Renewed Race For Gulf-India Aviation Sector Trophy As Stakes Increase Further

By K Raveendran

Strong signs of undercurrents are emerging in the aviation space between India and the Gulf. There is renewed tussle over landing rights — the coveted permissions that determine which airlines get to fly where, how often, and with how many seats. For years, this battleground has been tilted in favour of Gulf-based giants, particularly Emirates and later Etihad, both of which have entrenched themselves so deeply in the India-Gulf sector that they dominate passenger volumes, especially among the vast Indian expatriate population in the Gulf. But recent movements suggest that the terrain may be shifting again, albeit not necessarily in India’s favour, raising concerns about whether past missteps are being repeated or even institutionalized.

The first wave of this dominance came during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years, a period that aviation experts and political observers often recall with unease. During this time, India’s aviation rights — especially in the high-demand Gulf sector — were offered up with a generosity that baffled many. The most glaring beneficiary was Emirates, which capitalised on India’s fragmented aviation policy and the aggressive diplomacy of Dubai government. The role of Praful Patel, then Union Civil Aviation Minister, and N. Chandrababu Naidu, then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, has often come under scrutiny for facilitating deals that disproportionately benefited Gulf carriers. The underlying implication, often whispered but never proven in courts, was that kickbacks were exchanged for each seat Emirates filled on its India routes — a suggestion that continues to fester in the collective memory of Indian aviation policy circles.

At that time, Emirates enjoyed a distinct monopoly, owing largely to the fact that it was the sole UAE-based carrier of international standing. With Dubai’s rise as a global aviation hub and Emirates’ unmatched marketing muscle, the airline quickly scaled up its footprint in India, locking in prime time slots and lucrative routes with little resistance. In effect, Emirates became the default choice for millions of Indians flying to the Gulf and beyond, eclipsing the capacity and visibility of Indian carriers like Air India. This asymmetry didn’t just result in a business setback for Indian aviation — it triggered a slow bleeding of India’s aviation sovereignty. The profits, the passenger data, the traffic, and the global prestige of being a gateway carrier all accrued to Emirates, while Indian airlines floundered under the weight of policy paralysis and state apathy.

Things became even more complicated when Etihad entered the fray. As Abu Dhabi’s flagship carrier, Etihad’s arrival introduced a new axis of influence in the India-Gulf aviation theatre. Where earlier it was just Emirates leveraging its ties with Indian authorities to expand its rights, now both Emirates and Etihad were competing not just with each other but also for the same slice of the Indian aviation pie. The diplomatic equation thus had to be recalibrated. No longer could Dubai’s interests automatically translate into Emirates’ gain. Abu Dhabi, backed by the UAE federal structure, began asserting its claim, demanding equitable treatment for Etihad.

India, in turn, found itself in a quagmire. Granting more rights to one Gulf emirate risked offending the other. But instead of revisiting its entire bilateral framework or strengthening Indian carriers to hold their ground, Indian policymakers chose the path of least resistance: acquiescing to more requests from both sides. The result was that foreign carriers ended up with the lion’s share of rights, while Indian carriers, with limited international ambitions and fleet capacity at the time, were left watching from the sidelines.

Fast forward to today, and the script seems eerily familiar. Both Emirates and Etihad are once again lobbying for increased landing rights and additional seat allocations. This comes at a time when the dynamics of the aviation industry have evolved significantly. There is renewed focus on strategic aviation corridors, a post-pandemic surge in travel, and a stronger realisation globally that aviation is not just commerce — it is a soft power instrument. Yet despite all this, India appears to be on the verge of conceding even more ground. That this is happening without a thorough review of how previous concessions impacted national interests is particularly disheartening.

A disturbing undertone to this situation is the re-emergence — or rather, the persistence — of the very individuals who were instrumental in the original giveaways. These actors, once thought to have exited the stage after presiding over what some call the ‘Great Indian Aviation Surrender,’ are now reappearing in various roles, emboldened by their earlier success and perhaps by the lack of accountability. The risk here is not just the erosion of market share but the institutionalization of a defeatist approach to aviation diplomacy, where India negotiates from a position of weakness rather than asserting its growing economic and geopolitical clout.

However, the new player that adds an unexpected twist to this ongoing narrative is IndiGo. As India’s largest airline by a considerable margin, IndiGo is no longer content with its domestic dominance. It wants in on the Gulf bonanza, and it is using its size, efficiency, and growing international aspirations to demand a bigger seat at the table. This changes the calculus considerably. For the first time in years, there’s an Indian private player with both the appetite and the capacity to challenge Gulf airlines on their turf. IndiGo’s entry into the fray has the potential to reshape the competitive landscape — provided, of course, the government aligns national policy with corporate ambition.

To avoid repeating past mistakes, India must initiate a root-and-branch review of its bilateral air service agreements. The country needs a clear aviation doctrine — one that articulates when, how, and under what conditions foreign airlines may operate in India. This doctrine must prioritize Indian interests, encourage domestic capacity building, and align with broader national objectives. It must also be shielded from short-term political compulsions and the influence of lobbying networks that have historically undermined strategic policymaking. (IPA Service)