Hegseth disputes claims of depleted US interceptors

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has rejected a report that the military has exhausted nearly 80 per cent of its principal high-altitude missile interceptors during the war with Iran, insisting that American forces retain the weapons required to sustain operations.

Hegseth described the account as untrue after CNN reported that the Pentagon had used almost four-fifths of the interceptor inventory for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as THAAD, compared with levels held before the conflict. The report also estimated that roughly half of the military’s Patriot interceptors had been expended.

The Defence Secretary did not release inventory figures or provide a detailed breakdown of missiles fired, delivered or held in reserve. Missile stockpile data are classified, making it difficult to independently establish either the Pentagon’s remaining holdings or the precise proportion consumed during months of combat.

The dispute has sharpened scrutiny of Washington’s ability to maintain air defences across the Gulf while preserving enough advanced munitions for other potential crises. THAAD and Patriot batteries have been central to efforts to defend US troops, military installations and regional partners from Iranian ballistic missiles.

THAAD is designed to destroy short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during the final phase of flight. Its interceptors are manufactured by Lockheed Martin, while Northrop Grumman supplies key elements of the system. Patriot batteries, including the PAC-3 configuration, operate at lower altitudes and are used against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft.

The two systems have overlapping roles but cannot be freely substituted in every operational setting. Commanders may fire more than one interceptor at an incoming missile to improve the probability of a successful engagement, accelerating consumption during sustained attacks.

Concern over availability has grown as Iranian forces have continued launching missiles and drones against US positions and allied countries. Even when interception rates remain high, the imbalance between inexpensive offensive weapons and costly defensive missiles creates a prolonged logistical strain.

The Pentagon has repeatedly maintained that commanders possess sufficient munitions for assigned missions. Military leaders have also argued that public estimates based on production rates, budget documents and known deployments may not capture classified reserves, emergency transfers or missiles already under contract.

That position has not ended questions from lawmakers and defence specialists. Earlier assessments indicated that the Iran campaign had consumed large shares of several precision-strike and air-defence inventories. Officials have acknowledged that rebuilding some categories of weapons will take months or years because of specialised components, limited production lines and lengthy testing requirements.

Washington has moved to accelerate replenishment. The government this week signed agreements worth more than $3 billion with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to expand the production of components used in Patriot and THAAD interceptors. The plan is intended to triple capacity for Patriot-related parts and quadruple output for THAAD components.

The initiative also seeks additional suppliers for critical rocket motors and ignition systems, reducing dependence on single production sources. Defence planners have been pressing manufacturers to add facilities, hire skilled workers and place advance orders for materials that can require long lead times.

Industry expansion, however, will not immediately replace missiles already fired. Production of sophisticated interceptors involves guidance electronics, propulsion systems, specialised chemicals and extensive quality controls. Bottlenecks can persist even when Congress provides additional funding.

The Pentagon has sought tens of billions of dollars to replenish weapons used against Iran and strengthen inventories for future contingencies. The administration argues that larger multi-year contracts will give companies the certainty needed to invest in new capacity.

The stockpile debate also carries implications beyond the Middle East. Patriot systems remain important to Ukraine’s defence against Russian ballistic missiles, while THAAD and other interceptors form part of US planning for possible threats in the Indo-Pacific. Any sharp reduction in available missiles could force commanders to reconsider deployments, training expenditure and transfers to partners.

Gulf governments are closely watching the dispute because their security depends partly on access to American interception technology. Several countries operate Patriot batteries, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have invested heavily in layered missile defences. Sustained Iranian attacks have nevertheless demonstrated that even advanced networks can be strained by repeated salvos.

Hegseth has framed concerns about shortages as exaggerated and has said the administration is rebuilding what it calls the “arsenal of freedom”. His assurances place the emphasis on current operational capability rather than publicly disclosed inventory percentages.