Syria Remains Another Battleground For Competing Regional Powers

By Cihan Tuğal

DAMASCUS: As the smoke settles on the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and its replacement by Islamist leadership under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), it is clear that Turkey’s far-right governing bloc has emerged from the tumult strong and emboldened. What is less clear is whether this will mean that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be able to project influence across the region without constraint.

To many observers and government propagandists, HTS’s victory in Syria was a product of Erdoğan’s strategic genius. But while the fall of Assad may have emboldened those elements of the Turkish elite happy to entertain neo-Ottomanist imperial dreams, it has not yet changed the fact of Kurdish presence in Syria’s north or definitively altered the complex balance of power between regional players like Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and Russia.

Turkey’s old establishment — made up of figures from the centre-rightist and Kemalists, two loose class coalitions led respectively by the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy — prioritized the integrity of the postwar state system. Keeping Syria intact was an unquestioned part of this balancing act, which Turkey maintained even as tensions mounted between it and its southern neighbour due to disputes over water, Islamist insurgency, and Kurdish guerrilla camps.

Turkey has long desired to see more conservative Sunni rule in Syria and has gone as far as to back the country’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, an alliance that culminated in the 1982 Hama uprising, which the Syrian army eventually quashed after a twenty-seven-day siege of the city and tens of thousands of casualties. Assad, in turn, housed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) training camps, ignoring his own troubled relations with Syria’s Kurds.

A thaw began in 1998, when Assad decided to stop harbouring the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Points of tension between Damascus and Ankara remained, but until the Arab uprisings of 2010–13, it appeared that the major ones could be resolved. Initially, the implications of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power in 2002 were unclear. Yes, the AKP had Islamist roots, but its leaders had disavowed much of this background in order to make a dash for the political centre ground. Or so it seemed. In power, the AKP flirted with neo-Ottomanist tendencies through mostly “soft power” overtures, by intensifying Turkey’s Islamic outreach through business and diplomatic expansion. What it did not seek to alter — at least openly — was the fragile peace between Turkey and its southern neighbour.

Commentators and historians of Turkey often counterpose the AKP’s Islamism with a secular nationalist Kemalist tradition, so named after the country’s founder, Kemal Atatürk. However, the line separating the two traditions has often been blurry. In fact, the AKP’s rise to power was made possible by a contradictory integration of the two. Turkey had warm relations with Assad’s Syria during the first nine years of AKP rule. The reproachment that the AKP had organized between its Kemalist and Islamist factions, combined with a geostrategic pragmatism, smoothed over potential cracks in the relationship between Syria and Turkey. During the 2000s, Turkey arguably developed warmer relations with Syria than it had during the heyday of the old establishment, a development that was partially a reflection of the growing influence of what has come to be called Eurasianism within the state apparatus.

Actors within Turkey’s foreign policy establishment developed a so-called “Eurasianist” line following the 1990s, largely in an effort to distinguish themselves from neo-Ottomanist and Sunni-Islamist imperialisms. The defining feature of Eurasianism is its acceptance of the idea of Turkey as a nation-state, as opposed to an imperial or supranational religious project. This bloc favours alliances with Russian, China, and Central Asian republics and was significantly more favorable to Assad’s rule in Syria than previous Turkish governments. However, the Eurasianists’ and AKP’s shared anti-Kurd sentiment — a through line connecting the party in the early 2000s to its present iteration, and the earlier Kemalists to their Eurasianist offshoots — remained a sore spot in their relations with the Assad regime.

In the late 2000s, the AKP, fearing a coup, purged Eurasianists from the military. Despite growing hostility, the two sides’ positions were quietly converging. For the Islamic camp, Turkey’s interests as a capitalist nation-state had started to outweigh, or at least reduce, the relative importance of Islamist ideology. For the erstwhile Kemalists, Mustafa Kemal’s foreign policy motto — Peace in the Homeland, Peace in the World — didn’t make as much sense as it did in the twentieth century. The world was walking into an era of falling and rising empires, and Turkey had to redefine itself.

Whether Islamism and Kemalism would be able to form a constructive relationship with one another remained unclear throughout the 2000s. What finally decided things was the Arab Spring. During the uprising, Turkey sought to impose Muslim Brotherhood rule in the region, but after this attempt failed, Erdoğanists shifted their support to the jihadis. Initially, the Gulf statelets and Saudi Arabia appeared to have more control over the Sunni forces, and especially the jihadis. But pro-Turkish forces’ occupation of Idlib in 2020 changed this picture.

Ankara had greater control over the jihadis in northeastern Syria, where war between multiple sides, including the Kurds, still rages on. However, al-Qaeda’s Syria offshoot HTS also came under Turkish influence in the second half of the 2010s, although it retained a certain degree of independence. Unlike the Syrian National Army (SNA), which focused its energies on fighting the Kurds along Ankara’s desires, HTS prioritized building a functioning Islamic ministate in the Idlib area. HTS ruled this region for more than four years, laying the groundwork for “tamed jihadi” government in the rest of Syria.

These regional changes interacted with tectonic shifts in Turkey. In 2016, the AKP regime’s solidly pro-American wing, the Gülen movement, cooperated with other forces to stage a coup, which military factions allied with the fascist Grey Wolves (MHP) and police forces resisted. The AKP’s Istanbul branch and youth organizations cooperated with mosques to mobilize millions and, as a result, the putsch failed. Victorious Erdoğanists then liquidated the Gülenists and reintegrated Eurasianists and other Kemalists into the military. What until then was only flirtation encouraged by understated ideological similarities congealed into a new ruling bloc. The AKP and the Grey Wolves were the public face of this new arrangement, but Eurasianists and other right-wing variants of Kemalism exercised influence behind the scenes.

This new bloc favoured state capitalism and imperialism, reversing earlier AKP administrations’ emphasis on free markets and soft power projected in the form of “neo-Ottomanismism.” Alongside adopting more aggressive stances in other corners of the world, including the Caucasus and Africa, Syria became an arena in which the different aspects of Turkey’s imperial ambitions — Islamism and opposition to the Kurds — played out. The disparate forces within this bloc allowed for apparently contradictory overtures, such as negotiating with Iranians and Russians as late as November 2024 to keep Assad in the picture, while paving the way for HTS control over the entire country.

While from the perspective of Turkey’s elites, imperialism in Syria appeared to be a win-win proposition because it served Turkish capital accumulation, Sunni consolidation, and could potentially lead to the defeat of the Kurds, the AKP’s attempt to project power was not overwhelmingly popular within Turkey. Battles between jihadis, Assadists, and the Kurds led to a massive influx of refugees into Turkey. The opposition — primarily the Republican People’s Party (CHP), as well as the newly formed anti-immigrant fringe Victory Party and the Good Party (a liberalized offshoot of the MHP) — treated the refugee crisis as Erdoğan’s greatest foreign policy failure.

Subsequently, anti-Syrian sentiment grew. In the eyes of many Turks, Syrian refugees came to be perceived as the source of not only crime, but an alleged Islamist conspiracy to undermine secularism and Turkish identity. From the mid-2010s until the end of 2024, a race to the bottom between the (centrist-Kemalist) Republican People’s Party and small far-right parties ensued to monopolize this sentiment.

The overthrow of Assad seems to have reversed this wave, even though the fate of refugees remains uncertain. Erdoğanists now market their Syrian policy as the government’s main foreign policy success. Going even further, Islamist newspapers see in this “revolution” (as they call it) the rebirth of Turkish control over the Islamic world. Mainstream opposition forces (primarily the centrist-Kemalist CHP) are now on the defensive and seek to draw attention away from Syria. But among the sections of Turkey’s political class supportive of their country’s adventurism, there is a general sense that the Kurds pose a serious obstacle to the more ambitious aspects of the Islamist program.

There are almost daily clashes between the Kurds and the Turkish-controlled SNA. Hundreds of people have died in the last several weeks. At the same time, the government has been carrying out a crackdown on Kurdish mayors in Turkey, along with journalists who appear to have ties with the Kurdish movement. The crackdown frequently extends to Kemalist, leftist, and liberal journalists and academics, and even to far rightists who refuse to join the governing bloc.

Some commentators in Turkey see these ongoing crackdowns as part of an effort to put tactical pressure on the opposition, rather than simply a contradictory stance: Erdoğanists want to gain as much ground as possible before they reach a deal with the Kurds. The expanding operations are negotiation tactics instead of signs of confusion or conflicts within the government, as some other commentators (such as Istanbul mayor Ekremİmamoğlu, CHP) hold.

However, other interpretations are possible: the AKP has used its media empire to convey the message that it views Trump’s election as auguring a new moment in global politics, in which repressive governance and expansionism will be more legitimate than in any time in the recent past. Rather than viewing the AKP’s ongoing crackdown on dissent as a negotiation tactic for a coming peace deal with the Kurds, the governing bloc might be abusing the possibility of a peace deal to establish a dictatorship in Turkey that no electoral process or uprising will be able to shake.

For now, HTS appears to be aligned with Turkey’s position on the Kurds, in spite of mixed signals. In the first few days following the overthrow of Assad, al-Jolani resisted the SNA’s extremism regarding the Kurds, creating hopes among the latter that he might be a potential partner. HTS has even met the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces during the last few weeks. Recognition of Kurdish autonomy and Kurdish rights in the constitution were among the discussed items. Some speculate that Turkey has offered tacit approval of these talks, though there are those who see in the HTS’s actions as a partial divergence from Ankara.

Nevertheless, there are real signs of Erdoğanist-HTS alignment on the Kurdish issue. Right before al-Jolani declared his presidency, HTS convened a “Syrian Revolution Victory Conference,” where the SNA dissolved itself and joined the newly founded Syrian Arab Army. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and militias of non-Sunni groups were not invited to the conference, signalling the formation of the new military apparatus on solidly ethnic and religious sectarian grounds, with sizable jihadi flanks.

Al-Jolani’s visits to Saudi Arabia and Turkey didn’t resolve these ambiguities. There were more signs (yet still no declaration) regarding promises of integration of Kurdish armed forces into the Syrian army. Yet, al-Jolani solidly communicated his stance against not only federalism but Kurdish autonomy. However, regional security forces for Kurds, as well as the constitutional recognition of their rights and language, still seems to be on the table. These vague commitments notwithstanding, the extent to which Ankara or al-Jolani will be willing to accept some version of Kurdish autonomy is deeply unclear.

Along with the Kurdish issue, another source of uncertainty for Erdoğanists is the multiplicity of players in the region. Turkey will have to vie not only with Israel but also the Saudis, the United Arab Emirates (and more distantly, Western and Eastern powers) in its attempts to control the new Syria. Qatar seems to be more aligned with Turkish desires, as evidenced by both countries’ support for Islamist forces throughout the region to the dismay of the Saudis, but even these two groups do not share an identical set of interests.

The cash and natural resource reserves of the Arab monarchies make them unavoidable partners for Syria, given that Russia and Iran can no longer smoothly serve these purposes due to the overthrow of the regime they supported, and Turkey does not have as much to offer in terms of cash and resources. This was one reason al-Jolani visited Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammed bin Salman after declaring his presidency, and only then Turkey. However, there seem to be more convoluted reasons behind his actions as well. There is widespread and credible speculation that al-Jolani and company are trying to convey the message that the Gulf monarchies need not fear Islamist rule, and also that they are not puppets of Turkey. Counterintuitively, Turkey is said to have facilitated this thinking, making the competition between these players all the more difficult to decipher.

Furthermore, shortly after al-Jolani assumed the position of president he met with Turkey’s foreign minister and announced plans to establish Turkish airbases in Syria. Based on anonymous Syrian and foreign sources “not authorised to speak to the media,” Reuters also added that Turkey is likely to train Syria’s new military. Pro-government Turkish news outlets featured more details regarding business and military plans throughout Syria, with specific ports, routes, towns, and regions meticulously specified.

How much of this will the monarchies tolerate? It is too early to tell. With or without al-Jolani, the new Syria will be one of the primary battlegrounds for the rivalry between Turkey and Saudi Arabia to lead Sunni forces in the region. In the years coming, the two countries will compete over the right to build Syria’s infrastructure and chart new paths for the flows of energy between the Middle East and Europe.

It is still unclear what stance the United States will take on these issues. Trump and sources close to him have sent mixed messages regarding American military presence and initiatives in Syria, going back on Trumpists’ earlier declarations of quick withdrawal and nonengagement. It is even less clear whether Trump’s America would side with Turkey or Saudi Arabia in their bid to control infrastructural overhaul, capital accumulation, military restructuring, and energy flows in and through Syria.

The dream scenario for American imperialism would be a toned-down Turkish imperialism, al-Jolani leadership without its more radical Islamist elements, and the cooperation of both Turkey and Syria with Saudi-led monarchies in further eroding Iranian and Russian influence over Syria. However, given the multiplicity of forces in the country, the turbulence within Turkey, and the disunity of the Gulf monarchies, which are still far from acting as a bloc, the Trumpist fantasy that the new Syria can turn into a haven for Western-friendly regional actors without any serious American involvement (and high price tags for Americans) is bound to crash hard against reality.

The frequently voiced fear in some foreign policy circles — that Turkey is seeking to replace Iran as the leader of resistance against the West and Israel — is also unfounded. Erdoğanists are not principled opponents of either Western imperialism or Israel; they are, rather, advocates of a loosely formulated imperialist project of their own, which continuously morphs under shifting geopolitical balances, domestic pressures, and pragmatic considerations. Likewise, it would be completely misguided to expect democracy or equitable peace from a Syrian regime that is under heavy Erdoğanist influence. Neither the world hegemon nor any aspiring regional hegemon is in a position to bring liberty and dignity to Syrians. (IPA Service)

Courtesy: Jacobin