the White House and Emmanuel Macron’s Élysée Palace in Paris. President Joe Biden emphasized the strong partnership between India and the United States, describing them as among the world’s closest allies. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin, despite not attending the G-20 summit due to the ongoing war, emphasized a “specially privileged strategic partnership” with India.

According to Milan Vaishnav, director and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s South Asia Program said to Bloomberg, India has effectively managed the delicate balancing act of multi-alignment. This capability is influenced by significant geopolitical dynamics, particularly the ascent of China and the diminishing influence of Russia.

However, Indian officials, preferring to remain anonymous when discussing confidential discussions, admit to the fragility of what they refer to as “multi-alignment.” Even though India is seen as a pivotal player in global geopolitics, maintaining that position is becoming challenging, especially if faced with a genuine crisis such as a military conflict in Taiwan, which could render it extremely difficult to sustain.

The delicate balancing act becomes particularly evident at this week’s G-20 summit due to the notable absence of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi has been endeavoring to court the same group of emerging market economies in a bid to diminish US influence on a global scale.

Tensions in diplomatic relations reached a critical point last month during the BRICS summit in South Africa. India opposed proposals to enlarge the group to 11 members due to concerns that it might transform into a pro-China alliance. However, more nations sided with Xi, compelling Modi to concede and permit the inclusion of new members, including Iran, despite facing various sanctions supported by the United States.

Sushant Singh, a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, expressed to Bloomberg,  that India’s involvement in BRICS was initially intended to restrain Russia and China from turning it into an anti-G-7 group. However, New Delhi did not fulfill this role effectively. This is likely to diminish India’s influence as a power capable of countering China in different geopolitical considerations.

China’s resistance to crucial elements of the G-20 communique, such as the inclusion of Sanskrit phrases, stipulations concerning emerging market debt, and the portrayal of Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, poses a risk of Modi becoming the first leader to be unable to secure a consensus since the group’s establishment in 1999.

A senior Russian official suggests that the BRICS expansion offers a glimmer of hope for Moscow, anticipating greater support or at least reduced resistance at the G-20 summit. However, this potential development would not bode well for Ukraine or its allies, amplifying their frustration with India’s neutral position regarding Russia’s invasion.

According to officials within the 27-member European Union, the absence of a communique at the G-20 wouldn’t necessarily be undesirable. Officials from France and Germany emphasized that supporting India in hosting a successful G-20 is in their best interests due to India’s crucial role as a strategic partner, especially in the domains of technology and trade.

Germany, France, and Spain are collaborating with Indian shipyards to create submarines featuring an air independent propulsion system. This technology enables diesel-electric submarines to remain submerged for extended durations compared to traditional submarines. Furthermore, the European Union has established a Trade and Technology Council with India, a partnership unique to India apart from the United States, aimed at enhancing cooperation.

In economic discussions, there seems to be a disconnect. EU officials have gathered the impression that India views the bloc as a progressively less significant aging society, despite the fact that it constitutes the world’s largest single market. This perception has been reported by two individuals familiar with the discussions.

Nonetheless, the United States and its allies, including Japan, France, and Germany, have adopted a forward-looking perspective in their engagement with India, as stated by an anonymous senior official due to the sensitivity of the issue. The official emphasized that India is the sole nation in the Indo-Pacific region possessing both the economic and military capacity, along with the determination, to counter China’s growing assertiveness.

Modi has previously implemented robust measures concerning China, including app bans, tightening investment regulations, and rejecting Xi’s major global infrastructure endeavour, the Belt and Road Initiative. India’s effort to advocate for the inclusion of the African Union in the G-20, supported by the European Union, is another move aimed at countering China’s influence in the developing world. Simultaneously, it bolsters Modi’s self-proclaimed position as a leader of the Global South.

The United States has aimed to enhance economic connections with India, focusing on clean energy and defense. A notable development is the collaboration between India’s state-owned enterprise, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, and General Electric Co., to co-produce jet engines. This partnership grants India entry into an exclusive group as General Electric progressively shares technology with its Indian counterpart, based in Boston.

According to Swasti Rao, a senior fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, a research group supported by the Defence Ministry in New Delhi, l told Bloomberg,  the current world order is marked by ambiguity. India is adopting a cautious stance until a clear victor emerges from the ongoing geopolitical changes. While multi-alignment might seem self-serving, Rao believes that India is making the most of the uncertainties to prioritize its national interests, a perspective that is recognized by the global community.

Sudden developments like the worsening situation in the Ukraine conflict or escalating tensions around Taiwan could increasingly challenge India’s position of neutrality. Its geographic proximity to critical chokepoints like the Malacca Strait and its extensive border with China along the Himalayas are strategic advantages that partners like the United States and other countries might seek to leverage in a wider conflict.

Currently, Modi will stress the theme of unity with the slogan “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam,” which translates to “One Earth, One Family, One Future.” However, this Sanskrit-inspired motto has generated discord, not only among certain G-20 members but also among his political adversaries in India, especially in light of the upcoming national election next year, which Modi’s party is anticipated to win once more.

Aside from the typical preparations like fresh paint and newly planted shrubs that accompany a summit, the capital is adorned with posters and billboards prominently featuring Modi’s image. The use of Sanskrit, the presence of the Shiva statue, and the lotus flower G-20 logo, which is also the symbol of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, all suggest the summit’s integration into the nationalist Hindu agenda of his government. To emphasize this, Modi replaced “India” with the ancient Sanskrit term “Bharat” on the summit’s dinner invitations.

In the lead-up to the summit, a surge in religious violence, among the most severe in years, has drawn attention to allegations of increasing human rights violations under Modi’s leadership, particularly against religious minorities like Muslims within the Hindu-majority population. Modi has largely downplayed these concerns, remarking during his visit to the United States earlier this year that he was “quite taken aback” to hear India’s commitment to democracy being questioned.

Regardless, India appears to be less preoccupied with criticism from other nations nowadays, whether it pertains to domestic challenges or the intricate geopolitical matters involving the United States, China, Russia, and other global powers.

India’s Foreign Minister, Jaishankar, stated in an interview with local broadcaster NDTV last week, “We are a nation of 1.4 billion people, and we are the fifth-largest economy. When you take a firm and confident stance, people acknowledge it. However, if you are indecisive or hesitant, the world may corner you.” (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst based in Bengaluru)

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By Girish Linganna

Home to around 520,000 people and famous for its sun-kissed atolls, the Maldives is said to be dizzyingly beautiful with underwater marine life that has complex kingdoms of corals scattered across its thousand-odd isles. The tourism website of this archipelagic country in South Asia proudly announces: ‘Swim with Whale Sharks During Your Local Island Stay…’ And swimming with sharks is what India seems to be doing at the moment.

Both Asian giants, China and India, have sunk in millions of dollars in building infrastructure in this archipelago as they seek to spread their sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean region. And the weekend presidential election in the Maldives (on September 9) could be a decisive factor in determining who wins the race for superiority in this far-flung region.

Around 280,000 eligible voters will exercise their franchise over the weekend in this island nation. The winner will be the candidate who secures more than 50 per cent of the votes. If no candidate can reach the halfway mark, a second round of polling between the top two contenders will be held within 21 days.

Incumbent president Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, who professes close ties with the country’s ‘Big Brother’ with an ‘India-first’ policy, seems to have a slight edge in the hustings. The results of the poll will have marked implications for Maldives’ foreign policy. But the competition is intense with seven other challengers lined up for the top post. President Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) stormed to power after defeating then-incumbent president Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom of the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) in the September 2018 poll.

Yameen, Maldives’ second president to be democratically elected, won the 2013 presidential election by defeating then-incumbent president Mohamed Nasheed and leader of the MDP. But, with his tenure as president marred by several controversies, such as putting key Opposition figures and Supreme Court judges behind bars, gagging the media that hurled corruption allegations and a Parliament lockdown after a no-trust vote, Yameen, in 2019, was slapped with a five-year prison term following corruption and money-laundering charges. He was released in November 2021 after a top court overturned the verdict. As recently as on August 6, in a significant development, the Maldives Supreme Court announced that Yameen would be barred from contesting the presidential election this time around.

In contrast to Solih’s ‘India-first’ policy, his main rival, Mohamed Muizzu of the People’s National Congress (PNC) has a record of being China-friendly and is known for scripting an ‘India-out’ campaign. India had begun the process of bringing the island nation within the ambit of India’s security grid as early as in 2009, when the moderate Islamic nation knocked on New Delhi’s doors fearing a takeover of one of its island resorts by terrorists since it lacked ample military strength and surveillance capabilities. The Southern Naval Command is tasked to oversee the Maldives’ inclusion into the Indian security grid.

During his tenure, Yameen, backed by his considerable number of supporters, tried to fan anti-India sentiments, which only became more pronounced once he had left office. The bones of contention: The presence of two Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters (ALF) that India gave Maldives in 2010 and in 2015, used for maritime weather surveillance, ocean search-and-rescue operations and for airlifting patients to and from the islands. A more-pervasive complaint by the Opposition party, the PPM, that bilateral agreements had been signed between India and the Maldives during Solih’s rule, which, ostensibly, “lacked transparency”.

The coalition that backs Muizzu says that India’s overarching influence over the island nation’s security apparatus poses a threat to its sovereignty and that India has sinister designs of setting up a permanent military presence in the archipelago. India is helping the Maldives military to build a naval harbour and has offered it training by the Indian armed forces.

India has also signed an agreement with the Maldives, which includes the following: A permanent Indian base of two helicopters in the country to enhance its surveillance capabilities. Setting up of radars on all 26 atolls to scan for approaching vessels and aircraft. The Maldives has only two coastal radars of its own. The Maldives’ coastal radar chain to be networked with Indian coastal radar system so that a central control room in India’s Coastal Command is able to get a seamless radar picture. Regular Dornier sorties by the Indian Coast Guard to check out for suspicious vessels or movements. Maldives military teams to visit the tri-Services’ Andaman Nicobar Command to study India’s surveillance and security of the critical island chain. Annual joint military exercise, Ekuverin, held every year since 2009 between India and Maldives.

The 2018 Maldivian election was widely seen as a thumbs-up for India and a thumbs-down for China. Yameen had faced accusations of cosying up to China after numerous maritime and free trade agreements were signed. After 2012, Chinese investment in the Maldives had surged with many mega-projects, running up huge Chinese debts. India’s historically friendly relationship with the Maldives spanning more than six decades, was, naturally, strained and geopolitical commentators went so far as to say that Yameen was literally “handing over the Maldives to China”.

China, over the recent years, has invested considerably in Maldives’ infrastructure projects, cementing its ties in line with its ‘Belt and Road’ vision for transport and energy networks. China’s platter of offerings for the Maldives should be seen through the lens of support for the latter’s development aspirations. China’s maritime expansionism in the Indian Ocean region is still looking to renew ties with the Maldives depending on the kind of development cooperation it needs.

Concerns abound that the Maldives will abandon its previously India-friendly stance in the event of a negative poll outcome for Solih, and especially so if the Yameen-led PPM were to win. This last scenario could result in significant turnaround in the island nation’s relationships with India and China—and Indo-Pacific partnerships in the larger context. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst based in Bengaluru)

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By Girish Linganna

Bhutan, in the Himalayas, is nestled in a strategically sensitive geographical position between two Asian superpowers, India and China. Over the years, Delhi has been offering Thimphu hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid, not without its own geopolitical compulsions. Both India and Bhutan are yet to resolve their long-standing land border dispute with China, which has been pressuring Bhutan to reach a border deal over territory in the north and in the west in the Himalayas. A likely settlement will also need the implicit approval of Bhutan’s long-time ally, India.

At the end of the 13th Expert Group Meeting (EGM)—which supervises the progress of boundary talks—held between Bhutan and China in Beijing from August 21-24, both countries announced in a joint press release that they had agreed to speed up, and implement, simultaneous steps to put in place a “three-step roadmap” for a resolution of their long-pending boundary dispute. This was the third expert group meeting held in the current year.

The joint communiqué noted that the two sides had had “candid, friendly and constructive discussions” on implementing the roadmap on the basis of the agreement hammered out at the earlier EGMs. “One of the important outcomes of the 13th EGM is the establishment of the Joint Technical Team on the Delimitation of the China-Bhutan boundary which held its first meeting on the sidelines of the EGM,” the statement said.

Boundary talks between China and Bhutan have been an ongoing process since 1984 as both countries stake claim to the Doklam region. India, all along has backed the latter’s stance. Chinese international relations watchers say China and Bhutan came very close to reaching a final agreement around 1996, but the negotiations failed as India upset the apple cart. Since 1984, more than 24 rounds of border talks have taken place between China and Bhutan, besides 12 rounds of expert-level meetings.

In May 2023, the 12th Expert Group Meeting (EGM) was held in the Bhutanese capital, Thimphu, just four months after the 11th EGM talks were held in China’s Kunming, the capital and largest city of Yunnan province. As the Thimphu round of deliberations came to an end, both Bhutan and China said progress had been made towards implementing a “three-step roadmap” which would help resolve their boundary dispute.

The 11th EGM in January 2023 followed the 10th EGM in April 2021 after a long gap of two years. In view of that, it seems significant that, after the 12th round in May 2023, the 13th has followed within only three months—and in the Chinese capital—indicating a more rapid development in the talks.

The dispute has its roots in the acrimonious border negotiations between India and China. The bone of contention in this decades-long border standoff between the two countries is the strategic plateau of Doklam, situated close to the tri-junction of the three countries—India, Bhutan and China. If Beijing manages to seize control of this disputed plateau, it would allow China undeterred force mobilization as it will provide it greater access to land routes in case an armed conflict broke out with India.

Bold and unabashed Chinese intrusion across India’s Himalayan borders has led to rival military buildups and occasional clashes in the region. The 2017 China-India border clash, termed the ‘Doklam standoff’, was a military faceoff between India and China. What ignited the tinderbox was Chinese attempts at building a road in Doklam.

On June 16, 2017, Chinese soldiers with bulldozers, cranes, excavators, forklifts and dump trucks started work on extending a pre-existing road in Doklam to the south. On June 18, 2017, India launched its own response in the form of ‘Operation Juniper’, when about 270 armed Indian troops charged across the Sikkim border into Doklam armed with only two bulldozers to put a halt to the unwarranted Chinese activity. On August 28, however, both countries announced a troop withdrawal.

The India-China border crisis reached a head over the tri-junction demarcated by India’s Sikkim state to the west, China-occupied Tibet’s Chumbi Valley to the north and Bhutan’s Haa Valley to the east. India and China have had a long-standing faceoff over the exact location of this tri-junction.

The Bhutan-China border question has direct links with the festering decades-old India-China border crisis. The two countries share a frontier that has not been adequately demarcated, so both countries’ claims to the territory overlap. India estimates it to be 3,488 kilometres long, while China says it is 2,000 kilometres. The current status quo border lies in the Ladakh region to India’s north and runs all the way to Arunachal Pradesh in the east —which is also disputed since the Chinese call it ‘Southern Tibet’.

China stakes claim to roughly 269 sq.km in western Bhutan and 495 sq.km in north-central Bhutan, says the BBC. In 2020, China’s adventurism extended to 739 sq.km of territory in the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan, claiming it to be a part of Mainland China, although most official Chinese maps have shown Sakteng to be a part of Bhutan. Even in China’s most ambitious—and contentious—2014 map claiming vast territories including Arunachal Pradesh, Sakteng Park was depicted to be a part of Bhutan.

Delhi has solid reasons to support Thimphu’s stand on Doklam. If China’s  designs are successful, this strategically significant plateau for India would give Beijing a terrain advantage over Delhi at one of the most sensitive geographic points for India—the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, a 22-kilometre, narrow land bridge that connects Mainland India with its ‘Seven Sisters’ states in the North-East.

Significant data, including satellite images, indicates that China is engaged in building infrastructure—even small villages—inside sovereign Bhutanese territory. Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering is reported to have told Belgian daily La Libre in an interview in March 2023, “no intrusion as reported in the media” has happened into Bhutanese territory. He had expressed the hope that Bhutan and China would find common ground in demarcating some of the boundaries in a couple of meetings.

This was perceived to indicate that Tshering was, possibly, bending to China’s pressure and preparing to cede territory to ‘resolve’ the border issue, a move that rang alarm bells in India’s security establishment. A 2012 India-China agreement says that, at points along boundaries shared between India, China and a third country, the border demarcation will be done upon agreement of all parties concerned. So, the border dispute can be amicably resolved only if all the three countries—India, Bhutan and China—manage to reach a consensual decision. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst based in Bengaluru)

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By Girish Linganna

China and Russia’s aggressive actions   against the West have caused problems, like conflicts over spy balloons, and have also led to NATO becoming stronger. One important result of this has been the West’s effort to develop a closer relationship with India. In June, India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Washington and received a warm welcome from the White House, Congress, and business leaders.

Europe has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with India. Recently, Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, invited Narendra Modi for a state visit. In February, Olaf Scholz, the Chancellor of Germany, visited Delhi. Giorgia Meloni, the Prime Minister of Italy, also made a trip in March. After the Ukraine war started last year, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, visited India, accompanied by seven European foreign ministers. Ministers and officials from Hungary, Spain, and Nordic countries have also been visiting Delhi.

The US is trying to strengthen its relationship with India for two main reasons. Firstly, it wants to enhance its business connections with the fastest-growing major economy in the world. Additionally, the US sees India as an important ally in its strategy for dealing with China. The US hopes that India can serve as an alternative manufacturing base as supply chains diversify away from China. Moreover, the US aims to reinforce security ties with India, as its relationship with China has been tense in recent years. During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in June, the two countries signed defense deals, including an agreement to manufacture jet engines in India. Importantly, President Joe Biden did not criticize Modi’s government for its human rights record or the erosion of democratic norms.

Europe shares similar goals with the US in terms of boosting trade with India and reshaping supply chains. However, countering China is not as high of a priority for Europe. Instead, Europe is focused on getting other countries to oppose Russia’s war in Ukraine. Additionally, Europe places greater emphasis on human rights compared to the US.

The Biden-Modi summit went well, but Europe faces three barriers in improving relations with India. One obstacle is that Europe does not take seriously what it considers to be small annoyances but greatly upsets India and its people. An example is the European Union’s visa policies for its Schengen region. Europeans can easily get a visa to visit India, while Indians face numerous document requirements and the possibility of rejection when trying to go to Europe. This issue also affects Britain’s efforts to establish a free-trade deal with India. The process should be simplified for business tourists.

One problem is that Europe wants India to publicly criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. European leaders have been calling for international support to stop the conflict, but India values its independence and believes it should maintain relationships with different countries, including Russia, without being influenced by their actions. This demand from Europe is not well received in India.

Europe’s emphasis on human rights is another reason why they are struggling to gain India’s support. The EU follows a foreign policy that is based on values, which can upset Indian officials who are defensive about outside criticism, particularly from Western nations whom they view as hypocritical. A recent resolution by the European Parliament that condemned India’s handling of ethnic violence in Manipur, a state in north eastern India, received a strong backlash from India’s foreign ministry. They firmly stated that it was an internal matter and that the EU should focus on its own affairs.

None of these challenges are impossible to overcome. One European leader, French President. Macron, seems to understand what motivates India. He avoids lecturing and supports India’s pursuit of strategic independence, focusing on security cooperation. In July, Mr. Narendra Modi was a special guest at France’s annual military parade, where they successfully impressed President Trump in 2017. Additionally, India’s Defense Acquisitions Council approved deals worth $10 billion to buy 26 French Rafale jets and three Scorpène submarines. If other European countries genuinely want to strengthen ties with India, they might have to adopt Mr. Macron’s approach.(IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

India will launch the PSLV-C56 rocket on July 30, carrying the DS-SAR satellite from Singapore and six other co-passenger satellites. The launch is scheduled for 6:30 am from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh, by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).

All the satellites will be placed in a specific orbit called the Near Equatorial Orbit. This orbit is positioned at an angle of 5 degrees from the equator and at a height of 535 kilometers above the Earth’s surface.

India developed the DS-SAR satellite through a partnership with Singapore’s Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and ST Engineering.

Once operational, the DS-SAR satellite will support the satellite imagery needs of the Singaporean government. ST Engineering, on the other hand, will use it to provide improved and more responsive images and location-based services for their commercial clients.

The DS-SAR satellite, weighing around 355 kgs carries a special payload called Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). This radar technology enables DS-SAR to take pictures and gather data, regardless of the weather or time of day. It can even capture images with very high detail, down to one-meter resolution, using a technique called full polarimetry.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is like a special camera on the DS-SAR satellite that can take pictures of the Earth’s surface using radio waves instead of light. It works like a bat using sound waves to “see” in the dark. The radar on the satellite sends out radio waves towards the ground, and when these waves hit something, like a building or a tree, they bounce back to the radar. The radar then collects these bouncing waves and uses them to create detailed pictures of the things on the ground.

The cool thing about SAR is that it can “see” through clouds and even in the dark because it doesn’t need sunlight to work. It can take pictures day or night, and it’s not affected by bad weather. This makes it really useful for things like finding out what’s happening on the Earth’s surface during storms or at night.

Polarimetry, on the other hand, is like a special feature of the SAR camera. It helps the camera to understand more about the things it’s looking at. It’s like being able to tell if an object is bumpy or smooth, or if it’s made of metal or wood. This extra information helps us learn more about the objects on the ground and makes the DS-SAR satellite even more helpful for different tasks, like helping farmers with their crops or helping the government keep an eye on things from space.

The NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), which is a government organization responsible for space activities, purchased the PSLV-C56 rocket. They obtained this rocket to launch the DS-SAR satellite into space.

The upcoming PSLV-C56 launch will be the 58th flight of the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and the 17th flight in its Core Alone configuration. When they say “Core Alone,” it means that the PSLV will not have any strap-on boosters attached to its core stage. The core stage is the main part of the rocket responsible for the initial phase of the launch.

There are 6-Co passenger Satellites  Velox AM, Arcaade, Scoob, NuLIon, Gaalassia 2  and Strider.

1. VELOX-AM, a 23kg microsatellite developed by Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore, aims to test Additive Manufactured (AM)- space craft parts and payloads in the challenging space environment. By carrying these components into space, VELOX-AM will gather valuable data to enhance the design and performance of AM-produced parts for future space missions.

2. ARCADE is a 27-unit Cube Sat developed by Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in collaboration with the INSPIRE consortium. It is designed to be 10 cm x 10 cm x 10 cm in size, consisting of 27 individual cubes. This larger size allows ARCADE to carry various scientific instruments and payloads. The satellite uses an iodine-based propulsion system based on a Hall effect thruster. The propulsion system utilizes an iodine and compound mixture as a solid propellant, which is ignited to generate thrust. This innovative system enables ARCADE to maintain its orbit in low Earth orbit effectively.

3. SCOOB-II is a small satellite developed by a student team at NTU in Singapore. It is a 3U Cube, weighing 4 kgs, roughly the size of a shoebox. The satellite is designed to operate in space for 6 months. It utilizes a three-axis controlled reaction wheel assembly to control its orientation in space.

4. NuLIoN is a lightweight 3U Cube satellite developed by NuSpace, weighing only 3kgs and roughly the size of a shoebox. Its primary purpose is to offer continuous LoRaWAN IoT services, utilizing a low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) technology specifically designed for connecting IoT devices. NuLIoN will be the pioneering satellite in a constellation that aims to provide LoRaWAN services to IoT devices in the equatorial region. This technology enables physical objects embedded with sensors, software, and network connectivity to collect and interchange data, opening up opportunities such as connected cars with collision-sensing capabilities and wearable devices that track fitness and health data.

5. Galassia-2, a nano satellite weighing 3.5 kgs and developed by students at the National University of Singapore (NUS), is a 3U spacecraft designed for an inter-satellite link (ISL) with TeLEOS-1. Its compact size, similar to a shoebox, allows it to demonstrate the use of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) multispectral imagery for space applications. TeLEOS-1, an Earth observation satellite operated by ST Electronics (STEE), was launched in December 2015 and serves as the partner for Galassia-2’s ISL. By utilizing COTS multispectral imagery, Galassia-2 can study the Earth’s surface, monitor changes, and support applications like disaster management and environmental monitoring.

6.Developed through an international collaboration led by Singapore’s ALIENA, ORB-12 STRIDER is a satellite designed to showcase advanced propulsion systems for small satellite constellations. Its notable feature includes being equipped with the world’s first Multi-modal all-Electric Propulsion Engine (MEPE). This cutting-edge engine enables ORB-12 STRIDER to execute a range of maneuvers in space with higher efficiency compared to traditional propulsion systems.(IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

With effect from August 1, the Chinese capital has imposed restrictions on the export of gallium, a component that has long been an integral part of the U.S. military’s advanced defense systems and supply chain.

An expert has claimed that although there may be some short-term disruption associated with the market adjustments, any costs incurred would be minor and the US government will be able to find alternative sources.

Experts contend that Beijing’s current export restrictions on gallium, a necessary element in US military radars, may not have a major effect on the Pentagon’s supply chain since defence chiefs will be seeking out other sources.

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce declared the introduction of export restrictions on gallium and germanium related items in order to defend “national security and interests”, which is generally perceived to be a reaction to the US-supported sanctions imposed on the Chinese semiconductor industry.

Consequences of failing to adhere to the measures, which necessitate Beijing’s approval for the exporting of these strategically important metals, can include administrative discipline or criminal charges

China’s Ministry of Commerce declared that germanium and gallium products had both military and civilian applications when they declared the restrictions.

Gallium is a key material in US advanced defense systems, especially high-energy radars. It is used in semiconductors and LEDs, and is being increasingly used in gallium nitride (GaN) technology. GaN is used in the transmit-receive modules for active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, such as the US Navy’s AN/SPY-6 and the Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR radars.

The AN/SPY-6 is a 3D radar that will be used on the latest Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. These destroyers use the Aegis combat system to defend against air and missile threats.

The AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR is a 3D radar that can detect a variety of objects, including uncrewed aerial systems, cruise missiles, air-breathing targets, rockets, and artillery. It uses gallium nitride (GaN) technology to support its antennas and other essential components.

China is trying to disrupt the US defense supply chain by restricting exports of gallium, a key material used in semiconductors. This is seen as a way to retaliate against US sanctions on the Chinese semiconductor industry. China is hoping that this will increase its leverage against the US by making the US more vulnerable to disruptions in its defense supply chain was told by an associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana in the US,to SCMP

China is hoping that by restricting exports of gallium, a key material used in semiconductors, it can disrupt the US defense supply chain and annoy the US in response to the US’s restrictions on Chinese semiconductor imports.

Although China’s export controls on gallium would cause a shift in the global gallium trade, their impact on the US defense supply chain would be limited, as the US would be able to find alternative sources said the professor

China’s export controls on gallium may change the way gallium is traded, but it is unlikely to make gallium more scarce, as there are other suppliers in the market.

It is likely that US companies, the defense industry, and other stakeholders will look for a substitute for gallium and establish their own supply chains.

Radar technology has become a new point of contention in the ongoing US-China rivalry.

China imposed economic sanctions on South Korea in 2016 after Seoul deployed a US High Altitude Area Defence missile defense system that Beijing said threatened its security.

Raytheon, a US aerospace and defense company, was awarded a $412 million contract to upgrade and maintain surveillance radar in Taiwan in September. This came amid increasing tensions between Beijing and Taipei. In February, China imposed sanctions on Raytheon for its involvement in arms sales to Taiwan.

Chinese scientists have developed a new radar that can detect ballistic missiles from 4,500 kilometers away, which is much farther than the range of conventional radars.

The US does not produce gallium, and it relies on other countries to supply it with this material.

China is the world’s leading producer of gallium, accounting for more than 95% of global production in 2020 and 2021. The US imported about 53% of its gallium from China between 2018 and 2021.

China’s decision to restrict exports of gallium is seen as a response to US pressure on China to control the export of semi conductor technology that could be used for military purposes.

In October, the US government restricted China’s access to advanced computing chips and equipment used in the development and maintenance of supercomputers and the manufacture of advanced semiconductors for military applications.

The US government said that China used the restricted items to produce advanced military systems, such as weapons of mass destruction, and to improve the speed and accuracy of its military decision-making, planning, and logistics.

The US government is taking steps to prevent China from acquiring sensitive technologies that could be used for military purposes.(IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s success in concluding high valued defence deals during his visit to France on July 13 and 14 has led to the escalation of fighting between the United States and France over the sale of high tech defence equipment to the burgeoning Indian market.

According to Indian military experts, France is aiming to secure valuable Indian defence contracts as a way to teach a lesson to its close ally, the United States (US), which is a big competitor to France in the global aviation market covering both civil and military aviation. Paris is reportedly making efforts to persuade New Delhi to halt a deal for GE jet engines of US origin and replace them with an agreement involving French aviation company Safran.

Military experts recently commented on a rift between France and the US, stemming from the US’s perceived “betrayal” in the Australian submarine matter. Last year in a sudden move, the Australian Government unilaterally announced the termination of a reportedly $ 66 billion contract for 12 new diesel electric submarines from Paris.

Following that, Australia announced the establishment of the AUKUS military alliance, which comprises three nations: the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and themselves. This alliance represents a significant defence partnership in the Indo-Pacific region.

After formalizing the tripartite alliance, Australia opted to acquire nuclear-powered submarines from the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).France criticized the development as “unacceptable behaviour between allies and partners,” with President Emmanuel Macron accusing the former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison of lying about the situation while secretly holding talks with London and Washington.

During the G20 summit in Rome in September, President Macron emphasized the importance of maintaining honesty and consistency in line with the value of respect. He made these remarks in response to Australia’s decision to backtrack on its commitment to procure submarines from France.

In the aftermath of this decision, France went a step further by recalling its ambassadors to the United States and Australia. Additionally, in the subsequent months, Canberra was required to pay a penalty of €550 million to Paris as compensation for the terminated agreement. In light of the situation, an ex-Indian military official with over three decades of service mentioned that the arms lobbies of both the United States and France hold significant influence.

The trade of weapons is an immensely profitable industry, and the arms lobbies within these nations exert considerable control over their respective political leadership. Consequently, their primary objective revolves around promoting and selling their own weaponry to India. When asked whether Paris was seeking retaliation against the US due to Safran’s offer of 100 percent technology transfer to New Delhi, which came shortly after reports of General Electric’s commitment to an 80 percent technology transfer on GE-414 engines for India’s indigenous LCA Tejas warplanes, the defence expert confirmed this to be the case.

It seems that France is attempting to deliver a message to the US: if you can cancel my submarine deal with Australia, I can disrupt your order of GE-414 jet engines from India. This appears to be a reciprocal response from French President Emmanuel Macron’s government to the administration of US leader Joe Biden.

While acknowledging that Paris may be retaliating against Washington, the concerns of New Delhi are focused on securing the best possible deal. India’s priority lies in obtaining fighter plane engines of superior quality, durability, and ensuring technology transfer. The government’s ‘Make in India’ initiative is also crucial, aiming to develop these engines domestically and customize them to meet the specific requirements of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

According veteran Indian military analysts, since New Delhi has received offers from both General Electric and Safran, the Indian government should request both companies to provide one engine each for field trials within India. This would enable the Indian Air Force (IAF) to assess and determine which engine is better suited to its specific requirements. Ex Military man emphasized that India cannot afford to compromise on the quality of engines for its warplanes, highlighting the significance of this decision.

Friction between NATO allies, specifically France and the US, has the potential to escalate due to defence contracts with India. If France’s Safran secures the order for manufacturing jet engines for the Indian Air Force’s fighter aircraft, sidelining the US, it would be a significant blow to the US arms lobby.

In response, the US arms lobby is unlikely to remain passive. They would likely retaliate and influence the Biden administration, leading to a conflict between the two nations. Such a conflict would impact the relationship and wartime cooperation between these NATO allies. Simultaneously, this will lead to US pressure on India.

New Delhi and Paris have zeroed in on two significant contracts, which have already been approved by India’s Defence Procurement Board. These contracts include the procurement of 26 Rafale-M’s for the indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and three conventional diesel-electric submarines for the Indian Navy.

The acquisition aims to address the immediate and vital requirements of the Indian Navy for carrier-based fighter aircraft. This move will provide the added benefit of synergy with the existing fleet of 36 Rafale fighters that are already in service with the Indian Navy, streamlining operations and enhancing capabilities. The combined value of both deals is estimated to be $10.6 billion. Out of this amount, approximately $6.15 billion will be allocated for the purchase of Rafale-M aircraft, while the remaining portion will be used to acquire three Scorpene-class submarines. (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

Narendra Modi, India’s Prime Minister, recently visited the White House representing one of the world’s rapidly growing major economies. With an annual growth rate of 6%, India is currently the fifth-largest economy globally. The country’s technology industry is thriving, and there is a significant focus on renewable energy with widespread installation of solar panels. India’s attractiveness to multinational companies is evident as Goldman Sachs recently held a board meeting there.

As developed countries and China face aging populations, India’s substantial youth population, with around 500 million individuals under the age of 20, should serve as an additional driving force. However, despite India’s highly educated elite who excel academically, the majority of the population still lacks quality education. This situation poses a risk to India’s economic progress as unskilled and unemployed young people may hinder its development.

India has made progress in enhancing services for its impoverished population. The government has implemented digital initiatives that simplify banking access and the distribution of welfare payments. In terms of education, significant investments have been made in infrastructure. Previously, only a third of government schools had handwashing facilities, and electricity was available in only about half of them. However, these numbers have improved, with approximately 90% of government schools now equipped with both. Additionally, India has established close to 400 universities since 2014, resulting in a 20% increase in enrolment in higher education.

However, despite efforts to improve school infrastructure and increase enrolment, India is struggling to ensure that its students acquire essential skills. Prior to the pandemic, less than half of India’s ten-year-olds were able to read a simple story, even though they had spent several years attending school. In comparison, the literacy rate among ten-year-olds in America was 96%. The situation has worsened due to prolonged school closures lasting over two years.

There are various reasons for this situation. The overcrowded curriculum leaves insufficient time for teaching fundamental subjects like math and literacy. As a result, children who struggle with these basics often struggle to learn other subjects. Teachers are inadequately trained and lack proper supervision, as evidenced by a significant absence rate among staff in rural schools, according to a large-scale survey. Additionally, officials occasionally assign teachers unrelated tasks, such as conducting elections or enforcing social-distancing rules during the pandemic.

Due to these challenges, a significant number of families have opted to enroll their children in private schools, which educate approximately 50% of all Indian children. Although these private schools are cost-effective, they often do not deliver improved outcomes. There have been optimistic expectations that India’s technology industry could bring about an educational revolution. However, relying solely on technology for education poses risks. In recent weeks, Byju’s, India’s largest ed-tech firm that claims to educate over 150 million individuals globally and was previously valued at $22 billion, has experienced a significant decline in valuation due to financial difficulties and statutory issues.

It is increasingly crucial to address the issues in government schools, making it imperative for India to allocate more funds towards education. The previous year witnessed education outlays at a mere 2.9% of GDP, which falls below international benchmarks. Simultaneously, there is a need to revamp the education system by drawing inspiration from successful models in other developing Asian countries.

According to our findings, Vietnamese students have consistently outperformed their counterparts from wealthier nations in international exams for the past decade. Surprisingly, despite spending less time in formal classroom lessons, including homework and additional study, Vietnamese students excel. Furthermore, they also contend with larger class sizes. The key distinction lies in the better preparation, experience, and accountability of Vietnamese teachers, who face consequences if their students fail to meet expectations.

India can make progress by improving its education system, but this requires strong leadership. First, it should focus on accurately assessing students’ learning outcomes, which means politicians must stop disregarding data that doesn’t reflect well on their policies. Additionally, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party should refrain from removing concepts like evolution from textbooks or distorting historical facts to appease Hindu nativists. These distractions only hinder progress. While India is investing in infrastructure like roads, technology campuses, airports, and factories, it must also prioritize developing its human capital. (IPA Service)

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By Girish Linganna

The claim that China’s power is peaking is not new. For decades, there have been articles and books predicting that China’s rise is about to end and that its decline—or even collapse—is imminent. However, these predictions have always been wrong. Could this time be different? Let us examine the strongest arguments on both sides of this issue and come to a conclusion…

China’s exceptional rise over the past 40 years was the product of a unique set of circumstances that are unlikely to be repeated. These circumstances included a large and growing workforce, a low-cost manufacturing base and a favourable global economic environment. However, these tailwinds are now turning into headwinds, as China’s workforce is ageing, its manufacturing cost rising and the global economic environment becoming more uncertain. As a result, China’s economic growth is retarding .

China’s economic slowdown is a structural issue unlikely to be reversed in the near future. As China has become wealthier, its labour force has become more expensive, making it less attractive as a manufacturing hub. This trend was already underway before the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdowns have only exacerbated the problem. As a result, China’s economic growth is likely to remain below its historical levels for the foreseeable future.

China’s economic growth has been slowing for a decade now, and the quality of that growth has deteriorated. Infrastructure has been overbuilt in an attempt to artificially boost growth, leading to the creation of dozens of ‘ghost cities’ that are devoid of people. This stimulus has been financed by an explosive debt bubble that the Chinese government has been reluctant to deflate.

Explosive debt bubble is a situation where a country has borrowed so much money that it is at risk of defaulting on its debt. This can happen when a government borrows too much money to finance its spending, or when businesses and individuals borrow too much money to finance their investments.

The Chinese government has been reluctant to deflate this debt bubble because it would cause a lot of economic pain. If the government were to stop borrowing money, it would have to cut spending, which would lead to job losses and a slowdown in economic growth.

The Chinese government is currently at the crossroads. It can either continue to borrow money and risk a financial crisis, or it can deflate the debt bubble and cause economic pain and hardship within the country. The government will need to decide which option is less risky.

China’s closed political system and President Xi Jinping’s statist economic preferences are hindering technological innovation, which is the most reliable engine of long-term growth. Although China’s research and development spending has increased significantly, the Chinese Communist Party’s increasingly heavy-handed interventions in the tech sector are stifling entrepreneurship and technological experimentation.

China has already lost many of its best and brightest minds, who have left the country for more welcoming environments, taking their talent and capital with them. This brain-drain is being compounded by Western export controls on semiconductors and other dual-use advanced technologies, which are further restricting China’s access to critical technologies. As a result, China’s tech capabilities are facing major binding constraints, which could have a significant impact on its long-term economic growth.

China is facing a demographic crisis that is unprecedented in peacetime. The country’s population peaked at 1.4 billion last year and is now in decline, due to an ageing population and plummeting birth rates. By 2035, China may stand to lose 70 million adults in the working age group, gaining 130 million senior citizens in the process. By 2100, the country’s population could be anywhere between 700 million and 475 million, with one in three Chinese citizens over the age of 65.

President Xi’s decision to end China’s one-child policy and then the two-child policy has not been enough to reverse the country’s demographic trends. In simpler terms, China’s government has tried to increase the number of babies being born by allowing couples to have more than one child. However, this has not been enough to reverse the country’s declining birth rate. The only way to significantly increase the number of births would be to allow more immigrants into the country, but the Chinese government is reluctant to do this. The fact that China’s demographic implosion has hit the country before it has had a chance to grow wealthy puts its economic and political future in all the more dire straits.

China is facing an increasingly hostile external environment. Proof of this can be evidenced in the USA’s unambiguous policy of containing China’s information and other technology sectors, besides China’s increasing strategic isolation in its own backyard. Japan and South Korea are increasing their defence spending. Taiwan is becoming more defiant. And new anti-China alliances, such as the Quad and AUKUS, are forming.

Relations between China and India have become more competitive in recent years due to a series of military clashes along their shared border. This has led India to draw closer to the US as it seeks to balance China’s growing clout in the region.

As China’s global footprint has expanded, so has anti-China sentiment. More than 10 countries have suspended, or cancelled, high-profile projects funded by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive infrastructure project that has been criticized for its opaqueness and debt-trap diplomacy.

It is true that China is facing unprecedented challenges that make its continued growth more difficult. It is, therefore, possible that China will never surpass the US economically or become a global superpower. However, the question is whether China’s power has already peaked… And the answer to that question is ‘no’.

Although China’s economic growth has slowed in recent years, it is still growing faster than the US. This is to be expected, as China has already transitioned from a low-income country to a middle-income country in a relatively short period of time. The IMF has projected that China will continue to narrow the gap with the US in the coming decade reaching parity around 2030. Chinese labour costs remain significantly lower than in advanced industrial economies and China’s deep integration into global value chains means that any decoupling from the global economy will be slow and gradual, rather than abrupt and complete.

China’s economic growth has not been primarily driven by stimulus measures since the global financial crisis, with the exception of the Covid-19 reopening period. Infrastructure spending used to be unproductive, but fiscal reforms have imposed stricter profitability conditions. Although Beijing has delayed dealing with the country’s massive debt burden during the pandemic, the government remains committed to getting it under control.

Xi is ideologically committed to a statist economic agenda, which will likely slow down China’s economic growth. However, he also understands that he cannot stifle the private sector, especially the tech sector, which is one of the cornerstones of the Chinese economy. China continues to invest heavily in advanced technologies and it has already achieved parity with, or surpassed, the US in many fields, such as voice/facial recognition, smart infrastructure, telecommunications and electric vehicles. If artificial intelligence (AI) becomes the new commanding height of the global economy, as inevitably it will, China’s data advantage and strong AI talent pipeline will make it competitive, if not dominant.

China’s demographic challenge is real and massive, but it is not a near-term problem. Beijing has a number of tools at its disposal to delay the onset of this challenge, such as raising the retirement age. By bringing 40 million more people into the workforce by 2035, China can halve its demographic tax. This reform has already been flagged by Xi in his recent Party Congress report.

China’s educational system has recently received a significant boost in funding, which will lead to improvements in labour force quality in future. China can also boost productivity by increasing urbanization and moving workers out of low-productivity agriculture. These factors will give China at least 10-15 years to address the challenge of low birth rates.

China’s external environment has become more hostile, but there is no appetite for a new Cold War with Beijing. The US-China relationship is becoming more antagonistic, but both Biden and Xi want to avoid a full-blown rivalry. Biden’s containment policy is limited to narrow sectors deemed critical to national security and most US allies are not prepared to decouple economically from China. China remains the most important trade partner for most developing countries who are sympathetic to Beijing’s focus on economic development.

China’s diplomatic network is the largest in the world and its global soft power projection is just getting started. While many wealthy countries are becoming more hostile towards Beijing, the reality is that there are no feasible economic alternatives for much of the world. The US, all the while harping on decoupling from China, continues to sell record levels of its agricultural produce to China.

China is facing a dramatically more challenging domestic and global environment than it has in decades. The country is dealing with a demographic crisis, an increasingly hostile external environment and growing economic inequality. However, China still has substantial upside potential. The country’s economy is still growing at a relatively robust pace and its international influence is continuing to expand. While a ‘Chinese century’ may not be on the cards, China is likely to continue to grow and prosper in the decades to come. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst)

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By Girish Linganna

US President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi reached an accord that is hailed by experts as “historic” and which will provide India with American drones and engines for combat aircraft, in an effort to confront China. Modi is attempting to expand the international standing of India, currently the most populous nation on earth with 1.4 billion citizens, in the midst of tense relations with next-door neighbour China. In her article for The New York Times, Harvard University professor of History Maya Jasanoff declared that the US is actively seeking India’s support in the new Cold War with China. And the signal is clear!

The White House was decked out in a red carpet in honour of the Indian prime minister by the US president—in an attempt to strengthen ties in the light of China’s military development in the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions, although Democrats have been pushing Biden to address human rights issues with Modi during their discussions. For Modi’s’ visit, Biden arranged a reception with an attendance of around 7,000 on the South Lawns of the White House to welcome Modi.

Modi had the honour of speaking at a joint session of Congress and attending a White House gala dinner. He voiced his opinion that the international spotlight is focused on both India and the United States, as they are the two largest democracies. He strongly suggested that their strategic partnership is of great significance and that collaboration between them will be a successful endeavour. Biden stated that he considered the US-India relationship to be a significant factor in the current century. For this century, India and the United States must come together and take the helm in tackling the difficulties and prospects that the world faces.

The United States Institute of Peace says in a report, “India has been able to leverage state-of-the-art defence acquisitions from the United States to counter Chinese assertiveness, including strategic lift to transport and resupply its troops deployed along the mountainous line-of-actual control (LAC), as well as a variety of advanced maritime patrol aircraft to defend its maritime approaches.”

US defence trade with India skyrocketed from almost nil in 2008 to more than $20 billion in 2020. India majorly shopped for C-130 transport aircraft, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, missiles and drones from the US. Indo-US ties relations have been improving over the past few years amid China’s growing aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region and along its 3,488-kilometre-long line-of-actual control (LAC) with China.

As part of the recent series of the pacts, US naval vessels are now authorized to dock in Indian shipyards for servicing, as the US builds a defensive cordon of strengthening alliances on the border of China. The transaction was concluded at a key moment, since the US had become discouraged by India’s sustained alliance with Russia amid the war in Ukraine.

General Electric Company’s (GE) aerospace division will collaborate with India’s Hindustan Aeronautics to manufacture F414 engines for the Tejas fighter jets as part of the principal agreement. For more than $3 billion (£2.3 billion), India has also agreed to purchase 31 US-made MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones.

Meanwhile, Idaho-based Micron Technology has set aside a fund of $2.7 billion (£2.1 billion) to create a semiconductor testing and packaging facility in the Modi’s home state of Gujarat.

The White House reported that India had answered the call to join the ‘Artemis Accords’, a collective of nations who are dedicated to peaceful space exploration, and will take part in a collaborative mission with the USA’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to the International Space Station in 2024. Just prior to the Modi-Biden summit in the Oval Office, a senior official from the administration revealed that India would be signing the Artemis Accords, which uphold an international initiative for space exploration that would benefit all parties. Now, finally India has signed causing jitters in Chinese leadership.

China views the Artemis Accords—the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the foundation of international law governing space exploration—as the USA’s attempt to take control of outer space. So, India signing on the dotted line of this agreement would only work to further provoke the already volatile relations between the two countries. The Artemis Accords are a set of principles, guidelines and best practices for ensuring the safe and sustainable exploration of Mars, the Moon and beyond. They were developed by NASA in 2020 and are open to all countries and private companies interested in participating in the Artemis program. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst)

The post Narendra Modi Has Achieved Success In Acquiring High Tech Defence Items From US first appeared on IPA Newspack.

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By Girish Linganna

US President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi reached an accord that is hailed by experts as “historic” and which will provide India with American drones and engines for combat aircraft, in an effort to confront China. Modi is attempting to expand the international standing of India, currently the most populous nation on earth with 1.4 billion citizens, in the midst of tense relations with next-door neighbour China. In her article for The New York Times, Harvard University professor of History Maya Jasanoff declared that the US is actively seeking India’s support in the new Cold War with China. And the signal is clear!

The White House was decked out in a red carpet in honour of the Indian prime minister by the US president—in an attempt to strengthen ties in the light of China’s military development in the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions, although Democrats have been pushing Biden to address human rights issues with Modi during their discussions. For Modi’s’ visit, Biden arranged a reception with an attendance of around 7,000 on the South Lawns of the White House to welcome Modi.

Modi had the honour of speaking at a joint session of Congress and attending a White House gala dinner. He voiced his opinion that the international spotlight is focused on both India and the United States, as they are the two largest democracies. He strongly suggested that their strategic partnership is of great significance and that collaboration between them will be a successful endeavour. Biden stated that he considered the US-India relationship to be a significant factor in the current century. For this century, India and the United States must come together and take the helm in tackling the difficulties and prospects that the world faces.

The United States Institute of Peace says in a report, “India has been able to leverage state-of-the-art defence acquisitions from the United States to counter Chinese assertiveness, including strategic lift to transport and resupply its troops deployed along the mountainous line-of-actual control (LAC), as well as a variety of advanced maritime patrol aircraft to defend its maritime approaches.”

US defence trade with India skyrocketed from almost nil in 2008 to more than $20 billion in 2020. India majorly shopped for C-130 transport aircraft, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, missiles and drones from the US. Indo-US ties relations have been improving over the past few years amid China’s growing aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region and along its 3,488-kilometre-long line-of-actual control (LAC) with China.

As part of the recent series of the pacts, US naval vessels are now authorized to dock in Indian shipyards for servicing, as the US builds a defensive cordon of strengthening alliances on the border of China. The transaction was concluded at a key moment, since the US had become discouraged by India’s sustained alliance with Russia amid the war in Ukraine.

General Electric Company’s (GE) aerospace division will collaborate with India’s Hindustan Aeronautics to manufacture F414 engines for the Tejas fighter jets as part of the principal agreement. For more than $3 billion (£2.3 billion), India has also agreed to purchase 31 US-made MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones.

Meanwhile, Idaho-based Micron Technology has set aside a fund of $2.7 billion (£2.1 billion) to create a semiconductor testing and packaging facility in the Modi’s home state of Gujarat.

The White House reported that India had answered the call to join the ‘Artemis Accords’, a collective of nations who are dedicated to peaceful space exploration, and will take part in a collaborative mission with the USA’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to the International Space Station in 2024. Just prior to the Modi-Biden summit in the Oval Office, a senior official from the administration revealed that India would be signing the Artemis Accords, which uphold an international initiative for space exploration that would benefit all parties. Now, finally India has signed causing jitters in Chinese leadership.

China views the Artemis Accords—the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the foundation of international law governing space exploration—as the USA’s attempt to take control of outer space. So, India signing on the dotted line of this agreement would only work to further provoke the already volatile relations between the two countries. The Artemis Accords are a set of principles, guidelines and best practices for ensuring the safe and sustainable exploration of Mars, the Moon and beyond. They were developed by NASA in 2020 and are open to all countries and private companies interested in participating in the Artemis program. (IPA Service)

(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst)

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By Girish Linganna

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting USA on a four day state visit beginning  on June 21. He will discuss pending defence deals with the US President Joe Biden and the other senior policy makers   during his visit including the summit with the US President on June 22.

India and the US are discussing ways to co-produce defence equipment. This would help India become more self-sufficient in defence production, which is one of its long-term goals. As the two countries deepen their defence cooperation, these agreements and co-production initiatives could strengthen their bilateral ties and contribute to regional security and stability.

India and the US will be discussing a  number of major defence deals including the sale of the MQ-9B Predator drones  by the US to Indian defence   forces.

The Indian Armed Forces are in talks with the US to buy MQ-9B Predator drones. The number of drones needed is still being decided. The Indian Navy had initially asked for 30 drones, but last year the Navy Chief hinted that the number may need to be reduced. The Indian Navy    and the Indian Air Force  have   been pitching    for the most advanced   drone     for quite some    time. Finally, the deal can be concluded   during   this visit.

The Indian Navy leased two MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from General Atomics in 2020 after the Galwan Valley clashes. The lease has been extended and the drones are now being used for land and maritime surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean Region. They have also operated alongside P-8 aircraft from Boeing.

The Indian Navy and the US are working together to monitor the growing presence of Chinese boats in the Indian Ocean Region. The US has agreed to sell India 30 MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones for $ 3 billion and will be through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)”

India needs to be able to monitor its vast coastline and expanding maritime interests. MQ-9 Predator drones can help with this by providing maritime surveillance, detecting illegal activities, and supporting maritime security operations. By acquiring these drones, India can improve its defence capabilities, intelligence-gathering, and situational awareness.

The next is the deal over upgrading the M-777 Light Howitzer Guns by the US. The Indian Army already uses these guns, and the US has proposed an upgrade that will significantly increase their range. This will give the army greater firepower and flexibility on the battlefield. Further the supply of GE-F-1414 fighter   jet engines will be on the agenda   between the two sides during the talks.

India is planning to produce GE-F414 fighter jet engines under license. This will help India produce its own engines for the Tejas Mk2 and future Indian Navy warships. This will help India become more self-reliant in defence manufacturing.

Then India is looking    for the supply of Skyer Armoured Personnel    Carrier from  the USA.   India and the United States are exploring the possibility of jointly producing the Stryker armoured personnel carrier. This would replace the Russian BMP-2s currently used by the Indian Army. The collaboration would benefit both countries by meeting India’s defence needs and promoting local manufacturing and technology transfer.

Apart the supply of F/A-18 Super Homet is also under discussion. The Indian Navy is considering buying F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets for its indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. However, India may prefer the French Rafale fighters due to compatibility issues. Prime Minister Modi will be visiting France next month, and the Rafale fighter jets are expected to be discussed during his visit.

The above deals have been discussed before, and either a deal may be reached during the visit or the talks may be continued when the US President visits India in September. (IPA Service)

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