From ‘Howdy Modi’ To 50 Per Cent Tariffs On Indian Exports: The End Of An Illusion

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s declaration that he is willing to “pay a heavy price” to stand by Indian farmers in the face of escalating U.S. trade tariffs has captured headlines—but not necessarily for the right reasons. It is a speech crafted more for the political stage than the policy war room. Beneath its populist veneer lies a troubling admission: the government’s foreign policy is increasingly reactive, strategically confused, and, worse, electorally obsessed.

The backdrop is serious. On August 6, the White House announced a sweeping 25% additional tariff on all Indian imports, doubling duties to 50%, effective August 27. The justification: India’s continued purchase of Russian oil. The real consequence: the unraveling of a decade’s worth of public diplomacy between two supposedly “natural allies.”

What should have triggered a sober recalibration of India’s external economic strategy has instead become an opportunity for political theatre. With key state elections in Bihar, Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal between October 2025-to May 2026, Modi has repurposed a severe diplomatic setback into a rhetorical opportunity—an opportunity to shore up his image as the unwavering protector of Indian farmers, even as the economic fallout from this trade standoff threatens tens of billions in exports and thousands of jobs.

Speaking at the MS Swaminathan Centenary International Conference, Modi projected himself as a man under siege for doing the morally right thing. Without naming the United States or President Trump, he defiantly declared that he was prepared to suffer political consequences for refusing to compromise on India’s agricultural sovereignty.

But here lies the problem: this wasn’t an articulation of long-term economic vision or a coherent foreign policy strategy. It was a soundbite engineered to dominate the nightly news and trending hashtags. For all the fiery rhetoric, the Modi government offered no blueprint for how India plans to shield its exporters, safeguard trade relations, or navigate a global economic environment increasingly hostile to its interests.

India’s largest trading partner has just raised the economic cost of doing business by 50%—and the official response was a speech designed for rural voters.

The so-called Modi-Trump friendship, once showcased as a symbol of India’s rising diplomatic clout, now lies in ruins. The “Howdy Modi” and “Namaste Trump” rallies were held up as high points in the strategic partnership between the world’s largest democracies. But the reality was always more transactional than transformative. And the latest tariff escalation exposes that transactionalism in full.

The current trade penalty—far harsher than what Washington imposes on China, Vietnam, or even NATO allies—makes a mockery of the goodwill supposedly cultivated over years of personal diplomacy. According to the Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI), India imported $52.7 billion of Russian oil in 2024—less than China’s $62.6 billion. Yet Beijing faces no tariffs. The European Union imported $25.2 billion of Russian oil last year, and even the U.S. bought $3.3 billion worth of strategic materials from Russia.

India, by contrast, has been singled out. Not because it is the worst offender—but because it is the easiest target.

The opposition has seized the moment, and rightly so. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi has derided the prime minister’s relationship with Trump as an exercise in vanity diplomacy that has yielded no tangible benefits. “Dost dost na raha,” he quipped on social media, summarizing in one line what many in the policy community have felt for years: Modi’s foreign policy has been heavy on spectacle, light on results.

More damning is the opposition’s broader critique—that this is not an isolated trade dispute, but a symptom of a deeper malaise. The government has repeatedly failed to anticipate global headwinds, whether it was the fallout from the 2020 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the West’s sanctions regime on Russia, or shifting supply chains post-COVID. India’s response has been reactive, not strategic. And the latest tariffs have only highlighted that dysfunction.

There is no denying the centrality of farmers in India’s electoral politics. Roughly half the Indian workforce is engaged in agriculture. Modi’s dramatic reversal on the 2021 farm laws—following a year-long protest movement—remains one of the rare instances where public pressure forced his government into retreat.

The Prime Minister has learned that lesson well. His latest comments are aimed squarely at insulating himself from fresh criticism: frame the tariff standoff not as a policy failure, but as a noble stand for Indian farmers. The message is emotionally resonant especially in states where elections are imminent but strategically hollow.

Where is the articulation of how Indian farmers benefit from continued purchases of Russian oil? How does refusing to liberalise dairy and agricultural markets shield domestic producers if export channels dry up under punitive tariffs? None of these questions were addressed—because the speech was never meant to answer them.

The fundamental problem is this: Indian foreign policy is now subordinate to domestic political cycles. Modi’s calculus is simple—optics over outcomes. Rather than confront the difficult reality that the U.S. is recalibrating its global alliances through economic coercion, the government has chosen to turn the episode into a domestic drama about sovereignty and sacrifice.

This is not statecraft—it is short-termism at its worst. By politicising the trade crisis, the government has closed off the space for serious negotiations. As long as New Delhi insists on couching every foreign policy challenge in the language of electoral battle, it will be unable to build the trust necessary to engage with global partners on equal terms.

Ironically, the U.S. action may force India to revisit its own assumptions. The idea that India can be a trusted partner of the West without being a pliant one is now being tested. If the current penalties are a preview of what economic alignment with the U.S. entails, India may very well accelerate its hedging strategy—strengthening ties with Russia, the Global South, and even China where interests align.

But this pivot must be based on strategy, not spite. As GTRI has argued, retaliation would be counterproductive in the short term. India must remain calm, avoid tit-for-tat escalation, and prepare the ground for a more robust economic policy—one that does not leave it vulnerable to the whims of an unpredictable U.S. administration.

Modi’s speech offered no such clarity. What it offered instead was a reminder that the Prime Minister is at his most comfortable not in closed-door negotiations, but on a public stage, casting himself as the lone warrior standing up to foreign pressure.

What we witnessed this week was not leadership, but performance. At a moment when India’s exporters, trade negotiators, and strategic thinkers needed clear direction, they got a campaign speech. The Modi government has taken a serious economic threat and turned it into a political script, hoping that a few emotionally charged lines about farmers will be enough to deflect scrutiny.

India’s global ambitions require more than bluster. They require competence, consistency, and above all, credibility. If the government continues to treat foreign policy as just another front in its perpetual electioneering, it risks isolating India at a moment when the world is more fragmented—and more transactional—than ever before. And no amount of political spin can shield the economy from the hard landing that may now be coming. (IPA Service)