By Nitya Chakraborty

Former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s announcement last week to return to her country in December this year ending her exile in India, has created big interests in global diplomatic circles, apart from India and Bangladesh. In an interview to the Reuters, she said that she intends to return to her own country voluntarily to face justice and revive her party Awami League. She was candid that she would lead an active political life.

Sheikh Hasina left Dhaka on August 5, 2024 at the height of the anti discrimination movement of the students and since then, the deposed PM has been living in India enjoying all the facilities given by the Indian government. Narendra Modi government did not respond to the extradition demand made by the Bangladesh government a number of times. Right now, Sheikh Hasina is facing a death sentence for her alleged role in the killing of students in 2024 protests.

So what suddenly happened that Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of the founder of Bangladesh Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was murdered on August 15, 1975 by some rebel army officers, has suddenly planned to return to Dhaka within next six months. Sheikh Hasina is not a political novice. She must have done some planning. It is also fair to assume that she has consulted the Indian government leadership. India have a stake in Sheikh Hasina’s future. Hasina and her advisers must have held consultations with other countries and international legal bodies.

As regards Bangladesh reaction, the BNP government views this as a potential trap to incite unrest but still there is some restraint on the part of the BNP administration. Sources say that once she returns, she will be treated as per law. Significantly, Hasina said in her interview that upon her return, she would expose her farcical trial at the International Criminal Court. There are reasons to believe that the deposed PM and her advisers many of whom are based in UK and USA have assessed the legal implications and the possibility of internationalise the trial in Bangladesh once it takes place.

For India, Hasina’s agreeing to return to Bangladesh on her own is a big relief as far as India-Bangladesh relations are concerned. BNP government has been insisting on extradition and there is the common view in Bangladesh that no improvement in bilateral relations with India can take place unless Sheikh Hasina is handed over to the Bangladesh government. That irritant is now over and it is easier for the Indian foreign ministry to make new moves in improving relations with Dhaka.

New Delhi has to take some supplementary moves to counter the challenge of China in Bangladesh. The visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to China in the last week of June opened up a new era of strategic relationship between the two countries. The signing of the Teesta Comprehensive Development and Restoration Treaty has serious implications for India’s river system in the north eastern part. Hasina’s going back on her own has created the right environment for the Indian side to take up bilateral issues in a friendly manner.

The BNP government in Bangladesh is now set to complete five months. In this period, PM Tarique Rahman has performed with restraint. He is under tremendous pressure from the main opposition Jamaat E Islami which always takes up any issue and gives it anti-India slant. The NCP also is equally vocal against India, though both differ in their respective approaches. BNP is the only party now in Bangladesh Parliament on which India can depend for saner approach to bilateral issues. If Hasina’s return decision opens up the possibility of better understanding between BNP government and India, that will be of positive development for New Delhi.

As of now, Bangladesh is having political stability with BNP ruling with absolute majority in Parliament. But the voters in Bangladesh are very sensitive. They exercise their franchise with vengeance on the basis of experience. Bangladesh will be having local polls in October this year. That will be the first statewise polls after February 12 national elections of 2026. The preparation for the polls has started. The Election Commission will release the electoral rolls in August.

Though Awami League is banned, all estimates made by the media sources put the Party’s present strength between 15 and 20 per cent just below BNP and Jammat. In the last two months, Sheikh Hasina has addressed her AL supporters online. More and more viewers have heard Hasina’s comments on the political situation and future plan of action. Dhaka based analysts say that by announcing her return to Bangladesh in December from her exile, Hasina seeks to energise her supporters and tell them to participate in local elections in a big way.AL members will contest local polls individually. But the total strength of the candidates and the winners will be known. Awami League wants to test the political waters through the October local polls.

In the last two months, the Awami League members and even leaders have started moving in districts. In many areas, the BNP and the AL members have been coordinating in rural developmental activities. The AL league members are drawing on the same legacy of the 1971 liberation struggle which Jamaat lacks. There are efforts to have a working relationship with the BNP and AL at the base level.

However, there is also a possibility that Bangladesh politics will again be hot after Hasina returns and trial begins. Jammat and NCP will continue to put pressure on the BNP government not to dilute its earlier position on punishment to Hasina. The trial may lead to polarization against Awami League. So that way, the unfolding of events in Bangladesh after Hasina’s return is still unpredictable. It is to be seen how Sheikh Hasina, the tried warrior of many battles faces the most formidable challenge in her political career in December. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

The monsoon session of the parliament beginning next week from July 21 is going to be politically very significant on account of delimitation and women reservation bills, passage of which can alter the political map of the country. Union Minister Ramdas Athawale has said with confidence that the bills will be passed during the upcoming session, while cracks have developed within INDIA bloc in meeting the challenge to block them, as they had successful done in the Budget Session of the Parliament on April 17.

The three bills were introduced in Lok Sabha on April 16, 2026, namely – (i) the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026, (ii) the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, and (iii) the Delimitation Bill, 2026. However, on April 17 the Constitution amendment bill to implement reservation for women in legislatures in 2029 and increase the number of seats in the Lok Sabha was defeated during an extended sitting of the Parliament, with 298 members voting in support of the bill and 230 MPs voting against it. Out of the 528 members who voted, the bill required 352 votes for a two-thirds majority.

The RPI (A) leader Athawale, who is an ally of the BJP in NDA, and a Union Minister, has said that the bills are expected to be passed in the wake of some members of TMC and Shiv Sena (UBT) supporting the NDA and the DMK parting ways with the Congress. He has also claimed, “We have a two-thirds majority. Women’s Reservation Bill and Delimitation Bill will be passed.”

Athawale seemed to be big mouthed, even though we have seen how several INDIA bloc allies TMC and Shiv Sena (UBT) have undergone “split” that has allegedly been caused by the BJP by adopting carrot and stick policy. That it has weakened the INDIA bloc’s strength in Lok Sabha is true. However, it is wrong that NDA has now two-thirds majority in the parliament to get any constitutional amendment passed.

Nevertheless, cracks have appeared in the INDIA bloc, and some of the leaders from its constituents have said that they will support the delimitation bill if their demands were met and the bills will be revised accordingly. It is certainly an ominous signal for the INDIA bloc in meeting the delimitation challenge in the parliament.

One of the logic the BJP leaders, especially the Union Minister of Home Amit Shah has been giving has unfortunately got legitimacy among a section of opposition. He says that 50 per cent seats will be increased in every state, and there will be no injustice to anyone. Many opposition leaders believe it to be fair, as their statements reflect.

Nevertheless, they have missed the flaw in the logic of proportionate increase in seats. For example, Kerala has 20 seats and Uttar Pradesh has 80. The difference is now 60. When their seats will be proportionately increased by 50 per cent their seats will be 30 and 120, and the difference will be increased from 60 to 90. Here is the basis on which North Indian Hindi Belt states will establish political dominance over all others, especially Southern India, the chief beneficiary of which will be BJP. That is why BJP is pushing for delimitation before 2029 Lok Sabha election, on the basis of 2011 census, and not ready to wait for the Census 2027 result.

The opposition parties have perceived this conspiracy of the BJP, and therefore they unitedly defeated the delimitation and other two bill in the Budget Session 2026 on April 17. However, the cracks seen now has made the INDIA bloc weak, and its leadership will need urgently cement the cracks to defeat the bills again in the Monsoon Session.

One of the INDIA bloc constituent NCP (Sharad Pawar) leader and its working president Supriya Sule said on July 15 that her party would consider supporting the proposed delimitation bill if the Centre guarantees a 50 per cent increase in Lok Sabha seats for every state, though she has firmly ruled out any alliance with the BJP.

He statement came after the senior leaders of both the factions of the NCP – NCP (Ajit) and NCP (Sharad Pawar) – separately met CM Devendra Fadnavis of Maharashtra late on July 14. The meeting led to speculation that both the factions will be going to merge under the BJP’s watch.

The speculation has some basis in the past political developments in Maharashtra, where six MPs of Shiv Sena (UBT) have already switched to Shiv Sena (Shinde) camp. Though Sule has voiced opposition’s concern, her statement must be taken seriously by INDIA bloc leadership and talk to the opposition leaders of all opposition parties before it is too late.

Sule’s statement made in Mumbai is significant because she has said, “Parties like the DMK, the SP and ourselves had stated that we would consider if the bill provides for 50 per cent increase in seats for all states.” She has also said, “We will formulate our stance once the bill is introduced in consultation within the INDIA bloc.”

Another important statement was made by Shiv Sena (UBT) MP Sanjay Raut on July 16. He said that opposition would oppose the proposed delimitation bill but could reconsider its stand if the Centre incorporates amendments suggested by Opposition parties. “When the bill does come, we will all sit down and decide, and a collective decision will be taken about what to do,” he said.

Though reports have emerged that SP and DMK are also likely to switch sides to support delimitation bills on conditions, their leaders have category denied that they will be supporting the BJP’s move on delimitation. They have insisted that they will decide on the issue in INDIA bloc meeting scheduled to be held on July 20, just before the monsoon session.

Congress held a high-level meeting of the Parliamentary Strategy Group at 10 Janpath on July 16, which was chaired by Congress Parliamentary Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, to finalise the party’s floor strategy during Monsoon Session. INDIA bloc is likely to decide further strategy on its July 20 meet in New Delhi. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

Nitin Gadkari has invested considerable political capital in presenting ethanol-blended petrol as a national solution to several problems at once. It is meant to cut India’s crude oil import bill, reduce emissions, support farmers, create a market for agricultural produce and strengthen energy security. Each of these objectives has merit. Yet the transport minister’s increasingly combative defence of E20 petrol is turning what should have been a carefully managed technological transition into a crisis of public confidence.

The controversy is no longer limited to claims about a possible conflict of interest arising from the involvement of Gadkari’s sons in businesses linked to ethanol production. The minister has repeatedly said that ethanol accounts for only a small part of their commercial interests and that he receives no financial benefit from the blending programme. That explanation may satisfy the narrow test of personal enrichment, but it does not dispose of the broader question of public propriety.

Conflict of interest is not established merely by proving that a minister or relative made money from a policy. It also concerns whether a reasonable citizen might perceive that a public official’s advocacy overlaps with family business interests. The appropriate response to such a perception is maximum transparency, independent scrutiny and emotional distance. Gadkari has instead treated many questions as politically motivated attacks, making his defence sound less persuasive with each repetition.

The minister’s larger problem is that the argument has moved beyond his family. Millions of motorists are asking why they must use a fuel that may provide lower mileage, particularly when owners of older vehicles were given little effective choice. The government maintains that extensive testing has found no widespread engine damage and that the fall in fuel efficiency is marginal. Studies and statements from sections of the automobile industry have supported the safety of E20, including for several vehicle categories.

But official assurances do not answer every consumer concern. Ethanol has a lower energy content than petrol, making some decline in mileage physically plausible even when an engine remains undamaged. The precise impact varies according to the vehicle, engine calibration, driving conditions and whether the model was designed for higher ethanol content. Owners of vehicles manufactured before E20 compatibility became standard cannot be expected to dismiss uncertainty simply because newer models are equipped to handle the blend.

The C-Voter findings expose the depth of the credibility gap. More than half of supporters of the governing alliance reportedly said they did not want to use E20 petrol, while resistance was even higher among respondents outside the alliance. The survey also indicated widespread concern about mileage, vehicle performance and the price charged for blended fuel. That opposition cannot easily be dismissed as a campaign by political rivals or petroleum interests when it extends to BJP voters and activists.

Public resistance is particularly damaging because ethanol policy was initially sold as an economic gain for consumers. Political claims over the years created expectations that increased ethanol use would substantially reduce petrol prices. Instead, motorists are buying E20 petrol at prices that do not visibly reflect the lower energy value of ethanol or the savings generated through reduced dependence on imported crude. Consumers see no direct reward for accepting the transition, while the risks, real or perceived, remain theirs.

Gadkari’s assertion that people unwilling to use ethanol-blended petrol can buy costlier unblended fuel worsens this imbalance. It frames consumer choice not as a legitimate requirement in a transition but as a privilege for which sceptical motorists should be penalised. The remark carries an unmistakable suggestion that those questioning E20 are obstructing national progress and should bear a financial cost for their resistance.

That approach is politically unwise. A government cannot mandate a major change in the composition of a universally used fuel, reduce the availability of alternatives and then imply that unconvinced citizens are being unreasonable. Motorists did not choose the engines in their existing vehicles on the assumption that fuel standards would be accelerated years ahead of the earlier timetable. Many bought cars and two-wheelers whose manuals indicated compatibility with E10 rather than E20. Their anxiety is not an ideological objection to renewable energy; it is an ownership and consumer-protection issue.

The rollout also suffers from weak communication. Petrol pumps often do not offer meaningful differentiation between fuel grades. Vehicle owners struggle to obtain model-specific guidance from manufacturers. Warranty language can be difficult to interpret, and there is no widely trusted mechanism for compensating motorists who believe higher ethanol content has damaged components or sharply reduced performance. The government has emphasised national savings and investment in ethanol capacity, but it has not communicated individual costs with comparable clarity.

The argument that reversing E20 could endanger nearly ₹1 lakh crore in annual financing and investment linked to ethanol infrastructure is an argument for better planning, not for suppressing consumer choice. Sunk investments cannot become the sole justification for continuing a policy unchanged. Infrastructure should serve public policy; public policy should not become captive to infrastructure created before doubts were adequately resolved.

The latest indication that the government may proceed more cautiously with blends beyond E20 suggests that policymakers recognise the political and technical risks. Standards for E22, E25 and still higher blends may exist, but moving towards them without resolving the E20 dispute would deepen distrust. Long-duration testing of E25 on E10- and E20-compliant vehicles is itself evidence that compatibility questions require more than rhetorical certainty.

A credible course would preserve E20 while restoring access to E10 or unblended petrol at a fair, transparently calculated price during a defined transition period. Fuel pumps should clearly display ethanol content, manufacturers should publish model-by-model compatibility information, and an independent technical authority should investigate complaints. Pricing should account for differences in energy content instead of asking consumers to pay the same amount for potentially fewer kilometres.

Gadkari’s achievements in highway building and infrastructure have given him a reputation as one of the government’s most effective ministers. That makes his handling of the ethanol debate more surprising. He is arguing as though technical confidence should automatically produce public consent. It does not. Consent is built through disclosure, choice, fair pricing and respect for citizens who raise questions.

By portraying opposition as ignorance, conspiracy or unwillingness to support farmers, the minister risks converting a defensible energy policy into a test of political obedience. E20 may ultimately prove safe and economically beneficial for most vehicles. But Gadkari will not establish that case by sounding hostile to the people who remain unconvinced. The more he insists that sceptics must simply pay more, the clearer it becomes that the government has secured a blending target without securing the trust required to sustain it. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

Inflation – both wholesale and retail – in India has been rising sharply since January 2026. Wholesale inflation for all commodities rose from 1.19 per cent in January 2026 to 9.87 per cent in June 2026, while retail inflation during this period rose from 2.74 per cent to 4.38 per cent. It is obvious that the rise in wholesale inflation is not yet fully reflected in the retail inflation though it has accelerated this month, breaching the Reserve Bank’s 4% target for the first time in 17 months.

It is a clear indication that the Union Government of India is no longer able to absorb the full impact of the sharp rise in wholesale inflation. It has already started spilling over to end users pushing the retail inflation up, and it may accelerate further due to multiple external and internal reasons.

According to the data released on July 14, the all India Wholesale Price Index (WPI) inflation for June 2026 was 9.87 per cent on year-on-year (YoY) basis, compared to 9.68 per cent in May 2026. The index for All Commodities for June 2026 stands at 110.2, whereas it was 109.9 in May 2026.

YoY inflation rates based on WPI for major groups, namely, Primary Articles, Fuel and Power, and Manufactured Products were 7.0 per cent, 27.41 per cent, and 7.48 per cent, respectively in June 2026, compared to 4.99 per cent, 30.33 per cent, and 7.48 per cent, respectively in May 2026.

In January 2026, wholesale inflation for food articles was in negative (-1.3 per cent), which rose to 5.49 per cent in June 2026. For non-food articles it was 3.98 per cent and 11.07 per cent respectively, while for minerals it rose from negative (-0.45 per cent) to 9.45 per cent.

Wholesale inflation for all commodities jumped to 3.98 per cent in March from 2.18 per cent in February and 8.36 per cent in April, primarily due to West Asia crisis on account of Iran war. Mineral oil inflation jumped from negative (-4.19 per cent) in January to 4.26 per cent in March, 40.74 per cent in April, and 49.82 per cent in May. In June it eased to 46.48 per cent. For crude petroleum and natural gas, inflation was negative (-9.95 per cent) in January, 26.13 per cent in March, 56.31 per cent in April, and 61.51 per cent in May. In June it eased to 34.75 per cent.

The indices for Primary Articles, Fuel and Power, and Manufactured Products are 116.1, 111.1, and 107.8, respectively, in June 2026, whereas they were 113.7, 113, and 107.8, respectively, in May 2026.

Across groups, ‘Mineral Oils (containing Petroleum Products)’, ‘Food Articles’, ‘Manufacture of Basic Metals’, and ‘Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products’, have been major drivers of WPI inflation in June 2026.

The WPI Food Index (weight=24.99 per cent) consists of ‘Food Articles’ from Primary Articles major group, and ‘Manufacture of Food Products’ from Manufactured Products major group. It observed a YoY inflation of 6.14 per cent in June 2026, compared to 4.49 per cent in May 2026.

The final index for the month of April 2026 has been revised from 108.8 (Provisional estimate) to 108.9. Accordingly, WPI inflation has been revised from 8.26 per cent, as per provisional estimate to 8.36 as per the final estimate.

The Final Estimate of WPI (Base Year 2022-23) for the month of April 2026 has been compiled with a weighted response rate of 97.5 per cent.

The Provisional Estimate of WPI (Base Year 2022-23) for the month of June 2026 has been compiled with a weighted response rate of 82.6 per cent.

It should be recalled that wholesale inflation of all commodities in April-June 2024 was 1.72 per cent and in April-June 2025 there was zero inflation.

The Union Ministry of Commerce and Industry has also released provisional estimates of Output Producer Price Index (Base Year 2022-23) for the month of June 2026, along with the WPI. According to the data, All India Output PPI for All Commodities for June 2026 stands at 109.9, whereas it was 109.6 in May 2026.

WPI indices for Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Manufactured Products; and Electricity were 114.1, 121.5, 109.2, and 92.0, respectively, in June 2026, whereas they were 111.9, 122.3, 109.5, and 90.2, respectively, in May 2026.

The final index of Output PPI for the month of April 2026 has been revised from 108.6 (Provisional estimate) to 108.8.

The data released for Provisional Estimates of Trial Input Producer Price Index (IPPI) (Base Year 2022-23) for the month of June shows that All India trial Input PPI for Manufacturing Sector for June 2026 stands at 107.1. Trial Input PPI for Manufacturing Sector for the month of April 2026 has been revised from 104.9 (provisional estimate) to 104.2 (final estimate).

As for latest data released on retail inflation on July 13, retail inflation based on Consumer Price Index in June, 2026 was 4.38%, while year on year food inflation, based on Consumer Food Price Index, in June, 2026 was 5.32%.

Year-on-year retail inflation rate based on All India Consumer Price Index (CPI) with base year 2024 for the month of June, 2026 over June, 2025 was 4.38% (Provisional). Corresponding inflation rates for rural and urban were 4.74% and 3.92%, respectively.

Year-on-year retail food inflation rate based on All India Consumer Food Price Index (CFPI) for the month of June, 2026 over June, 2025 was 5.32% (Provisional). Corresponding inflation rates for rural and urban were 5.45% and 5.09%, respectively.

Year-on-year Housing inflation rate for the month of June, 2026 was 2.10% (Provisional) and the corresponding inflation rates for rural and urban were 2.66% and 1.90%, respectively. (IPA Service)

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By Nantoo Banerjee

Fake news is flooding across India’s nearly half-a-billion social media and messaging platforms, threatening trust, relationships, and democratic processes. The country, boasting almost a billion internet subscriptions, is facing a growing crisis of misinformation with digital content spreading faster than truth across the online community. To add to the concern are Artificial Intelligence (AI) generated images accelerating the spread of digital misinformation by creating highly realistic but completely fabricated visuals that strengthen fake headlines. With AI tools producing these synthetic images cheaply and at scale, fact-checkers struggle to keep up, particularly during emotionally charged breaking news cycles and global conflicts, making audiences more likely to believe and share unverified claims. Seemingly realistic and “probative” images—those that provide strong visual evidence to false headlines—significantly boost a reader’s belief in the misinformation.

Fabricated visuals of politicians, and unverified crisis footage frequently go viral across largely unregulated social media platforms, often before fact-checking algorithms can intervene. The AI technology has fuelled beyond political and current events a massive surge in non-consensual deepfakes and manipulated images targeted at individuals, particularly women. Media scepticism is undermined by media cynicism. While encountering suspicious media, few care to pause and utilize tools like reverse image searches to verify the source’s origin before sharing. Not many net users spend time to understand how these images are created and identify common digital artifacts to act as effective interventions. Interestingly, a 2024 Pew survey showed as many as 65 percent of Indians consider fake news a very big problem, while 81 percent saw it as at least moderately concerning.

AI-generated deepfakes now pose an urgent global security and social trust crisis. Fuelled by cheap, accessible AI tools, synthetic media—including video face-swaps and voice clones—are heavily weaponized to commit large-scale financial fraud, manipulate elections, and generate non-consensual sexualized imagery targeting women and children. The proliferation of these digital forgeries undermines public discourse and makes it increasingly difficult for the public to discern fact from fiction. Because they are so convincing, deepfakes threaten organizational reputations and contribute to a broader atmosphere of doubt, where genuine evidence can be falsely dismissed. Several organizations and governments are actively fighting back by ramping up protective measures. Regulatory watchdogs advise deploying real-time detection programs, applying digital watermarks, and shifting to a “zero-trust” authentication mindset.

While the pervasive nature of synthetic media has triggered widespread legislative and regulatory crackdowns, India’s effort to enforce strict guidelines for social media intermediaries is highly laudable – especially, the latest statement by MeitY (Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology) secretary Sundaram Krishnan, suggesting that the government is looking into a separate legal framework for AI. Earlier this month, Krishnan told a business gathering in Delhi that India has been relying on a combination of IT rules, the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, and criminal codes like the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) to manage AI. The proposed new legislation aims to proactively regulate emerging risks and cybersecurity threats while balancing ongoing AI innovation.

The industry as well as the public are concerned. Obviously, the existing broad based legal framework and intermediary rules are not sufficient to address AI-related issues such as deepfakes, misinformation and online harms. The rapid proliferation of generative AI tools has made deepfakes, misinformation, and online harms critical issues across the tech industry, prompting governments and international organizations to step up regulations. These advancements present a variety of tangible threats such as disinformation, financial fraud and extortion and personal harassment. Synthetic video and audio clips are increasingly used to manipulate public discourse and interfere with democratic processes. The United Nations (UNHCR) warned that AI-generated deepfakes are spreading life-threatening misinformation to displaced populations.

In India, cybercriminals regularly use voice cloning and video synthesis to impersonate executives and family members, especially pensioners and elderly, facilitating wire transfer fraud and extortion. Deepfake technology is being frequently weaponized to create non-consensual intimate imagery or targeted defamatory content. Platforms such as X and Instagram are required to take down identified deepfakes within three hours. The government proposes stricter continuous-labelling mandates for synthetically generated content and exploring a dedicated AI-focused legislative framework to manage these systemic risks. Globally, the International Telecommunication Union and Global AI dialogue continue to push for incorporating concrete human rights safeguards across the AI life cycle.

Lately, over 60 global data protection and privacy authorities have issued joint statements warning against the unauthorized spread of synthetic imagery of real individuals, demanding stronger safety-by-design guardrails from AI developers. International telecommunication and tech bodies are actively developing standardized watermarking and provenance tracking to help the public verify the authenticity of digital content before consuming it. Several global powers have established unique AI policy frameworks to balance innovation with safety, security, and human rights. The world’s primary regulatory approaches are led by the US, the European Union, China, and rising technology hubs like India, Singapore, and South Korea. The US uses sector-specific guidelines and executive actions rather than a single, sweeping federal law, to frame its AI policy.

The European Union’s approach is toward a comprehensive, risk-based legislative framework. The landmark EU AI Act classifies AI into different risk categories (from unacceptable to minimal risk). It strictly bans applications like social scoring, biometric categorization of sensitive traits, and untargeted facial recognition in public spaces. China follows state-centric regulations targeting the management and control of AI-generated content. It implemented administrative regulations targeting generative AI services and rules on algorithmic recommendations. These policies require providers to ensure AI outputs reflect “core socialist values,” avoid subverting state power, and explicitly label AI-generated content. South Korea has a comprehensive national safety law combined with aggressive support for AI research and development. Its AI Framework Act is one of the world’s first comprehensive laws regulating AI safety, emphasizing transparency and promotional measures to support small-to-medium enterprises and workforce preparation.

Until now, India has been focusing heavily on integrating AI to drive socioeconomic development, digital infrastructure, and national welfare. The IndiaAI Mission and various advisory frameworks highlight ethical use, bias mitigation, and the responsible deployment of AI in governance systems, supported by significant government and startup funding. The IndiaAI Mission is a comprehensive Rs. 10,372 crore initiative approved by the government to build a sovereign AI ecosystem for the country. Implemented by IndiaAI under MeitY, the mission aims to democratize computing access, build indigenous foundation models, and foster socially impactful AI solutions. It is encouraging to note that IIT Kharagpur, IIT Madras, IIT Jodhpur and IIT Mandi have been working on technology and forensic frameworks to detect deepfakes, digital fraud, voice cloning and counter AI-generated manipulation and improve online security. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

The Supreme Court vacation bench’s observation that the “heavens are not going to fall” if petitions seeking an independent investigation into the alleged misappropriation of donations to the Ayodhya Ram Temple waited for the regular judicial process was an unfortunate choice of words. The bench may have been procedurally justified in declining an urgent hearing, but its rhetorical dismissal failed to recognise the extraordinary moral, institutional and political dimensions of the controversy.

Courts routinely distinguish between genuine emergencies and matters that can await normal listing. Judicial discipline also requires caution before transferring an investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation, ordering a court-monitored inquiry or displacing the authority of the police already handling a case. Yet the legal question before the court was not merely whether money had allegedly been stolen from an ordinary organisation. It concerned offerings made by millions of devotees to one of India’s most symbolically charged religious institutions.

The distinction matters. Donations to a temple are not conventional financial transactions. They are expressions of faith, sacrifice and trust. Many contributors may never visit Ayodhya or examine the accounts of the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Teerth Kshetra Trust. They donate because they believe the money is being placed at the service of a sacred purpose. Any allegation that such offerings were systematically diverted, stolen or manipulated therefore represents more than a possible economic offence. It constitutes a breach of a deeply personal covenant between devotees and the institution receiving their money. For those devotees, the heavens have already fallen.

The scandal has moved far beyond an isolated allegation. Eight people have been arrested, substantial sums have reportedly been recovered, bank transactions and cash-counting procedures have come under scrutiny, and investigators are examining whether discrepancies were episodic or part of a wider pattern. The temple had received donations running into several billion rupees, making the scale of the institution’s financial operations comparable to that of a major enterprise. Even a theft involving a small fraction of those funds raises serious questions about internal controls, supervision, auditing and accountability.

The response of the Trust itself demonstrates that the matter cannot be treated as inconsequential. Senior office-bearers have stepped down, the leadership structure has been reshuffled, and a process has begun to appoint a professional chief executive. Cash-counting systems and security arrangements are being tightened. These are not the actions of an institution facing a trivial bookkeeping dispute. They amount to an acknowledgement that the existing mechanisms failed badly enough to threaten the credibility of the entire administration.

The Trust may argue that the arrests show the system is functioning and that corrective measures should be allowed to take effect. That position has some merit. Criminal liability must be established through evidence, and no individual should be condemned merely because political parties have found advantage in amplifying allegations. A demand for a central investigation cannot automatically be treated as proof that the state police are incapable of conducting a fair inquiry.

But the burden on the Trust and the government is higher than simply securing convictions against those immediately accused. The central issue is whether the alleged theft was enabled by structural weaknesses, administrative complicity or deliberate concealment. An investigation limited to the individuals caught handling cash could produce arrests without explaining how irregularities continued within a heavily scrutinised institution. The recovery of money is not a substitute for tracing the full chain of responsibility.

A forensic audit, disclosure of collection and deposit procedures, publication of independently verified accounts and transparent identification of supervisory failures are essential. The Trust owes this not to the opposition but to the devotees whose contributions created the institution’s financial strength. The government, which has closely associated itself with the temple’s construction and consecration, cannot suddenly insist that the Trust is an entirely autonomous religious body when questions of accountability arise.

The political consequences are equally serious. The Ram Temple was projected as the fulfilment of a historic civilisational promise and became inseparable from the Bharatiya Janata Party’s ideological identity. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s central role in the consecration ceremony underlined that political ownership. The project was presented not merely as the construction of a place of worship but as evidence that the BJP had delivered what generations of supporters had sought.

That association now creates corresponding political responsibility. A party cannot claim the emotional dividend of a religious achievement while disclaiming responsibility for failures surrounding its administration. Attempts to portray every demand for scrutiny as an attack on Hindu faith are unlikely to resolve the underlying problem. On the contrary, they risk creating the impression that faith is being used as a shield against accountability.

The opposition’s conduct also deserves examination. Congress and the Samajwadi Party will inevitably seek to convert the controversy into an electoral weapon ahead of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections. Their demand for a Supreme Court-monitored or CBI-led probe may contain political calculation. Yet political motivation does not invalidate the demand itself. Opposition parties exist partly to scrutinise institutions linked to the government. The test is whether their allegations are supported by evidence and whether their proposed remedies would improve transparency rather than merely sustain a campaign narrative.

The BJP’s greater danger lies in underestimating the electoral power of wounded religious sentiment. The Sabarimala controversy offers an instructive, though not identical, precedent. The CPI(M)-led Left Democratic Front government in Kerala defended its implementation of the Supreme Court judgment permitting women of all ages to enter the shrine. Legally, it could claim that it was enforcing a binding constitutional ruling. Politically, however, large sections of devotees saw the government’s actions as insensitive to established religious practice.

The result was a dramatic erosion of support in the 2019 Lok Sabha election. The LDF won only one of Kerala’s 20 parliamentary seats, and the CPI(M) itself later acknowledged that the Sabarimala issue had alienated sections of its traditional electorate. The episode showed that voters do not always distinguish neatly between judicial authority, administrative responsibility and political intent when they believe a sacred institution has been mishandled.

Ayodhya carries an even broader political charge. Sabarimala affected a state government whose ideological relationship with organised religion was already complex. The Ram Temple, by contrast, is foundational to the BJP’s political narrative. Any suggestion that donations offered in Lord Ram’s name were stolen under an administration identified with the temple could produce anger not only among opponents but within the party’s own support base. Religious faith is politically combustible precisely because its effects cannot be measured through conventional calculations alone. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

China is hosting the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai on July 17 to 20 the deliberations of which are expected to decide the course of AI development globally as also the scope of AI governance as also collaboration for assisting AI growth in the developing countries. The four day session will be having big participation from most of the countries including India which is a major player in the development and application of AI among the developing countries.

Interestingly, this global meet is taking place in Shanghai, the same city which held the International Conference on Computers in 2000 just after the dotcom bust. This writer attended that conference 26 six years ago and saw in his own eyes how the gathered IT experts from major countries including the USA, China and India were panicky at the dotcom bubble and looked desperately for a new model that could sustain the IT industry and improve its business.

Hard work by the techies led to new discoveries and right now, the IT industry has undergone four transitions in the last 26 years after the Shanghai conference to reach the present level in 2026 when AI is at the top of the new transition agenda and there is a mad rush for investing in AI related infra and development programmes in billions without any guarantee that commensurate returns will be available to the high tech companies investors.

The USA, as usual is the leader followed now by China. India is also in the race, though in terms of investments and output, India lag far behind. The experts both in USA and the international bodies have taken note of two contrasting strategies of AI development in USA and China. While the US companies as also many government aided bodies have invested enormous amount in AI development, the future projections do not give a rosy picture about the likely returns. The US experts themselves express the opinion that is the present stage of AI going to face the fate of dotcom bust that took place during 2,000?

The apprehensions are based on the analysis that many of the US high tech companies which have invested enormous amounts in AI, are now overvalued in the market and any major decline in projections, will hit the Nasdaq just like what happened in 2000. The optimists argue that the present high tech companies have the resilience to deal with such developments and the situation will not be allowed to reach the 2000 collapse level. But still, the doubts persist as some of the US majors have put all stakes in AI application for their future.

As against this, the Chinese model of AI development in the recent past tells of a different story. China has developed the AI open source models with much less investment and indigenous technology. Chinese open source AI models are popular in the developing countries. Chinese open source models represented by DeepSeek and Qwen have greatly reduced the barrier to and cost of using AI, effectively helping all parties, especially developing countries to benefit equally from the wave of intelligence.

A Chinese spokesman of WAIC said “We are willing to use this conference as an opportunity to work with all parties to jointly discuss technological innovation, jointly promote achievements, enable development, build an inclusive ecosystem, and advance AI for the benefit of all, injecting new momentum into global AI development,”

Under the theme “AI Partnership for a Brighter Future,” the 2026 WAIC aims to highlight AI’s transformative potential as a collaborative force while addressing shared challenges and opportunities through international cooperation, cutting-edge research and public engagement, according to a Chinese expert.

This year’s WAIC is set to achieve new milestones in scale and influence, bringing together over 1,400 prominent guests, including leading industry figures, top executives and venture capitalists. This edition marks a record-breaking gathering of professional expertise and industry influence in the event’s history, the Conference sources say.

This exhibition will boast participation by more than 1,100 companies from across the globe, collectively presenting over 3,000 advanced exhibits. Among these, more than 300 new AI solutions are set to make their global debut.

It is expected that international exchanges during the event will focus on critical topics such as global AI governance and security, underlying standards for world models and AI agents, bridging the global digital intelligence gap, fair trade within the AI industrial chain, and the development of norms for the humanoid robotics and digital asset sectors,

In fact, the U.S.-China high tech battle for supremacy reached a new peak last month after the China manufactured Supercomputer LineShine was adjudged the best among the Top 500 supercomputers made by various nations including the USA, at the International Supercomputing Conference in Hamburg, Germany held on June 23.China got this top slot recognition after 2017- a gap of nine years.

The announcement by the international body has sent tremors to the U.S. high tech companies and the Pentagon. They have been mobilizing huge financial resources for manufacturing more and more technologically developed Supercomputer. US is still ahead of China in high tech war, but this latest feat of China has bridged the gap between the two super powers making Trump’s bargaining power on high tech vis a vis China more problematic. The top computer experts of USA have been assessing the arrival of Chinese LineShine and its impact on the high-tech industries.

The LineShine supercomputer has two technical features. First, LineShine was researched and developed entirely domestically and independently. Faced with years of export controls on high-end GPUs and advanced chip equipment targeting China, Chinese research teams have established a complete closed-loop process – from chip design to system integration – truly achieving self-reliance and control. That means LineShine took first place despite facing layer upon layer of restrictions.

From 2023 onwards, rich nations have been announcing massive investments in AI related projects: Europe announced over $23 billion investment in AI infrastructure, Saudi Arabia over $114 billion, and the United States between $1.14-2.28 trillion. These enormous numbers exceed the typical technology spending. Historically, such a fund allocation was used for power competition, suggesting that the major powers now see AI as not merely as a technology sector, but a fundamental part of national power, economic influence.

USA is much ahead of others including China in terms of AI investments. In 2024 alone, US companies received nearly $109.1 billion in private investment, while Chinese firms received only about $9.3 billion, a figure that includes government-backed funding alongside private capital. Another difference in the approach is that AI companies in the US receive revenue from selling the access to their AI models to businesses and individuals.

Anyone can buy ChatGPT Plus for $20 per month, while Chinese firms, such as DeepSeek, Baidu, and ByteDance’sDoubao provide access for free and this is because its consumer AI operates on a different model. For companies like Baidu and ByteDance, AI is primarily a tool to attract and retain massive user bases, with profits generated indirectly through ads, enterprise services, such as API calls from businesses, and platform integration like cloud service bundling, rather than through direct user subscriptions.

Besides the huge capital gap, there is also a massive spending gap. The US firms spent about $368.52 billion on software in 2024, while China only $61.8 billion. This is because historically, Chinese firms spend far less on software as AI cannot be easily sold as a standalone product. Instead, it has to be represented as a full-service solution for concrete business outcomes and aims to be sold to big organisations rather than individual users.

Official data show that the deployment of AI in the industrial sector in both countries varies significantly. In manufacturing, 67% of Chinese industrial firms have deployed AI in production, compared with 34% of analogous US firms. This speed of deployment by Chinese firms is linked to their revenue depending on delivering outcomes rather than access, and this is something China is very good at.

Overall, the expert opinion is that the US might lead in terms of model performance, while China might be ahead in terms of widespread adoption. It all depends on how the progress is defined – when it comes to model performance, the US might be ahead; however, if progress means broader economic adoption, China may have the edge, as its restriction-based strategies are gaining traction more quickly in certain areas.

In the Shanghai conference, the U.S. will face China during the discussions with a less stronger position as the technological gap has bee3n reduced in the recent months and China is looking more confident due to its low investment and proper returns. But broader issues like AI governance and the use of AI by the developing nations and the poorer4 countries will draw big attention as there is a big need in the developing and poor nations to use AI effectively for improving the living standards of the people. Apart from US-China big tech war, this issue of sharing AI benefits will be of immense significance to the global economy in general. (IPA Service)

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By Arun Srivastava

The Loot of the huge funds and jewelleries from the coffers of Ram Mandir Trust has led to intensification of factional battles between the VHP and the RSS on the one hand and the RSS-BJP on the other. Interestingly, insiders say that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken his position supporting the VHP as against the RSS in this tussle within the Hindutva eco-system.

It is indeed deplorable that instead of identifying and punishing the plunderers, the rightist RSS, its allies and the protagonists of Hindutva politics are engaged in the bitter mud-slinging and shifting the responsibility. What is most intriguing is the passive silence of RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat who has the habit of issuing statements on any issue and of the prime minister Narendra Modi. One thing is however quite apparent that the saffron stake holders are busy using the scam for taking control of the temple and projecting them as the Hindu face of the country. What is worse is the stake holders are making all kind of attempts to whitewash the sin and let the sinner go scot-free.

RSS and Narendra Modi have been the prime stake holders. Modi who took pride of being the Hindu Hridaya Samrat by consecrating the Ram Lala statue at the temple and performing the task of Zajman (host of the rituals) is using the theft to take control of the temple through Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Teerth Kshetra Trust. He is contemplating to have his blue-eyed bureaucrat Nripendra Mishra as the full-time Chief Executive Officer on the plea of having a professional administrator. RSS which runs the Trust, which in turn manages the temple is reluctant to withdraw and allow Modi to rule. In the war the VHP is playing the crucial role by coming out openly in support of Modi, of course in an oblique manner.

While RSS foiled the initial move of installing Mishra as the CEO by bringing in Krishna Mohan as the acting general secretary, in place of Champat Rai, the VHP has challenged the authority of RSS by deciding to hold its crucial meeting in Delhi on July 17-18. Since some key officials of Trust are from VHP, the meeting should have been held in Ayodhya. But to register its protest the VHP decided to shift the venue to Delhi. VHP has also been toeing the line of Modi, who questioned the functioning of Trust and wanted to install Mishra as the CEO.

The crucial meeting of the Trust which took place in Ayodhya on July 6, 2026 witnessed the worst kind of clash between the RSS and its ally VHP. The meeting accepted the resignations of general secretary Champat Rai and trustee Anil Mishra, and appointed Krishna Mohan as the acting general secretary. Mohan is a retired Indian Forest Service (IFS) officer. Being a bureaucrat he is close to Modi, but has been associated with RSS for long and has served in various organizational roles in Uttar Pradesh, before being inducted into the Ram Temple Trust in September 2025.

What was most significant was the Trust meet did not censor Champat Rai for abdication of responsibility and duty and allowing the embezzlement to take place before his eyes. On the contrary, the participants at the meet sang peans for him, they eulogised his stewardship. This was nevertheless perceived as a victory for RSS, which had come under scanner following the bust of the scam. The meet nevertheless made it explicit that the feud inside the saffron ecosystem in the wake of expose of the huge embezzlement has been virtually the extension of the old personality clash between Modi and Bhagwat.

While Modi intends to exploit the exposure of the scam for his electoral gains, RSS has its existence and identity at stake in the entire Hindi heartland and faces the threat of losing the tag of the right-wing, Hindu nationalist paramilitary volunteer organization which serves as the ideological and organizational core of the Sangh Parivar, a vast network of affiliate groups that includes India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The organization is driven by the concept of Hindutva—an ethno-nationalist ideology that defines Indian culture and national identity primarily through the lens of Hinduism. It envisions India as an overtly Hindu nation-state (Rashtra) rather than a secular republic. With Trust under its firm control, RSS would have a complete control on all the temples, like Kashi Vishwanath, Mathura, home to thousands of temples, but the most important and sacred is the Shri Krishna Janmasthan Temple, which marks the exact birthplace of Lord Krishna.

Being in power has been an advantage for Narendra Modi. VHP was quite vocal against the Trust functioning and demanded a thorough probe into the scam. It was echoing the stand of Modi. The VHP international president Alok Kumar said, “There was donation theft there. Who wasn’t saddened and hurt by it? This is shameful. All such thieves and their gang should be identified, arrested and jailed. Learning from this incident, the system there should be strengthened so that not even paisa can be stolen…He has also cautioned society against vultures who see an opportunity for themselves in this for 2027 UP Elections and are attempting to defame Hindutva”. His message was clear and loud.

The VHP is taking a combative stance in the Ayodhya Ram Temple donation theft investigation. Kumar wrote a letter to the Special Investigation Team (SIT) investigating the theft requesting that public figures—including Congress leader Priyanka Gandhi Vadra and AAP’s Arvind Kejriwal and Sanjay Singh—be summoned to provide evidence for their claims of financial irregularities. Congress leader K.C. Venugopal, criticized the VHP’s demands as “the pot calling the kettle black,” and accused the organization of trying to shift the spotlight away from the Trust’s own internal accountability and the Modi government’s role in setting it up.

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) has said it is not responsible for the alleged donation theft at the Ram Temple in Ayodhya and will wait for the outcome of the ongoing investigation before deciding whether to take any action against its international vice president, Champat Rai. He said the alleged theft had deeply hurt the sentiments of Hindus worldwide but stressed that the organisation had no role in the temple’s administration.

Trust has set up a search committee to appoint a CEO for overhauling the donation system and restore the faith of devotees. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), while open to the idea of a professional CEO, has reiterated its opposition to direct bureaucratic or government control of the shrine. The sequence of events surrounding the leak and the theft scandal highlights several key factors. Though a whistle blower had busted the scam in 2021, the trustees did not take the revelation seriously. The scandal eventually became widely publicized in May 2026 due to internal infighting among Trust members regarding recruitment and stolen funds. PM who had come to know of the scam leaked it. It was a tactical move of Modi to protect himself from facing public outrage and criticism. Trust has been brain child of Modi and he had handpicked the trust members and is accountable for the alleged breaches of trust.

Though VHP has not accepted any difference with the RSS, its decision to shift its Central Management Committee meeting to New Delhi for July 18 and 19 amid the Ram temple donation controversy, replacing an earlier five-day plan in Ayodhya from June 25 to 29, has given rise to doubt about its relation with the RSS. His demand of action against the persons, obviously Trust members, in the scam has simply strengthened the perception that it has thrown its weight behind Modi.

As the news first broke, both the VHP and the RSS initially distanced themselves from the allegations. The Trust and its senior members downplayed or attempted to limit the public fallout, and early reports indicated a desire to contain the issue to prevent political damage. Following the Special Investigation Team (SIT) probe initiated by the UP government and growing public outrage, the RSS officially broke its month-long silence. RSS General Secretary Dattatreya Hosabale acknowledged that the incident “deeply hurt” devotees but simultaneously cautioned against “anti-Hindu forces” exploiting the controversy for political gain in the upcoming 2027 UP Elections.

Tensions between the VHP and the parent RSS recently resurfaced in the administration of the Ayodhya Ram Temple. Following allegations of donation embezzlement and discrepancies in temple funds, the VHP demanded a police investigation and questioning of Opposition leaders who highlighted the issue. The RSS, however, publicly urged for patience, restraint, and an overhaul of financial management to protect the integrity of the institution. VHP also urged the Hindu society to show “necessary patience and restraint to thwart the conspiracies of anti-Hindu and anti-national forces seeking to malign the Hindu dharma and society by exploiting this unfortunate incident.” For taking out the Trust from the grip of RSS, demands are also made by some allies to reconstitute the Trust. Kumar also raised the issue of Internal Accountability, Trust Reorganization and Political Pressure.

A public rift has emerged between the RSS and the VHP over alleged administrative failures and the embezzlement of donations at the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. The RSS took a hardline stance against the VHP-dominated Trust. RSS General Secretary Dattatreya Hosabale expressed that the organisation was “extremely pained and angered”. He openly criticized the Trust, demanding that it treat the incident as “extraordinary” and overhaul its management to address operational shortcomings. No doubt VHP dominates the Trust, it is a fact that it is run and managed by the RSS. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

The Narendra Modi government’s position on fuel prices now looks less like prudent caution and more like an overly defensive reading of a market that has already absorbed much of the Iran-US risk. The more calibrated question, therefore, is not whether New Delhi is right to watch the West Asian security situation, but whether a two-month wait before reassessing retail fuel prices is justified when crude has failed to sustain a meaningful geopolitical premium.

The government’s argument rests on a familiar premise: oil markets can turn quickly, and India, as one of the world’s largest crude importers, cannot base domestic pricing decisions on a few days of calmer trading. That caution is not without logic. The Gulf remains central to global energy flows, the Strait of Hormuz remains a pressure point, and any direct threat to tankers, export terminals or insurance costs can change the arithmetic for Indian refiners almost overnight. A single disruption that affects physical supply, rather than merely raising political noise, can force importers to pay more, scramble for alternative cargoes and deal with a weaker rupee at the same time.

But this is only one side of the current market. The other side is more striking: crude has not behaved like a market preparing for a sustained war premium. Prices have moved after flare-ups, but the moves have been contained. Traders have treated isolated missile attacks and ceasefire violations as risks to be priced temporarily, not as evidence of a lasting supply shock. The market’s message is that violence without sustained disruption is no longer enough to lift crude decisively. Brent hovering in the low-to-mid $70 range, after having fallen sharply from earlier panic levels, suggests that participants are looking past sporadic skirmishes and focusing instead on supply, inventories and demand.

That is why the government’s caution now appears heavier than the market’s own assessment. If the oil market itself is refusing to climb on every provocation, it is difficult to argue that domestic consumers must continue paying as though the threat premium remains fully alive. The crude market is not risk-free, but neither is it signalling a crisis. It is, rather, signalling a wary normalisation: traders are alert to West Asian headlines, but not persuaded that every violation of a fragile understanding between Iran and the United States will interrupt barrels reaching global buyers.

The bigger force weighing on prices is the prospect of excess supply. Rising output expectations, restored flows, weaker demand signals and producer efforts to defend market share have shifted attention from shortage to surplus. This matters greatly for India. A market facing possible glut conditions is structurally different from one facing shortage. In a shortage market, governments and oil companies can defend price rigidity by citing replacement costs and uncertainty. In a surplus market, the same argument becomes thinner, especially when refiners benefit from cheaper crude while retail consumers see no proportionate relief.

Indian consumers are familiar with this asymmetry. Retail fuel prices rise quickly when crude becomes expensive, but reductions tend to arrive slowly, selectively and often after political calculation. Oil companies cite inventory costs, past under-recoveries, refining margins, currency fluctuations, taxes, freight, product cracks and working-capital pressures. Some of those factors are real. Petrol and diesel prices are not determined by crude alone. Refiners buy different grades at different times, product prices do not always move in line with crude, and a weaker rupee can offset part of the global price fall. Yet these explanations become less convincing when the direction of the market is clearly softer and the consumer is still asked to wait.

The two-month window is especially problematic. For the government, two months may seem a reasonable monitoring period in a volatile geopolitical setting. For households, transporters, farmers and small businesses, it is a long period of additional spending. Fuel prices feed directly into commuting costs, freight rates, agricultural operations and the price of goods moved across long distances. Even when retail inflation is contained, high fuel prices act as a hidden tax on consumption. They also reduce the visible benefit of lower global crude at a time when the economy could use broader cost relief.

The political economy of fuel pricing complicates the issue further. Petrol and diesel are not merely energy products; they are revenue instruments. Central and state levies make up a large part of the pump price, and governments have often relied on fuel taxation as a stable source of revenue. That fiscal dependence gives every administration an incentive to delay cuts unless public pressure becomes acute or elections create an immediate reason to act. Oil marketing companies, too, prefer to rebuild margins when crude softens, particularly after periods of price freezes or squeezed profitability. The result is a pricing system that is market-linked in theory but politically managed in practice.

This is where the government’s caution risks becoming indistinguishable from convenience. A genuine wait-and-watch approach would be more credible if it were accompanied by a transparent formula: for example, a commitment that if crude remains below a defined threshold for a specified number of trading sessions, retail prices will be reviewed. Instead, consumers are told that the situation will be watched, while the benchmark that would trigger relief remains unclear. That opacity strengthens the suspicion that uncertainty is being used as a buffer against passing on gains.

A more balanced policy would recognise both risks. There is room for a calibrated reduction, especially if crude remains around current levels and the rupee does not suffer a major slide. A modest cut would signal that consumers are not excluded from the benefits of lower import costs, while still leaving room for future adjustment if the geopolitical premium returns.

Such a move would also align domestic policy more closely with market reality. The market is not saying that the Iran-US deal has eliminated all risk. It is saying that the probability of a sustained supply shock has declined enough to remove a large part of the fear premium. That is a meaningful distinction. Governments should be more cautious than traders because they must plan for national energy security, not just daily price movements. But caution should not become inertia, especially when the cost is borne by consumers who have already endured long stretches of elevated pump prices.

The more defensible reading is that the Modi government is right to remain alert but wrong to postpone the consumer question for two full months. Oil prices are not collapsing, but conditions are favourable enough for a lower retail adjustment. The market has taken ceasefire violations in its stride, supply concerns have eased, and the emerging worry is oversupply rather than scarcity. If that balance holds, continued delay will look less like responsible risk management and more like a refusal to share the dividend of cheaper crude with the public. (IPA Service)

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By Satyaki Chakraborty

Amidst Trump-Modi bonhomie and the continuation of India-US trade talks, former Indian intelligence chief Vikram Sood said on Sunday in an interview to a British network that the present U.S. deputy secretary of state Christopher Landau told Indian officials during his visit to India in March 2026 that Washington would use tariffs, sanctions and other tools to curb India’s rapid economic growth and would not allow it to emerge as a major power competing with USA.

According to Sood, Landau said in that New Delhi meeting” We made a mistake by helping China become a major economic power. We are not going to do that with India. We will not make that mistake again”. Sood gave the interview in a British current affairs programme New Order which the host shared on social media along with the original video of Landau’s comments. The interview has created a furore in diplomatic circles

Landau is still the deputy secretary of state and he is known to be close to the Trump led MAGA lobby along with his boss secretary of state Marco Rubio. Rubio is most visible U.S. official as far as the India-US relations are concerned, but Landau speaks the mind of the Trump administration He was frank about U.S. perception of future of bilateral relations.

In the recent days, Trump administration is taking less interest in its old idea about Indo-Pacific security involving India. India’s importance has declined in Trump administration’s broader Asia strategy. All these have taken place following Trump-Xi Jinping summit in Beijing in May this year. As a result, the focus is now more on extracting maximum concessions from India in trade and in defence purchases while ensuring that India’s growth momentum does not pose any threat to the U.S. economic power.

While other foreign offices are also assessing the real import of the comments made by the deputy secretary of U.S. Christopher Landau, China has reacted instantly as Landau cited the example of China to say that the US would not make that type of mistake in the case of India.

Chinese observers described Washington’s approach toward New Delhi as a dual strategy of “limited engagement and ceiling control.” They argued that deep-rooted structural contradictions arising from differing national ambitions, visions of global order, geopolitical interests, industrial competition and diplomatic traditions could not be fundamentally resolved through diplomatic engagement or economic cooperation between India and the US.

Qian Feng, director of the Research Department at Tsinghua University’s National Strategy Institute, told the Global Times on Monday that the rapid expansion of US-India relations over the past two decades is reaching a ceiling, as the two countries face structural contradictions that are difficult to reconcile. These differences stem from their differing stages of development, strategic cultures, geopolitical positions, diplomatic traditions and the foreign policy orientations of their leadership.

Qian said India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy fundamentally differs from Washington’s alliance-based approach. New Delhi has consistently pursued an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests rather than aligning fully with US strategic objectives. Even within frameworks such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, India seeks to engage the US as an equal partner rather than as a formal ally or subordinate security partner

This observation by the Chinese expert in the official media indicates that China now is seeking to woo India for improving India-China bilateral relations and toned down its earlier stance that the US has got India as a partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy, primarily meant against China. The emphasis of the Chinese analysts is that PM Narendra Modi was seeking to follow an independent policy defying the American pressure.

According to Chinese experts, Landau’s remarks reflected Washington’s broader approach toward India – seeking New Delhi’s support in geopolitical competition while locking it at a lower end of the industrial chain. Such a strategy, they argued, runs counter to India’s strategic goals.

According to Qian Feng, “Industrialization is a legitimate right of all developing countries. Guided by a zero-sum mindset, the US seeks to impose a ceiling on other countries’ development. By carving up global supply chains through tariffs and technical barriers, it will only push India to deepen cooperation within the BRICS framework as well as with China and Russia, accelerating the diversification of industrial chains”,

Right now, India and the United States appear to be racing towards concluding the trade deal much before the end of 2026. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said that 99 per cent of the issues had been sorted out in the negotiations.. U.S. officials also underlined that the bilateral trade framework is nearly complete. But even in the last phase of India-US trade negotiations, the U.S. talked of imposing sanctions under section 301. This meant an imposition of 12.5 per cent duty on countries including India which are under investigations.

The details of the proposed India-US trade deal are not known, but the tenor of the senior official Landau’s statement vindicates the apprehensions being expressed by many trade experts that the US is imposing a trade deal on India in a hurry protecting only the interests of USA and not India. It is time, the Narendra Modi government shows some guts and protects the interests of the Indian farmers and the other sections just as the US negotiators are defending their own farmers and industry’s interests.

India is the largest populated country of the world with a growing economy. Its growth depends on its resources human capital and many other assets. The country certainly needs trade agreement with the USA. But it has to be on an equal footing. No country, however powerful , can be allowed to suppress the growth of the Indian economy. The assertion of India’s strategic autonomy during negotiations with the U.S. will be the fittest reply to the U.S. deputy secretary of state Christopher Landau. China has shown that. India also can do the same by dealing with the U.S. on an equal footing. (IPA Service)

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By Nantoo Banerjee

Despite never qualifying for the FIFA (Federations of International Football Associations) World Cup, India has emerged as one of the largest global markets for the current tournament being co-hosted by the United States, Canada, and Mexico, with matches played across 16 official host cities. In the opening weekend alone, the tournament reached over 100 million viewers across Zee Entertainment’s platforms. The FIFA World Cup 2026 is officially broadcast in India in Hindi, English, Bengali, and Malayalam. These language feeds aim to cater to regional football strongholds in West Bengal and Kerala, as well as the broader national audience. India holds the second largest Instagram audience for FIFA globally. It is another matter that India’s national men’s football team is currently ranked 139th in the official FIFA World Rankings, placing them 26th among Asian Football Confederation (AFC) nations. Viewers in India are consuming the tournament through a variety of digital, television, and social platforms.

Live matches are being exclusively broadcast in India by Zee Entertainment Enterprises across their Unite8 Sports network channels. Digital streaming is handled by Zee5, which attracted millions of viewers on its opening weekend, with an average engagement time exceeding 190 minutes per viewer. Zee Entertainment secured the exclusive television and digital broadcasting rights for the 2026 FIFA World Cup in India for an estimated cost of US$40 million (over Rs.380 crore). The World Cup Football tournament has generated huge buzz in India, with over 360 million views on social media and a massive 10.21 percent share of FIFA’s global Instagram audience. Zee Entertainment holds the exclusive television and digital broadcasting rights for the FIFA World Cup 2026 in India. Football fans are watching the matches live on Zee’s newly launched United8 Sports Network on TV and streaming them digitally on the ZEE5 platform.

A powerful chain of events is driving the growth of India’s media and entertainment (M&E) sector to digital space. Hyper-affordable data and widespread smartphone penetration, a massive shift from traditional broadcasting to digital streaming, a booming live event economy, and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) are propelling the growth. Over 55 crore smartphone users and the availability of the world’s cheapest data costs have transformed mobile phones into the primary entertainment device, where Indians spend the majority of their media time. With audiences increasingly consuming personalized and regional content, digital media officially overtook television to become the largest segment in the Indian M&E landscape. Lately, the exploding ‘concert economy’ is being fuelled by a spike in ticketed concerts featuring global artists, large public gatherings, and a massive rise in multi-city domestic tours. The democratization of content creation—powered by a four-million-strong creator economy and AI-enabled workflows—has drastically cut production costs and accelerated the generation of professional-grade audio and video.

Thanks to these developments, the media and entertainment industry is experiencing a highly encouraging growth. Leading the country’s media and entertainment industry boom are JioStar (Reliance-Disney-Bodhi Tree), Zee Entertainment Enterprises, Sony Pictures Networks, Sun TV Network and digital leaders like Prime Video. Latest reports suggest that the country’s media and entertainment (M&E) sector reached an estimated total value of Rs. 2.78 trillion, clocking nearly a 10 percent year-on-year growth. This comprehensive growth was defined by several key drivers and structural shifts such as digital media, live events and traditional media shifts.

The digital media has crossed the historic Rs. one-trillion mark, becoming the largest single segment. Digital advertising grew 26 percent and now accounts for 63 percent of total ad revenues. Live events are experiencing massive growth, expanding by 44 percent year-on-year as audiences returned to in-person experiences. Linear television and print media faced transitions and mixed trends, with brands increasingly pivoting to performance-led digital formats. The industry is undergoing a massive transformation with key trends dominating the landscape are digital and micro-drama explosion, the ‘Orange Economy’, live events and regional content, global tech investments. Reports suggest that overall industry revenues are pacing forward toward Rs.3.30 trillion by 2028.

Digital media’s growth has been fuelled by widespread smartphone penetration and 5G. Further, vertical mobile micro-dramas (bitesize, high-intensity serialized episodes) have emerged as the fastest-growing sector, capturing a US$300 million market share. The government views the creative and cultural economy (Orange Economy) as a core employment strategy and soft power asset, leading to tech-forward initiatives and support for AI integration in visual effects, gaming, and cloud-based storytelling. Live events and experiential entertainment are surging by over 40 percent year-over-year. Simultaneously, regional OTT (Over-The-Top) content volumes have officially surpassed Hindi-language releases, decentralizing production to local markets. Tech giants like Amazon are pouring billions into Indian cloud and AI infrastructure to bolster this content revolution.

The government is keenly watching the expansion of the digital sector and its growing contribution to economic growth. Digital India, the government’s umbrella flagship programme, is helping the country transform itself into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy. Its digital infrastructure Is providing high-speed internet, lifelong digital identities, mobile connectivity, and accessible public internet networks across urban and rural areas. All government entitlements, utility payments, and services are being made instantly available online and via mobile devices. At the same time, the government is driving digital literacy and bridging the urban-rural divide through nationwide training and local service centres. Over 5.6 lakh Common Services Centres (CSCs) deliver hundreds of e-governance and business services right to the village level. Policy initiatives, including the upcoming National Centre of Excellence for AVGC (Animation, Visual Effects, Gaming, and Comics) and single-window clearances for live events, are fostering sustainable, structured growth across the country.

Digital media is driving an explosive growth of the entertainment industry, shifting power from traditional gatekeepers to direct-to-consumer digital platforms. Digital explosion has engulfed even the traditional publishing and print media establishments such as Bennett Coleman& Co., Hindustan Times, India Today and Jagran Prakashan. In fact, India’s media & entertainment (M&E) sector is experiencing a monumental structural shift. Today, digital media has even overtaken television to become the largest segment, driving the industry to a massive Rs. 2.78 trillion market. Everything from content creation and distribution to advertising is now fundamentally centred around digital consumption. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

The alleged theft of donations from the Ayodhya Ram Temple has pushed a long-simmering question into the national foreground: who should guard the wealth of religious institutions when faith, money and power converge without adequate public accountability?

The issue is not confined to Ayodhya, nor to Hindu institutions. Across denominations, religious endowments, shrines, trusts, churches, mosques, waqf properties, mutts, gurudwaras and pilgrimage centres command vast public confidence and substantial material assets. They receive cash donations, jewellery, land, securities, foreign contributions and digital payments. Many also run schools, hospitals, charities, hostels and welfare networks. Yet the systems meant to protect these assets are often uneven, opaque and vulnerable to manipulation by insiders, contractors, political patrons and intermediaries.

The Ayodhya episode is especially disturbing because of the symbolic weight of the institution. The Ram Temple is not an ordinary shrine. It was built after decades of mass mobilisation, litigation, political conflict and emotional investment by millions of devotees. Donations came not merely as money, but as acts of belief. When allegations of organised pilferage, cash diversion, foreign-currency recovery and weak internal controls arise in such a setting, the damage goes beyond financial loss. It strikes at the moral authority of those entrusted with managing a sacred public trust.

The decision to re-audit several years of temple accounts, the formation of a special investigation process, resignations linked to the controversy and political protests around the issue suggest that the matter has moved beyond routine administrative failure. Even if the final criminal liability is determined only after investigation and trial, the governance failure is already evident. A system that allows donation theft to become organised, or even credibly alleged at scale, cannot be defended as merely the work of a few rogue individuals. It points to inadequate safeguards, excessive concentration of control and poor external scrutiny.

Religious institutions occupy a difficult constitutional and moral space. They are not commercial companies, yet they handle wealth on a scale that would require strict compliance if held by a corporation. They are not arms of the state, yet they often enjoy public concessions, police protection, tax privileges, land grants and political patronage. They are not private family properties in the ordinary sense, yet their management is frequently dominated by closed groups, hereditary interests or networks answerable only to themselves. This ambiguity has created the perfect terrain for mismanagement.

The instinctive response in India has often been state control, especially in the case of Hindu temples. Several states have long exercised control over temples through endowment departments and statutory boards. That model was justified historically as a way to prevent hereditary abuse, protect temple assets and ensure public access. Yet experience has shown that government control is no guarantee of integrity. It can replace one form of capture with another. Bureaucrats may lack religious sensitivity, politicians may use temple revenues for patronage, and administrators may treat sacred institutions as revenue-generating departments rather than community trusts.

At the other end lies the argument that religious communities should be left entirely to manage their own institutions. That view has emotional appeal, particularly where state intervention appears selective or discriminatory. But it ignores the record of internal capture. Many religious institutions have seen allegations of land alienation, donation siphoning, inflated contracts, gold and silver misappropriation, manipulation of appointment powers, under-reporting of income, unauthorised leases and factional control by clerical or lay elites. Faith alone is not an audit mechanism. Devotion cannot substitute for governance.

The answer, therefore, cannot be either blanket government control or unregulated autonomy. What India needs is a secular, arms-length accountability framework that treats religious wealth as public-trust wealth without interfering in religious practice. The distinction is crucial. The state has no business deciding rituals, doctrine, liturgy, worship methods, clerical legitimacy or theological questions. But it has a legitimate interest in ensuring that assets donated by the public are not stolen, diverted, encroached upon or used for purposes contrary to the trust under which they were given.

A statutory national commission for religious institutional governance deserves serious consideration. Its remit should not be denominational. It should cover major public religious institutions across faiths, subject to reasonable thresholds of income, assets, public donations, landholdings or charitable operations. Such a body should not manage temples, mosques, churches or gurudwaras directly. It should supervise governance standards, mandate transparent accounting, prescribe independent audits, require asset registers, enforce conflict-of-interest rules, examine major land transactions and ensure that complaints are investigated through due process.

The secular character of such a commission would be its strongest safeguard. It should not be a Hindu temple board, a waqf authority, a church regulator or a politically appointed religious council. It should be a public accountability body staffed by experts in law, audit, public finance, heritage management, charity regulation, digital payments, forensic accounting and constitutional rights. Religious representatives could be consulted through advisory panels, but operational control should remain professional and independent. The objective should be institutional integrity, not theological supervision.

The commission’s first task should be transparency. Every significant religious institution should maintain a publicly accessible annual statement of income, expenditure, assets, liabilities, donations, major contracts and land transactions. This need not expose the identity of small donors or sensitive religious details. But the public should know how much money was received, where it was deposited, how it was spent, who approved the spending and whether independent auditors found irregularities. Digital donation systems should be traceable, tamper-resistant and reconciled daily with bank accounts. Cash donation boxes should be opened only under recorded procedures, with multiple authorised signatories and surveillance-backed counting systems.

There will, of course, be objections. Religious bodies will fear state intrusion. Minority groups may fear majoritarian pressure. Hindu organisations may argue that temples must first be freed from discriminatory state control. Political parties may resist losing influence over appointments, contracts and land. These concerns are not imaginary. Any national commission could itself become an instrument of control if appointments are partisan, powers are vague or safeguards are weak. That is why design matters.

Appointments to such a commission must be insulated from day-to-day politics. Selection should involve the judiciary, constitutional authorities, financial experts and representatives of recognised civil society institutions. Its orders should be appealable before courts. Its powers should be limited to secular administration, finance, property and governance. Its functioning should be transparent.

The Ayodhya controversy has arrived at a moment when religious institutions are becoming more financially complex. Pilgrimage tourism is expanding, digital giving is rising, religious infrastructure is being linked to urban development, and faith-based charities are moving large sums through formal and informal channels. The old assumption that temple or trust management is a matter for local elders and voluntary committees no longer matches reality. Many of these institutions now resemble large public endowments with national reach and emotional legitimacy. Their governance must evolve accordingly. (IPA Service)

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By R. Suryamurthy

Every war leaves behind shattered cities, broken societies and grieving families. But some wars destroy something less visible yet infinitely more consequential: faith in the institutions created to prevent humanity from repeating history’s darkest chapters. The latest report of the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories is therefore more than another meticulous chronicle of atrocities. It is a stark reminder that the international system is steadily losing either the ability—or the political will—to enforce the principles upon which it claims to rest.

For nearly eight decades, the post-1945 order has been built on a simple premise: no state, military or armed group stands above international law. The Geneva Conventions, the UN Charter, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court were designed not merely to codify legal norms but to ensure that power remained constrained by law. Yet Gaza and the occupied West Bank increasingly suggest that these institutions have become repositories of evidence rather than instruments of accountability.

The Commission documents an occupation that has become more entrenched, settlements more aggressive and civilian suffering more routine. It accuses Israel of creating conditions in which settler violence increasingly advances political objectives, while simultaneously exposing Hamas’ systematic campaign of executions, torture and intimidation against Palestinians. Civilians find themselves trapped between state power and militant authoritarianism, with neither side exempt from legal scrutiny.

The temptation is to reduce the conflict to competing moral absolutes. Israel invokes security and the trauma of October 7; Palestinians point to decades of occupation, displacement and overwhelming military force. Both narratives contain undeniable truths. Yet neither can justify deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage-taking, collective punishment, torture or demographic engineering. International humanitarian law was never designed to validate political narratives; it exists precisely to restrain them.

The Commission’s most unsettling conclusion, however, lies beyond its catalogue of abuses. It exposes the widening gulf between documentation and accountability. The United Nations has become exceptionally proficient at recording violations through satellite imagery, digital forensics and witness testimony. Rarely has the world possessed such sophisticated investigative capacity. Yet political enforcement remains conspicuously absent.

This is the defining paradox of contemporary international governance. Never before has humanity known so much about atrocities while doing so little to stop them. Reports accumulate, emergency sessions convene, and resolutions proliferate, yet settlements continue expanding, rockets continue flying, hostages remain captive, and civilians continue paying the price. Every investigation strengthens the historical record while simultaneously exposing the institutional paralysis of those responsible for enforcing international law.

The West Bank illustrates this failure vividly. For years, settler violence was often portrayed as the work of isolated extremists beyond effective government control. The Commission challenges that narrative, suggesting instead that repeated failures to investigate attacks, prosecute offenders and protect Palestinian communities have created an environment where impunity increasingly serves broader political objectives. When intimidation systematically displaces communities, alters demographics and reshapes territory, violence becomes more than a law-and-order problem; it becomes an instrument of policy.

Equally significant is the Commission’s assessment of Hamas. While international attention has understandably focused on Israel’s military operations in Gaza, the report documents Hamas’ own use of executions, torture and public intimidation to consolidate control. These findings complicate the simplistic binary narratives that increasingly dominate global debate. Human rights cannot become conditional upon political allegiance. A legal system that excuses violations committed by one side while condemning identical conduct by another ceases to be universal. That principle now faces its greatest test.

The erosion of international credibility is not solely the consequence of events in Gaza. It also reflects a geopolitical order in which law increasingly bends before strategic interests. Nowhere is this clearer than within the United Nations Security Council. The veto, originally intended to preserve great-power consensus, has evolved into a mechanism that frequently prevents collective action precisely when humanitarian intervention is most urgently required. Whether the conflict is in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan or Myanmar, the outcome has become painfully familiar: competing resolutions, diplomatic deadlock and continued civilian suffering.

The Gaza conflict has exposed these contradictions with unusual clarity. The United States continues to balance unwavering support for Israel’s security with concern over humanitarian conditions. European governments remain divided between historical responsibility and domestic political pressure. Russia and China present themselves as defenders of international legality even as they face allegations of violating similar principles elsewhere. Across much of the Global South, these inconsistencies have reinforced a growing belief that the rules-based order operates differently depending on whose interests are involved.

Whether entirely justified or not, this perception carries enormous geopolitical consequences. For decades, Western democracies derived moral authority from the claim that international law applied equally to allies and adversaries. As that consistency comes under question, so too does the legitimacy of the institutions they helped build. In international relations, perception often shapes reality. If accountability appears selective, states begin calculating geopolitical protection rather than legal responsibility. The implications extend well beyond the Middle East.

Military planners across the world are studying Gaza not only as a battlefield but as a precedent. They are observing how urban warfare, prolonged sieges, humanitarian access and allegations of war crimes influence international diplomacy. Armed groups are making similar calculations regarding hostage-taking, coercion and information warfare. If the political costs of violating humanitarian law continue to diminish, future conflicts are unlikely to become more restrained. They will become more brutal.

History suggests that legal norms rarely disappear overnight. They erode gradually through repeated exceptions, selective enforcement and political compromise until violations become routine rather than exceptional. Gaza risks becoming one of those defining historical moments when the erosion of norms becomes unmistakable.

Perhaps the Commission’s most profound warning concerns the next generation. Palestinian children continue to grow up amid displacement, deprivation and trauma. Israeli children inherit lives shaped by terrorism, insecurity and hardened political narratives. Every year of unresolved conflict deepens mutual distrust and normalises violence as a permanent condition. Infrastructure can eventually be rebuilt. Political trust is far harder to reconstruct.

This is why reconstruction, humanitarian aid and ceasefires, while essential, cannot by themselves secure lasting peace. The international community must confront the deeper crisis of accountability. Documentation alone is insufficient. Investigations must translate into credible legal, diplomatic and political consequences. Otherwise, reports become little more than historical archives chronicling the repeated failure of international institutions.

Major powers face an equally consequential choice. They can continue treating international law as a strategic instrument selectively invoked against adversaries while shielding allies, or they can recommit to the principle that credibility depends upon consistency. That choice will determine not only the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also the survival of the broader rules-based order.

Ultimately, the Commission’s report should be remembered not simply as another account of a tragic conflict but as a warning that the post-war international system is approaching a moment of reckoning. The central question is no longer whether violations have occurred; the evidence is overwhelming. The question is whether the world still believes that international law possesses equal authority over the powerful and the powerless alike.

If the answer increasingly becomes no, the consequences will extend far beyond Gaza. Future wars will begin not with calculations of legality but with calculations of diplomatic protection. International institutions will continue producing reports and governments will continue invoking universal values, yet each failure to translate principle into action will further weaken the foundations of the international order.

The greatest casualty of Gaza, therefore, may not be confined to its devastated cities or shattered lives. It may be the quiet death of the belief that law can still restrain power. Once that belief disappears, rebuilding it will prove far more difficult than rebuilding any city reduced to rubble. (IPA Service)

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By Satyaki Chakraborty

The U.S.-China high tech battle for supremacy has reached a new peak after the China manufactured Supercomputer LineShine was adjudged the best among the Top 500 supercomputers made by various nations including the USA, at the International Supercomputing Conference in Hamburg, Germany held on June 23.China got this top slot recognition after 2017- a gap of nine years.

The announcement by the international body has sent tremors to the U.S. high tech companies and the Pentagon. They have been mobilizing huge financial resources for manufacturing more and more technologically developed Supercomputer. US is still ahead of China in high tech war, but this latest feat of China has bridged the gap between the two super powers making Trump’s bargaining power on high tech vis a vis China more problematic. The top computer experts of USA have been assessing the arrival of Chinese LineShine and its impact on the high-tech industries.

The LineShine supercomputer has two technical features. First, LineShine was researched and developed entirely domestically and independently. Faced with years of export controls on high-end GPUs and advanced chip equipment targeting China, Chinese research teams have established a complete closed-loop process – from chip design to system integration – truly achieving self-reliance and control. That means LineShine took first place despite facing layer upon layer of restrictions.

Second, while most of today’s leading supercomputers rely heavily on GPUs, LineShine is the first supercomputer to achieve exascale performance using only CPUs, and it is approximately 20 percent faster than El Capitan, the US supercomputer that previously held the top spot. The even greater significance of LineShine reaching the top lies in the fact that it has validated the feasibility of a complete domestic technology stack, including domestically made chips, storage, interconnects, and cooling systems. Prior to this, no country had ever built the world’s top supercomputer without relying entirely on products from AMD, Intel, or NVIDIA.

According to Chinese experts, Chinese supercomputer’s return to the global top not only demonstrates the country’s increasingly robust self-reliance and control in the high-tech sector, but also offers new options and greater opportunities for global industrial development. Today, fields such as atmospheric and oceanic sciences, engineering simulation, materials science, drug discovery, brain science, scientific AI, and large language model inference all rely on powerful supercomputing support.

According to Chinese experts, for a long time, high-end computing resources have been highly concentrated in a few Western countries. Many developing nations lack the capacity to build their own supercomputing systems and can only passively accept a single source of technology and stringent access restrictions. The path China has taken in computing power provides a model for countries in the Global South – one that is free from external control and allows for autonomous innovation.

Chinese official media mentions in recent years, China’s technological innovation has advanced rapidly, with many sectors accelerating the transition from quantitative growth to qualitative breakthroughs, from the low and mid-range to the mid- and high-end, and from being followers to leaders. China’s ranking in the Global Innovation Index rose from 34th place in 2012 to 10th in 2025. China will not close the door to international cooperation because it has achieved technological leadership, nor will it abandon its commitment to independent innovation because of external restrictions.

As far as U.S. experts are concerned, they hold the view that US-China tech war has intensified dramatically since 2017, employing a full spectrum of measures from tariffs and export controls to restrictions on market access in a race for technological dominance that is reshaping the global electronics landscape. While our calculations indicate a substantial shift in US imports away from China that has cost the latter close to USD150 billion in lost exports since 2017, they also suggest that underlying, mutual interdependence remains deeply rooted in the very structure of the industry: 29% of US semiconductor manufacturing machinery exports flow to China, and US electronics imports from Mexico, Taiwan and Vietnam incorporate a great deal of Chinese value-added.

I As they see it, if the ties connecting the US and Chinese electronics industries have proven more resilient than what headline bilateral trade figures might suggest, it is largely because the US administration’s long-term drive to cut ties with China contradicts the short-term interests of corporate America and the world’s most dominant electronics companies. We estimate that over the last decade US companies alone accounted for 54% of global electronics profits, a share that balloons to 88% when including their Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese peers.

Meanwhile, despite surging sales and remarkable technological progress, Chinese companies only secured 7% of global industry profits and are still lagging far behind leaders in the all-strategic semiconductor segment (Chart 3). A major supplier of critical inputs, an unmatched manufacturing hub and one of the world’s largest consumer markets for electronics, China resembles more a condition for, rather than a threat to, the profitability of dominant US electronics companies.

A study released in June by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found that industrial firms in China had received three to eight times as much government support over the past two decades as companies in the 38 mostly wealthy nations that belong to the O.E.C.D. In a report last month, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Rhodium Group argued that Chinese industrial policy was becoming more pervasive and systemic, calling the strategy an “industrial policy of everything.”

The U.S. experts argue that China’s advances are fuelled by investments in research, education and talent, policies that the United States should do more to emulate. Albert Bourla, the chief executive of Pfizer, said in March that one of Pfizer’s biggest challenges was how to tap into the “meteoric rise” of China’s scientific abilities in the midst of geopolitical tensions.

Mr. Bourla predicted that China would surpass the United States in biopharmaceutical innovation within this decade, saying the country had carried out a strategic plan over decades to reform regulations, file patents, fund research and cultivate talent. “They built their science. So this is where we need to become better,” Mr. Bourla said.

That way, the Chinese attack on U.S. supremacy in high tech areas covers not just supercomputers and electronics but also biopharmaceuticals. The U.S. multinationals are worried. The low cost production base of the Chinese companies has posed a big threat to the big U.S. firms. They have to compete on an equal footing. After the latest Supercomputer announcement, a frenzy has gripped the U.S. companies as also the Trump administration. The battle for supremacy in high tech has entered more intense and decisive phase. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

The arithmetic of India’s fuel market has long been sold as market-driven, but the latest price movements expose a more selective discipline. When crude oil rises, the pass-through to consumers and businesses is quick, stern and explained as unavoidable. When the same crude oil retreats, the adjustment becomes cautious, partial and wrapped in administrative silence.

The cut in commercial LPG prices from July 1 is being presented as relief for restaurants, hotels, caterers and small food businesses. A 19-kg commercial cylinder has been reduced by ₹183.50, taking the Delhi price to ₹2,930. The figure looks substantial in isolation, but it comes after a period in which oil and gas prices had hardened sharply on fears of supply disruption in West Asia. The same international conditions that were invoked to justify the rise have now eased materially, yet the scale of the reduction does not fully reflect the reversal in global petroleum prices. That asymmetry is the real story.

The price cycle has once again followed a familiar pattern. Consumers are asked to accept increases as the natural consequence of a volatile global market, but reductions arrive as if they were concessions. This is not a technical quibble. Fuel pricing has a direct bearing on transport costs, food inflation, household budgets, restaurant margins, small vendors, and the cost structure of almost every traded good. A slow or incomplete fall in petroleum prices keeps inflationary pressure embedded even after the original shock has faded.

The latest global context makes the hesitation harder to defend. Crude prices surged during the West Asia crisis as markets priced in the possibility of supply disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. Once the immediate danger receded and tanker movement normalised, oil prices fell back towards pre-war levels. Brent crude, which had climbed during the crisis, dropped sharply as the geopolitical premium unwound. The market did what markets do: it repriced risk. Indian fuel pricing, however, has not shown the same elasticity on the way down.

The contrast with Nayara Energy is revealing. The private refiner and fuel retailer moved to reduce petrol and diesel prices at its pumps, cutting petrol by ₹5 a litre and diesel by ₹3 a litre as global crude softened. Nayara operates a smaller retail network than the public sector oil marketing companies, but the significance of its move lies less in its market share than in the signal it sends. If a private company can restore prices closer to pre-war levels, it becomes difficult to argue that public sector companies are powerless before international volatility.

The public sector oil marketing companies remain the dominant players in India’s fuel retail market, and their pricing behaviour matters far beyond their balance sheets. They shape the benchmark for the entire economy. When they hold petrol and diesel prices steady after crude falls, the benefit of lower import costs is retained within the system rather than transmitted to households and businesses. This may improve margins, repair past losses or create fiscal comfort, but it weakens the claim that retail fuel prices are a clean reflection of market forces.

There is, of course, a legitimate argument that public sector oil companies must avoid abrupt swings and manage inventory costs, refinery economics, currency movements and tax structures. India imports most of its crude oil, and the rupee-dollar exchange rate can dilute the effect of a fall in headline crude prices. Oil companies also argue that they often absorb losses during politically sensitive periods or when global prices rise too quickly. These are not frivolous points. A country of India’s size cannot run fuel pricing as a daily emotional reaction to every market tick.

But that argument cuts both ways. If consumers are made to bear increases swiftly in the name of market discipline, they are entitled to expect similar discipline when prices decline. A smoothing mechanism that only smooths reductions while accelerating increases is not market pricing. It is administered pricing with market language. That distinction matters because public trust erodes when the rules appear to change depending on who benefits.

Commercial LPG illustrates the problem in miniature. The monthly revision system creates an impression of regular price discovery, but the pass-through remains selective. Businesses that rely on LPG rarely have the pricing power to adjust menus, service rates or supply contracts every time fuel inputs rise. Many absorb the increase, some pass it on, and others cut corners. When prices fall only partially, the earlier inflation does not fully reverse. The consumer may not see the relief in restaurant bills, street food prices or small service costs because the upstream reduction is too modest relative to the earlier shock.

Domestic LPG is an even more politically sensitive area, and here the silence is more pronounced. Household cylinder prices are typically managed with greater caution because of their direct link to voter sentiment and welfare commitments. But commercial LPG is not outside the inflation chain. A commercial cylinder used by eateries, small manufacturers, bakeries and service providers affects the final price of goods consumed by ordinary households. Treating the commercial cut as a sectoral adjustment misses its wider economic meaning.

Petrol and diesel are even more important because they are the arteries of the economy. Diesel powers freight, agriculture, public transport and logistics. Petrol affects personal mobility and urban consumption. When diesel prices remain sticky despite a fall in crude, the cost of moving vegetables, grains, milk, construction material and manufactured goods remains elevated. This stickiness has a multiplier effect. It allows an energy shock to linger in the economy long after the original international trigger has weakened.

The government’s own actions show that it recognises the changed global situation. Restrictions on the sale of petrol and diesel imposed during the Middle East disruption have been lifted from July 1. Export duty adjustments have also been made in response to easing global prices and changing supply conditions. These moves show that the state is reading the global oil market actively. The question, then, is why the retail consumer does not receive a fuller benefit when the same market turns favourable.

The deeper issue is political economy, not petroleum chemistry. Fuel pricing involves consideration of several factors such as company margins, government revenue, inflation management and electoral calculation. Excise duties, value-added taxes, dealer commissions and company margins all sit inside the final retail price. When crude falls, governments and companies face a temptation: let consumers benefit, or retain the cushion. Too often, the cushion wins.

This is why the phrase “market forces” rings hollow. If public sector oil companies are commercial entities, they must respond commercially both ways. If they are instruments of public policy, then the government should say so clearly and explain the formula by which consumers are protected or burdened. What cannot be sustained indefinitely is the fiction that consumers are paying a market price when downward market movement is filtered through opaque discretion. For the hospitality and small business sector, the LPG cut will help, but only at the margin. Commercial users have faced a sequence of cost pressures: rent, wages, electricity, transport, food inputs and borrowing costs. A sharper fuel correction would have supported margins without requiring government subsidies. Instead, a partial cut keeps businesses in a holding pattern. They receive enough relief for a headline, but not enough to reset operating costs meaningfully. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

The joint statement of the Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman issued in Beijing on June 26 following the visit of Tarique to China has drawn the attention of the global diplomatic circles due to the sweep of the nature of collaboration between the two countries mentioned in the statement.

For India, the most important part is the detailed outline of the cooperation for the development of Teesta river project and the defence cooperation. New Delhi officially has not reacted to the statement but some non-official sources have expressed their anxiety at the massive Chinese participation in Teesta river project in some areas which have relevance for India. Teesta flows in India and then goes to Bangladesh. India have long relationship with Bangladesh on the handling of Teesta waters. So India has a stake in any development concerning this project.

Perhaps, China is aware of such apprehensions in India. So the Chinese spokesperson said in Beijing on Friday in the press briefing that Teesta Cooperation agreement was not targeted against any third country, meaning India. But the more important reaction was in Dhaka on Monday from the Prime Minister Tarique Rahman when he said that the implementation of Teesta Barrage Master Plan is a national priority and it would be implemented at any cost. It is apparent that the comment was meant for India.

It is quite likely that the Indian officials have been assessing the in depth implications of the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP). Since this involves lot of areas including dredging, river training, flood control, building of embankments and advanced technologies of water management, Indian experts have been analyzing whether Indian side of Teesta river has any consequences due to the implementation of this project on their side. India is expected to take up with Bangladesh some issues if those are of common interest.

Let us be frank about the Indian dilemma. India have lost the opportunity of being a partner of Teesta project due to the myopic view which the Narendra Modi government too in 2024 and 2025 during the interim Yunus regime in Bangladesh. PM could have met Dr. Muhammad Yunus to take forward this partnership as it had already got the consent of the earlier PM Sheikh Hasina and lot of discussions were held. This was the most important bilateral project. So India should have shown more interest to talk on this issue of common interest despite sharp political differences.

Even after the installation of Tarique government in February 2026, Indian government could have shown special interest as Tarique government was going ahead with some priority programmes. If India had shown more friendly attitude to Tarique government in the initial period Tarique Rahman might have chosen India for his first visit as PM. In diplomacy, time matters and optics also. China offered red carpet to the Bangladesh Prime Minister. Bangladesh badly needed funds as also industrial programmes to create new job opportunities. China offered that. The relationship was catapulted to a new strategic level.

It is true that after the China visit, the foreign office in Dhaka is upbeat saying that China has agreed to be by the side of Bangladesh, come what may. But at the same time, the foreign policy planners are saying that Bangladesh have not put all eggs in Chinese basket. For the Tarique government-Bangladesh is first priority. Who is helpful to Bangladesh prosperity will be welcomed, it can be India or the United States.

India have to approach Prime Minister Tarique Rahman with open mind. Tarique has every right to sign agreement with any country based on the country’s interests just like India. Indian side should renew the invitation to the Bangladesh PM to visit India soon and follow up this so that PM accepts. Just requesting the PM to visit India after taking oath, is not enough. It has to be pursued. Chinese ambassador in Dhaka did that. China was constantly in touch with Bangladesh PM and then he agreed.

Bangladesh sources say that China is among Bangladesh’s most important partners in the sphere of economic development. It has invested heavily in infrastructure construction in Bangladesh and plays an important role as a source of investment and manufacturing capacity. As Bangladesh prepares to graduate from the Least Developed Country (LDC) status, China will be an important partner in industrial relocation, renewable energy, digitalisation, and logistics. Bangladesh government need to generate new jobs for the youth. China’s proposal for setting up industrial clusters in districts, is suitable for Bangladesh in generating jobs at a faster pace.

But at the same time, the official position is that Bangladesh is ready to equally welcome India and its offer for assistance in the industrialization of Bangladesh. India-Bangladesh partnership should be helpful to Bangladesh for creating strategic opportunities. India should treat Bangladesh on equal footing. Bangladesh is assertive about its strategic autonomy. This is true in case of China also.

Bangladesh experts also feel that India will remain Bangladesh’s indispensable neighbour whose cooperation is strongly needed for connectivity, water, energy and regional security requirements. India can also help Bangladesh in digital development. That’s the call to India and New Delhi has to respond in an appropriate manner. (IPA Service)

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By Nantoo Banerjee

West Bengal’s first ever Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government’s resolve to rebuild the state to its “old glory” sounds good though reversing decades of economic stagnation and industrial decline remains an incredibly difficult challenge. Economically, West Bengal’s rank among Indian states has dropped from No.1 till the mid-1960s to below 10 now. Currently, even the 10th ranked Haryana counts more than 10,389 operating registered factories, serving as a major automotive, auto-component, and consumer goods manufacturing hub. Official statistics from the annual survey of industries indicate that West Bengal has only around 6,100 factories operating actively at any given time. Factory jobs are shrinking in traditional sectors. A severe talent paradox exists. Localized manufacturing in light engineering, food processing, and specialized textiles is actually facing massive mid-level technical vacancies.

Gone are the days when West Bengal was the country’s topmost Industrial state during the 1950s and partly through the mid-1960s. The decline started within three years of the death of Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy, the state’s best performing chief minister. In the 1950s, Bengal accounted for nearly a quarter of the entire country’s industrial output. By the mid-1970s, the state was overtaken by Maharashtra. The Naxalite movement, Marxist-sponsored militant trade unionism, anti-MNC attitude of the Left parties, led by CPM, constant centre-state political clash, and frequent strikes led to production bottlenecks, forcing industrial houses to quit Bengal. More than three decades of Left rule (1977-2011), followed by 15 years of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) regime, triggered a continuous industrial decline of the state. Historically, the period between 1980 and 1981 was known as the “Death Cross” for the state, as its relative income dropped below the national average for the first time.

By 1991, Bengal accounted for over 40 percent of India’s lockout-related lost working days. As a result, large industrial giants and private capital relocated to states like Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu. This shift from a manufacturing leader to an economic laggard was driven by several interconnected factors. Efforts to reverse the trend in the 2000s, such as the Tata Nano project in Singur, faced intense political opposition from TMC, further deterring large-scale manufacturing investments. Today, the state’s share of national industrial output has shrunk to around 3.5 percent. Although there have been some localized initiatives — such as developments in the Kharagpur industrial park or the Bantola leather complex — the state’s structural manufacturing and economic base remains heavily eroded compared to its 1950-60 peak.

During prolonged tenure of the Left and TMC rule, the state’s industrial scene was mostly controlled by a group of local businessmen in their own business interest. The latter discouraged outside investors, depicting an alarming political picture of the state, in national forums. Those local businessmen projected themselves as best well-wishers of the state government – first, the Left Front, and then TMC – for squeezing incentives for their survival and growth. Bengal experienced a severe and prolonged structural decline. This shift from a manufacturing leader to an economic laggard was driven by several interconnected factors. Today, the state features only some 200 industrial and economic parks driving manufacturing, with operations centred just around four industrial belts.

Among the states which have industrially overtaken Bengal over the years are: Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Telangana, Punjab and Rajasthan. Today, Tamil Nadu leads India with over 40,100 factories and employs the largest number of industrial workers. The state is a powerhouse for textiles, automobiles, and electronic hardware. Gujarat is home to over 33,300 factories. It is heavily dominated by petrochemicals, heavy manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and trade networks utilizing major ports. Maharashtra, the country’s wealthiest state by GDP, hosts over 26,500 factories. It is the premier hub for engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. UP has over 22,100 registered factories. Key sectors include agro-processing, heavy machinery, and defence manufacturing. Andhra Pradesh boasts over 16,000 factories. It thrives on pharmaceutical, food processing, and textile manufacturing. Karnataka hosts roughly 15,000 factories. Beyond IT and biotechnology, it is a leading hub for aerospace and heavy machinery.

West Bengal’s first BJP government will have to work really hard to attract large industrial investments in the state under the current national industrial backdrop. The automobile industry is known as the engine of growth all over the world. The state, which once housed the country’s biggest automobile production outfit and tyre manufacturing unit, must try to bring at least one national or multinational vehicle manufacturing company to set up a production unit. That will quickly change the industrial environment in Bengal. The existing industrial complexes in the Kolkata-Howrah region, the Durgapur-Asansol-Burnpur belt and Kharagpur must be helped and encouraged to grow fast. While most industrial outfits in the Kolkata-Howrah region focus on engineering, metal and alloy industries, leather products (Bantala), and garments, the industrial belt covering Haldia and East Midnapur houses petrochemical plants, oil refineries, and chemical/fertilizer manufacturing. The Durgapur-Burnpur belt is traditionally known for heavy machinery production, coal-bed methane exploration, and large-scale iron and steel production.

Thanks to large manufacturing investments by the Tata group, Kharagpur has quietly emerged as a rapidly growing hub for multi-product manufacturing, wagon plants, and food processing. The Tata Hitachi Construction Machinery Company operates on a 250-acre parcel in the Vidyasagar Industrial Park. This is one of their largest and most successful new generation manufacturing facilities in the country. It produces a wide range of excavators and heavy construction equipment. Tata Metaliks, a Tata Steel subsidiary, has a large plant at Kharagpur, manufacturing pig iron and ductile iron pipes. The site recently underwent a Rs. 600 crore expansion programme to scale up its production capacity.

The BJP government’s first budget, presented by Finance Minister Swapan Dasgupta, heavily prioritizes bringing back industries and businesses that had previously migrated to Northern and Western India. The ‘Revive Bengal Plan’ involves a Rs.5,000 crore makeover aimed at infrastructure development, logistics connectivity, and job creation to reverse past trends of de-industrialization and attract global companies. It is a major challenge before the state government. Rebuilding the industry takes time. With the national government by its side, the state must work fast to respond to the public expectation and demand. Fortunately, Chief Minister Shubhendu Adhikari’s council of ministers seems to be working in unison and collaborating toward a shared objective to make the state great again. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

India’s decision to initiate an anti-dumping investigation into cheap steel imports marks more than another defensive trade action. It is a reminder that globalisation, which New Delhi has often invoked when Indian exports face barriers abroad, becomes far more complicated when the pressure arrives at home. The steel case has exposed the contradiction that sits at the heart of every large economy’s trade policy: open markets are desirable when they expand one’s reach, but politically and economically painful when they threaten strategic domestic capacity.

The investigation into steel imports from China, Japan and Russia comes at a time when Indian producers are facing a sharp squeeze from low-priced shipments, particularly from China. Finished steel from China has entered the Indian market at prices domestic mills say are difficult to match. China has emerged as India’s largest supplier of finished steel, deepening concern in an industry that is capital-intensive, employment-generating and central to infrastructure, construction, automobiles, engineering and defence manufacturing. For India, steel is not a marginal commodity. It is an industrial backbone.

The irony is difficult to miss. India has frequently protested when other countries restrict Indian goods, whether through tariffs, standards, quotas or anti-dumping measures. Its exporters have often argued that such actions are protectionist, unfair or politically motivated. Yet New Delhi is now using the same trade remedy framework to shield domestic producers from imports it says may be entering at unfairly low prices. This does not make India hypocritical in any unusual sense. It makes India a normal state in a world where national interest routinely outranks free-trade theory.

The language of globalisation has always promised mutual benefit. Markets would open, efficiencies would rise, consumers would get cheaper goods and producers would find new buyers. India has gained substantially from that order. Pharmaceuticals, information technology services, automotive components, textiles, chemicals and engineering goods have all benefited from access to foreign markets. Foreign competition has also forced parts of Indian industry to modernise and improve quality. But the steel dispute underlines the other side of the bargain. When foreign producers, backed by scale, state support, cheaper finance or excess capacity, flood a market, the impact is not limited to price. It can reshape the industrial base of the importing country.

Domestic steelmakers operate under burdens that are not always visible in the final price of a tonne of steel. They must invest heavily in plants, mines, logistics, environmental compliance, power, technology and labour. The business requires long investment cycles and carries large debt exposure. Freight costs, land acquisition challenges, raw material linkages, regulatory delays and expensive capital all affect competitiveness. A company cannot shut and restart a blast furnace with the ease of a trading firm switching supply sources. Once capacity is damaged, revival is slow and expensive.

This is why the issue cannot be reduced to the narrow argument that cheaper imports benefit consumers. They do, at least in the immediate term. Builders, fabricators, small manufacturers and downstream users welcome lower input costs. Infrastructure projects may gain from cheaper material. Inflationary pressure may ease. But if low prices are the result of dumping or surplus disposal rather than genuine efficiency, the short-term gain can come at the cost of long-term dependence. A country that allows core industrial sectors to weaken may later discover that the market does not remain cheap when domestic alternatives have vanished.

China’s role is central to the debate because its steel industry is not merely large; it is structurally capable of influencing global prices. When domestic demand weakens in China, excess steel seeks external markets. Countries across regions have then faced similar anxieties: local mills complain of price suppression, governments weigh tariffs, and importers warn against higher costs. India is not alone in confronting this pressure. The wider world has moved towards a more guarded trade posture, particularly in industries linked to strategic capacity, jobs and infrastructure.

The Indian case is made sharper by the country’s own industrial ambitions. The government wants India to become a manufacturing hub, expand infrastructure, build domestic supply chains and reduce dependence in key sectors. Those objectives cannot coexist easily with unlimited exposure to underpriced imports. The “Make in India” aspiration requires domestic firms to invest at scale. But investment becomes harder when producers fear that imported material can undercut them during every downturn. No boardroom will commit billions to new capacity if policy signals suggest that the market can be overwhelmed by dumped goods at critical moments.

At the same time, protection cannot become a substitute for competitiveness. This is the central balance New Delhi must strike. Trade remedies are legitimate when imports are unfairly priced and causing injury. They are dangerous when they become permanent shelter for inefficiency. Indian steel companies must not use anti-dumping duties as a shield against productivity improvement, technological upgrades or cost discipline. Consumers and downstream industries should not be made to carry inflated prices simply because upstream producers have political influence. Industrial policy must protect capacity, not complacency.

The government’s challenge, therefore, is to distinguish between strategic defence and routine protectionism. An anti-dumping investigation is an evidence-based process. It must examine pricing, injury, market share, cost structures and the behaviour of exporters. If dumping is established, duties may be justified. If the problem is merely that foreign producers are more efficient, the case for intervention becomes weaker. The credibility of India’s trade policy depends on this distinction. A country that seeks access to global markets for its own exporters cannot appear casual in restricting imports when domestic lobbies complain.

There is also a diplomatic dimension. India’s economic relationship with China is already shaped by distrust, border tensions and trade imbalance. Steel imports add another layer to a relationship in which India depends heavily on Chinese industrial goods while trying to reduce strategic vulnerabilities. Action against Chinese steel will be viewed through that broader lens, even if the investigation also covers other countries. New Delhi will have to show that the measure is based on trade law rather than geopolitical signalling. That is essential because India’s own exporters may face scrutiny abroad under the same rules.

The steel dispute also exposes a larger shift in the world economy. The era when globalisation was treated as an unquestioned good has passed. Supply shocks, pandemics, wars, sanctions, energy volatility and strategic rivalry have forced governments to rethink dependence. Free trade is no longer judged only by consumer price. It is judged by resilience, employment, national security and the ability to maintain essential industrial capacity. The steel industry sits exactly at that intersection.

For India, the lesson is not to abandon globalisation but to approach it without illusion. Open markets helped India integrate with the world, but openness without safeguards can create vulnerabilities. Trade policy must be pragmatic, not sermonising. When Indian goods face arbitrary restrictions abroad, New Delhi is right to object. When Indian industry faces unfairly priced imports at home, it is equally entitled to act. There is no contradiction if both positions rest on rules and evidence. The contradiction arises only when free trade is invoked as morality abroad and protection is practised as entitlement at home. (IPA Service)

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By Sobhanlal Datta Gupta

The Eighteenth West Bengal Legislative Assembly which was formed in the wake of the poll results in 2026 has catapulted the BJP into power on a scale which is unprecedented, but not totally unsurprising. It has been a verdict by default, a furious act of political revenge against years of misrule, violence, fear and corruption. A structure that was built up at the behest of the TMC supremo, completely devoid of transparency, and bolstered by a crude culture of sycophancy, led to an all-pervasive alienation of the party from the masses. This is manifest in the complete collapse and fragmentation of the TMC in a month’s time and the drama that is unfolding in West Bengal almost every day has made it an object of ridicule and disdain in the eyes of the common man.

While for the saffron brigade the West Bengal verdict is certainly a shot in the arm, what signal has it sent to the Left, which is its bête noire? For the Left the implications are three-fold. One: the ouster and the virtual evaporation of the TMC has opened up an unprecedented opportunity for the Left to create a space of its own. It goes without saying that in the preceding years the TMC supremo targeted the Left as its sworn enemy and was hell-bent to decimate it. Now that this hurdle is gone and the so-called opposition, following the split in the TMC, is virtually acting as the B-team of BJP, the Left now would be in a position to project itself as the only viable and meaningful alternative to the saffron brigade. Rallies are being staged, party offices are being unlocked and the presence of the Left in public life is being increasingly felt.

Two: while the erasure of a virtually lumpen outfit like the TMC has been a big relief, the coming to power of the BJP with such a thumping majority, however, does not at all augur well for the Left. It may be presumed that, while in the given conditions of constitutional democracy BJP will be constrained not to unleash open repression on the Left, the Left too must respond by adopting two rather different strategies. First, it has to play the role of a constructive opposition instead of simply castigating the new government as reactionary, fascist, etc, because it must remember that BJP has come to power with a massive popular mandate.

The Left should utilize this opportunity by placing before the Government alternative blueprints of development which would take into account the interests of the common man, the underprivileged and the downtrodden. It should tell the Government that the Left demands appropriate steps to be taken, cutting across party lines, against all those who were engaged in repression of those who opposed the TMC. This would immediately send the message that the Left does not believe in any sectarian understanding of the victims of repression.

The Left should also draw the attention of the Government to the ugly practice of publicly parading the persons implicated in corruption charges and throwing rotten eggs and tomatoes towards them and demand stern measures against the perpetrators of such acts. The other strategy refers to the condemnation of any step taken by the government which makes discriminatory treatment of the minorities, indulges in history writing by erasure of Islam from syllabus, unleashes bulldozer against hawkers without rehabilitation, promotes the agenda of Hindutva. To be more precise, any kind of assault on the democratic rights of the people, the poor, the underdogs, must be questioned.

Three: The Left has to understand that it has failed to arrest the BJP’s strategy of mobilization of Hindu votes, which the BJP could do by instilling in the psyche of the Bengali Hindus a sense of deep insecurity posed by the so-called growth of Muslim population in West Bengal , a threat across the Bangladesh border as a result of easy entry of infiltrators and TMC’s populist strategy of appeasement of minorities for the sake of conserving the Muslim vote bank. The most disturbing issue concerning the Left is that the verdict in favour of the BJP was a mix up of anti-TMC plus pro-Hindu vote. Since It is very difficult to segregate the two, it will remain a perennial problem for the Left to detect the extent of influence of the Hindutva factor on the electorate.

This being the scenario, it is high time that the Left in West Bengal has to reinvent itself by addressing issues which have been traditionally neglected by them. This refers to the challenge of cultural nationalism, espoused by the BJP. The West Bengal Left has for decades nurtured the feeling with complacence that the so-called Hindu Bengali is culturally oriented towards secularism, that the Hindu Bengali psyche is relatively free from the virus of communalism. This is an exercise in self-deception.

The great cultural legacy of Bengal notwithstanding, we Bengalis are not aware of the fact that there is a deep undercurrent of religious intolerance in our blood, which comes out in the open at specific historical moments. We have never been comfortable with the Muslims, have shown no interest in learning from the rich legacy of Islam and no effort was made during the three decades of Left Front regime to promote an appropriate cultural agenda which would foster the spirit of secularism among us. BJP has made full use of it by taking advantage of our own ignorance.

Consequently, the Left has to take up a two-fold challenge on the cultural front. First, it has to systematically undertake the campaign that the BJP’s strategy of misappropriation of the cultural icons of Bengal, i.e. Vivekananda, Bankimchandra, Aurobindo, Subhash Chandra, even Tagore by presenting their ideas in a fragmented manner, isolating them from their historical context and projecting them as proponents of Hindutva is an exercise in fabricated, and not real history. Second, it needs to be acknowledged that the Left has not given due importance to these figures, considering them as religious or literary figures who do not merit much attention.

This has led to colossal neglect of the religious syncretism of Rammohun Roy and Vivekananda, the ideal of human unity in Aurobindo, the predilection for western science in Bankimchandra, apart from his amazing literary creations, his critique of gender inequality, the uncompromising secularism of Subhash Chandra Bose. To be more exact, the Left has to remind and enlighten the public by projecting the iconic cultural figures of Bengal in the totality of their historical contexts and counter the standpoint of the BJP. Space has opened up. It is now time for the Left to enter this space, set the agenda and work it out. (IPA Service)

** The writer is a Kolkata based leading political Scientist. He retired as Sir Surendranath Banerjee Professor of Calcutta University.

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By K Raveendran

The new FCRA rules may look like an administrative tightening of India’s foreign funding regime, but their political effect is likely to be far larger than their legal wording suggests. On paper, the framework is simple: organisations receiving foreign donations must be more precise about what they do, where they operate, and how the money is spent. They can no longer seek registration or permission by offering broad statements of purpose. They must now identify their work within a defined list of 105 activities grouped under religion, culture, economy, education and social service. The government’s stated logic is transparency, traceability and better monitoring of foreign money entering sensitive sectors. Yet the impact of such a move cannot be judged by text alone. It has to be read against the atmosphere in which it has arrived.

That atmosphere is already strained, particularly for Christian organisations working in education, healthcare, welfare, tribal development and rural support. Many such groups operate in places where the state is weak, private capital is absent and public services arrive slowly. Their work is often practical rather than theological: schools, hostels, clinics, nutrition centres, orphanages, old-age homes, rehabilitation services and disaster relief. But the public debate around Christian institutions has shifted steadily from service to suspicion. Allegations of conversion, foreign influence and cultural intrusion have become frequent in several states. Even where the claims do not stand legal scrutiny, the damage is done by the process itself: police complaints, local intimidation, stalled permissions, nervous donors and administrators forced into a defensive posture.

The new rules therefore land not as a neutral compliance exercise, but as one more layer of surveillance in a sector that already feels politically exposed. A requirement to specify the exact category of activity may appear reasonable to officials and auditors. For an NGO, however, it can create operational anxiety. Social work rarely fits into neat compartments. A Christian organisation running a rural school may also provide nutrition, counselling, scholarships, community health awareness and relief support. A tribal development project may involve education, livelihood support, culture, rights awareness and local leadership training. Under a rigid classification system, such overlap becomes a vulnerability. If an activity later appears to differ from the category declared, the organisation may fear accusations of diversion, concealment or misrepresentation.

This is where distrust deepens. Rules that demand precision from institutions operating in complex social settings tend to shift power towards officials interpreting the rules. That discretion matters because FCRA approval is not merely a financial licence. For many NGOs, it is the difference between survival and closure. Foreign contributions sustain long-term programmes that domestic philanthropy often does not fund, especially in remote, poor or conflict-affected regions. When permissions become harder to obtain or easier to challenge, the chilling effect goes beyond the organisations directly affected. Smaller groups begin avoiding certain kinds of work. Donors become cautious. Local staff fear being branded as political actors. Beneficiaries lose services without necessarily understanding why they have disappeared.

The government has a legitimate interest in knowing how foreign funds are used. No sovereign state can treat external money as irrelevant, especially in sectors involving religion, rights, political mobilisation or vulnerable communities. India has had past controversies involving shell organisations, opaque transfers, misuse of charitable platforms and campaigns that blurred the line between welfare and political advocacy. A regulatory regime that asks organisations to declare their activities and spending locations is not inherently unreasonable. The difficulty lies in whether regulation is applied evenly, transparently and with proportionate safeguards. If the rules are used to improve compliance, they may strengthen public confidence. If they are perceived as tools for ideological filtering, they will erode trust further.

For Christian minorities, perception is already shaped by lived experience. The anxiety is not only about the FCRA form or the list of 105 activities. It is about the growing frequency of confrontations around prayer meetings, schools, charitable homes and missionaries. It is about anti-conversion laws in several states and the way accusations can be made before evidence is tested. It is about local pressure groups arriving before officials do, and administrative systems responding to political noise rather than legal facts. In such an environment, even a technically neutral rule acquires a sectarian shadow. Communities ask not what the rule says in isolation, but who is likely to suffer from it in practice.

This presents a serious political problem for the BJP’s Christian outreach. The party has spent years trying to soften its image among Christian voters, especially in Kerala and parts of the Northeast. Kerala has been central to this project because Christians form an influential social bloc with deep roots in education, healthcare, entrepreneurship, migration networks and civil society. The BJP has held dialogues with church leaders, highlighted welfare schemes, projected minority-friendly faces and tried to build issue-based bridges with sections of the community.

But outreach cannot survive on symbolism alone. If the same community that is being courted politically feels that its institutions are being watched, restricted or distrusted administratively, the message becomes contradictory. A Christmas visit, a meeting with bishops or a public statement praising Christian contributions will not easily offset anxiety among schools, diocesan charities, mission hospitals and grassroots NGOs. Kerala’s Christian community is politically diverse and not automatically hostile to the BJP. Sections have concerns about economic opportunity, migration, security, social change and minority competition. But distrust of majoritarian politics remains a barrier. FCRA tightening, when viewed alongside pressures on missionary activity elsewhere, reinforces the suspicion that engagement is tactical while policy remains adversarial.

The challenge is sharper because Christian institutions in Kerala are not marginal actors. They are deeply embedded in the state’s social history. They run hospitals, colleges, technical institutions, welfare networks and charitable bodies that serve people across communities. Their influence is not confined to Sunday congregations. It extends into the middle class, the professional sector, the diaspora and local development. Any regulatory move perceived as targeting Christian-linked NGOs can therefore travel quickly through church networks, family conversations, parish bulletins and community media. The political cost may not appear immediately as street protest, but as quiet consolidation of scepticism.

There is also a wider democratic issue. Civil society cannot function effectively if every foreign-funded activity is treated as a potential threat. Nor can the state abdicate oversight simply because an organisation claims charitable intent. The balance requires clarity, fairness and trust. The new rules offer clarity in one sense by defining categories and asking for specific declarations. But clarity without trust can become rigidity. A system that classifies service too narrowly may fail to understand how social work actually happens. A school in a poor district is not just an educational activity; it may be a nutrition intervention, a gender programme, a child protection mechanism and a community development platform. A hospital may be healthcare, but it may also be disaster relief, livelihood support and social rehabilitation.

The government can reduce distrust only by ensuring that the rules are not enforced through suspicion-first governance. Decisions on registration, renewal or prior permission must be timely, reasoned and open to meaningful appeal. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

The opposition INDIA bloc which completed its three years on June 23 is passing through a critical period when the very foundation of this alliance, the strong regional parties, are shattered by defections and splits backed by the ruling party BJP. Mamata Banerjee who gave the name of the alliance at the founding conclave in Patna on June 23, 2023, is out of power from West Bengal in the recent state assembly elections. What is more damaging is that most of the MPs and MLAs of her Trinamool Congress have disowned her virtually making her a non entity in politics.

TMC with its 28 Lok Sabha members in Lok Sabha was a major regional party engaged in fighting the BJP at the national plane. The marginalization of Mamata and her TMC has immensely affected the power of the INDIA bloc vis a vis BJP at national level. Both the dissidents MPs and the legislators of TMC are presently being guided by the BJP. They are expected to function as the B team of the BJP in both Lok Sabha and in the West Bengal assembly.

Along with marginalization of Mamata, UBT Shiv Sena supremo Uddhav Thackeray is also facing a similar situation as six rebel MPs of his party joined the Eknath Shinde led Shiv Sena on Monday reducing his party’s number in Parliament to three. Shinde’s Sena is a part of NDA, so the BJP will get the support of another six members in Parliament. Only last month, seven MPs of AAP defected to the BJP. AAP is not attending INDIA bloc due its differences with the Congress but the AAP is committed to fight BJP on national plane along with INDIA bloc parties.

After the political setbacks to the two major INDIA bloc partners TMC and UBT Sena, the central BJP is focusing on splitting the powerful Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh which has 37 seats in Lok Sabha . UP is going for state assembly polls in early 2027..UP is politically very important for BJP. All sorts of reports are coming from Lucknow about nocturnal meetings organized by the state BJP for some SP Lok Sabha members, but still now, no SP MP or MLA has indicated any intention in public. SP President Akhilesh Yadav is alert. He has refuted all reports about split in the SP. But the central leadership of BJP is determined to organize the split before the assembly polls. So the INDIA Bloc partners Congress and the SP have to be very vigilant.

As regards Tamil Nadu, the loss of DMK for the INDIA Bloc has also its adverse impact on the total unity of INDIA Bloc. DMK supremo M K Stalin has been a consistent fighter against the BJP till the state assembly results were out on May 4 and the Congress extended support to Vijay for chief ministership without having any talks with the party’s long time ally DMK. Earlier DMK, at the instance of the Left parties said that the Party would be fighting BJP on national plane, but in recent days, the DMK attitude towards the Congress and INDIA bloc has stiffened. This gives a big opportunity to the BJP to fish in the volatile politics of Tamil Nadu.

TN chief minister Vijay’s views about BJP and the INDIA bloc have not been fully transparent. Vijay is vulnerable to the BJP pressure if he thinks that that helps his party. Rahul Gandhi is quite close to Vijay. He must ensure that TVK joins INDIA bloc and agrees to its official position to fight the BJP in Lok Sabha elections. DMK was the leader of INDIA bloc in Tamil Nadu and Stalin led the bloc quite well by accommodating his allies including the Left parties. In 2029 Lok Sabha elections, Congress and the CPI, CPI(M) will have to fully depend on Vijay for seat sharing..It is not sure whether Vijay will be as cooperative as Stalin was in 2024 Lok Sabha polls.

Amidst this bad patches in the fortunes of the INDIA Bloc partners, Rahul Gandhi is continuing his consistent fight against the BJP-RSS and focusing in a big way for ideological battle against the BJP and the RSS. His speech at the June 8 meeting of the INDIA bloc in Delhi made sense since lot of analysis was there about the failings of the bloc partners including the Congress. Resolve was made for taking corrective action.

The ground reality is that the Congress has to shoulder the main responsibility of electoral offensive in the coming three years preceding the holding of Lok Sabha polls in 2029. 2029 is special since the BJP is aiming at establishing a one nation one party goal through this elections. The next constitutional amendment to convert India into a Hindu Rashtra is also on agenda after 2029 Lok Sabha elections. So the next three years are crucial for INDIA bloc in rebuilding the bloc and uniting all the forces including the civil society groups against the BJP.

In 2027, seven states are going for assembly elections, Out of this seven, excepting in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, in all other five states, the Congress is the principal INDIA bloc party taking on the BJP and NDA. These states are Goa, Manipur, Uttarakhand, Himachal and Gujarat. In UP, the Congress has to arrive at an electoral understanding with the SP recognizing that SP is the major partner and the seat sharing will be made on the basis of ground reality. As regards Punjab, AAP is the dominant player followed by the Congress. Here there is no threat from the BJP. So it can be a contest between AAP and the Congress.

In 2028, state polls will be held in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chattisgarh, and Karnataka among others. These are the states the Congress has to improve its performance. The win of INDIA bloc partners in the state assembly elections can only generate the necessary momentum for the Lok Sabha polls in April/May 2029. That way, the Congress and to some extent SP will have to lead the INDIA Bloc during this crucial period. The five point programme adopted at the June 8 meeting, has to be followed up in true spirit

After the INDIA bloc founding in June 2023, the results of the 2024 Lok Sabha polls were quite favourable for the partners. BJP was reduced to 240 from the earlier majority figure. But the Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah took corrective steps and in the next two years, the BJP has turned the electoral arithmetic in its favour. INDIA Bloc has also to do correctives and ensure that the united struggles continue along with the measures for electoral preparedness. Congress, SP, RJD and the Left have to shoulder the ideological task for taking on the BJP-RSS combo. (IPA Service)

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By Arun Srivastava

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) strategy of fracturing regional parties serves as a quaternary-track political manoeuvre designed to secure long-term constitutional dominance, dismantle the opposition architecture INDIA bloc, give a shape to its long cherished desire to create Bharat free of active opposition and finally, consolidating its position in 2029 and sweeping the Lok Sabha election. It is a three year programme piloted by Narendra Modi-Amit Shah duo to facilitate the process of One National One Party goal and the establishment of Hindu Rashtra.

Splitting regional parties is a highly calculated, multi-layered political strategy rather than a simplistic action. The immediate goal is often to secure a two-thirds legislative majority for constitutional amendments for enabling passage of the delimitation bill during the next parliamentary session. For ensuring the constitutional amendment, the ruling NDA requires a two-thirds majority (360 seats out of 540) in the Lok Sabha. Modi government had tried to have the bill through in the last session, but it fell of majority support.

The push to split parties and consolidate power is also inextricably linked to Narendra Modi’s attempts to pass a Delimitation Bill ahead of 2029LokSabha polls.. Consolidating numbers would help Modi to give a shape to his plan to easily push through redrawn electoral maps that fundamentally alter India’s parliamentary math.

Poaching regional leaders would provide instant grassroots organizational machinery to BJP, but the possibility could not be ruled out that Shah’s action may prove to be counter-productive and harm the BJP and Modi’s design. Delimitation will increase seats in northern states where the BJP possesses a strong footprint, while reduce the relative electoral weight of southern and regional strongholds.

Controlling the legislative process ensures the boundary redrawing aligns with the party’s long-term national electoral map optimization. The INDIA bloc relies heavily on strong regional parties to anchor specific states and defeat the BJP locally. By fracturing these regional entities, the BJP isolates the Congress party, depriving it of crucial coalition partners, shared vote banks, and localized organizational machinery. Splits trigger intense internal infighting over party names and election symbols, forcing opposition leaders to focus on survival rather than mounting a unified national campaign.

The Delimitation Bill, 2026 is highly controversial because it proposes a massive overhaul of India’s electoral map by expanding the Lok Sabha from 543 to 850 seats and changing how parliamentary constituencies are calculated. Modi government had introduced a three-bill package in a special parliamentary session to operationalize the 33% women’s quota, which was legally tied to a new delimitation exercise. The opposition, along with several region

The parties, opposed the move, leading to the bill falling 54 votes short of the required majority. The delimitation bill would widen the “North-South” Divide. Southern states, which have successfully curbed population growth, feared that a population-based redistribution of seats would drastically diminish their political representation in favour of more populous northern states. Their apprehension was genuine and rationale. By inflating the Lok Sabha to roughly 850 seats, the government aimed to ensure no state lost its absolute number of seats, but at the same time it would create an unwieldy legislative chamber without addressing the underlying federal concerns.

It was purely a political move of BJP. It is a major power in northern India, by virtually by crippling the Congress in the states. With increased number of seats, BJP would emerge as the ruling party. It would not have to bother for support from the southern states. Despite its defeat, the bill remains the epicentre of a fierce debate on Indian federalism. The fear that seat reallocation will permanently shift political power from South India to North India will come true. Because the North’s population grew exponentially faster over the last 50 years, a purely population-based seat allocation would drastically increase the number of MPs from northern states (like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar).

Though BJP and RSS talk of one country, this move of the saffron ecosystem will split India between North and South. The INDIA bloc had accused BJP of forcing through a radical, potentially unfair restructuring of constituencies. The bill sought to grant Parliament the direct authority to decide which census to use for redrawing boundaries, stripping away the fixed constitutional timelines that ensured institutional neutrality. Splitting the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and Shiv Sena (SS) would yield immaterial gains for the BJP as it is already in power in Maharashtra. A dozen Lok Sabha members of these parties, deserting their parent parties, would not have much significance in the state. But their support is essential at national level. They will help BJP-RSS accomplish their long-drawn mission. The Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) is yet to come out of the psychological shock it suffered in June 2022 when Eknath Shinde led a major rebellion within the Shiv Sena.

In Bengal too, the rebellion by the TMC parliamentarians does not have so much of relevance. BJP is already in power and it will continue to rule for next five years. While the rebels are using the BJP for getting state protection and enjoying power, the BJP is encouraging them to desert TMC with an eye on smooth passage of the Delimitation bill. The number of the deserters is not small; around 20 MPs are in line. Nonetheless the national BJP gains from the Trinamool Congress MPs desertions by breaking Mamata Banerjee’s regional dominance in West Bengal, weakening anti-BJP opposition coalitions at the national level, and boosting its own parliamentary strength and organizational footprint in eastern India. Bolstering its parliamentary numbers makes it easier for the national BJP to get pass crucial bills and legislative reforms where it previously required broader opposition consensus.

By engineering splits or exploiting existing fractures (such as the DMK distancing itself from Congress), the BJP creates mutual distrust among opposition parties, effectively destroying the united front they presented in earlier parliamentary sessions. There is no doubt that a successful delimitation exercise could structurally redesign the composition of the Lok Sabha—potentially benefiting saffron ecosystem. Weakening regional players would prove to be boon for the BJP as it would either co-opt the regional leaders or consolidate its own grassroots presence in states where regional parties once held monopolies.

These desertions will help the BJP in not only having its contentious Delimitation Bill passed in the next session of parliament, but also smooth passage of highly contentious, stalled legislation, like One Nation, One Election (simultaneous national and state polls), and the Uniform Civil Code (UCC). By splintering the key regional pillars of the opposition, the BJP effectively dilutes the collective bargaining and voting power of the INDIA alliance inside Parliament.

Rather than confronting entire regional blocks, this strategy involves “salami slicing” the opposition.“Salami slicing” of the opposition is a political strategy where a dominant or ruling party gradually weakens, divides, and eliminates opposition forces piece by piece—one thin “slice” at a time—rather than launching a single, massive crackdown. By taking small, incremental steps, the ruling power avoids triggering a massive public backlash, a unified resistance, or international condemnation. By the time the opposition realizes what is happening, they are already completely neutralized. Saffron ecosystem has already been resorting to Salami Slicing, in future it would further intensify it for having an effectively complete control.

Political analysts and commentators view this BJP’s strategy of engineering splits and absorbing leaders from regional parties as a definitive push toward an “Virodh-mukt Bharat” (opposition-free) political order. This will also lead to erosion of federal power. Yet another aspect of this move is; by systematically weakening regional satraps, the BJP seeks to replace India’s highly fragmented, multi-party coalition system with a centralized, dominant-party system. When Modi introduced the phrase “Congress-mukt Bharat” in 2014, it was framed as ridding India of dynastic politics, but his latest move aims at finishing the regional political power centres. BJP’s top leadership has frequently critiqued regionalism, arguing that regional parties prioritize caste-based, and dynastic interests over national development.

Modi’s delimitation and seat-expansion proposals are rooted in the RSS’s longstanding ideological goals. The RSS has historically advocated for population-based representation and restructuring India’s political geography. The push to link delimitation with the 2011 Census and a massive expansion of the Lok Sabha (up to 850 seats) is strongly supported by the RSS. It has also echoed the Modi administration’s legislative “guarantees” regarding the redrawing of constituencies. The Modi government argued that population-based delimitation restores “one person, one vote, one value” after 50 years of freeze. However, the opposition sees it as unfair to the southern and eastern states that fared better in implementing the government’s population control policies. (IPA Service)

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By T N Ashok

On a humid June morning in India’s capital, the birthday wishes began arriving before sunrise. Students posted videos on Instagram. Party workers unfurled banners across small towns. Political allies issued carefully worded messages of solidarity. Critics, never far behind, reminded the nation of his electoral defeats, his verbal missteps and the privilege of his birth.

Few politicians in contemporary India provoke reactions as sharply divided as Rahul Gandhi. To supporters, he is the last national leader capable of challenging Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s formidable political machine. To detractors, he remains an accidental politician, a fourth-generation dynast whose surname opened doors that would remain shut to almost everyone else.

Yet after two decades in public life, Gandhi has outlasted countless predictions of his political demise. At 56, he remains perhaps the most recognizable opposition figure in India and, despite repeated setbacks, one of the few politicians with a conceivable path to the prime ministership. The caricature and the reality, as often happens in politics, are not quite the same.

Rahul Gandhi entered politics carrying a burden few politicians have known. He was born into one of the most powerful political lineages and yet has to struggle to defeat the BJP. He was born in 1970 to Rajiv Gandhi and Sonia Gandhi, grandson of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and great-grandson of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.

The family lineage is inseparable from the story of modern India itself. Nehru guided the newly independent nation for seventeen years. Indira Gandhi centralized power and dominated Indian politics for decades. Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister after his mother’s assassination in 1984. Both Indira and Rajiv would later be assassinated.

The violence profoundly shaped Rahul Gandhi’s life. Unlike many political heirs who eagerly embrace public attention, Gandhi spent much of his youth shielded from it. Security concerns dictated his schooling. Friends recall a reserved young man more comfortable in small circles than on public stages.

He studied at institutions linked to Delhi University and later abroad, eventually working briefly in the private sector before returning to India. Politics was less a choice than an inheritance.

When Gandhi entered electoral politics in 2004, winning from the family stronghold of Amethi in Uttar Pradesh, many assumed the succession plan was obvious. The Congress Party, once India’s natural party of government, expected its young prince eventually to reclaim the throne.

Reality proved more complicated. Gandhi initially appeared uncomfortable with the rituals of Indian politics. His speeches often lacked the sharpness of seasoned campaigners. Interviews sometimes became fodder for ridicule. Television studios and social media users dissected his mistakes with unusual intensity.

For years, political opponents successfully portrayed him as inexperienced, entitled and disconnected from ordinary Indians. The image stuck. It became one of the most effective political caricatures in modern Indian politics.

Yet colleagues who worked closely with him described a different figure: intensely curious, deeply interested in organizational reform and surprisingly persistent despite public setbacks. The contradiction would define much of his career.

Judged solely by election results, Gandhi’s record appears uneven. But there is success hidden behind his failures. The Congress-led coalition won national elections in 2004 and 2009, though those victories were generally attributed to Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rather than Rahul.

The real tests came later. The crushing defeats of 2014 and 2019 transformed him into the face of Congress’s decline. Narendra Modi’s rise reshaped Indian politics, turning the BJP into the dominant national force and reducing Congress to a shadow of its former self.

Many politicians would have disappeared after such defeats. Gandhi did not. Instead, he gradually reinvented himself. His most significant political achievement may not have been an election at all but a journey.

In 2022, Gandhi launched the Bharat Jodo Yatra, a cross-country march spanning thousands of kilometres. Critics initially dismissed it as political theatre. Yet as images emerged of him walking through villages, cities and remote regions, the march began altering public perceptions. It showcased a politician willing to engage directly with citizens rather than relying solely on rallies and television appearances.

A second nationwide march followed. The yatras helped transform Gandhi from a reluctant politician into a more confident public figure. Even some critics acknowledged the change.

Unlike many Indian political leaders, Gandhi’s personal life remains largely private. He has never married. Like Vajpayee the orator and Modi the PR man , he is a reclusive politician who is also a bachelor like them. So NO baggage.

The subject periodically becomes a national obsession, generating speculation that he rarely addresses. Supporters argue that his bachelor status frees him from accusations of promoting immediate family interests. Critics counter that it reveals little about his political abilities. In truth, the fascination says more about India than it does about Gandhi.

In a political culture where family networks often determine careers, the absence of a spouse and children makes him an unusual figure. His closest political relationship remains with his sister, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, whose campaigning skills have frequently drawn comparisons with their grandmother, Indira Gandhi.

Together, they represent the latest generation of one of the world’s most enduring political dynasties. The youthful duo captures the imagination of GEN Z and millennials. The productive force of Indian society and nation building. Perhaps the most surprising development of recent years has been Gandhi’s growing appeal among younger voters. India is a young nation. Hundreds of millions of citizens are under forty.

Many have no memory of Congress dominance. They grew up during the Modi era and encountered Gandhi primarily through digital platforms rather than traditional party structures. His social media presence has evolved significantly. Videos of unscripted interactions with students, workers, delivery personnel and small entrepreneurs often circulate widely online.

He speaks a language that resonates with parts of Generation Z: inequality, unemployment, concentration of wealth and democratic accountability. Whether that online popularity translates into votes remains uncertain. But it has given Gandhi something he lacked for much of his career: a direct connection with younger Indians unmediated by television channels or party organizations.

Any profile of Rahul Gandhi ultimately returns to Narendra Modi. His biggest challenge is to break the Modi Magic, The Charisma, The bubble that Modi has created. He has to find ways to prick the bubble to replace it with himself.

The two men represent contrasting political stories. Modi rose from modest beginnings to become India’s most dominant political figure in decades. Gandhi inherited a legacy that many Indians admire and many others resent. Modi projects authority and certainty. Gandhi often projects introspection and questioning. Modi’s supporters celebrate decisive leadership. Gandhi’s supporters argue that democracy requires a robust opposition capable of challenging concentrated power.

The asymmetry between them remains vast. Modi leads a party that has expanded its footprint across much of India. Gandhi leads a Congress Party still struggling to recover organizational strength lost over a decade. Yet politics has a way of changing unexpectedly. Few believed Congress could return to power after earlier periods of decline. Few predicted the BJP’s extraordinary rise thirty years ago. History rarely moves in straight lines.

Can He Become Prime Minister?: The question follows Gandhi everywhere. The answer is neither impossible nor imminent. For Gandhi to become prime minister, several conditions would need to align. Congress would need to continue rebuilding. Opposition parties would need to cooperate. Regional leaders would need to accept a national coalition framework. Most importantly, voters would need to decide they want an alternative to the BJP.

Those are substantial hurdles. But Gandhi possesses advantages that few opposition leaders enjoy. His national recognition is unmatched outside Modi. His party, despite its weakness, remains India’s only opposition organization with a truly nationwide legacy. His surname continues to evoke loyalty among millions even as it generates skepticism among others.

Political careers are often judged too quickly. The young man once mocked as an unwilling heir has become a resilient opposition leader. The politician repeatedly written off has repeatedly returned. Whether Rahul Gandhi eventually reaches the prime minister’s office remains one of the central unanswered questions of Indian politics.

For now, on his birthday, he occupies a more familiar position: neither triumphant or defeated, neither fully embraced nor fully rejected. Just still standing. And in a democracy as vast and unpredictable as India, that alone can be a remarkable political achievement. (IPA Service)

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By R. Suryamurthy

India’s economy is supposedly doing remarkably well. Growth remains among the fastest in the world. Stock markets continue to flirt with record highs. Billionaires are multiplying. Airports are expanding. Bullet trains are advancing. Defence exports are reaching new milestones. The nation is speaking confidently about becoming a $10 trillion economy and a developed country by 2047.

Yet somewhere between these grand ambitions and glittering statistics, another India exists. It is the India of shrinking grocery baskets, rising electricity bills, stagnant wages, disappearing job opportunities and relentless economic anxiety.

This India does not feature prominently in government presentations, corporate earnings calls or investor conferences. But it is India that most citizens inhabit.

And for them, the economy feels less like a boom and more like a slow-moving recession. Not a technical recession measured by GDP contractions. A household recession is measured by declining purchasing power. A recession of aspirations. A recession of dignity. A recession in which people are working harder merely to stand still.

The latest diplomatic thaw between the United States and Iran is being hailed as a victory for stability. Markets have responded positively. Oil traders anticipate lower risk premiums. Shipping companies expect fewer disruptions in the Gulf.

But if there is one lesson ordinary Indians have learned over the past few years, it is that global crises arrive quickly while relief arrives slowly. When tensions escalated in West Asia, fuel prices rose. Transportation costs climbed. Fertiliser became more expensive. Food inflation accelerated. Electricity costs increased. Every stage of the supply chain passed costs downward until they finally landed where they always do—on the shoulders of the consumer.

Now that peace appears to be returning, nobody is promising that those costs will fall with equal speed. That asymmetry defines modern economics. Prices rise like rockets and descend like feathers. Profits are privatised. Pain is socialised. The same pattern is visible across sectors.

When commodity prices increase, companies raise prices immediately. When commodity prices fall, they discover fresh reasons to maintain margins. Consumers are expected to understand market realities during difficult times, but rarely receive equivalent consideration when conditions improve.

The burden of adjustment is remarkably one-sided. The consumer absorbs inflation. The worker absorbs productivity pressures. The taxpayer absorbs subsidies. The citizen absorbs uncertainty. Everyone else has mechanisms to hedge risk. The common man has none.

This reality becomes even more uncomfortable when viewed through the lens of climate change. India is entering an era in which the weather itself is becoming a source of economic instability.

For decades, economists treated climate as a background condition. Rain arrived. Temperatures fluctuated. Agriculture adapted. Markets adjusted. That assumption no longer holds.

Heatwaves now arrive with frightening regularity. Monsoons have become increasingly erratic. Floods and droughts often occur within the same season. Reservoir levels, crop yields, electricity demand and food prices are becoming more volatile.

What was once considered an environmental challenge is rapidly becoming an economic one. And once again, the burden falls disproportionately on those least capable of carrying it.

The wealthy experience heat differently. They retreat into climate-controlled homes, offices and vehicles. The poor experience heat physically. The delivery rider crossing a city under a blazing sun experiences climate change differently from the executive tracking temperatures from an air-conditioned office. The construction worker labouring on exposed concrete experiences climate change differently from the investor purchasing shares in cooling-equipment manufacturers.

One person’s inconvenience is another person’s survival challenge. This inequality is becoming one of the defining features of modern India. The country is witnessing extraordinary wealth creation alongside growing economic insecurity. That contradiction is becoming impossible to ignore.

Official statistics may show moderation in inflation. Yet anyone visiting a local market knows that food prices remain stubbornly high. Healthcare costs continue rising. Education expenses keep climbing. Housing has become unaffordable in many urban centres. Electricity consumption required merely to remain comfortable during summer is creating a new category of household expenditure.

Meanwhile, wage growth remains uneven. This is especially true for younger Indians. No demographic should be more optimistic about the future than the youth of a rapidly growing economy.

Instead, many young Indians find themselves trapped between expensive education, uncertain employment and rising living costs. Degrees are multiplying faster than opportunities. Expectations are rising faster than incomes. Qualifications are increasing faster than job creation.

The result is a generation that often appears educated but economically insecure. That insecurity carries consequences extending far beyond economics. A society’s stability ultimately depends not on how wealthy its richest citizens become but on whether ordinary people believe their future will be better than their present.

That belief is becoming harder to sustain. The middle class, once viewed as India’s greatest success story, increasingly finds itself squeezed from both directions. It pays taxes but receives limited subsidies. It earns too much to qualify for assistance yet too little to feel secure.

It is expected to finance healthcare, education, housing, retirement and increasingly climate adaptation from its own resources. Every new shock—whether geopolitical, climatic or economic—extracts another layer of savings. For many families, financial planning has been replaced by financial firefighting.

The deeper problem is that policymakers continue to treat these crises as isolated events. Inflation is discussed separately from climate. Climate is discussed separately from employment. Employment is discussed separately from energy. Energy is discussed separately from geopolitics. In reality, they have become inseparable.

A conflict in the Gulf affects fuel costs. Fuel costs affect transportation. Transportation affects food prices. Food prices affect inflation. Inflation affects household consumption. Consumption affects growth. Growth affects employment. Employment affects social stability. Everything is connected. Yet policy frameworks often remain fragmented.

India’s greatest challenge in the coming decade may not be achieving rapid growth. It may be ensuring that growth remains meaningful for ordinary citizens. Economic success cannot be measured solely by aggregate indicators.

GDP does not reveal whether families are reducing protein consumption. Stock indices do not reveal whether young graduates are finding stable jobs. Corporate earnings do not reveal whether households can afford air-conditioning during increasingly dangerous summers.

National wealth does not automatically translate into household security. The distinction matters. Because citizens do not experience economies in aggregate. They experience them individually. Through salaries. Through bills. Through rents. Through school fees. Through grocery purchases. Through fuel receipts. Through medical expenses. Through the constant calculation of whether the next month will be manageable.

The danger facing India is not economic collapse. The danger is something more subtle. A gradual normalisation of insecurity. A society in which citizens become accustomed to paying more for less. A society where every external shock is accepted as inevitable. A society where resilience becomes a euphemism for endurance. That is not resilience. That is resignation.

The forthcoming Iran-US agreement may lower tensions. The monsoon may eventually recover. Inflation may moderate. Markets may celebrate. But unless those improvements translate into tangible relief for households, the underlying discontent will remain.

Because ultimately, nations are not judged by the comfort of their elites, the optimism of their investors or the ambitions of their policymakers. They are judged by whether ordinary people can live with dignity, security and hope.

And today, despite all the triumphalism surrounding India’s rise, millions of Indians are asking a simple question that remains unanswered: If the economy is doing so well, why does everyday life feel so difficult? (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

The US-Iran deal marks a genuine easing of one of the most dangerous geopolitical shocks to hit the energy market, but it should not be mistaken for a reset button. The immediate risk of a military breakdown has declined, and that matters for every stakeholder: Washington, Tehran, Gulf producers, Asian importers, shipping insurers and consuming economies already battling inflation. Yet the oil market that existed before the war cannot simply be restored by diplomatic signature. The risk premium has not vanished. It has changed its structure, moving from the visible fear of missiles, mines and naval confrontation to the less dramatic but equally consequential uncertainties of compliance, sequencing and trust.

Before the war, oil prices were already showing a downward tendency. Slowing demand growth, stronger non-OPEC supply, the gradual cooling of speculative positioning and concerns over the durability of consumption in China and Europe had all placed pressure on crude. That bearish environment has not disappeared, but it has been overlaid by a new political memory. Traders, refiners and governments have now priced in the fact that the Strait of Hormuz can again become a pressure point at short notice. That experience has value in the market, and value in oil markets usually translates into a premium.

The most optimistic reading is that the deal opens the way for flows through Hormuz to recover more strongly than many had expected. If sanctions relief proceeds and the ceasefire holds, volumes could rise towards 14 million barrels per day by January, supported by the return of Iranian exports, greater confidence among shipowners and a gradual retreat of the geopolitical premium. That would be a major improvement from the wartime disruption and would ease pressure on import-dependent economies. It would also reduce the urgency of emergency stock releases, shipping escorts and costly rerouting. But even this constructive scenario does not imply a return to pre-war pricing. It implies a transition from acute crisis pricing to conditional normalisation.

The distinction is important. Markets do not only price today’s physical barrels; they price the probability that tomorrow’s barrels may not arrive. A ceasefire can lower the probability of immediate disruption, but it cannot erase the fact that the region remains crowded with unresolved flashpoints. Lebanon remains one of them. Any escalation involving Iranian-aligned actors, Israel, or Western military assets could quickly test the understanding behind the deal. Even if Tehran and Washington intend to hold the line, regional allies and proxies may not interpret restraint in the same way. Energy markets are particularly sensitive to such ambiguity because a small perceived threat to chokepoint supply can have an outsized impact on price expectations.

Sequencing is another weakness. The deal may be positive in principle, but its durability depends on who moves first, how quickly sanctions are lifted, how nuclear-related commitments are verified, and how maritime guarantees are monitored. If Iran expects immediate economic relief while Washington expects staged compliance, friction is inevitable. If shipowners and insurers believe legal waivers are reversible, they will move cautiously. If banks fear secondary penalties, oil trade will resume more slowly than the political language suggests. Physical flows can recover only when the commercial ecosystem around them feels protected. Tankers, letters of credit, insurance cover, port access and refinery procurement decisions all require confidence that the arrangement will survive beyond the next diplomatic dispute.

That is why the market response is likely to be uneven. The first phase is relief. Prices fall from panic levels as traders remove the most extreme war scenarios. The second phase is scepticism. Buyers ask whether barrels can actually move, whether sanctions waivers are enforceable, whether insurance costs fall, and whether Gulf shipping lanes are secure enough for normal scheduling. The third phase is adjustment. If cargoes move consistently and political messaging remains disciplined, the premium compresses further. But compression is not elimination. The war has created a new baseline of caution.

For Gulf producers, the deal is both stabilising and complicated. It lowers the risk of a regional conflict that could damage infrastructure and trade routes, but it also brings additional Iranian supply into a market already attentive to balance. If Iranian exports rise quickly, other producers may need to calibrate output more carefully to avoid a renewed price slide. The pre-war downward tendency in crude prices could reassert itself if demand remains soft and inventories rebuild. But because the market is no longer operating in a clean macroeconomic frame, every bearish signal will be filtered through geopolitical risk. That makes price formation more volatile than before.

For Asian economies, particularly large importers like India, the deal offers breathing space rather than comfort. Lower risk of immediate conflict helps inflation management, external balances and currency stability. Refiners gain optionality if Iranian grades become more available. Freight and insurance costs may ease. But governments will be reluctant to assume that the Hormuz risk has permanently receded. Strategic reserves, diversified sourcing and long-term supply contracts will remain central policy tools. The lesson of the crisis is not merely that diplomacy can reopen flows; it is that dependence on a narrow maritime corridor remains a structural vulnerability.

For Iran, the economic upside is clear. Access to oil revenue, banking channels and transport services could provide relief after prolonged pressure. But the political bargain is demanding. Tehran will need to show enough compliance to keep the deal alive while avoiding the domestic perception that it has conceded under pressure. Washington faces a parallel problem. It must convince allies, markets and domestic critics that sanctions relief does not reward escalation and that nuclear restrictions are credible. Both sides therefore have incentives to claim victory, but not necessarily the same understanding of what victory means. That gap is where future disputes may emerge.

The consensus that oil will not return to pre-war levels rests on this altered psychology. The market has learned that military risk in the Gulf can escalate faster than diplomacy can contain it. It has also learned that the legal and commercial plumbing of sanctions relief is slower than political announcements. Even if flows recover sharply by January, the memory of disruption will remain embedded in freight rates, inventory strategy and hedging behaviour. The market may stop pricing war, but it will continue pricing relapse.

The most credible outlook is therefore neither a full peace dividend nor a renewed crisis premium. It is a middle path: prices ease from wartime extremes, Iranian supply gradually returns, Hormuz traffic improves, and the largest shock scenarios fade. At the same time, a residual premium persists because the ceasefire is exposed to regional escalation, implementation disputes and mutual suspicion. Oil can fall from fear, but it cannot yet fall back into innocence. (IPA Service)

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By Asad Mirza

The framework peace agreement between the United States and Iran has reduced the immediate risk of a wider regional war. Yet the accord leaves unresolved the central issues that have fuelled four decades of confrontation, making its long-term survival far from assured.

The announcement of a framework peace agreement between the United States and Iran marks one of the most significant diplomatic developments in West Asia in decades. After months of direct military confrontation that disrupted global energy markets, threatened maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and raised fears of a regional conflagration, Washington and Tehran have chosen negotiation over continued escalation. Yet history suggests that signing a peace framework is considerably easier than implementing one.

While both sides have declared victory, the agreement remains less a comprehensive peace treaty than a political understanding designed to halt hostilities and create space for further negotiations. Whether it ultimately succeeds will depend not only on American and Iranian commitments but also on Israel’s posture, domestic political opposition in both countries, and unresolved questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme.

President Donald Trump has presented the agreement as evidence that his administration successfully combined military pressure with diplomacy. He has repeatedly emphasised that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen fully, restoring confidence in global energy markets. The reopening of one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints has already eased concerns over oil supplies and shipping costs. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that peace and stability would return to West Asia – a region of enormous strategic importance for India’s energy security and expatriate population. However, beyond these immediate gains lies a much more complicated strategic picture. The American position represents a noticeable evolution rather than an outright policy reversal.

For years, successive US administrations insisted that Iran must completely dismantle its nuclear capabilities before meaningful sanctions relief could occur. The present framework appears considerably more pragmatic. Rather than demanding immediate resolution of every contentious issue, Washington has accepted a phased process in which military hostilities end first, while negotiations continue over nuclear verification, sanctions and regional security. This reflects strategic realities.

The recent conflict demonstrated that although American military superiority remains overwhelming, sustaining a prolonged regional war carries significant economic and political costs. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz affected global oil markets, while continued military operations risked drawing additional regional actors into the conflict.

Equally important are domestic political considerations. President Trump entered office promising to avoid prolonged overseas wars. Although his administration justified military operations as necessary responses to Iranian actions, public support for an extended conflict remained uncertain. The peace framework therefore allows Washington to claim both military strength and diplomatic success.

Nevertheless, skepticism exists within Republican circles. Some conservatives argue that any sanctions relief could provide Tehran with resources to rebuild its military capabilities. Others question whether Iran can be trusted to comply with future nuclear obligations given previous disputes over international inspections.

Iran’s leadership also portrays the agreement as a victory. Tehran argues that it resisted overwhelming American and Israeli military pressure without surrendering its core strategic objectives. Iranian officials have repeatedly maintained that the country will not abandon peaceful nuclear technology or compromise its sovereignty under coercion.

The reported framework appears to support part of that narrative. Rather than requiring immediate dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, negotiations on enrichment and uranium stockpiles have been deferred to subsequent talks. This allows Iranian leaders to tell domestic audiences that fundamental national interests remain protected while sanctions relief becomes possible through future negotiations. Yet Iran faces its own internal constraints.

Hard-line factions remain deeply suspicious of Washington after decades of sanctions, covert operations and diplomatic breakdowns. Many Iranian conservatives continue to cite the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement after the United States withdrew from it during Trump’s first presidency as evidence that American commitments cannot be trusted. Consequently, Tehran is likely to insist upon stronger guarantees before making irreversible concessions regarding uranium enrichment or international inspections.

History casts a long shadow over every US-Iran negotiation. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations have been characterised by mutual distrust, sanctions, proxy conflicts and periodic military confrontations. Every major diplomatic breakthrough has eventually unravelled under competing domestic politics and shifting strategic priorities.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 initially demonstrated that sustained diplomacy could constrain Iran’s nuclear activities. However, Washington’s withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 fundamentally damaged Iranian confidence in American reliability. Tehran subsequently expanded uranium enrichment while Washington intensified sanctions, creating the cycle that ultimately contributed to the latest confrontation. This historical experience explains why today’s negotiations remain cautious. Neither side wishes to repeat previous failures.

The most significant weakness of the present framework is that it postpones rather than resolves the central nuclear dispute. Reports indicate that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium remains one of the principal issues awaiting negotiation. Washington continues to demand verified reductions in enrichment capability alongside intrusive international monitoring. Tehran insists that peaceful nuclear enrichment remains its sovereign right under international law. This creates what many analysts describe as an “indivisibility problem.” Neither side can easily compromise on an issue viewed as fundamental to national security.

For Washington, preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon remains non-negotiable. For Tehran, maintaining an indigenous nuclear programme has become closely tied to national prestige and strategic independence. Until these competing objectives are reconciled, the peace agreement rests on fragile foundations.

Even perfect US-Iran cooperation would not automatically stabilise the region. Israel has made clear that its security concerns extend beyond any bilateral American-Iranian understanding. Israeli leaders remain focused on Hezbollah, Iranian regional influence and missile capabilities. Reports indicate that Israeli military operations in Lebanon remain outside the framework agreement, creating the possibility that renewed fighting could undermine broader diplomacy.

Similarly, Iran’s relationships with regional partners – including Hezbollah and other allied groups – remain largely untouched by the current framework. Unless these broader regional security issues are eventually incorporated into future negotiations, new crises could emerge even if Washington and Tehran maintain direct dialogue.

Despite these challenges, there are reasons to believe the agreement may prove more durable than previous efforts. Both governments have experienced the enormous costs of direct conflict. Economic disruption, military expenditures and international diplomatic pressure have created incentives for restraint that did not exist during earlier periods of confrontation.

Furthermore, the agreement appears deliberately incremental. Rather than attempting to solve every issue simultaneously, negotiators have prioritised ending active hostilities before addressing more politically difficult questions. This sequencing may increase the likelihood of gradual progress.

Ultimately, the framework agreement should be viewed not as the conclusion of the crisis but as the beginning of an exceptionally complex diplomatic process.

Its success depends upon sustained political will, rigorous verification mechanisms, credible implementation of reciprocal commitments and careful management of regional tensions. Domestic opponents in both Washington and Tehran remain capable of derailing negotiations, while unresolved nuclear issues continue to pose the greatest long-term challenge.

The agreement has undoubtedly reduced the immediate danger of war and restored hope for regional stability. Yet history warns against excessive optimism. American and Iranian relations have repeatedly oscillated between diplomacy and confrontation, with trust remaining the rarest commodity.

Whether this agreement survives will depend less on the signatures placed upon it than on whether both governments can overcome decades of accumulated suspicion and demonstrate that negotiated compromise serves their national interests better than perpetual confrontation. Only then can this ceasefire evolve into a lasting peace. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be taking part in the outreach session of the 52nd meeting of G7 being held in Evans of France hosted by the French President Emanuel Macron. Already the main session started on Monday with the participation of the leaders of the seven nations. The main task of G7 at the moment is to retain the tottering alliance defying the thrusts by both President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Simone Takaichi.

As far as Indian PM is concerned, he had already had bilateral talks with the French President at Nice on Sunday agreeing to further strengthening their strategic partnership in a range of areas including defence, civil nuclear cooperation, trade and technology. What was significant was the resolve to double the India-France trade in five years.

It is a fact that Narendra Modi and Macron have been able to establish an excellent rapport in political as also economic matters. France has special interests in selling its Rafale and other defence equipment to the burgeoning Indian market. It suits India also as the country, now the big purchaser of arms in the international market India can choose options withstanding pressures from both USA and Russia.

Indian officials underline that French President as the host of the G7 summit is giving special importance to the Indian PM among outreach nations and PM is expected to make use of the occasion in his address and interactions on championing the Global South, advancing strategic partnerships and addressing geopolitical conflicts in West Asia. Indian PM is also expected to emphasise on better global governance and cooperation among the nations on the applicability and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

The G7 Summit under the French Presidency has chosen some key priorities for the current year. These are reducing excessive macro economic imbalances, and fostering shared growth, renewing international partnerships and development solidarities, strengthening the resilience of critical mineral value chains, protecting minors online, and settling major geopolitical crises.

On the sidelines of the Summit, the Prime Minister is also expected to hold bilateral meetings and discussions with G7 countries, partner countries and international organisations. Some of the countries invited for the Summit include South Korea, Kenya, Brazil and Egypt as partner countries. Other invited international organisations include the World Bank, African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and OECD.

The major issue for India is whether PM Modi holds bilateral talks with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the summit on June 16 or 17. The White House has confirmed the bilateral meeting though as of now, Indian foreign ministry has not confirmed. If finally the meeting takes place, Prime Minister has to take up with Trump the issue of killing of three Indian sailors by the US navy last week. It was unprovoked and worse, Trump tried to pass the buck on the Iranians while even the US navy was clear that they shot.

The nature of India-US relations is such that at the last week talks between external affairs minister Dr. Jaishankar and the US state secretary Marco Rubio, Rubio virtually threatened India and said that US would not tolerate any violations of US blockade. Firstly the US blockade of Iranian ports was illegal and secondly, the US side knew that the ship had Indian sailors. Still the missiles were fired and the deaths of the Indians took place. What type of India-US strategic relations is this?

PM Modi has to demand apology from the US government for the death of the sailors in his meeting with Trump, if the bilateral meeting takes place. It is no use talking of strategic autonomy and defender of Global South at meetings, it has to be proven on the ground. BY strongly conveying India’s reaction on the US killings of Indian sailors, Indian PM can really serve the cause of Global South.

India’s stature has gone down in the last one and half years after the assumption of Trump in power for the second time. The other countries of South including Mexico, South Africa and Brazil see India as a sort of partner with USA in its strategic objectives. This impression has to be removed. That India can do by taking a principled position on issues against the USA. It will be seen whether Narendra Modi really speaks for Global South agenda at the outreach sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday.

While the other Global South countries will carefully observe Indian Pm’s performance in the outreach session of G 7, the main G7 sessions are expected to be stormy on the issues of Ukraine war as also on the US-Iran peace deal draft which will be signed on Friday. The European countries feel that Trump is giving concessions to Tehran without getting full guarantee on nuclear facilities non-use.

At the economic level, G7 countries are widely facing sluggish economic growth, rising debt levels, declining industrial competitiveness, deepening social fragmentation, and increasing pressures from population aging. However, frictions among its member states persist, with trust in the US among European countries falling to a historic low. As a result, the G7 members themselves struggle to form a shared consensus, let alone prescribe appropriate remedies..It is still not clear whether the G7 member nations will be able to come out with a joint communiqué after sorting out their internal differences.

For India and its PM Narendra Modi, the focus should be on strengthening Global South and not hobnobbing with G7 without meaningful benefits. Today, countries of the Global South, with their vast populations, expansive markets, and strong development potential, have become the major force of promoting global growth. Against this backdrop, a group accounting for less than 10 percent of the world’s population and whose share of the global GDP continues to decline, is seeking to impose rules on others. The 21 st century is the era of Global South including India. PM Narendra Modi should better finetune the country’s foreign policy in that direction. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Nilanjan Banik

The Indian economy, to quote from Charles Dickens’ novel, looks like A Tale of Two Cities. Recent estimates suggest India’s real GDP expanded by 7.8%, with strong growth noted across sectors: services (9.3%), manufacturing (10.7%), and construction (7.4%). Consumption expenditure, which is the largest component of GDP explaining 58% of GDP, also grew at around 7.6%, pointing to the resilience of the Indian economy. Other macro indicators such as Goods and Services Tax (GST) collections, sales of automobile, two-wheeler, and FMCG products complement the healthy growth in consumption expenditure, with gross GST collections growing around 7.7% in Q4 of FY 2026, passenger vehicles rising 17%, two-wheelers increasing 25%, and FMCG products posting 12% growth — the highest since June 2022.

Yet all is not well on the external front: the Indian Rupee is depreciating, the current account deficit (CAD) is widening, and net foreign direct investment (FDI) is falling. Interestingly, the depreciation of Rupee against the US dollar is not a recent phenomenon. Between 2005 and 2024, the Rupee has, on average, depreciated by around 3.5% annually. An analysis of long-term data suggests that the average annual depreciation of the Rupee was 0.4% between 2000 and 2004. The depreciation accelerated significantly after that, with the rupee depreciating on average by 3.4% annually between 2005 and 2014. This trend remained largely unchanged between 2015 and 2025, with the Rupee depreciating on average by 3.5% annually.

However, what is worrying is that in recent times, the depreciation of the Rupee has broken all earlier records. Among countries that are on a flexible exchange rate and not on a managed or fixed float — for example, Japanese Yen (6.6%), South Korean Won (7%), Indonesian Rupiah (9.3%), and the Philippine Peso (10.3%), to name a few — the Indian Rupee has depreciated the most over the last one year by around 11.2%.

Net FDI inflow is also falling. Recent estimates from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) suggest that total amount of dollars flowing out of the country exceeded inflows by $30.8 billion in FY 26, a more than six-fold increase over FY25. India witnessed a balance of payments (BOP) surplus as recently as FY23 but took a hit, falling into negative territory from FY24 onwards. The data for FY 26 is until December 2026, with a worsening trend with the continuation of Iran-Israel-US war, starting February 2026.

BOP is the sum of the current account and the capital account. The current account captures surpluses or deficits in tradable items, while the capital account records investment flows (both direct and portfolio investments), external borrowings, and asset transfer. Over the last 5 years, any deficit owing because of trade deficits were largely financed by the surplus in services trade. India has been importing crude oil worth $130–$150 billion annually, and a significant portion of this import bill has been financed by the surplus in services, which has averaged over $240 billion during the past three years.For instance, during FY 25, India’s overall merchandize trade deficit stood at $251.6 billion in FY25, down from $286.9 billion in the previous year.

However, this trend has changed in 2026. There are two major reasons. Indian stock market has been on a downward trend.FPI are pulling out the money from India to the tune of Rs 2 lakh crore in FY 26. The recent emergence of agentic AI models has raised concerns about the future of Indian software exports, which no longer appear as promising as before. Meanwhile, the US and Taiwanese stock markets are attracting renewed investor interest, driven by strong performance in microchip and AI stocks.

Second, the war in the Middle East has also led to higher prices for crude oil, fertilizers, and chemical products, adversely affecting India’s external sector performance measured in term of BOP. The war and higher price of imports have led to dollar appreciating against the Rupee, further worsening the CAD. India has to import almost 90% of its energy requirement. Every $10 rise in global Brent crude prices is estimated to widen India’s CAD by about 0.3% to 0.5% of GDP, translating to billions of dollars.

Brent crude was trading between $66-$70 per barrel before the start of the war in February 2026, reaching to a high of $126 on 29 April 2026. Now, with the UAE’s exit from OPEC, Brent crude may continue to hover around $80 a barrel for the remainder of 2026, even if the Iran and the US decide to end the war. If the disruption persisted through the rest the rest of 2026, Brent could average $91 per barrel in fourth quarter of 2026.

Returning to the tale of two cities — for the Indian economy, the more consequential headwinds appear to be largely exogenous: geopolitical conflicts and the structural disruption of AI-driven automation, both of which lie beyond the government’s direct control. Where the government does have meaningful control, however, is in creating conditions that attract sustained Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) inflows, and make India a better place to do business.

For instance, at last Friday’s monetary policy meeting, the RBI outlined measures to simplify access for overseas investors to government bonds and equities. Separately, the government announced a reduction in capital gains taxes on bond investments by FPIs. The last time the Indian government initiated a bold reform measure on September 20, 2019, when it executed the largest corporate tax reduction in three decades– slashing the base corporate income tax rate for domestic companies from 30% to 22%.

The move, introduced by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, was aimed at boosting domestic investment and reviving economic growth. However, larger corporates largely used the windfall not to reinvest within India, but to acquire foreign assets abroad. Corporate investment, by and large, remained subdued. This time, the focus needs to shift toward more targeted interventions — extending tax benefits or introducing interest subvention schemes for the MSME sector, strengthening incentives for setting up Global Capability Centers (GCCs), and deepening support for India’s start-up ecosystem. Unlike the exogenous pressures of geopolitical conflict and AI-driven disruption, these are policy which are firmly within the government’s control, and the onus is on it to deploy them wisely.(IPA Service)

(The author is Professor, Mahindra University).

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By T N Ashok

By the time Narendra Modi crossed Jawaharlal Nehru’s record as India’s longest-serving elected Prime Minister in continuous office, the country’s political landscape had already begun to resemble a battlefield after a great storm.

The old certainties have vanished. Alliances that appeared permanent are fraying. Regional satraps are calculating survival. Political parties once united by opposition to the BJP are now questioning whether they can survive independently in an era increasingly dominated by national narratives, presidential-style politics, and relentless electoral machinery.

At the centre of the latest drama stands West Bengal Chief Minister and Trinamool Congress supremo Mamata Banerjee.

In New Delhi this week, a series of meetings between Mamata Banerjee, Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi and Abhishek Banerjee ignited fevered speculation that the Trinamool Congress might merge with the Congress. The rumours gained momentum because of the unprecedented crisis confronting the TMC after its devastating setback in the 2026 West Bengal Assembly elections and the subsequent rebellion within the party.

Yet both Congress and TMC leaders have categorically denied any merger discussions. Publicly, both sides insist there is no proposal on the table. Privately, however, they acknowledge the need for closer coordination against the BJP.

The distinction is important. A merger would effectively mean the end of the Trinamool’s independent identity, something Mamata Banerjee has spent nearly three decades building. What is more plausible is a strategic partnership that allows both parties to pool resources, share parliamentary space and present a united front before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections.

For the TMC, the benefits are obvious. Congress remains the only opposition party with a genuine national footprint. In a period when the Trinamool is battling defections and factionalism, an understanding with Congress offers political legitimacy, organisational support and protection from further isolation. Some defectors who left primarily because of internal leadership disputes could potentially return if a broader anti-BJP platform emerges. Yet others who have already aligned with rebel factions or the NDA are unlikely to be persuaded back.

Whether such cooperation improves prospects in 2029 depends on arithmetic. In West Bengal, vote consolidation between Congress, Left remnants and the TMC could significantly improve opposition chances against the BJP. Nationally, however, the challenge is far more complex.

The Congress leadership meeting in Delhi reflects precisely this dilemma. The agenda is believed to revolve around rebuilding opposition coordination after recent setbacks, assessing the future of the INDIA bloc, strengthening state-level organisations and preparing for a sequence of crucial state elections beginning with Uttar Pradesh and Punjab in 2027.

A notable participant is Karnataka Chief Minister D. K. Shivakumar, who recently assumed office after a long internal power-sharing arrangement within the Congress. Shivakumar brings more than just a state government to the table.

He is widely regarded as one of the party’s most effective organisers and fundraisers. Karnataka remains the Congress’s most important large-state success story, and party strategists hope elements of its electoral model can be replicated elsewhere. The influence of election strategist Sunil Kanugolu, now closely associated with Shivakumar’s administration, further enhances Karnataka’s importance in Congress calculations.

Yet the opposition’s larger problem is fragmentation. The June 8 INDIA bloc conclave exposed deep fissures. The absence of the DMK and AAP was not merely symbolic. It reflected fundamental disagreements over leadership, strategy and regional interests.

The DMK’s decision to distance itself from the bloc follows accusations that Congress has sought understandings with rival forces in Tamil Nadu, including formations associated with actor-politician Vijay’s TVK. Relations between AAP and Congress remain burdened by years of rivalry despite periodic cooperation against the BJP.

Consequently, the INDIA bloc now resembles a coalition searching for a common purpose after the glue that held it together began to weaken. Fevicol ka Jod abhu mazbhoot nahin.

The BJP, meanwhile, is preparing for a very different contest. For the first time since 2014, it faces genuine economic anxieties among voters. Across urban and semi-urban India, unemployment, underemployment, stagnant incomes and rising household costs have become recurring concerns. The economic consequences of global instability, particularly disruptions following the Iran conflict, have fed inflationary pressures and heightened public anxiety about fuel prices, food costs and job creation.

Conversations in tea stalls from Kanpur to Coimbatore increasingly revolve around economic opportunity rather than ideological identity alone. Social media is ablaze with anti BJP memes with PM Modi being at the center of it.

Yet the BJP retains formidable advantages. Prime Minister Narendra Modi continues to enjoy unmatched national visibility. The party possesses the country’s most extensive electoral organisation. Welfare schemes remain deeply embedded among beneficiaries. Infrastructure projects continue to provide visible evidence of governance. Most importantly, the BJP has consistently demonstrated an ability to shift elections away from economic discontent and toward issues of nationalism, leadership, security and welfare delivery.

The road to 2029 will therefore pass through several critical state elections. The first major test comes in Uttar Pradesh in 2027. No opposition strategy can succeed nationally without substantially reducing the BJP’s dominance in India’s largest state.

Punjab will vote around the same period, providing another indicator of opposition strength. Uttarakhand is also due for elections in 2027. Bihar follows in 2030 if the current schedule remains unchanged, while Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan are expected to hold their next Assembly elections after the 2029 Lok Sabha contest, barring any early dissolution. These states collectively represent the political heartland where the BJP remains strongest. Their outcomes will shape the momentum entering the national campaign.

What emerges, therefore, is a picture of two Indias competing for the future. One India sees continuity under Modi: political stability, muscular nationalism, infrastructure expansion and strong central leadership.

The other sees mounting economic pressure, concentration of political power, weakening institutional checks and the need for a broader coalition capable of restoring competitive politics.

For the opposition, the challenge is existential. Can Mamata Banerjee and Congress work together without one consuming the other? Can regional leaders subordinate personal ambitions to collective goals? Can the INDIA bloc survive the departure of key allies and the mutual suspicion that now shadows its meetings? (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

Resolution of the US-Israel war with Iran now appears further away than at any point in the conflict, with the latest American strikes pushing global markets into a more unsettled phase. The US launch of retaliatory attacks on Iranian defence and radar systems after Washington accused Tehran of responsibility for the downing of an American Apache helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz has shifted attention from the risk of a contained military exchange to the possibility of a prolonged confrontation in one of the world’s most important energy corridors.

For investors, the significance of the escalation lies not only in the exchange of fire, but in the location and timing. The Strait of Hormuz is central to global oil and liquefied natural gas flows. Any sign that military operations are becoming normalised near the waterway immediately feeds into crude prices, shipping insurance, freight rates and inflation expectations. Even without a full closure of the strait, the mere prospect of repeated incidents can add a substantial risk premium to every barrel moving out of the Gulf.

The immediate danger is not necessarily a single dramatic escalation. A spectacular confrontation would be severe, but it might also force urgent diplomacy. The more difficult risk for markets is that the conflict becomes entrenched through intermittent strikes, retaliatory operations, drone incidents, cyberattacks, warnings to vessels and proxy activity across the region. That pattern would be harder to price because it would keep supply fears alive without producing a single decisive moment of crisis.

Washington may describe its strikes as limited and retaliatory, but the military threshold has moved. Tehran is unlikely to treat attacks on its defence infrastructure as an episode that can be absorbed without response. Israel, already deeply engaged in the confrontation with Iran, may view any Iranian move as further justification for military action. Each side can say it is responding rather than escalating, yet the cumulative effect can still be a wider and more durable conflict.

That prospect matters because markets had grown used to absorbing geopolitical shocks as long as energy supplies remained broadly intact. The present confrontation is different because it directly links military risk to inflation. Oil price spikes are not just a commodity-market issue. They raise transport costs, fertiliser costs, utility bills and food prices. They also complicate the work of central banks that are trying to ease policy without allowing inflation expectations to revive.

For the Modi government, the conflict poses a particularly sharp policy test. India is heavily dependent on imported crude, gas and fertiliser inputs, much of which is exposed to Gulf shipping routes. A prolonged confrontation near Hormuz would not merely raise the import bill; it would force New Delhi to decide how much of the shock should be absorbed by the state and how much should be passed on to consumers. That decision has economic, fiscal and political consequences.

The government is already expected to look at several measures to raise or conserve resources for emergencies linked to the Gulf conflict. These could include tighter control over non-essential expenditure, reworking subsidy allocations, tapping dividend flows from public-sector companies, accelerating disinvestment receipts where feasible and using higher duties or levies selectively if oil prices remain elevated. Such measures would not be cost-free. Any attempt to raise revenue during an inflationary energy shock risks hurting consumption, while unchecked subsidies would widen the fiscal burden.

Fuel pricing is the most sensitive area. Passing the full burden of higher crude prices to consumers would feed quickly into inflation and household budgets. Absorbing the shock through state-owned oil marketing companies would weaken their balance sheets and may eventually require budgetary support. Cutting excise duties would soften pump prices but reduce government revenue just when emergency spending needs are rising. This is the central dilemma for New Delhi: the same crisis that demands fiscal support also narrows the room to finance it.

Fertiliser is another pressure point. India’s farm economy depends heavily on affordable fertiliser, and the government has historically used subsidies to cushion farmers from global price swings. A Gulf conflict that raises gas and fertiliser import costs would increase subsidy demands at the same time as food inflation risks rise. With weather uncertainty also a recurring concern, the government would have little room to allow a sharp increase in farm input costs before a politically sensitive agricultural season.

The rupee adds another layer of vulnerability. Higher crude prices typically increase dollar demand from importers and widen the current account deficit. If investors also move towards safe-haven assets, emerging-market currencies can come under further pressure. A weaker rupee then makes oil, gas and fertiliser imports even more expensive, creating a feedback loop between external vulnerability and domestic inflation. The Reserve Bank of India may be forced to balance currency support with the need to preserve reserves and avoid excessive tightening.

India’s policymakers therefore face a three-way squeeze: protect consumers, preserve fiscal credibility and maintain growth. The economy has domestic demand strength, but high energy prices can erode disposable income, raise corporate costs and delay private investment. Airlines, logistics firms, chemicals, cement, steel and transport-linked sectors would be among the first to feel the strain. Small businesses would face higher working-capital needs, while households would see the impact through fuel, cooking gas, food and transport costs.

The political stakes are also significant. The Modi government has built much of its economic messaging around infrastructure spending, welfare delivery and macroeconomic stability. A Gulf crisis threatens all three. Capital expenditure may be difficult to cut because it supports growth and employment, but revenue spending on subsidies and emergency buffers could rise sharply. Welfare commitments cannot easily be diluted when inflation is hurting lower-income households. Fiscal consolidation targets may therefore come under pressure if the confrontation persists.

The Gulf states face their own paradox. Higher oil prices may improve revenue for producers, but a militarised Hormuz threatens the stability on which their broader economic models depend. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain have invested heavily in logistics, finance, tourism and non-oil growth. A drawn-out confrontation would raise security costs, unsettle investors and expose the region’s dependence on safe maritime routes.

The turning point for markets may therefore be psychological. Energy prices, inflation expectations and fiscal planning are again being shaped by war risk. For India, the crisis is no longer a distant geopolitical event but a direct test of economic management. The confrontation may still be contained, but containment has become harder to assume. That uncertainty is now the central market fact. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

The INDIA bloc’s meet on June 8, 2026 in New Delhi has reset a broader consensus on national politics to take on the BJP despite its regional conflicts that surfaced with DMK keeping away from and AAP declaring that it was not part of it. Nevertheless, as many as 25 political parties participated, the Congress President and the Leader of the Opposition in Rajya Sabha said, adding that they reached a collective resolve on five key issues.

BJP had earlier said that INDIA bloc was dead and buried, but this level of success of the INDIA meet despite structural fragility and regional friction within, has come as contradiction to their narrative. After the meet, BJP mocked INDIA bloc and claimed that it has shrunk from stadiums to a single room (at Constitution Club New Delhi), described the alliance as a “figment of imagination” plagued by intense internal conflicts, and is in disarray with “no leader, policy, or office” after key partners like DMK and AAP left. One of the BJP leaders even said that the alliance is effectively dissolved, lacking a cohesive structure, policy, or leadership. BJP’s narrative against the INDIA bloc clearly reveals their own “regimentation” approach within their party and in their RSS family.

INDIA bloc runs differently, there is no regimentation but democracy, no single leader but collective leadership, and no political autocracy but political federalism. INDIA bloc tries to achieve “unity in diversity” and there is not structural regimentation, which its detractors try to project as structural fragility. Every political party in INDIA bloc has its own regional or national interests and it is not a small achievement that 23 political parties participated in the meet along with two other political individual personalities after a series of setbacks in the last two years after the Lok Sabha election 2024. The meet decided to meet regularly from now on, the next meeting to be held in August in Hyderabad. Regular coordination matters, which amount to a reset of the INDIA bloc.

The other achievements of the INDIA bloc meet are its five key resolutions. It resolved that the bloc would write to the Chief Justice of India, flagging concerns over the Special Intensive revision (SIR) and the alleged ‘vote loot’. It demanded the immediate resignation of Union Minister of Education Dharmendra Pradhan, stating that he had “presided over the betrayal of lakhs of youth who appeared for NEET and CBSE exams”. These two issues are very sensitive, and has political implications for the ruling establishment, given that the third and final phase of SIR in the country has already been announced by the Election Commission of India (ECI), while the youth of the country under the banner of Cockroach Janata Party (not a political party but a non-political front) has threatened nationwide agitation if Pradhan does not resign or is not removed this week.

The third important resolution of the INDIA bloc has called on the Union Government led by PM Narendra Modi to convene an all-party meeting to discuss the “current critical economic situation” in the country including inflation and price rise, unemployment crisis among youths, and farm sector distress. The fourth important decision taken in the meet was to hold coordination meetings every two months, and the fifth and last, but not the least, that the participating political parties committed themselves to daily parliamentary coordination during sessions.

The significance of these decisions at this juncture is more focused on the collective resolution of the INDIA bloc constituent political parties to corner the ruling BJP led by PM Narendra Modi on governance failures, for which they have reset their institutional framework. Their aim seemed to prepare for the 2029 Lok Sabha elections, and to oppose the sweeping changes in the political system of the country that PM Modi is set to introduce in the coming months, which included delimitation and one nation one election among others. It can be counted as success of the INDIA bloc meet.

The course of events in the recent months, especially after the state election results on May 4, 2026, has clearly brought the conflicting interests within the INDIA bloc constituents. Regional parties have expressed their trust deficit against Congress, which is the largest political party leading the bloc. In Kerala UDF led by Congress was in opposition to LDA led by CPI(M), but both participated in the meet. In West Bengal, TMC led by Mamata and the Congress fought each other, but both came to participate.

In case of Tamil Nadu, Congress joined hands with the TVK led by C. Joseph Vijay for form government after election result, which irked its old ally DMK in the state. DMK stayed away from the meet but it has said that it will remain in solidarity with the opposition against the BJP on national issues concerning Tamil Nadu. DMK did not come despite the party was approached by Mamata and SP Supremo Akhilesh Yadav. TVK has defeated DMK and Congress alliance in Tamil Nadu, and DMK have never been ready to share power with the Congress. If Congress joined hands with TVK, it is no surprise. TVK has not yet decided to join INDIA bloc, but it also does not support the BJP, and not likely to. If fragility in the INDIA bloc is seen in Tamil Nadu, it will not give advantage to the BJP, since BJP has also been split, and its important former leader Annamalai will launch his own party.

As for AAP, it is in power in Punjab where legislative assembly election will be held in 2027. Congress is the main opposition there, and BJP has little presence. It was natural for the AAP to declare that it was not part of INDIA bloc, which is no advantage to BJP. Therefore, BJP’s structurally fragile narrative against INDIA bloc, though partially true, will not benefit them.

However, the real problem is with split within one of its constituents TMC, whose rebel group of 58 MLAs out of 80 in the Legislative Assembly of West Bengal has formed their own group and one of the rebel leaders was given the status of the Leader of the Opposition. However, more concerning development has taken place in the Lok Sabha where 20 TMC MPs has declared their support to NDA led by BJP. It may effectively reduce the strength of the INDIA bloc in the parliament. However, INDIA bloc will be able to get issue based support of both AAP and DMK in national politics against BJP’s agenda to defend secularism, federalism, and victimization of opposition leaders and states they rule.

Congress was criticized for parting ways with the DMK and Left parties criticized it for aggressive campaign against LDF in Kerala. JMM of Jharkhand and RJD of Bihar have also raised their grievance. However, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi said that he “welcomes all the criticism with a smile” and assured that the Congress would work with “love and affection” to keep the alliance united.

Uttar Pradesh is going to poll in 2027 which will be crucial for the INDIA bloc. SP supremo said that defeating BJP will be crucial. While acknowledging the Congress’s pan-India presence, he urged Congress to be “large-hearted” and allow dominant regional parties to take the lead wherever appropriate. It gives a hope that there will be some sort of alliance between the Congress and SP, though they are presently preparing to contents on all seats on their own. The possible unity in Uttar Pradesh has unnerved the BJP.

To address the organization or structural fragility, Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Uddhav Thackeray and CPI(ML)L general secretary Dipankar Bhattacharya called for a concrete organizational structure. Several other issues were raised. INDIA bloc has decided to meet every two months to discuss all the issues. INDIA bloc has just been reactivated, and most likely to evolve first into a stronger federal front, secondly a stronger parliamentary coalition with greater cohesion, and thirdly a stronger electoral alliance before the Lok Sabha election 2029. (IPA Service)

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By Nantoo Banerjee

It is good that the government has finally decided to introduce the Producer Price Index (PPI) as a more reliable inflation tracker than the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). However, it may not be desirable to dump WPI entirely after a period of the next five years. Wholesale price levels remain highly valuable to assess inflation in a country like India. For instance, domestic producer price of items such as petroleum and pharmaceuticals in India has little link to their market price. Central banks in many countries use both these indices as important indicators. Because changes in input and production costs (what factories pay) typically pass through to consumer retail prices (what you pay), economists use this data to forecast future consumer inflation trends.

In India, crude oil is mostly imported. The domestic output is just around 10 percent of the country’s requirement. As a result, the domestic market is entirely dictated by global import prices. The producer price of domestic crude oil is believed to be much less than the import price. While the actual cost of extracting this oil in India is low, the price at which domestic producers sell it is largely tied to international market rates and government formulas (e.g., pricing formulas linked to imported crude.) India being a price-taker, this import price is volatile and fluctuates daily based on international geopolitics, supply-demand dynamics, and the rupee-to-dollar exchange rate. Similarly, producer price of medicines, especially prescription drugs, has little link with their wholesale and consumer price which include post manufacturing expenses (PME) which may vary from 500 percent to 2,000 percent or even more.

Interestingly, India’s provisional Wholesale Price Index inflation surged to 8.30 percent year-on-year in April 2026, up sharply from 3.88 percent in March. This marked the highest wholesale inflation rate since October 2022, primarily driven by spikes in fuel, food, and manufacturing costs. On the contrary, India’s latest retail inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index, stood at 3.48 percent (provisional) for April 2026 compared to the same month last year. The headline CPI index value is 105.12. This data utilizes the updated base year of 2024 = 100.

Many nations use both PPI and WPI to track inflation more accurately. For instance, Japan actively tracks the Corporate Goods Price Index (CGPI), which functions as their PPI tracking producer output/input costs, while also compiling and releasing a legacy WPI to monitor transaction prices between businesses. The Philippines government actively maintains both indices, with the WPI acting as an essential inflation guide for bulk sales, while the broader PPI monitors industry output price movements. However, it may be noted that many other economies like the US, China, Germany, France, Australia and the UK rely solely on the PPI to measure producer inflation, as it covers both goods and services and aligns with modern economic accounting. The PPI acts as a critical leading indicator of inflation, as changes in factory gate prices usually trickle down to consumer prices over time.

The WPI measures average price changes of goods sold in bulk at the wholesale level. While major economies transitioned to the globally standardized PPI, many countries still publish WPI-based inflation tracking. Japan tracks domestic corporate goods prices using methods synonymous with a WPI. Germany’s the Erzeugerpreise acts as their producer and wholesale price barometer. Canada tracks industrial product price (IPP) changes. Indonesia publishes Statistics Indonesia (BPS) to monitor bulk commodity prices. Italy tracks wholesale prices across domestic and imported goods (often reported via Moody’s Analytics Wholesale Price Index.) South Korea measures price movements across goods originating from and trading within domestic markets. Brazil tracks industrial and wholesale price aggregates (often monitored via Trading Economics Wholesale Prices).

However, it must be appreciated that the PPI is widely considered a more accurate tool for tracking inflation than the WPI. In fact, the PPI has several structural advantages. The WPI only tracks goods. Because services now make up over 50 percent of India’s economy, the WPI misses a massive portion of economic activity. The PPI tracks service sectors (like banking, telecom, and insurance) alongside goods. The WPI counts intermediate goods multiple times as they pass through various stages of production (e.g., steel, then auto-parts, then the final car). This artificially inflates the measured inflation rate. The PPI tracks output and input prices separately to avoid this.

The PPI includes both an Input Index (what businesses pay for materials and services) and an Output Index (what they receive). This creates an early-warning system that shows how rising production costs get passed on to consumers. The WPI only measures domestic wholesale transactions and completely excludes goods that are exported. The PPI captures producer price dynamics globally. In India, the WPI has historically been used in long-term commercial contracts and government price-escalation clauses. Therefore, the transition away from it must be gradual. Many countries transitioned to PPI as their primary measure of producer-level inflation.

Finally, it must be said that neither the WPI nor the PPI is the best measure for the cost of living. Neither index is “better” overall; they simply track inflation from different perspectives. For retail inflation and the interest rates set by the RBI, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) holds the key as it reflects the actual prices paid by end consumers. While the PPI is the best measure for tracking production and business costs, neither WPI nor PPI is the best measure for tracking the cost of living.

For retail inflation and the interest rates set by the RBI, CPI is the primary standard because it reflects the actual prices paid by end consumers. Major countries and global economies track inflation using CPI, PPI and gross domestic product (GDP) deflators. Economists use producer indices to strip out inflation from nominal growth data. Because PPI separates out indirect taxes and trade margins, it acts as a cleaner GDP deflator for tracking actual economic output. Adopting it follows International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines, giving foreign investors clearer comparability. (IPA Service)

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By Asad Mirza

Marking exactly 100 days since a catastrophic conflict reordered the Middle East, a fragile, US-brokered truce violently collapsed as Israeli jets struck deep inside Iranian territory. By directly defying President Donald Trump’s explicit warnings to exercise restraint, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed the region into uncharted waters, leaving a heavily anticipated peace deal dead in the water.

The conflict that began as a series of sharp, asymmetric naval skirmishes in the Persian Gulf has reached its grim centennial. Over the past 100 days, the United States and Iran have engaged in an exhausting war of attrition that has triggered what the International Energy Agency calls the worst energy crisis in modern history.

The conflict has seen the US Navy forced into escorting commercial vessels through the heavily contested Strait of Hormuz, direct American missile strikes against Iranian military radar and drone installations, and subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes on Western bases across the region – including a devastating drone and rocket attack on Kuwait International Airport.

Yet, just as a fragile ceasefire brokered on April 8 appeared to offer a diplomatic exit ramp, a dramatic sequence of events over the last 48 hours has pushed the region closer to a total, uncontained regional war. At the heart of this latest escalation is a widening, highly public rift between the White House and Jerusalem, exposing the stark limits of American leverage over its closest Middle Eastern ally.

The immediate catalyst for the collapse of the truce began in Lebanon, where an unexpected exchange of fire rapidly dismantled weeks of delicate diplomacy. Following a rocket barrage launched by Iran-backed Hezbollah into northern Israel, the Israeli Air Force launched a severe retaliatory airstrike targeting the southern suburbs of Beirut – a heavily fortified stronghold of the militant group.

Tehran viewed the strikes on Beirut as an egregious violation of the standing agreements regarding Lebanon’s sovereign borders. In a calculated move designed to re-establish deterrence without triggering an outright regional invasion, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) retaliated on June 7 by firing a salvo of approximately ten ballistic missiles at the Ramat David Airbase in northern Israel, the precise installation from which the Israeli jets that struck Beirut had departed.

This specific sequence of military events unravelled with frightening speed over a 48-hour period. It began with the initial Hezbollah rocket attack into Northern Israel, which triggered the immediate Israeli retaliatory strike on Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut.

The Iranian missile response, while precise, was relatively measured in its payload, signaling Tehran’s desire to stay within the bounds of controlled escalation. However, the political fallout was immediate.

Iran’s top negotiator and Parliament Speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, took to social media to proclaim that the ongoing US naval blockade of Iran, combined with Washington’s perceived “green light” for Israeli operations in Lebanon, had effectively nullified previous diplomatic understandings.

As sirens wailed across Israel and the region braced for impact, President Donald Trump moved behind the scenes to save his administration’s signature foreign policy initiative. Trump had frequently claimed that Washington and Tehran were “very close to a final peace deal” that would permanently dismantle Iran’s enriched uranium program in exchange for economic concessions.

Fearing that an unrestricted regional cycle of violence would destroy months of secret negotiations, Trump spoke candidly to journalists, stating that both Israel and Iran had effectively “done their part” through an equal exchange of strikes and that further escalation was unnecessary.

This diplomatic breakdown exposed the deeply diverging strategic agendas of the two allies. On one side, Washington’s primary objectives are to secure a grand peace deal, prevent an all-out regional war, maintain global oil stability, lift the volatile naval blockade, and eventually leverage frozen assets for regional rebuilding.

On the other side, Jerusalem’s uncompromising position is driven by the need to permanently dismantle the Iranian nuclear threat and completely eradicate Iran-backed proxy networks operating on Israel’s borders. Because of these existential concerns, Israel increasingly rejects any US-brokered truces that leave these fundamental security threats intact.

The White House remained visibly shaken by the insubordination, refusing to comment on whether the strikes were carried out with any level of American coordination.

The military confrontation on the ground is closely mirrored by a fierce diplomatic stalemate over the fate of frozen Iranian financial assets. Prior to the latest round of strikes, the Trump administration had floated a highly controversial legal strategy to utilise billions of dollars in frozen Iranian foreign reserves to compensate Gulf allies for infrastructure damage caused by IRGC drone strikes and naval aggression over the course of the 100-day war.

Tehran has fiercely rejected the proposal, warning that any attempt to expropriate its sovereign funds would be treated as an act of international piracy. Concurrently, President Trump has dug in his heels regarding the sequencing of sanctions relief, explicitly stating that his administration would not unfreeze a single dollar of Iranian assets before a comprehensive, verified nuclear and ballistic treaty is fully signed and finalised.

This financial gridlock is heavily influenced by the dual nature of the Iranian resistance axis, which operates across both an economic and a military core. On the economic front, Iran maintains a total rejection of asset seizures for damages, demands the complete and immediate lifting of the naval blockade, and insists on upfront sanctions relief before making concessions.

On the military front, this resistance is backed by a commitment to symmetrical ballistic missile strikes, active threats against all regional US military bases, and the ongoing capability to disrupt vital international maritime transit corridors.

With Israel’s latest counter-strike, the entire architecture of the proposed peace deal has been thrown into complete limbo. The diplomatic progress made during previous rounds of negotiations in Doha has effectively evaporated.

As the war enters its second 100 days, the international community faces a deeply volatile landscape. The conflict has moved past the stage of proxy skirmishes and localised containment; it is now a direct, state-on-state war characterised by a complete breakdown of international legal norms and deterrence.

The legal basis for the ongoing US naval blockades and unilateral Israeli pre-emptive strikes faces mounting scrutiny from international legal experts, even as both nations claim the inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The fundamental reality of the conflict is that the United States is no longer the sole architect of the Middle Eastern security paradigm. By demonstrating that Israel will independently strike Iranian targets despite explicit American warnings, Netanyahu has decoupled Israeli security policy from Washington’s broader geopolitical agenda.

As long as Tehran demands a total lifting of the economic blockade before halting its regional operations, and Israel refuses to tolerate an intact Iranian nuclear infrastructure, President Trump’s envisioned “grand deal” will remain a distant mirage, drowned out by the thunder of anti-aircraft fire over Tehran. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government may have done itself a favour by allowing the Cockroach Janta Party protest led by Abhijit Dipke to proceed without turning it into another confrontation between the state and restless young citizens. For a government that has often preferred firmness over accommodation, the decision to let anger over examination irregularities spill from social media timelines into a public square was politically sensible. It denied the protest instant martyrdom, lowered the temperature on the streets, and allowed the ruling establishment to signal that it was not afraid of noisy dissent. But it would be a mistake for the government to read the modest crowd strength as proof that the movement is electorally harmless or socially shallow.

Numbers matter in politics, but they do not always tell the whole story. The cockroach protest did not have the machinery of a trade union, the district-level network of a national party, or the mobilisation capacity of caste and community organisations. It lacked buses, convenors, local committees, booth workers and the invisible logistics that turn outrage into a disciplined mass gathering. Yet young men and women still came from different parts of the country to join a protest around a cause that has touched nearly every middle-class, lower-middle-class and aspirational household: the credibility of examinations. That is what should worry the government. A protest without an organisation is not always a weak protest. Sometimes it is a warning that the organisation may come later.

The issue at the heart of the agitation is unusually combustible. Examination irregularities are not viewed by students as a routine administrative failure. They are seen as theft: of years of preparation, family savings, emotional stamina and the promise of social mobility. Parents mortgage comfort and sometimes assets to fund coaching, hostel stays, application fees and travel. Students spend their teenage years under brutal pressure, often measuring their self-worth against cut-off marks and answer keys. When papers leak, marking systems fail, or exam bodies appear casual about accountability, the damage is not merely procedural. It strikes at the moral bargain that keeps millions invested in the system: work hard, compete fairly, and the state will protect the sanctity of the contest.

That bargain has been under strain for some time. The explosion of competitive examinations has created a vast economy of hope, anxiety and exploitation. Coaching centres, online platforms, private hostels, test series providers and application portals have grown around a state-driven scarcity of seats and jobs. For young Indians, exams are not episodic events; they are life-defining gateways. Any perception that these gateways are compromised carries a political charge far beyond education policy. It feeds directly into discontent over unemployment, uneven opportunity and the belief that merit is being mocked by incompetence or collusion.

By permitting the protest, the government chose containment over provocation. That was a prudent move. A crackdown could have transformed a loosely structured movement into a national cause overnight. Detentions, barricades, lathi-charges or visible humiliation of young protesters would have supplied the movement with images more powerful than speeches. The decision to let the anger find physical expression allowed the state to avoid that trap. It also created a controlled release valve for frustration that had been building in the digital space, where rage often grows faster because it is not tested against the discipline of public mobilisation.

Yet the same strategy carries a risk. Once a movement moves from social media to the street, it acquires a different kind of legitimacy. Online followings can be dismissed as algorithmic storms, performative outrage or influencer politics. Bodies in a public protest are harder to wave away. They show sacrifice, however limited. They show that people were willing to travel, stand, shout, expose themselves to scrutiny and associate their names with a cause. For a movement like the CJP, that transition matters. It tells the government that the cockroach label, whether mocking, self-deprecating or defiant, has begun to carry emotional meaning among a section of youth.

Abhijit Dipke’s real achievement is not that he has built a conventional political organisation. He has not. His challenge will now be to convert attention into structure, emotion into strategy and anger into a programme. Indian politics is littered with examples of movements that captured the public mood but failed to survive the grind of organisation. The street can produce visibility, but politics and sustained pressure require cadres, discipline, internal democracy, funding transparency, local leadership and clarity of purpose.

For the government, however, the immediate question is simpler: what does it do with Dharmendra Pradhan? Modi’s decision to include the education minister in his Paris delegation was clearly meant to convey steadiness and defiance. The message was that the Prime Minister would not let a protest dictate personnel choices. Such signalling has value. No government wants to appear as if it changes ministers under street pressure. But the longer the examination issue remains alive, the more Pradhan risks becoming the face of a problem larger than himself.

A cabinet reshuffle, if it comes, gives Modi the cleanest route out. Removing or shifting Pradhan during a broader restructuring would avoid the appearance of surrender while allowing the Prime Minister to claim responsiveness. It would also help reset the education portfolio at a time when credibility matters more than rhetoric. A new minister would not solve paper leaks, institutional weaknesses or examination mismanagement overnight. But political accountability has symbolic weight. For students who believe nobody pays a price for their suffering, even a change at the top can signal that the government recognises the seriousness of the breach.

The danger for Modi lies in underestimating the emotional memory of examination failures. Young voters may not always protest in large numbers, but they carry grievances into homes, hostels, coaching classrooms and family conversations. A student who loses faith in an exam process influences parents, siblings, neighbours and peers. The political effect is diffused but real. It does not always appear immediately in rallies or vote shares, but it corrodes goodwill. For a leader who has built his authority partly on the promise of efficiency and delivery, administrative failure in such a sensitive domain is not a small embarrassment. It is a reputational wound.

The cockroach movement also arrives at a moment when youth politics is searching for new forms. Traditional student unions remain active but are often trapped within ideological campuses and party structures. Digital platforms have created leaders without offices, movements without manifestos and publics without membership cards. Such movements are unstable, sometimes erratic and vulnerable to exaggeration. But they are also fast, emotive and difficult to neutralise through old political methods. The CJP may fade, fragment or mature. Whatever its future, it has revealed a constituency that feels unheard by both the bureaucracy and mainstream opposition.

The cockroaches may not yet have the numbers to shake the government. They may not even have the structure to sustain themselves beyond the first wave of attention. But they have crawled into a crack in the Modi model: the gap between the promise of youth empowerment and the lived anxiety of young people navigating an examination system they fear is unfair. Governments can survive protests. They cannot afford to look indifferent to the dreams of students. If Modi wants to show that his concern for youth is more than a campaign refrain, the coming reshuffle offers him an opportunity to act before a manageable protest hardens into a wider political indictment. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

After a series of political setbacks since Lok Sabha Election 2024, the meet of the INDIA bloc scheduled to be held at the Constitution Club in New Delhi on June 8 is a significant development, especially when one of its allies DMK has announced to skip the meet, and the BJP has claimed that INDIA bloc is dead and buried, and exists only on paper.

The meet is significant on account of other reasons too. It is the first meet of the top leaders after they met in December 2023, ahead of general elections 2024. Several meetings of INDIA bloc were held thereafter, but top leaders did not come together in any of the subsequent meetings. As of now as many as 17 top leaders of the 35 constituent parties are reported to participate in the June 8 meet which included TMC supremo Mamata Banerjee, JMM supremo Hemant Soren, Jammu and Kashmir National Conference leader Omar Abdullah, Samajwadi Party president Akhilesh Yadav, RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav, and Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Uddhav Thackeray.

It should be noted that DMK had announced that they will not participate in the meet, which has been sensationalised in some news papers as “DMK to boycott the meet”. However, they failed to note that DMK has simultaneously maintained that it remained committed to broader Opposition solidarity on national issues. It indicates that in spite of some serious grievances of the DMK against the Congress, DMK will remain in broader opposition solidarity against the BJP’s policy regarding national issues.

It is a matter of serious concern for the BJP and hence the party has tried today June 5 to portray the INDIA bloc in very bad light. BJP’s national spokesperson Shehzad Poonawalla said, “The INDI alliance has now broken into pieces. It was predicted that on May 4 there would be nothing called the INDI alliance left, and that prediction came true.”

Poonawalla referred May 4, the day of election results of five states including Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal. In Tamil Nadu, DMK led government lost power to TVK led by Vijay; in Kerala Congress led UDF thrown LDF government led by CPI(M), and in West Bengal BJP thrown TMC led by Mamata out of power. Poonawalla has seen in the results and aftermath a disintegration of INDIA bloc, which was just a hype of the BJP, as the confirmation of top leaders participating in INDIA bloc meet on June 8 indicates, in which only DMK has announced not to participate but has stated the party’s commitment to broader solidarity. Poonawalla’s statement – “The INDI alliance is dead and buried. It may exist on paper and on television screens, but it does not exist in reality” – is just an overstatement.

Since its inception, INDIA bloc has been working on the principle of “March separately, Strike Together”, as the then CPI(M) general secretary Sitaram Yechury had suggested, because the Left Front had stakes in West Bengal and Kerala, where they had to fight TMC and Congress led UDF respectively. It allowed Left, TMC, and Congress to be part of the INDIA bloc though they have been fighting with each other in their respective states of influence. Here lies a hope for the INDIA bloc, which will sure to find a way out for a united front at the national level against the BJP, even though DMK on June 4 issued a strongly-worded statement and said that “out of respect for the feelings of party comrades who are deeply hurt by the betrayal committed by the Congress party against DMK after the Assembly election in Tamil Nadu, the DMK will not participate in the INDIA alliance meeting.”

DMK’s stand not to sit with the Congress in the Parliament, and not to participate in the INDIA bloc meet is, of course, a matter of concern. It was a result of Congress shifting its stand deserting DMK to join TVK government. Other two allies of INDIA bloc VCK and IUML has also joined TVK government. However, TVK’s ambivalence on becoming part of the INDIA bloc continues. Even if it does not become part of INDIA bloc, it is not likely to join hands with the BJP.

BJP has its own worries in Tamil Nadu. A former popular BJP leader K Annamalai has resigned from the party and has announced ‘new political movement’ in the state. Tamil Nadu politics is therefore taking a new shape, and it will be too early to announce death of INDIA bloc, in Tamil Nadu, and at national level. BJP will try to implement its decisions, such as delimitation of constituencies and “One Nation One Election” before 2029 Lok Sabha election, and hence INDIA bloc meet on June 8 has become important, where a broader solidarity among the anti-BJP political forces is most likely to be renewed.

Grievances and difference of opinion are there, but they will finally be sorted out. Two important states are going to polls in 2027 are Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. At present Congress and Samajwadi parties are preparing for election on their own, but it is worth nothing that SP Supremo Akhilesh Yadav will be participating in INDIA bloc. SP and Congress had contested 2024 Lok Sabha election in the state and considerably reduced the BJP’s seats in the Lok Sabha to only 240 seats. They are most likely to join hands for 2027 Legislative assembly election in the state. In Punjab, AAP is in power and they will have to battle with the Congress candidates. BJP has not strength in there, and hence contest between AAP and Congress will not benefit BJP. Obviously, AAP is not participating in INDIA bloc’s June 8 meet, but they will be part of opposition solidarity at national level.

Despite the Left and TMC political tussle, historically and currently, top leadership from both camps have confirmed their participation in the INDIA bloc meet.

INDIA bloc’s trying to renew their unity – and if possible, expand it – during the June 8 meet is significant at this juncture when BJP is trying to introduce sweeping political changes in the country in the form of SIR, NRC, One Nation One Election, and delimitation. This unity among non-BJP political parties will be important because they altogether have support of about 63 per cent of voters in the country. For INDIA bloc parties, it is a time to stand against BJP’s intention of sweeping political changes, that may alter the fate of the country, under which future elections will be contested. June 8 meet will be an occasion when the opposition INDIA bloc will show solidarity to the BJP and the nation. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

The preliminary version of the OECD Outlook released on June 3, 2026 has projected the real GDP of India to grow by 6.3% during the FY 2026-27, which is a sharp decline from the robust growth rate of 7.8 per cent year-on-year in the quarter ending in December 2025 (Q3 FY2025–26), easing from 8.4% in the previous quarter. However, it expects only a little improvement in the GDP growth in 2027-28 to 6.4 per cent.

Summing up the scenarios, the OECD Outlook stated that rising inflation is expected to weigh on private consumption, while investment slows amid higher oil and gas prices and gas rationing. Employment growth and labour market participation are set to weaken. Inflation is projected to increase to 4.8% in FY2026-27, driven by higher food, energy and fertiliser costs, and currency depreciation. The current account deficit is expected to widen, as higher energy import costs outweigh the impact of weaker domestic demand. More persistent energy rationing could lead to weaker growth.

High-frequency indicators, including softer industrial production, suggest a loss of momentum of India’s growth rate. Retail indicators and survey-based measures of consumer sentiment point to an easing of private consumption as higher food and energy prices weigh on households’ real purchasing power.

At 3.5% year-on-year in April, headline inflation has picked up since early 2026, driven primarily by food prices, but core inflation has remained broadly stable and below the mid-point of the central bank’s target band of 4% ± 2%.

The depreciation of the rupee relative to the US dollar of around 7% since the beginning of the year has added to inflationary pressures by raising import costs, particularly for fuel and fertilisers, with partial pass-through to consumer prices.

Labour market conditions are softening, with the workers population ratio declining from 40.5% in December to39.5% in April.

India’s crude oil and natural gas dependence on the Middle East is substantial, with crude oil imports accounting for about 46% of total imports in 2024 and natural gas for about 57%. Energy import prices have risen sharply in recent months, but only part of that has fed into domestic energy prices.

Reductions in excise duties on petrol and diesel and the removal of import duties on selected petrochemical inputs, alongside export levies on refined products, have helped to contain the pass-through from international prices to domestic inflation.

Rationing measures have prioritised natural gas supply to households and transport, while expanding access to kerosene through the public distribution system and increasing the availability of small LPG cylinders for migrant workers. The recent reduction in US import tariffs lowered the average effective tariff rate on India by 23 percentage points, reducing pressures on exporting sectors.

The Reserve Bank of India reduced the monetary policy rate from 6.5% in January 2025 to a broadly neutral level of 5.25% in February 2026 and average lending rates have fallen. Non-food bank credit (bank credit net of food procurement-related lending) expanded by 15.9% year-on-year in March.

However, the outlook says that recent developments point to a re-emergence of inflationary pressures. Headline inflation has begun to rise, driven primarily by higher food prices as favourable base effects fade. Higher oil and gas prices are adding both direct and indirect pressures, increasing transportation and production costs across sectors.

The depreciation of the rupee is further amplifying imported inflation by raising the domestic cost of fuel, fertilisers and other tradable goods. In this context, a temporary increase in the policy rate of around 25basis points is projected by the end of the first quarter of FY2026-27 to help maintain inflation within the4% ± 2% target band and anchor expectations. As inflationary pressures recede over the projection horizon, monetary policy is expected to ease in FY2027-28.

Fiscal policy is projected to become expansionary in FY2026-27 to cushion the impact of higher energy prices. The FY2026-27 budget envisaged a reduction in the fiscal deficit from 4.4% of GDP in FY2025-26 to 4.3% of GDP. However, measures adopted to mitigate the energy price shock are expected to widen the deficit by around 0.4% of GDP relative to the budgeted path.

OECD outlook says that these measures will provide near-term support to household real incomes and limit the impact on consumption but will also slow the pace of public debt reduction, which is expected to reach 54.7% in FY2027-28. Fiscal policy is expected to return to a moderate consolidation path in FY2027-28 as energy prices stabilise and temporary support measures are phased out.

The negative effects of higher energy prices and gas rationing, weaker global demand and higher production costs are expected to weigh on investment and exports, despite lower US import tariffs providing some support to exports. Private consumption growth is projected to slow as inflation reduces households purchasing power.

As some of these headwinds recede in FY2027-28, growth is expected to recover to 6.4%. Inflation is projected to rise to 4.8% in FY2026-27, driven by higher food and energy prices and exchange-rate depreciation, before easing in FY2027-28 as commodity prices stabilise and monetary policy tightens. The current account deficit is expected to widen in FY2026-27, reflecting higher energy import costs and weaker external demand.

Risks are tilted to the downside. Persistent disruptions to energy supply, including prolonged gas rationing, could further constrain production and raise inflation, including through reduced fertiliser supply and agricultural output. Trade policy uncertainty remains elevated, and additional restrictions or weaker global demand could weigh on exports and investment.

On the upside, if energy support measures effectively reduce near-term inflation and limit the erosion of real disposable incomes more effectively than assumed in the projections – particularly for liquidity-constrained households – private consumption may prove more resilient than projected.

Energy support could cushion real incomes and consumption more than expected, the outlook said, adding that India’s fiscal policy is poised to turn expansionary in FY2026-27 to mitigate the impact of higher energy prices, notably through subsidies. Moving from price support to targeted transfers could reduce the fiscal cost of policy support.

Following a period of easing, monetary policy is projected to tighten with a policy rate increase in early FY2026-27 to help keep inflation within the target band. Streamlining and harmonising regulations would reduce administrative burdens, boosting productivity and investment. Accelerating the rollout of renewable energy sources would strengthen energy security and reduce carbon emissions.

India’s energy support measures have largely relied on broad-based, price-distorting interventions rather than targeted assistance, the OECD outlook said. This approach has high fiscal costs, slowing the rebuilding of buffers. Direct transfers to vulnerable households and viable firms would achieve similar objectives at significantly lower fiscal cost.

Expanding renewable energy sources, while strengthening grid infrastructure and storage capacity, would make growth more sustainable by reducing carbon emissions and at the same time reduce the reliance on imported energy. However, regulatory complexity and overlapping administrative requirements across central and state levels continue to raise compliance costs, delay project implementation and deter investment, particularly in manufacturing and infrastructure. Streamlining and harmonising regulatory frameworks, expanding single-window clearance systems, digitalising approvals and setting clear administrative deadlines would reduce uncertainty and improve transparency. (IPA Service)

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By K Raveendran

Public anger has a strange way of finding symbols. Sometimes it gathers around a saintly figure in a white cap, sometimes around an unlikely political label that sounds almost like a joke until it begins to speak for a generation. The overwhelming response from Gen Z to the Cockroach party carries unmistakable echoes of Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption agitation. Both emerged as vehicles for resentment against a system seen as remote, arrogant and morally exhausted. Both drew energy from people who felt that conventional politics had stopped listening. Both appeared, at least at the beginning, to be spontaneous uprisings rather than carefully manufactured political projects.

That similarity is important because it explains why the Cockroach phenomenon has travelled so fast. It is not merely about one founder, one slogan or one organisational experiment. It is about a mood. Gen Z, like the urban middle class and politically restless citizens who flocked to Anna Hazare’s movement, is searching for a channel through which anger can acquire public meaning. The name Cockroach itself appears to have struck a chord because it mocks the grandeur of established politics. It suggests survival, irreverence and contempt for polite hypocrisy. For a generation brought up amid economic uncertainty, job anxiety, digital exposure and institutional distrust, such a label can become a badge of defiance.

Anna Hazare’s agitation also began as a moral revolt rather than a conventional political campaign. It tapped into a widespread belief that corruption had eaten into public life and that the existing parties had neither the will nor the credibility to cleanse the system. The protest sites became spaces of emotional release. Citizens who had long complained in private suddenly found themselves part of a larger national conversation. The movement’s strength lay in its simplicity. Corruption was the enemy. The people were the victims. The system was guilty. That moral clarity helped the agitation spread, but it also concealed the difficult questions that would follow.

The Cockroach party faces the same danger. Protest movements thrive on shared disgust, but politics demands choices, compromises and accountability. Anger can bring people to the street, to a rally or to a digital platform, but it cannot by itself build a durable political institution. A movement can say what it opposes in one sentence. A party must explain what it will do about taxation, employment, policing, education, health care, federal relations, social conflict, welfare, urban infrastructure and foreign policy. It must select candidates, raise funds, negotiate alliances, discipline ambition and survive the temptations of power. These are not small adjustments. They change the very nature of the project.

Abhijit Dipke’s plan to convert the Cockroach movement into a political party therefore marks the most hazardous point in its journey. Popularity outside the political system can become a burden once it enters the electoral arena. The outsider gains attention by condemning the established order, but the moment he forms a party, he becomes part of the same order he once attacked. He must ask for votes, distribute tickets, manage factions and defend decisions that will disappoint some of his own supporters. Every moral movement believes it can remain pure after entering politics. Very few do.

The lesson from Anna Hazare’s agitation is not that all protest is futile. On the contrary, that movement proved that public anger can shake complacent governments and force questions of accountability into the national conversation. Its failure lay elsewhere. It underestimated the difference between moral pressure and political governance. It assumed that a movement held together by anti-corruption sentiment could naturally produce a clean and coherent political alternative. Instead, the transition from agitation to party politics exposed personal ambition, ideological ambiguity and the fragility of trust. One of Anna’s closest associates later faced serious corruption charges and spent considerable time in jail, a development that badly damaged the moral aura associated with the movement’s political afterlife.

That episode remains a cautionary tale for every new anti-establishment platform. Movements often rise because they are broad enough to contain contradictions. Students, professionals, activists, disillusioned voters, opportunists and idealists can all gather under the same banner when the banner simply says the system has failed. But once a movement becomes a party, those contradictions must be resolved. Is it left, right or neither? Is it anti-capitalist or pro-enterprise? Does it believe in welfare expansion or fiscal restraint? Does it want institutional reform or merely new people in old chairs? Does it seek revolution, renewal or just visibility? These questions cannot be avoided forever.

The Cockroach party’s appeal among Gen Z may also prove double-edged. Young supporters can generate extraordinary momentum, especially in the age of social media, where ridicule, irony and outrage travel faster than manifestos. They can make a movement look larger than life almost overnight. But digital enthusiasm is not the same as electoral machinery. Politics still requires ground workers, booth management, local alliances, caste and community calculations, legal compliance, candidate vetting and constant negotiation with people who may not share the language of online revolt. A viral movement can dominate conversation without winning durable power.

There is also the problem of leadership. Spontaneous movements often claim to be leaderless or people-driven, but political parties inevitably centralise authority. Someone must decide strategy. Someone must speak for the party. Someone must control funds. Someone must settle disputes. The founder who once symbolised rebellion can quickly become the gatekeeper of a new hierarchy. Supporters who joined to escape the arrogance of established politics may then discover familiar patterns inside the organisation they helped build. This is how idealism curdles into cynicism.

Yet it would be wrong to dismiss the Cockroach surge as a passing spectacle. Its rise says something significant about the present political climate. Established parties have failed to convince many young citizens that they understand their frustrations. Formal politics appears scripted, transactional and insulated from everyday anger. The success of an unconventional formation suggests that a vacuum exists. When mainstream institutions do not absorb dissent, dissent invents its own theatre. The Cockroach movement is one such theatre, and its dramatic rise should worry those who mistake public silence for public consent.

The deeper issue is whether the movement can mature without losing the irreverence that made it powerful. To survive, it must move beyond mockery and protest. It must explain its programme with clarity. It must establish internal rules before ambition corrodes its credibility. It must show how candidates will be selected, how money will be handled and how decisions will be scrutinised. It must resist the temptation to believe that popularity is proof of preparedness. The public may forgive inexperience for a while, but it rarely forgives hypocrisy.

Anna Hazare’s agitation became a landmark because it captured a national mood. Its political legacy, however, stands as a warning against assuming that moral energy automatically produces ethical politics. The Cockroach party now stands at a similar crossroads. Its popularity has transcended anything comparable in memory, but that very popularity may push it into a field for which enthusiasm alone is inadequate. Politics is not merely another stage for protest. It is a hard, unforgiving craft in which purity is tested by power and slogans are tested by administration.

The coming challenge for Abhijit Dipke is therefore not whether he can keep the crowd excited. He has already shown that he can. The real question is whether he can build an organisation that survives contact with ambition, compromise and scrutiny. History suggests that movements born from anger often burn brightly and then consume themselves. The Cockroach party may yet prove different, but the burden of proof now rests with those who believe disgust with the system is enough to replace it. (IPA Service)

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MUMBAI/CHENNAI: Just as the microfinance sector appears to be emerging from a prolonged asset-quality stress cycle, a weaker monsoon forecast threatens to create fresh challenges. With the India Meteorological Department (IMD) downgrading its southwest monsoon forecast to “below normal” — potentially the weakest in 11 years — concerns are resurfacing for India’s over ₹3-lakh-crore microfinance industry.

The IMD has revised its June-September southwest monsoon forecast to 90% of the long-period average, down from 92% projected earlier. It has also indicated that El Niño conditions are likely to develop during the season. A weaker-than-expected monsoon could hurt agricultural output, strain rural incomes and stoke inflation, prompting microfinance lenders to take a more cautious approach to fresh loan disbursements.

“A weak monsoon could trigger a major supply shock and lift inflation. The MFI sector is likely to withstand the first level of shock as the current guardrails have already reduced its risk exposure.

But prolonged inflation beyond a quarter would be a significant threat, increasing stress for borrowers and adding uncertainty alongside geopolitical tensions,” said the chief executive of a microfinance company. “It is too early to talk about demand sluggishness, but we are closely watching rainfall in August,” the executive added.

LVLN Murty, CEO of Dvara KGFS believes that  an erratic monsoon can significantly alter borrowing and saving behaviour in rural India. Failed monsoons often force borrowers to rely on informal credit sources to manage immediate expenses and income disruptions.

“We are taking a cautious approach by closely monitoring the Kharif sowing season, the progress of the monsoon and its impact on rural household earnings,” Murty said. He added that the lender is increasing its focus on income-generation loans to help customers diversify household incomes and strengthen financial resilience during periods of climate or income uncertainty.

This comes at a time when things are improving for the sector. After eight quarters of contraction, the microfinance sector’s gross loan portfolio grew 3.2% quarter-on-quarter to ₹3.31 trillion in Q4FY26, supported by higher loan originations, larger ticket sizes and improving asset quality, according to CRIF High Mark.

Asset quality improved significantly during the period, with PAR 31-180 declining to 2% in March 2026 from 3.4% a year earlier and 4.4% in December 2025.

The weaker monsoon outlook comes at a time when the industry is already grappling with uncertainty arising from the conflict in West Asia. Rising crude oil prices have heightened concerns over inflationary pressures on essential goods, potentially stretching household budgets and affecting the repayment capacity of microfinance borrowers.

“We remain deliberately cautious. Over the past year, we have tightened customer assessments, and with the war and an anticipated weak monsoon, we are further sharpening our customer-acquisition criteria,” the executive cited earlier said.

The improvement follows a series of guardrails introduced by the two microfinance self-regulatory organisations, Sa-Dhan and MFIN, including a cap of ₹2 lakh on total outstanding debt per borrower and a reduction in the maximum number of lenders per borrower to three from four.

“The industry’s diversified portfolio should limit the immediate impact, but a weak monsoon may slow disbursements. As forecasts point to a rainfall deficiency, we will continue to monitor developments closely and remain cautious,” said Sadaf Sayeed, MD & CEO, Muthoot Microfin.

“A weak monsoon will weigh on the broader economy, and microfinance borrowers will inevitably feel the impact as their livelihoods are closely linked to economic activity. If the monsoon shortfall and El Niño effects turn out to be severe, lenders will need to be particularly cautious and strengthen credit assessments before extending loans,” said Jiji Mammen, CEO of Sa-Dhan.

Source: The Financial Express

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By T N Ashok

The dust may have settled on the 2026 West Bengal Assembly election, but the political war has only intensified. Defeated former Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has launched perhaps the most serious challenge yet to the legitimacy of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s sweeping victory, alleging that the saffron party manipulated electoral rolls, rigged voting in 177 constituencies, hacked electronic systems, and is now using police pressure to engineer defections from the opposition.

The BJP, meanwhile, dismisses the allegations as the reaction of a party unable to come to terms with an electoral defeat. The Election Commission has categorically rejected claims that electoral rolls were manipulated through its offices, insisting that safeguards exist at every stage of voter registration and verification.

Caught between these competing narratives is a larger national debate that extends far beyond Bengal. As the Election Commission prepares to undertake Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercises in other states, including Delhi, questions are emerging about voter roll integrity, demographic shifts, electoral transparency, and whether future contests in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and beyond could be shaped by administrative processes as much as by political campaigning. They are explosive in nature.

Mamata Banerjee’s allegations are unprecedented in scale. According to the Trinamool Congress chief, the BJP’s victory was not entirely the result of voter preference but of a systematic operation involving voter roll manipulation, technological interference, and post-election intimidation.

“I was not defeated; I was made to lose,” she declared, alleging that the BJP had rigged 177 of the 208 seats it secured. She claims that irregularities were evident in multiple constituencies and points to the Rajarhat seat as one example where, according to her, a Trinamool candidate was initially declared victorious before losing after a recount.

The TMC chief further alleges that police officials are actively pressuring elected legislators to defect. According to her, local police officers first contact MLAs and are then followed by BJP representatives offering inducements or threatening criminal cases under laws relating to arms and narcotics.

The allegations gained further momentum after only a fraction of Trinamool MLAs attended a recent meeting called by Banerjee. Soon afterwards, two legislators were expelled from the party for alleged anti-party activities, deepening concerns about possible defections.

The political symbolism is significant. Mamata, who built her career through street protests against the then-ruling Left Front, has returned to agitation politics, vowing to lead demonstrations even after police denied permission for a planned sit-in protest in Kolkata. Abhishek Banerjee has shifted the debate.

Interestingly, Mamata’s nephew and Trinamool general secretary Abhishek Banerjee has framed the controversy differently. Rather than focusing on Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), Abhishek argues that the real battleground lies in electoral rolls. Weeks before polling, he accused the BJP of orchestrating large-scale voter enrolment fraud through bulk submission of Form 6 applications, which are used to register new voters. He alleged that voters from neighbouring states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were being enrolled in West Bengal constituencies to alter electoral outcomes.

The TMC’s argument is significant because it reflects a broader shift in opposition thinking. After years of questioning EVM reliability, many opposition parties are increasingly focusing on voter lists, claiming that the composition of the electorate itself may be changing before votes are cast. According to Abhishek, electoral manipulation today occurs long before polling day. The elections commission however has a different story to tell.

The Election Commission has firmly rejected these allegations. West Bengal Chief Electoral Officer Manoj Kumar Agarwal clarified that his office possesses no software capable of arbitrarily adding or deleting voters. He acknowledged that large numbers of Form 6 applications had indeed been submitted but emphasized that receiving applications is not equivalent to approving them. Every application, he noted, undergoes field verification before inclusion in electoral rolls.

Election officials argue that India’s voter registration process remains one of the most scrutinized electoral systems in the world. Applications are reviewed by Booth Level Officers, objections can be raised publicly, draft rolls are published for inspection, and political parties are allowed to monitor the process. From the Commission’s perspective, allegations of mass manipulation would require evidence that multiple layers of verification simultaneously failed or were deliberately compromised.

So far, no such conclusive evidence has been publicly produced. BJP offers a counter narrative. The BJP sees the controversy very differently. Its leaders argue that the party’s victory represents the culmination of years of organizational expansion in Bengal and growing voter dissatisfaction with Trinamool rule.

The BJP points to allegations of corruption, political violence, recruitment scams, and governance issues that dominated the state’s political discourse over recent years. Senior BJP leaders who met Election Commission officials before polling accused Trinamool workers of intimidating voters and attempting to influence the electoral process.

From the BJP’s standpoint, the election result reflects genuine public sentiment rather than manipulation. The party also notes that opposition allegations often emerge after electoral defeats but rarely withstand judicial scrutiny.

Its argument is straightforward: if voter rolls were manipulated on a massive scale, why did such manipulation remain undetected by opposition parties, polling agents, election observers, and courts throughout the election process? The SIR debate has reached a flashpoint.

At the heart of the controversy lies the increasingly contentious issue of Special Intensive Revision (SIR).SIR exercises are designed to clean electoral rolls, remove duplicate entries, eliminate deceased voters, and register eligible new voters. In principle, few dispute the need for accurate voter lists. The controversy arises from how these exercises are conducted.

Critics fear that aggressive voter verification drives could unintentionally disenfranchise legitimate voters, especially migrants, urban poor populations, and individuals lacking complete documentation. Supporters argue that failing to update rolls creates opportunities for duplicate registrations, illegal inclusions, and electoral fraud.

The Bengal controversy has effectively transformed SIR into a national political issue. If similar exercises are conducted in Delhi, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and other states, opposition parties are likely to scrutinize every addition and deletion with unprecedented intensity. Could delimitation change the political landscape.

An even larger question looms over Indian politics: delimitation. The forthcoming delimitation exercise, expected after the next Census-based review, could significantly redraw parliamentary and assembly constituencies. Northern states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Haryana, which have experienced higher population growth, could potentially gain representation.

Southern states fear that decades of successful population control may result in reduced relative influence. Combined with SIR exercises, delimitation could reshape political calculations across the country. However, it is important to distinguish between the two processes.

Delimitation changes constituency boundaries and representation. SIR changes voter rolls within existing constituencies. Both are legal and constitutionally sanctioned exercises, but both carry enormous political consequences. Where does the delimitation stand? The reality probably lies somewhere between absolute certainty and sweeping conspiracy.

Mamata Banerjee’s allegations cannot be dismissed outright merely because they are politically inconvenient. Electoral systems in every democracy require constant scrutiny. At the same time, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Allegations that 177 constituencies were rigged, electronic systems hacked, and thousands of external voters illegally enrolled would require substantial documentary, forensic and judicial verification.

As of now, much of the evidence remains in the realm of political accusation rather than proven fact. The Election Commission insists its processes remain intact. The BJP maintains its victory reflects voter choice. The TMC argues the playing field itself was altered.

India’s democracy has always relied on public confidence as much as legal procedures. That confidence can be damaged both by actual manipulation and by persistent allegations that remain unresolved.

The Bengal election may therefore be remembered not only for the BJP’s historic victory or Mamata Banerjee’s dramatic defeat, but also for opening a new front in India’s electoral battles—one centred not on EVMs, but on voter rolls, demographic change, administrative verification, and the growing struggle over who gets counted before a single vote is cast.

As Delhi, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh move toward future elections, these questions are unlikely to disappear. Instead, they may become the defining electoral debate of the next decade. (IPA Service)

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By Nantoo Banerjee

Bangladesh’s involvement of China in the country’s US$ 1.5-billion Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) seems to have posed a significant geopolitical tension for India and its defence concerns. Dhaka made a formal request to China for the project during Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s recent visit to Beijing, reflecting a pivot in Bangladesh’s foreign policy under its new government. And, Beijing obliged quite eagerly as it could be part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Bangladesh. The project under Chinese technical and financial involvement has naturally heightened India’s security concerns in view of its close proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, often called “Chicken’s Neck”, a highly sensitive, narrow strip of land connecting the Indian mainland to its eight northeastern states.

There is nothing surprising about the newly elected Bangladesh government’s sudden decision to involve China in the project as a comprehensive water-sharing agreement on the Teesta has been stalled for over 15 years, largely due to opposition from the state of West Bengal, led by former Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Under the Indian Constitution, water is a state subject. The Centre cannot sign a binding Teesta water sharing agreement without West Bengal’s consent. Mamata Banerjee blocked the deal due to domestic water scarcity, ecological concerns, and political considerations. In September 2011, then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the UPA government drafted an interim treaty proposing a water division during the dry season, giving India 42.5 percent and Bangladesh 37.5 percent. Mamata Banerjee, who was initially scheduled to accompany the Prime Minister to Dhaka, skipped the trip at the last minute and refused to sign the proposed deal.

Unable to secure a pact over the years, Bangladesh shifted focus to a conservation approach, inviting foreign infrastructure bids. The TRCMRP plans to build massive reservoirs, dredge the riverbed, build embankments, and construct satellite cities to mitigate dry-season water shortages and manage monsoon floods. Although New Delhi had already submitted its own technical and conservation proposal for the Teesta basin in a bid to resolve the issue collaboratively, the new Bangladesh government has opted for its own project under Chinese collaboration. New Delhi views China’s prominent involvement in the basin as a strategic security concern near its borders. India has actively offered to fund and handle the conservation project to pre-empt Chinese influence but the new Bangladesh government decided to collaborate with China.

The Teesta issue has unfolded amid broader water diplomacy concerns, including the impending expiration of the 1996 India-Bangladesh Ganges Water Treaty. Bangladesh is pushing for urgent negotiations to establish a new Ganges water-sharing treaty with India, as the current 1996 pact expires in December. Leaders from the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have formally linked the future of Dhaka’s bilateral ties with New Delhi to a fair, climate-resilient water-sharing deal that meets Bangladesh’s current needs. While the 30-year-old treaty established a structured mechanism for sharing dry-season flows at the Farakka Barrage, Bangladesh has frequently raised concerns that the actual water released during lean months often falls short of what was promised. On the contrary, India has maintained the issue of the release of Ganga water is addressed through established bilateral platforms, such as the ongoing joint measurements of water levels and engagement through the Joint Rivers Commission between the two countries.

While demanding renegotiations of the Ganges Water Treaty to govern the equitable sharing of dry-season water flows (January 1 to May 31) from the Ganga River between India and Bangladesh, the latter is believed to have approved a mega-project to construct a barrage on the Ganges water-fed Padma River. Bangladesh maintains this is for internal water management and mitigating dry-season salinity. The Ganga water treaty dictates water sharing at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal based on 10-day cycles. If flows are under 70,000 cusecs, the water is divided equally (50:50). When water flows fall between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh is guaranteed 35,000 cusecs, with India receiving the remainder. For flows exceeding 75,000 cusecs, India retains 75,000 cusecs and Bangladesh receives the rest. If water levels drop below 50,000 cusecs, both governments must hold immediate emergency consultations to adjust the sharing.

Now, Bangladesh’s decision to involve China in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project has deeply alarmed India. New Delhi views Beijing’s growing footprint close to the Siliguri Corridor as a critical strategic and security threat. The “Chicken’s Neck” is a 20-km wide and 60-km long chokepoint. It serves as India’s only overland link connecting mainland India to its eight northeastern states. The northern Bangladesh project site where the river enters the country is situated less than 100 kms from this vital corridor. India strongly fears that a massive Chinese infrastructure presence in the basin —combined with other reported projects such as the Lalmonirhat airbase — could establish a permanent or semi-permanent Chinese diplomatic and logistical foothold right near India’s most sensitive military and territorial chokepoint. India’s alarm is primarily driven by geography.

India must try to address Bangladesh’s river concerns as its three key sources of river water flow down from India through Brahmaputra, Ganga and Teesta. These rivers shrink considerably during the dry season. Every dry season, the water flow comes down. This is particularly more so in the case of Teesta River flowing through the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal before entering Bangladesh, where it is vital for agriculture and livelihoods. Hydro-politics has been a persistent source of tension between India and Bangladesh. The two countries must work together toward finalizing climate-resilient water-sharing agreements. With West Bengal now ruled by Bharatiya Janata Party, the national government should find it easier to address the river issues with Bangladesh. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

Facing the big possibility of China taking control of the new Junta government in Myanmar which took office last month, Indian policy makers are now very keen to give a big push to the India-Myanmar relations covering both economy and security aspects. Myanmar President U Min Aung Hlaing is in India visit from May 30 to June 3 to have extensive discussions with the Indian ministers and officials to take the bilateral relations to a new high.

President Hlaing will be meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi on June 1 after his visit to Bodh Gaya during week end. He will be visiting Mumbai also on June 2 to have talks with the chambers and the interested industry people for seeking investments in Myanmar. President of Myanmar will like to give the impression that he is the elected head of Myanmar after a normal elections and he has full legitimacy to talk as the head of the state.

President Hlaing took oath on April 10 this year. China was the only country sending a high level delegation while India sent a junior minister of the external affairs ministry Kirti Vardhan Singh. India has so far not given official recognition to the new Junta backed party government but Indian officials have been dealing with Myanmar de facto formally taking into account the big stake of India in this neighbouring country. Myanmar President knows the compulsions of Indian foreign policy in view of big Chinese presence in his country. So he will be seeking full recognition from the government of India at his meeting with the PM Narendra Modi. It is not yet clear whether PM Modi will agree to that at the moment, but it is sure, India will seek to woo Myanmar President through other assurances, especially in economic areas.

Myanmar President Hlaing was charged earlier for genocide. In fact, the human right group Myanmar for Justice has already questioned how Indian government can host such a army general who was responsible for the killing of democracy in his country by ousting the democratically elected National Unity Government through February 2021 coup. Significantly, a petition has been pending in Indonesian Court accusing the Myanmar President for genocide.

As of now, no western nation including the USA has recognized the new Myanmar President, they have also not given any credibility to the election results, calling it a junta organized rigged elections.. China, on the other hand, gave credibility to the elections and even praised efforts of the newly elected regime for their efforts in ensuring peace and stability in Myanmar as also the regime’s keen interest in Belt and Road projects of China. The transactionist nature of Chinese diplomacy was apparent from the beginning after the junta coup in February 2021. China was interested in protecting its investments and the work on the China organized Belt and Road Projects. Chinese leadership ignored the civilian killings by the junta in the last five years since the coup.

For India, the dilemma was acute. India has major investments in Myanmar. The country has to protect them. So the government maintained contacts with the Junta administration but did not identify with the regime, while China took all the advantage by identifying with the junta and arranging for all protection of its investments including the expansion of Belt projects. Further, China bargained with army led government by using its control over the rebels dominating the border provinces connected to China. These pro-China rebels even got arms and ammunitions from the Chinese sources.

While China has a long term interest in the political future of Myanmar since it has borders with Myanmar and has huge investments, for Russia, the interest is all defence supplies related. President Vladimir Putin took an active role in supplying arms and ammunitions to the junta led government after the arms supplies from the western sources dwindled following sanctions by the western countries. Russia has been a big beneficiary of the Myanmar civil war as the major supplier of arms, apart from China.

India shares a 1,643-kilometre land border with Myanmar through Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. The instability has affected connectivity initiatives such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway and raised concerns over cross-border insurgency and trafficking. India is the shelter of more than 80,000 Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar. India has been making efforts to see that India is not totally marginalized during the junta regime by China. But despite all efforts, India is now a minor player in Myanmar politics compared to neighbouring China.

In the army manipulated rigged elections,, the results of which were announced on January 29 and 30 this year, the army aligned United Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 232 out of 263 seats in the lower house and 109 of 157 seats in the upper house.

The Suu Kyi led National League of Democracy which was the ruling party before the 2021 coup, was able to organize resistance along with other civil society organisations as also students, but the nature of resistance varied from province to province. In the provinces adjoining China, the rebels were helped by the Chinese army thereby helping the process of their consolidation. In the army organized elections, Su Kyi’s NLD was banned along with other opposition parties. The former Prime Minister is in jail with a bad health condition.

From the beginning of the coup in February 2021, China has been playing a dual role since it needs the support of the junta to protect its projects under China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). China even employed its own forces to protect its projects. The junta in fact allowed free mixing of its army troops with the Chinese security forces even when the junta troops were engaged with the pro-China rebels. That way, China has the double advantage of having friendly generals within the Myanmar army as also big economic control over the projects under Belt and Road Initiatives.

India, as of now, may not emerge as the competitor to China in Myanmar at the same level, but India can promote its interests in a bigger manner if the present regime remains friendly. That way, India is expected to respond to Myanmar President’s request for more Indian participation in Myanmar’s industrial development. There are some core areas where the Indian companies are already participating. Similarly, there are big mineral deposits in Myanmar. India can assist in their development and production. Indian side has its list where India can help Myanmar development to the benefit of both.

Indian policy makers are pinning much hopes on this visit of Myanmar President. Indian companies have high credibility in Myanmar industry. In many respects, their products are far more competitive in quality and prices compared to China. If Myanmar regime wants, Myanmar market can open up to Indian products. That will be an effective manner of boosting the bilateral cooperation. President Hliang’s talks with PM Narendra Modi on Monday will have wider ramifications in boosting bilateral relations. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

The last three months of 2026 have seen considerable inflationary pressure on Indian economy on account of fuel crisis triggered by the Iran war. All sectors of economy are reeling under the pressure. Unemployment is rising, real wages have declined, and living cost is rising fast. Now, there is an additional concern of a deficit monsoon in 2026 after three years. It is a matter of great concern because Indian agriculture depends for 70 per cent of water on monsoon. The monsoon rainfall is also the chief source of groundwater and the waterbodies on the surface.

Currently, neutral El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) conditions are transitioning towards El Nino conditions over the equatorial Pacific region. The latest climate model forecasts, says India Meteorological Department (IMD) under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, indicate that El Nino conditions are likely to develop during the southwest monsoon season.

Based on this, in an updated second long-range forecast on May 29, 2026 for the forthcoming southwest monsoon seasonal rainfall during June-September, the IMD has projected 90 per cent of the Long Period Average (LPA) with a model error of ±4%, indicating that below normal rainfall is most likely over the country as a whole.

On April 13, the IMD had issued the first-stage forecast consisting of quantitative and probabilistic forecasts for the country as a whole, and the spatial distribution of probabilistic forecasts for the tercile categories (above normal, normal, and below normal) of the seasonal rainfall. At that time IMD had projected a normal monsoon to be 92 per cent with a model error of ±5%. IMD had expecting a weak La Nina-like conditions transitioning to neutral ENSO conditions.

However, things changed fast. Quantitatively, for India as a whole, IMD has now predicted lower by 2 per cent and also reduced error level by ±1%. The current prediction of 90 per cent rainfall with probable error of ±4% is a matter of serious concern because normal rainfall in India is in the range of 96-104 per cent of the 50-year average of 87 cm during the monsoon season of four months between June and September.

This means India is staring at drought, as the IMD projection indicates, but does not say in words. Since 2016, that is under Modi Raj, the IMD has officially decided to stop using the term “drought” in its reports and forecasts, and replaced the term with two different terms “deficient” (rainfall deficiency 40% and covering over 40% of the area). Thereafter, the responsibility of declaration of a “draught” is on the state governments, based on agriculture and hydrological factors.

Despite the changes in definition and responsibility of the state, PM Narendra Modi government will have to take the prediction seriously, because it may impact the general life conditions of the people of the country on account of food security, and also the adverse impact on the economy that the deficient rainfall is likely to cause. The government has to take actions quickly from now, since June, the first month of the monsoon, is also projected to be below normal, which will be likely less than 92 per cent.

Earlier, the Southwest monsoon was expected to come by May 26 on the Indian land, but it is still in the sea. IMD now expects that it will come over parts of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal in the next seven days in the first week of June. Monsoon is delayed in India this year, and El Nino conditions, has weakened the monsoon. It should also be noted that India has historically witnessed deficient rainfall during several El Nino years, at times leading to drought conditions in the country.

Nevertheless, for the Northeast India, IMD has predicted normal rainfall in the range of 94-106 per cent of LPA. For Central and South Peninsular India, it predicted less than 94 per cent of LPA, while for Northwest India even below 92 per cent.

The Monsoon Core Zone (MCZ) consisting of most of the rainfed agriculture areas in the country is most likely to receive below normal rainfall less than 94 per cent. Below-normal rainfall is most likely over most part of the country, except some areas over northwest and northeast India, eastern parts of south peninsula and adjoining areas of east-central India and isolated pockets of East India, where normal to above normal rainfall is likely, said IMD.

At present, neutral Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) conditions are observed over the Indian Ocean, IMD said. The latest MMCFS forecast indicates that neutral IOD conditions are likely to continue during the monsoon season.

The IMD forecast is based on the new strategy being used since 2021. For this, a newly developed Multi-Model Ensemble (MME) forecasting system is used. The MME system utilizes simulations from the coupled global climate models (CGCMs) sourced from various global climate prediction and research centres, including IMD’s Monsoon Mission Climate Forecasting System (MMCFS) model.

Given the deficient rain forecast probability is 60 per cent, below normal 24 per cent, normal 14 per cent and above normal 2 per cent, India needs to prepare itself for the worst in the midst of multiple crises the country has fallen into. (IPA Service)

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By Krishna Jha

The entire origin and development of living world has led to the emergence of complicated natural environment of which human beings are part and parcel. Environment and society are inter-related and inter-dependent. Society has come to rely on the natural environment for its existence. Any destruction of environment is sure to pose a threat to the society.

The case of Aravalli is one example of it. It has deep connections with those living around it, and faces a major threat from human kind, though the role it has played in shaping their lives is simply great. The Range has provided for meeting all their basic needs. The stability in their lives, with livelihood, space to live, and also clothes are all the gifts of the same. It is simply immeasurable. So far as the controversies that are raised around it, Supreme Court has sought a review of the existing one. For those who have realized the immense value of the range in their lives, it is beyond physical dimension. There has been hardly any reply, as even the definition provided by the Supreme Court, has been branded as too narrow in scope.

Amidst all these controversies, the question is raised about what Aravallis are. The apex court has sought a new evaluation and a yardstick for defining the Range. It may be added here that the Range stretches over 600 km across four states and, it is 2 billion years old. The Range represents India’s oldest fold mountains.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision to stay its past judgment accepting the controversial 100 metre-elevation definition for Aravali hills has brought the controversy to the fore again. On May 15, the Supreme Court said not an inch of Aravali would be allowed to be used for mining till an expert committee, to be constituted by the apex court, redefined what constitutes Aravali hills and ranges. As lawyers appearing for mining lease holders and those aspiring to get mining leases said the process for renewal and grant of leases could proceed without their finalisation, a bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi said, “We will not pass any order to allow resumption of mining activities in Aravallis.”…“We will not allow an inch of Aravali to be used for any purpose unless we are satisfied with the new definition that will be proposed by the expert committee to be constituted by us, taking into account the names suggested by amicus curiae K Parameshwar, Union government and parties,” CJI said.

People living in Aravallis do not agree with the definition given by the Apex Court in the past. It commands a larger influence area. The controversial definition provided by the Apex Court had previously been stayed in December last year.

Rajasthan, which accounts for a significant part of the Aravallis, is populated with those who feel one with the Range itself, synonymous with the Aravallis. Aravallis are not so much in heights as in depth, that is, in the lives of people for whom the entire area is home. There have been attempts to define the Range, but all such documents have been shelved. In one of the shelved definitions, involving a 100m elevation, cutoff and proximity of 500m between hills for demarcating the ranges, has made people scared as it can be defined as significant portion of the Aravallis that would be stripped of environmental protections. For those living in its folds, the stakes are high and to be implemented without losing time.

If the map shrinks, so do forests, grazing commons, water systems, and also the sacred groves. These sacred groves are forest patches protected by local communities due to deep religious, cultural or spiritual significance. These sacred groves are also hot spots for biodiversity, serve as sanctuaries for rare flora and fauna and often dedicated in the name of deities worshipped by locals.

In fact in our country there are an estimated number of 100,000 to 150,000 such groves. These areas are preserves for rare endangered plants and animal species, holding rich biodiversity. Slowly they are threatened by emerging checks that stand between community life and mining, fragmentation and forced migration. For those living in the Range, shelter and sustenance come from these mountains. It is not a modern phenomenon, the mountains have been providing for people since centuries. They have a bond with Aravallis, almost their identity.

The mountains shaped the warfare also. In the past, the Aravallis enabled guerrilla tactics and underground movement based on local knowledge of forests, mountain passes and water sources. If the hills protect, they also sustain. The Aravallis are Rajasthan’s ecological spine. It regulates climate, arrests desertification, feed rivers like the Banas, Luni and Sabarmati, and helps forests survive in a largely arid landscape. It is also a cultural watershed, separating not just river systems flowing towards the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, but also shaping traditions, languages and ways of life.

Among the communities that have made a home here like Bhil, Meena, Garasia, Saharia, Raika, Rewari, Mogia, Nath, and Gurjar, for them the mountains are not a resource, but a living presence. Temples, sacred groves, hilltop shrines, and forest deities dot the landscape and the mountains are treated as a sacred geography. Communities collect food, fuelwood, medicinal herbs, bamboo, tendu leaves and wild fruits from the forest. Rain-fed terraced farming supports hardy crops such as millets and pulses, while hill slopes provide grazing areas for cattle, sheep, goats and camels.

Forest produce are the lifeline for those living in the Aravallis, with their livestock and water. Traditional water systems are central to survival. ‘Johads ’, stepwells, nadis and baoris, are built and maintained collectively. The rainwater is harvested and groundwater is recharged. The water structures are their lifeline. They are protected not by law but by community ethics. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

Supreme Court of India on May 27, 2026 upheld the legality of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the electoral roll in Bihar and elsewhere and emphasized that this exercise is constitutionally connected to “free and fair polls”. The judgment strongly underlined the purity and accuracy of rolls giving priority to preventing bogus voters entering into the voter lists (deletion), but at the same time did not give equal weightage to, rather pushed into the rear, the task of protecting every eligible citizen’s right to vote (inclusion). This is where significant concerns lie, despite the judgement.

Before going into details of the judgement, it would be worth recalling the respective position of the ruling BJP and the political parties in opposition. The Ruling BJP and the Election Commission of India (ECI) have always emphasized on cleaning the electoral rolls after deletion of ineligible voters including Bangladeshi infiltrators, while the opposition has always grudged this and emphasized on protecting every eligible voter’s right to vote.

We have seen all through the SIR process the struggle between the two priorities – deletion of voters and the protection of citizens’ right to vote. At no point of time the so called “pure” voter list prepared by the ECI was complete even though election to the Legislative Assembly of West Bengal is over and results are out. The Tribunals are hearing the cases of excluded voters who could not exercise their right to vote, many of their names were cleared only after election was over, that benefited the BJP. The current judgement therefore suffers from giving less priority to “protection of the citizen’s right to vote” than deletion of voters for so called “purity” of electoral roll. One can therefore easily differ as to what constituted “purity” of the voter list that is prerequisite for “free and fair” polls.

Critics of the judgement argue that the Supreme Court failed to substantively examine the way SIR was implemented itself undermined free and fair elections. The court chiefly examined whether the ECI had statutory and constitution powers und Article 324 and the Representation of the People Act. The court gave less attention to whether the SIR exercise could disproportionately disenfranchise poor, migrant, minority, or document-deficient voters? The court justified the ECI’s requirement of documents, but on Aadhaar, it said that it can be accepted as an “additional indicative document” in future, which cannot itself determine citizenship status.

It should be noted that the bench itself had earlier acknowledged a possible “margin of error” in mass verification process. Yet in the latest judgement it seemed treating the mechanism as institutionally reliable without fully addressing whether large-scale verification can realistically avoid arbitrary deletions.

The bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi has pronounced the judgment after hearing a bunch of petitions that have challenged the notification issued by the ECI in June 2025 to conduct SIR in Bihar. The bench said, “When the statute itself authorises a special revision at any time, for reasons to be recorded and in such manner as the Election Commission may deem fit, the impugned exercise cannot be invalidated merely because it does not conform in every respect to the ordinary modalities contemplated for routine revision. In our considered opinion, the impugned SIR does not supplant the Representation of the People Act and the Rules. Rather, it breathes life into the constitutional mandate under Article 324 within the precise statutory contours provided by Section 21(3). Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commission has acted in excess of its statutory powers.”

The bench emphasized on the claimed objective of the SIR and said that it bore nexus with the constitutional goal of ensuring free and fair elections. It also noted that elections did not rest merely on the mechanics of polling but fundamentally depended on the integrity, accuracy, and credibility of the electoral rolls, which formed the foundation of the democratic process.

Every word of the bench seems to be important, but has different meanings for different people. What constitute “integrity, accuracy, and credibility of electoral rolls”? Answer to this question is not clear when we go through the judgement, since this is precisely the opposition’s allegation that “integrity, accuracy, and credibility of the electoral rolls” have been compromised because the PM Narendra Modi led government and the ECI have conspired to get SIR done in particular manner. Therefore the “foundation of the democratic process” that is preparation of pure and credible voter list with integrity and accuracy remains questionable in the light of the decisions of the Tribunals in West Bengal which has been finding thousands of eligible citizens who were excluded from electoral roll violating their right to vote.

CJI Kant has observed, “Calling upon electors to furnish supporting material in the course of such an exercise does not amount to negation of the presumption. Rather, it reflects the procedural mechanism through which the Commission seeks to reaffirm or, where necessary, correct existing entries. The presumption continues to operate, but it does not negate the possibility of verification.”

Moreover, the court said that ECI has power to go into questions of citizenship for the purpose of including in the electoral roll, but the negative determination of the ECI does not result in a conclusive finding that the person is not an Indian citizen. CJI pronounced, “The consequence of such a citizenship determination is correspondingly limited. It affects the individual’s entitlement to be included in the electoral rolls and thereby the right to participate in the electoral process. It does not, however, operate to divest the individual of claims to citizenship, nor does it foreclose adjudication of that question by the competent authority under the Citizenship Act.”

Where the country will be moving from SIR? There is an indication in the judgement itself. It says, in cases where commission is not satisfied that a person fulfils the statutory conditions for inclusion in the electoral rolls, it would be incumbent upon the Commission to refer such an individual to the competent authority of the Union Government for adjudication in accordance with law.

This confirms the opposition fear that “SIR was a backdoor NRC” which India will see soon, as we have already seen the case of Assam where D-voters (doubtful voters) were referred to authorities for ascertaining their citizenship. More so because the court has asked the ECI to forward the Central Government the names of persons deleted from the 2003 electoral rolls over doubtful citizenship within four weeks. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

With the U.S. President Donald Trump himself downgrading the status of the four nation Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), why is Indian government spending so much of its precious time on QUAD meetings? It is sheer wastage of time for the Prime Minister Narendra Modi as also Foreign Minister Dr. S Jaishankar. US state secretary Marco Rubio came to India on a four day visit beginning May 23. He left on May 26 after the QUAD foreign ministers meeting. Before that on Saturday, itself Rubio met PM Modi. He got what he wanted, but What was the gain of India?

The only important outcome of QUAD meeting on Tuesday was the signing of India-US critical minerals framework. The US which is desperately looking for supremacy in the domain of critical minerals after being cornered by China, is seeking such agreements with the concerned countries. Such agreements will be signed by QUAD also with other likeminded countries. India has good deposits of critical minerals. India will be in a better position if the officials can do a hard bargain with USA about the development of the critical minerals and its use. India can make use of this as a bargain for getting new technology.

QUAD consists of big brother USA, India, Japan and Australia. Indian foreign minister Dr. S Jaishankar hosted the meeting on May 26 and as usual the Indo-Pacific security was discussed. The QUAD nations agreed on Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Initiative and on a Common Operating Picture in the maritime domain. This is intended against China, though China’s name has not been mentioned.

Now in the context of Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14 and 15, this Indo-Pacific security issue also is not a big issue for Trump. In the Beijing summit, Indo-Pacific region security did not get any priority from Trump. This was mentioned in general, but no special emphasis was there from the US President’s side. Trump was more interested in major economic issues as also big political issues like Iran war and Taiwan. Japanese Prime Minister wanted Trump to take up the issue in a big way but Trump just ignored Japanese advice.

That way, even this surveillance mechanism will be used by USA only, India can not expect any real help from USA if any such eventuality in maritime waters against China arises. India has to depend more on the country’s own experts to acquire maximum info on maritime situation.

The moot question is in the changed geo political situation and the bilateral relationship between China and USA, the earlier equations are not working. India will have to reassess the situation in Indo-Pacific from its own perspective and deal with the USA in the region on the basis of strategic autonomy.

President Trump revived QUAD grouping during his first term in 2017 but in the second term, till now, no QUAD summit has been held. Trump indicated that QUAD summit would be held in New Delhi in 2025 but it was not held. Now in 2026, foreign ministers meeting was held on Tuesday, but there is no indication of the holding of any summit. What is the point of carrying on QUAD when the head of the group himself refuses to hold summit.

In 2026, PM Narendra Modi’s diplomatic calendar is full. India is hosting BRICS summit on September 14 and 15 this year. Before that on June 15-17, the G7 meeting will be held in France. President Emanuel Macron has invited Indian PM to attend that. Thereafter, SCO summit is at Kyrgyzstan on August 31 and September 1. Indian PM has been invited there also. Similarly apart from G7 in Paris, Trump himself is hosting G-20 summit at Florida on December 14 and 15 this year. PM Modi is also expected to be there at Florida though officially, it is too early for India to confirm the visit.

Since the QUAD FM’s meeting was over on May 26 and the summit may not take place, India should focus all its energy on the success of the BRICS summit on September 14 and 15 this year. BRICS has eleven members now including Iran and some other Gulf countries. PM Modi has to work hard to restore his status which he has lost in the recent period by identifying fully with the US position. India has given up on its strategic autonomy vis a vis USA. It is time to restore that and present India as a strong nation defending the interests of global south. India should give up this QUAD mirage and solely concentrate on the success of the coming BRICS summit. (IPA Service)

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By Nantoo Banerjee

India’s economy is navigating severe stress. The impact of Persian Gulf war, high cost of imported crude oil, frequent upward adjustment of retail oil prices, rising commodity rates, soaring transportation costs, weakening Rupee and continuous exit of foreign portfolio investors (FPI) are posing a big challenge to the economy. The government appears to be somewhat clueless about how to tackle the situation effectively. It has deployed both monetary and fiscal interventions. The measures don’t seem to be working as effectively as the situation demands. The falling Rupee is further raising the cost of imports. The US-Iran conflict has disrupted shipping through the Persian Gulf. India relies on the region for over 90 percent of its LPG and 60 percent of its natural gas imports, and the government and Reserve Bank of India (RBI) have been forced to implement supply-side distributions and emergency measures.

The current macroeconomic environment is being strained by several compounding factors. The Rupee’s continuous slump – already close to 97 per USD and inching towards 100 — has made energy imports significantly costlier. Foreign investors have pulled out over $26 billion from Indian equities, driven by global risk aversion tied to the geopolitical crisis. FPIs continued an aggressive sell-off in the Indian stock market in April and May, this year, pulling out a combined net total of over Rs.87,000 crore ($10+ billion) from equities. This prolonged retreat was driven by global economic uncertainty, rising crude oil prices, and the relative attractiveness of higher yields in developed markets. In April, FPIs pulled out Rs.60,847 crore from Indian equities, making it the seventh consecutive month of net selling.

The selling pressure continues to persist, with foreign investors withdrawing over Rs.27,000 crore in the first half of the current month. A stronger US dollar and elevated US bond yields prompted investors to shift toward safer, defensive assets. Geopolitical tensions weighed heavily on risk appetite toward emerging markets like India. Expensive market valuations and fluctuating crude oil prices are causing anxiety among foreign institutional players. The BFSI (Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance) sector absorbed the brunt of the April-May selling, with FPIs divesting over Rs.30,900 crore in this segment alone. Other major sectors hit by FPI exit included consumer discretionary, healthcare, energy, and auto.

The prices are soaring up. Higher wholesale fuel prices have raised the cost of production and transportation, leading to accelerated wholesale and retail inflation. The country’s Wholesale Price Index (WPI) stands at 8.3 percent, a 42-month high. It was 3.88 percent in the previous month. Going by the sector specific inflation rate, fuel and power accounted for the highest increase (24.71 percent), followed by manufactured products (4.62 percent) and primary food and non-food articles (2.31 percent). The food basket climbed to a 12-month high led by eggs, meat, and fish. The retail price inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which normally takes two to three months’ time to reflect the WPI rate, provisionally stood at 3.48 percent for the month of April.

Prices of consumer goods, especially food items, have sharply increased in the current month. The retail food inflation rate in April was 4.20 percent. Historical and economic patterns demonstrate that producer costs eventually pass through to consumers. A key reason behind the short-term divergence between the WPI and CPI is that while WPI is heavily weighted towards manufactured goods, fuel, and industrial inputs, the CPI is substantially weighted towards retail food, housing, and various services such as healthcare, education, and transport. Because of these distinct baskets, retail inflation might appear subdued if food supply chains are operating differently or if service prices remain sticky.

The government and central bank interventions have their own limitations to control the price surge. Some of the countries have gone for subsidising oil prices to control inflation due to the oil shock. Such measures could, at best, work as temporary intervention to insulate retail buyers from wholesale shocks. For example, if global crude oil prices spike, oil marketing companies or governments might absorb the hit to keep retail fuel and LPG pump rates flat. However, these policies can only suppress retail inflation temporarily until the budgetary costs become unmanageable. In a country such as India, which is nearly 90 percent import dependent on oil, price subsidies beyond a point could substantially push up the budget deficit. A large federal budget deficit is bound to impact inflation primarily by increasing aggregate demand, as government spending injects money directly into the economy. When this demand outpaces the economy’s ability to produce goods and services, it creates upward pressure on prices.

The primary economic strains currently facing India include surging imported inflation. With Brent crude crossing the $100-a-barrel threshold, the government has been forced to raise retail petrol and diesel prices. This heavily inflates production, agricultural, and logistics costs, triggering economy-wide price hikes for consumers. Wholesale inflation has spiked significantly, while retail inflation is inching up, squeezing household budgets. The RBI notes that every $10 increase in crude oil adds significantly to the CAD. Capital outflows and a ballooning import bill have made Indian Rupee one of the worst-performing Asian currencies, further amplifying the cost of all imported goods.

Trade and supply chains are facing bottlenecks with marine insurers have abandoned war risk coverage in the West Asia-Gulf region, delaying cargo movement and pushing up freight charges. At the same time, energy-intensive industries, manufacturing, and agricultural exports to the region are experiencing major setbacks due to higher operational and shipping costs. The region also accounts for a major chunk of India’s overseas remittances. A prolonged conflict directly threatens the livelihoods of millions of Indian workers in the Gulf region, putting downward pressure on vital remittance inflows.

Although the government is taking various measures to manage the crisis and protect the country’s forex reserves, they don’t seem to be working hard enough. Import duties on gold and silver have been raised to 15 percent (effectively 18.4 percent with GST) from six percent. Precious metals have long been accounting for the second largest segment of import after oil. The latest measure is ostensibly to curb forex outflows on non-essentials. Ironically, the government had earlier defended large gold imports to contain smuggling.

Meanwhile, the RBI continues to assess the inflation trajectory, carefully balancing the need to anchor inflation expectations without causing a drastic stall to India’s overall GDP growth. Spurred by the crude crisis, the government is fast-tracking the country’s transition away from fossil fuels with new ambitious plans. With crude oil imports draining a staggering Rs 10.9 lakh crore from the exchequer in FY26, the government is shifting its alternative fuel strategies into overdrive.

The combination of rising commodity prices, foreign capital flight and falling exchange value of Rupee means the Indian economy faces short-term headwinds. The government and RBI are struggling to tackle the situation. The authorities may be trying to avoid strong anti-inflationary measures, rationing of oil consumption and mandatory cut in foreign exchange spending on account of tour and travel, foreign education and investments abroad as they consider the current crisis is of temporary nature. As of now, the government and RBI seem to be in favour of limited interventions that will balance supporting domestic growth while curbing inflationary pressures. (IPA Service)

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K Raveendran

Cockroach Janta Party may have begun as satire, but its
popularity has exposed something far more serious than a passing joke on the
internet. The response it has drawn from government functionaries suggests that
the ruling establishment is less disturbed by the humour itself than by the
possibility that the satire has found a willing audience. That audience is not
laughing merely because the idea is absurd. It is laughing because the
absurdity feels familiar.

The Modi government’s apparent discomfort with the satirical
rise of Cockroach Janta Party reflects a recurring feature of contemporary
politics: the blurring of the line between criticism of the ruling party and
hostility to the nation. When those in power treat dissent, parody or ridicule
as an anti-national act, they reveal a deeper insecurity about their own
legitimacy. A confident government can withstand mockery. A nervous one looks
for enemies in memes, jokes and fictional parties.

The impulse to clamp down on satire rather than understand
its appeal is politically short-sighted. Satire succeeds when it distils public
frustration into a form that is easy to share, easy to recognise and difficult
to suppress. It does not create discontent out of nothing. It gives discontent
a language. Cockroach Janta Party has clearly touched a nerve because it
appears to represent a mood that many citizens, especially younger people,
already feel but may not have articulated through formal politics.

That mood is shaped by everyday anxieties: employment,
income insecurity, rising living costs, uneven public services, social
pressure, housing stress and the perception that political debate has become
disconnected from ordinary hardship. For many young Indians, governance is not
an abstract contest between ideology and nationalism. It is judged through
exams that do not lead to jobs, degrees that do not guarantee mobility, cities
that are costly to survive in, and public rhetoric that often feels triumphant
while private lives remain precarious.

This is where the government risks misreading the moment.
The popularity of a satirical formation is not necessarily evidence of
organised subversion. It is evidence of accumulated irritation. People do not
rally around a cockroach symbol because they expect it to govern. They do so
because it captures resilience, mockery and disgust in equal measure. The
cockroach survives everything. As a political metaphor, it suggests that
citizens feel they too are being forced to survive systems that are indifferent
to them.

The state’s instinctive suspicion of satire also points to a
larger problem in democratic culture. Political authority cannot demand
reverence as a condition of citizenship. In a democracy, leaders and parties
must be open to ridicule, scrutiny and rejection. When criticism is labelled
anti-national, the nation itself is reduced to the image of the ruling party.
That is a dangerous narrowing of public life. The country is larger than any
government, and democratic loyalty cannot be measured by obedience to those
currently in office.

The attempt to “kill the messenger” may also intensify the
very sentiment the government seeks to contain. Social media thrives on
overreaction. A satire page that might have remained a niche joke can become a
symbol of resistance when power appears frightened by it. Attempts at
suppression often confer importance, creating the impression that the joke has
exposed something the authorities wanted hidden. In such conditions, censorship
becomes free publicity.

The deeper lesson is that social media can no longer be
treated as a playground detached from political reality. It is now one of the
primary arenas where public mood forms, spreads and hardens. The new generation
does not wait for party manifestos or television debates to express
disappointment. It uses satire, remix culture, memes, parody accounts and viral
slogans. These forms may look unserious to officials trained in older models of
political communication, but they often carry sharp social intelligence.

Governments that dismiss online humour as frivolous miss its
diagnostic value. A meme can reveal anger before a protest does. A parody can
show distrust before an election does. A satirical movement can indicate that
official narratives are failing to persuade. Cockroach Janta Party, in that
sense, should be read less as a threat and more as a warning signal. It tells
the establishment that there is a constituency willing to mock power because it
no longer feels heard by power. Human chains have already been formed around
the theme. The authorities have denied permission for one in Bengaluru. But
massive human chains have already manifested on the social media.

The government’s challenge is not to prove that satire is
dangerous. It is to ask why satire is persuasive. Why does a fictional
cockroach party appear more relatable to some citizens than formal political
messaging? Why does ridicule travel faster than reassurance? Why do young
people find comic rebellion more authentic than official promises? These
questions are uncomfortable, but they are more useful than accusations of
anti-national intent.

The popularity of Cockroach Janta Party also shows that
political imagination is shifting. Traditional opposition politics has often
struggled to convert discontent into a clear national alternative. Satire,
however, does not need a programme to be effective. Its power lies in
puncturing the aura of inevitability around the ruling establishment. It tells
people that power can be laughed at, and once power becomes laughable, it
becomes less intimidating.

This does not mean satire is a substitute for politics.
Humour can expose contradictions, but it cannot build institutions, create jobs
or administer welfare. Yet satire can prepare the ground for political
questioning. It can lower the psychological cost of dissent. It can help people
recognise that their private frustrations are shared. That is precisely why
governments often fear it. The joke is not the danger; the community formed
around the joke is.

A wiser response from the government would be to engage with
the underlying grievances. Employment must be addressed not only through
headline claims but through credible opportunities for young people entering
the labour force. Living conditions must be discussed honestly, especially in
urban and semi-urban India, where aspiration and insecurity often collide.
Public communication must move beyond triumphalism and acknowledge the
pressures felt by families whose daily experience does not match official optimism.

The ruling establishment has built much of its political
strength on message discipline, centralised communication and the projection of
national purpose. That strategy has worked effectively for years. But the rise
of satire-driven dissent suggests that message control has limits. Citizens may
repeat official slogans in public while laughing at them in private. Once that
private laughter becomes collective and visible, it signals a change in the
emotional climate.

Cockroach Janta Party’s popularity is therefore not merely a
comic episode. It is a political symptom. It reflects the fatigue of a
generation that is online, impatient, exposed to global comparisons and
unwilling to accept that loyalty requires silence. The government can treat
this as sedition by another name, or it can treat it as feedback from a society
that is asking to be taken seriously. The choice will determine whether the
joke fades away or becomes a sharper symbol of democratic frustration.

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By K Raveendran

Cockroach Janta Party may have begun as satire, but its popularity has exposed something far more serious than a passing joke on the internet. The response it has drawn from government functionaries suggests that the ruling establishment is less disturbed by the humour itself than by the possibility that the satire has found a willing audience. That audience is not laughing merely because the idea is absurd. It is laughing because the absurdity feels familiar.

The Modi government’s apparent discomfort with the satirical rise of Cockroach Janta Party reflects a recurring feature of contemporary politics: the blurring of the line between criticism of the ruling party and hostility to the nation. When those in power treat dissent, parody or ridicule as an anti-national act, they reveal a deeper insecurity about their own legitimacy. A confident government can withstand mockery. A nervous one looks for enemies in memes, jokes and fictional parties.

The impulse to clamp down on satire rather than understand its appeal is politically short-sighted. Satire succeeds when it distils public frustration into a form that is easy to share, easy to recognise and difficult to suppress. It does not create discontent out of nothing. It gives discontent a language. Cockroach Janta Party has clearly touched a nerve because it appears to represent a mood that many citizens, especially younger people, already feel but may not have articulated through formal politics.

That mood is shaped by everyday anxieties: employment, income insecurity, rising living costs, uneven public services, social pressure, housing stress and the perception that political debate has become disconnected from ordinary hardship. For many young Indians, governance is not an abstract contest between ideology and nationalism. It is judged through exams that do not lead to jobs, degrees that do not guarantee mobility, cities that are costly to survive in, and public rhetoric that often feels triumphant while private lives remain precarious.

This is where the government risks misreading the moment. The popularity of a satirical formation is not necessarily evidence of organised subversion. It is evidence of accumulated irritation. People do not rally around a cockroach symbol because they expect it to govern. They do so because it captures resilience, mockery and disgust in equal measure. The cockroach survives everything. As a political metaphor, it suggests that citizens feel they too are being forced to survive systems that are indifferent to them.

The state’s instinctive suspicion of satire also points to a larger problem in democratic culture. Political authority cannot demand reverence as a condition of citizenship. In a democracy, leaders and parties must be open to ridicule, scrutiny and rejection. When criticism is labelled anti-national, the nation itself is reduced to the image of the ruling party. That is a dangerous narrowing of public life. The country is larger than any government, and democratic loyalty cannot be measured by obedience to those currently in office.

The attempt to “kill the messenger” may also intensify the very sentiment the government seeks to contain. Social media thrives on overreaction. A satire page that might have remained a niche joke can become a symbol of resistance when power appears frightened by it. Attempts at suppression often confer importance, creating the impression that the joke has exposed something the authorities wanted hidden. In such conditions, censorship becomes free publicity.

The deeper lesson is that social media can no longer be treated as a playground detached from political reality. It is now one of the primary arenas where public mood forms, spreads and hardens. The new generation does not wait for party manifestos or television debates to express disappointment. It uses satire, remix culture, memes, parody accounts and viral slogans. These forms may look unserious to officials trained in older models of political communication, but they often carry sharp social intelligence.

Governments that dismiss online humour as frivolous miss its diagnostic value. A meme can reveal anger before a protest does. A parody can show distrust before an election does. A satirical movement can indicate that official narratives are failing to persuade. Cockroach Janta Party, in that sense, should be read less as a threat and more as a warning signal. It tells the establishment that there is a constituency willing to mock power because it no longer feels heard by power. Human chains have already been formed around the theme. The authorities have denied permission for one in Bengaluru. But massive human chains have already manifested on the social media.

The government’s challenge is not to prove that satire is dangerous. It is to ask why satire is persuasive. Why does a fictional cockroach party appear more relatable to some citizens than formal political messaging? Why does ridicule travel faster than reassurance? Why do young people find comic rebellion more authentic than official promises? These questions are uncomfortable, but they are more useful than accusations of anti-national intent.

The popularity of Cockroach Janta Party also shows that political imagination is shifting. Traditional opposition politics has often struggled to convert discontent into a clear national alternative. Satire, however, does not need a programme to be effective. Its power lies in puncturing the aura of inevitability around the ruling establishment. It tells people that power can be laughed at, and once power becomes laughable, it becomes less intimidating.

This does not mean satire is a substitute for politics. Humour can expose contradictions, but it cannot build institutions, create jobs or administer welfare. Yet satire can prepare the ground for political questioning. It can lower the psychological cost of dissent. It can help people recognise that their private frustrations are shared. That is precisely why governments often fear it. The joke is not the danger; the community formed around the joke is.

A wiser response from the government would be to engage with the underlying grievances. Employment must be addressed not only through headline claims but through credible opportunities for young people entering the labour force. Living conditions must be discussed honestly, especially in urban and semi-urban India, where aspiration and insecurity often collide. Public communication must move beyond triumphalism and acknowledge the pressures felt by families whose daily experience does not match official optimism.

The ruling establishment has built much of its political strength on message discipline, centralised communication and the projection of national purpose. That strategy has worked effectively for years. But the rise of satire-driven dissent suggests that message control has limits. Citizens may repeat official slogans in public while laughing at them in private. Once that private laughter becomes collective and visible, it signals a change in the emotional climate.

Cockroach Janta Party’s popularity is therefore not merely a comic episode. It is a political symptom. It reflects the fatigue of a generation that is online, impatient, exposed to global comparisons and unwilling to accept that loyalty requires silence. The government can treat this as sedition by another name, or it can treat it as feedback from a society that is asking to be taken seriously. The choice will determine whether the joke fades away or becomes a sharper symbol of democratic frustration. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

Annoyed by the voice of the voiceless cockroaches on Social Media platform X, the Union Government of India led by PM Narendra Modi got their account banned in the country. Thanks to the Chief Justice of India Surya Kant’s one of the comments on May 15, 2026, that had triggered the voice, that was ultimately suppressed by the government that goes on trumpeting the world that India is the mother of democracy.

Why should anyone have a voice in democracy – other than the Mann Ki Baat of PM Narendra Modi? His master’s voice is alright but your own voice? Voice of the Cockroaches were heard first on X on May 16 with creation of Cockroach Janata Party (CJP), and within 4 days, the account got banned in India after it got more than 200,000 following. It was withheld in response to the legal demand from Modi government. The original handle @CJP_2029 was taken down.

Nevertheless, there is no ban on the social media that are openly claiming that they will kill all kinds of cockroaches. The founder of the CJP Abhijeet Dipke is being trolled by a number of netizens and their language indicates that they are from the BJP-RSS family. Someone asked even caste of the founder cockroach, and he revealed that he is a Dalit from Maharashtra – A Dalit Cockroach. Hackers are very active to hack the CJP’s website cockoachjanataparty.org their social media accounts.

Cockroaches, scientifically one of the toughest creatures of the world, and it may survive even nuclear warfare, scientists say. You may just imagine the annoyance of the Modi led BJP government, when it came to know that cockroaches got over 14.5 million followers on another social media platform on Instagram surpassing BJP’s only 8.8 million followers count. The pride of the BJP was hurt by the rise of the Cockroaches. Moreover, cockroach is back with a different handle on X @cockroachisback.

Banning the voice of the cockroaches on X is a serious matter since it throttles the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Only a few days ago, the Norwegian journalist Helle Lyng, who works for the Oslo-based newspaper Dagsavisen, reported that her Instagram and Facebook accounts were suspended following her attempts to question India Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Norway on May 18-19, 2026. Lyng said a very small price to pay. She had asked, “Prime Minister Modi, why don’t you take some questions from the free-est press in the World?” It is worth noting that Norway is at the top in ranking in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index and India’s at very low at 157th. One can see, it is not without reason.

Modi government and his party are worried because of the potential fallout of the cockroach movement in the country, as Samajwadi Party (SP) Supremo Akhilesh Yadav has said in his three word post on X – “BJP banam CJP” that is “BJP versus CJP”. Uttar Pradesh is going to poll within 18 months in 2027, where SP is the chief challenger of BJP. SP does politics on “PDA” (Pichhda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak). Now it has been revealed that a Dalit cockroach has founded the CJP, while he has identified himself with unemployed cockroaches.

The trigger for the CJP is the CJI Surya Kant’s comment during hearing of a case on May 15, “There are youngsters like cockroaches, who don’t get any employment or have any place in profession. Some of them become media, some of them become social media, RTI activists and other activists and they start attacking everyone.” Later he clarified that he meant “who have entered professions … with the aid of fake and bogus degrees.” Clarification has even complicated the matter since people are asking if the Constitution of India had denied access to justice even to the people with “fake and bogus degrees”, or the people who have no degree at all? People are seeing as an attempt to denial of access to justice “cockroaches” whatever it means according to Chief Justice of India.

CJI’s clarification has become totally ineffective on the ground level, since it has come at a time when papers are repeatedly leaked under Nation Testing Agency (NTA) dominated by Education Mafia, and Union Minister of Education presiding over the ministry, audaciously saying that he did not implement the recommendation of the Parliamentary Panel to reform NTA for leak proof examinations because there were opposition leaders in it. Supreme Court had also ordered reform in 2024 after a paper leak, but paper for NEET-UG 2006 examination held on May 3 were leaked again. Under PM Modi, the NTA was launched with Rs25 crore in 2018, and by 2022-23 it was earning Rs 3,513 crore. Several students have committed suicides.

CJI’s term cockroach immediately caught imagination of the “cockroaches” whose voice is not heard by anyone, especially the government, which goes on doing whatever it likes to. We have examples, in which justices even of the Supreme Court of India were rewarded by the BJP government for direct or indirect favour in facilitating the government to do whatever they wanted to. Judgments were delayed, and in the meantime, government got their works done, though later courts found the government’s mechanism unconstitutional. Judiciary was seen increasingly aligning with the Modi government as the Election Commission of India. We have also examples of Modi government appointing Election Commissioners of their choice, won elections, and officers of the Election Commissions were rewarded with posts for their loyalty.

Whatever is happening in India, gives a feeling to the common man that they are treated just like cockroaches, they have no or little access to justice due to numerous factors, and now they are losing even right to freedom of speech and expression under PM Narendra Modi rule. Where should they go if not to judiciary and not to Election Commission, when the government refuses them even the basic rights? They had a chance to voice their concerns on the social media and on the internet, but under new law their voices are stifled by takedown orders. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

The joint declaration made by Chinese President Xi Jinping and the visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin after their summit in Beijing on May 20 has major ramifications on the global geopolitics in the context of the present unilateral actions of the U.S. President Donald Trump including the launching of war against Iran which still is m not over.

The main thrust is the decision of Russia and China to set up a joint front against the USA blaming the Trump regime for global return to the law of the jungle. Significantly, this declaration was made by China and Russia after five days of the Xi-Trump summit held in Beijing on May 15. Though there was no joint declaration, both sides expressed happiness at the continuing improvement in the bilateral relations between China and the USA. Though the breakthrough took place only in business and economic discussions, there were much discussions on Iran war and Taiwan also. However, officially, Chinese side gave no details about the outcome.

In May 20 summit, however, President Xi came out more openly on Iran war and said that in Iran, further conflict was inadvisable and a ceasefire was necessary. President Xi said that a comprehensive ceasefire is of utmost urgency, resuming hostilities is even more inadvisable and maintaining negotiations is particularly important. What was more significant that in the joint statement, China and Russia took aim at Trump’s plans for a US$ 175 billion Golden Dome defence system which would create a new missile field in the middle east. Both the leaders also criticized the expiry of the last US-Russia arms control treaty fell to the wayside in February 2026 when the U.S. President did not respond to Moscow’s proposal for extension.

The joint declaration of Russia and China is going to have its impact on the present peace making efforts on Iran war. Trump discussed the issue with President Xi on May 15 but it was not fruitful. On May 20, President Xi made his position on Iran war more clearer by saying that negotiations and not war have to be the instrument for ending Iran war. So whatever claims, Trump is now making that he is ready for fiercer attack against Iran if Tehran does not agree immediately to a deal, his options are not working.

Trump also knows that he has to agree to a solution on the basis of three draft proposals, Trump’s own peace plan, Tehran’s peace plan and China’s four point formula. Both Trump and Tehran have to agree to a compromise solution to end the war. The joint declaration of China and Russia is a strong reminder to Trump that he has to resort to negotiations only for ending the Iran war.

Among the chief topics of discussion was the energy sector, which Putin called the “driving force of economic cooperation” in Russian-Chinese relations. China asserted itself as a major buyer of Russian oil and trading partner after Western countries largely cut economic ties with Moscow in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

According to Al Zajeera correspondent in Beijing, while the two leaders planned to sign some 40 agreements covering everything from the economy and tourism to education, energy security remained Putin’s priority. “Since the war in Ukraine, any gas sales that were previously heading to Europe, that is all dried up, and Russia is in desperate need of revenue to replace that,” she said. The talks did not lead to a new consensus on a long-discussed gas pipeline known as Power of Siberia

However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian media that the two sides had reached a “basic understanding” on the pipeline, including its route, but that there was no “clear timeline” for a rollout. All indications suggest that despite keen Russian interest in this gas pipeline, Putin failed to persuade President Xi to agree the implementation of the project on a priority basis. Russia needs it now as its West European customers have dried up, but China has its own considerations, therefore is the delay and no finalization of the much expected deal.

China analysts have observed that President Xi treated President Trump as equal and gave him gala reception as the head of the country with largest economic power. China had lot of expectations from Trump from the summit. But in Putin’s case, Russia is a lesser power now compared to Soviet days and also Putin is under economic stress. He needs President Xi more than China needs Russia. That way, President Xi also while giving Putin all the due respect and the fanfare of the celebrations, made it clear that China is the big brother. Putin is reconciled to it as that is the ground reality.

Xi, for his part, said Beijing and Moscow had deepened “political mutual trust and strategic cooperation” in a world that is “increasingly chaotic” and where “hegemony is overwhelming”. The comments made it clear that “Beijing and Moscow share a depth of established trust that simply does not exist between China and the US”. . But at the same time, President Xi is ambitious and he is looking for taking China forward to emerge as the supreme economic power by 2049, the centenary year of the Communist China. His vision is primarily directed that way, the other issues and partners are secondary. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

This is the season of high level summits. On May 14 and 15, U.S President Donald Trump visited Beijing and had ‘ fantastic’ talks, according to the U.S. President, Chinese media also went overboard explaining the great possibilities of China-US cooperation in political and economic spheres and also how important this was in the present state of global situation. Russian President Vladimir Putin was on a visit on May 20 to China and had very fruitful talks in strengthening the relations between the two big powers.

It is fine. All three big powers are working hard to improve their respective bilateral relations, nothing wrong in it. The moves for a friendly relationship between the three big powers are always welcome in the present unsettled world. But amidst all these, the Americans are pursuing with vengeance the implementation of their programme of bringing regime change in the Latin American region through their Trump doctrine. Right now, the focus is on Cuba after the US success in Venezuela.

It is ironic that the same day Trump was in Beijing talking with the Chinese President Xi Jinping on international issues including the war in Iran and the issue of Taiwan, in Havana, the CIA director John Ratcliffe was talking to the Cuba’s senior army officials about the need for bringing about fundamental changes in the communist nation including the changes in army leadership, closure of Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies and the adoption of economic reforms as desired by the USA.

CIA director’s sudden visit without formal clearance from the top Cuban leadership was a follow up of the Trump’s programme to convert Cuba into a most investor friendly nation with the setting up of more entertainment zones as also industries financed by the big US corporates. All these moves for regime change are taking place in an economic environment when the US blockade and sanctions have exhausted the common citizens. The fuel crisis has reached its nadir. The power cuts are taking place for long hours and essential commodities are lacking.

Cuban President has called for all support from the country’s citizens, but the situation is very grim if the economic blockade continues. Cuba needs big support from China, Russia and its other well wishers in the Latin American region. Mexico, Brazil and even Venezuela have been helping, but there is a limit for them. The non official organisations are also doing their best, but the needs are so big that only the lift of the US blockade can bring back normalcy in the battered Cuban economy.

And there the question of Chinese assistance comes. President Xi Jinping could have taken up the Cuban blockade issue boldly with President Trump in his summit discussions, but there was no indication in what Trump said latter or Chinese media reports mentioned that there was any concrete discussions between Trump and Xi on Cuban blockade issue. The present Cuban crisis is due to the US blockade and only Trump can withdraw that. Both Xi and Putin can press Trump on that, but they have not done so. President Xi bears more responsibility here as Cuba is still a communist nation and China also calls itself a communist Party led nation. It was the moral responsibility of President Xi to take up the issue seriously with Trump, but he failed as the leader of the strongest communist nation to do his duty.

The London based The Guardian rightly wrote while the world watched the pomp of Donald Trump’s trip to Beijing, the US was turning up the pressure thousands of miles away. Its oil blockade has plunged Cuba into a humanitarian crisis, sparking nationwide blackouts that have prompted rare protests, closing schools and universities and leaving hospitals battling to treat patients. Surveillance flights are circling. US media reported this weekend that federal prosecutors are preparing an indictment for Raúl Castro, the 94-year-old former president and brother of Fidel. Mr Trump has casually observed, while bragging about the kidnapping of Venezuela’s then leader Nicolás Maduro in January, that “Cuba is next”.

The US policy now is not to engage in any direct war in any country of Latin America. CIA and the US companies will do the job of finding out collaborators within the pink or Left regimes still governing a few nations. Mexico and Brazil are big countries with popular leaders. So Trump is not focusing attention on these big nations. The focus is on small nations, especially those who are having severe economic problems leading to resentment among the citizens. In the recent Presidential elections, Trump administrations backed the far right parties and got good dividends. For Cuba, the task is to divide the leadership and to look out for yesmen so that through them, the regime change programme can be implemented.

In Cuba, President is trying his best to control the situation but he has his limits also. The economic situation has gone out of control and it will worsen further as the US sanctions and economic blockade continue. Only a major political intervention by a powerful country like China can persuade Trump to reduce the intensity of blockade to the relief of the common Cuban citizens. So far China is not in a mood to do that. That is the tragedy. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

Despite several orders and recommendations of the Supreme Court and the Parliamentary Standing Committee, the Union Government did not structurally reform the National Testing Agency (NTA), and also did not take appropriate actions that helped the education mafia of the country to strengthen its grip over the agency. In the name of taking “tamper-proof exams” for much needed “education reform”, NTA is earning hundreds of crore from students, while by continued paper leaks education mafia is earning huge money. What surprises even more is the India’s Education Minister’s contemptuous statement on his not implementing parliamentary panel’s recommendations on the ground that there were opposition members in the committee. What is then behind it – an arrogance of his government, some people’s financial interests, or something else?

The decision to launched NTA was taken by the Union Cabinet meeting held under PM Modi’s chairmanship and was established in November 2027 with a very good business model, with one-time grant of Rs 25 crore at inception. Thereafter it operates without government funding. It sets question papers and heavily relies on outsourcing, because it does not have enough staff or its own permanent, nationwide infrastructure for conducting exams. Here lies the root cause of repeated paper leaks.

Nevertheless, between 2018-19 and 2023-24 it collected Rs3512.98 crore in exam or application fees. Parliamentary panel has said that it had a surplus of Rs448.21 crore that it could have used to plug the security gaps. Such a huge earning was because it collects huge fees. In the case of NEET-UG 2026, that was cancelled on May 12 due to paper leak, the fees collected were Rs1,700 from General, Rs1,600 from OBC-NCL/EWS, and Rs1,000 for SC/ST/PwD/ and Third Gender candidates. The total fee was about 355 crore.

The parliamentary panel on education, it its December 2025 report, recommended that NTA deploy the corpus to build in-house testing capacity or strengthen vendor monitoring. Earlier in March, the same panel has asked the NTA to produce annual report, but it had not produced any. It was therefore, the panel has reiterated again that it must produce its annual report and submit to the parliament.

The Supreme Court of India in its judgement in July 2024, on the NEET UG 2024 paper leak case, had said that NTA “must now avoid the flip flops which it has made in this case.” The court had recorded serious concern and directed for structural reforms. The court had expanded the mandate of the seven-member expert committee constituted by the Union Government under former ISRO Chairman K Radhakrishnan and directed it to recommend reforms on examination security, transportation of papers, CCTV surveillance, candidate verification, encryption protocols, technological safeguards, real-time monitoring, grievance redressal, and international best practices. The government has even filed compliance report in the Supreme Court in December 2024. However, the paper leak in NEET-UG 2026, shows even wider leak network under the education mafia.

Leader of the Opposition Rahul Gandhi has demanded from the Prime Minister of India that the Union Minister of Education Dharmendra Pradhan be sacked. The Congress chief whip in the Rajya Sabha Jairam Ramesh has moved a privilege notice against Dharmendra Pradhan and said that he had “deliberately lowered the stature and prestige of the institution of the standing committee.”

On May 15, Minister of Education Dharmendra Pradhan had said in reply to a question by a reporter during his press conference as to why the government did not implement parliamentary panel’s recommendation, “I will not comment on Parliamentary Standing Committee red flags. I will speak about the High-Level Committee of Experts (HLCE)/Radhakrishnan Committee. The Parliament Standing Committee has members from the Opposition. They write things in a certain manner; you also know that. Hence, I won’t speak on the standing committee.”

Congress leader Ramesh has said, “He has made these outrageous remarks while presiding over the rot in the Education Ministry that is destroying the future of lakhs of youth across the country.” In his privilege notice, Jairam Ramesh said these “derogatory” comments reveal the Minister’s “contempt for Parliament”. He said that Pradhan’s comments also “seek to malign parliamentarians, parliamentary committees and the Parliament of India. … The Minister’s comments are also tantamount to imputing dishonourable motives to members of parliamentary committees themselves.”

It is still a mystery, as to why Union Minister of Education, behaves in a way that goes against the critics of the NTA’s failures and repeated paper leaks, while NTA’s reforms have been delayed under his leadership, despite the orders of the Supreme Court of India and the Parliamentary Standing Committee’s recommendations?

Dharmendra Pradhan as Union Ministry of Education is politically and administratively responsible for repeated paper leaks under NTA functioning under his ministry. In India’s parliamentary system, ministries are accountable for the functioning of agencies under them. Repeated paper leaks raise questions about ministerial oversight. Moreover, recurring paper leaks indicate systemic governance failures. It should be noted that in case of NEET-UG 2024 paper leak he himself had admitted that as an “institutional failure” and had announced reforms. However, that proved to be a political statement only, and paper leak continued even in May 2026.

Petitions have been also been filed in the Supreme Court of India demanding even dismantling of the NTA, or replace it by another dependable institution, or fundamentally restructure it. Petitioners have also demanded accountability.

In the meantime, on May 18, the parliamentary panel has summoned the NTA chief to appear before it on May 21, to review their recommendation of reforms, that Union Minister of Education had refused to implement. The agenda includes a review of the implementation of the K Radhakrishnan Committee report on NTA reforms and an update on the investigation into the alleged NEET-UG paper leak case. (IPA Service)

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By Nantoo Banerjee

India’s continuous hesitancy to curb the retail oil consumption pattern despite a worldwide surge in fuel prices is inexplicable, if not unacceptable. The government, the biggest benefactor of large domestic fuel use by way of imposition of levies close to 50 percent of the retail oil prices, is not prepared to ration fuel consumption despite the fact that the country is nearly 90 percent crude oil import dependent. Last Friday, India’s state-run fuel retailers raised petrol and diesel prices for the first time in four years by a little over three rupees per litre to recoup some of the losses incurred by oil marketing companies due to higher global crude oil prices. The country is one of the last major economies to raise retail fuel prices following the disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz by the war started by US-Israeli attacks on Iran. Most of the countries have already raised domestic oil prices. Others have adjusted local fuel subsidies to control the retail cost.

Following the Iran-US conflict, nations worldwide—particularly in South Asia and Southeast Asia— have been forced to constrain and ration domestic oil consumption due to severe supply disruptions and skyrocketing prices. The government of tiny Sri Lanka has implemented strict fuel rationing via the National Fuel Pass QR system, limiting the amount of petrol per vehicle, and declared Wednesdays as public holidays to cut down on commuting. To dial back on fuel usage, Pakistan has instituted a four-day work week, closed schools for two weeks, and mandated a 50 percent reduction in fuel allowances for government vehicles. Indonesia has implemented strict limitations on subsidized fuel sales and mandated a work-from-home policy for civil servants to counter soaring energy prices. Egypt has cut fuel allocations for all government vehicles by 30 percent. It has also slowed down large-scale public projects that consume high amounts of fuel and diesel. The Vietnam government mandated a forced, accelerated switch to ethanol-blended gasoline to lower domestic reliance on pure fossil fuels.

The countries witnessing very high retail oil price increases include Myanmar (101 percent), Cambodia (68 percent), the Philippines (54.2 percent), Vietnam (over 50 percent), and Pakistan (42 percent). Comparatively moderate petrol price increases are seen in the United States where petrol pump prices rose by around 36 percent as against Australia (29 percent), Canada (28 percent), and the UK (20 percent). Diesel drivers bore the brunt of the European energy squeeze, with average cumulative pump prices increasing by 20 percent region-wide.

While Spain recorded the largest diesel price increase within the EU at 27 percent, fuel costs in Germany increased by nearly 19 percent. In China, price hikes were capped at around 28 percent by government controls and refinery adjustments. In India, where oil prices are already very high due to central and state levies, retailers made modest increases in prices of petrol and diesel at around 3.2 percent to 3.4 percent. Saudi Arabia kept retail prices steady without any increase due to direct state subsidy structures.

While most of the major oil importing countries have enforced restrictions on petroleum oil consumption for the general public, India, the world’s third largest importer of crude oil after China and the US, maintains no mandatory rationing or government-enforced restrictions on petroleum oil consumption for somewhat unknown reasons. India holds only around 4.6 to 4.9 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves. As a result, India imports over 85 percent of its crude oil needs and maintains strategic petroleum reserves for emergency supply protections. Oil imports by China and the US are basically intended to protect their massive internal oil reserves.

The US holds approximately 83 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves. China’s reserves are estimated at over 28 billion barrels. This ranks China 13th globally and accounts for about 1.6 percent of the world’s total proven oil reserves. China and the US are the primary drivers of global crude oil demand, though their import needs are shaped by different economic and domestic production factors. China, the world’s second-largest economy and a primary manufacturing hub, requires immense energy supplies to sustain industrial output and growing domestic consumption. The country regularly imports upward of 11 million barrels per day. India meets around 85 percent of its oil demand through imports to keep pace with its rapid urbanization, industrial growth, and vast transportation networks.

While several Asian countries with or without domestic petroleum reserves and production have various restrictions to curtail oil consumption, the government of India merely promotes voluntary fuel conservation and enforces specific legal storage limits for individuals. The government is weighing austerity and energy-saving measures to curb oil consumption by the citizens through public appeals. Driven by escalating geopolitical conflicts in West Asia and surging global prices, these voluntary and official cutbacks aim to protect foreign exchange reserves and minimize the national trade deficit.

Government ministries and departments have been instructed to identify immediate avenues to restrict unnecessary fuel consumption and minimize foreign travel for officials. The government is urging citizens to revive work-from-home (WFH) models, participate in carpooling, increase their reliance on public transit, and conduct more virtual meetings. It has issued advisories for state governments to implement temporary extensions on industrial boiler certificates in power plants to optimize energy efficiency and operations.

Interestingly, the Reserve Bank of India is actively championing the need to curb oil consumption. Faced with a “crude oil shock” from the West Asia conflict and the rupee touching record lows (past Rs.95 per dollar), the central bank has stepped in to manage foreign exchange reserves and combat imported inflation. The RBI is tackling this challenge through both macroeconomic interventions and direct appeals to the public. To reduce the immediate drain on forex reserves, the RBI has instructed state-owned oil refiners to curb spot dollar purchases and instead utilize special credit lines for their import needs. The RBI Monetary Policy Committee has maintained a “lower for longer” stance but stands ready to raise interest rates if energy shocks lead to entrenched inflation.

To preserve the country’s current foreign exchange reserves, the central bank and the government are pushing for reduced reliance on fossil fuels through work-from-home mandates, higher use of public transport, and accelerated electric vehicle (EV) adoption. Beyond immediate crisis management, the central bank continues to support a long-term transition away from fossil fuels. Through the RBI’s Green Deposit Framework, banks channel capital directly into renewable energy and green transportation to enhance India’s structural energy security. It seems the country prefers indirect actions and creation of strong public awareness of the need for cutting fuel consumption to imposing higher taxes on petrol and diesel or rationing to cut fuel consumption. (IPA Service)

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By Nitya Chakraborty

Now that the U.S. President Donald Trump is back to Washington DC. After his two day summit talks in Beijing on May 14 and 15, it is appropriate to decode the gains of the summit. There were four major issues– Taiwan, Iran war, trade deals and facilitating more business for the American high tech companies focusing on AI. What then was the final outcome of the Beijing summit on these issues?

To start with, it should be mentioned that both world leaders met in the Chinese capital under differing circumstances. While President Trump was under tremendous pressure to show results to his domestic MAGA base, President Xi Jinping had no such compulsions. He took a long term view and was not in any hurry to clinch any deal under pressure. At the same time, he also acted to ensure that the global politics remains more favourable for China’s advancement to become a more powerful economy and that can be possible only with the cooperation from the U.S. President.

If an analysis is made of the official Chinese media, it is seen that the Chinese side sees the Beijing summit as the new positioning of U.S.-China relations representing a recalibration of each side’s goals and modes of interaction under new circumstances. Global Times, the official English daily of the Chinese Communist Party went gaga in its editorial on May 16 saying the proposal to build a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability underscores China’s consistent commitment to head of state diplomacy and its active efforts to develop a China-US relationship that is strategic, constructive and stable so that positive interaction between the two countries can bring greater stability to the unsettled world.

These are all high sounding words of policy nature without specifically mentioning what China agreed to offer to Trump or what was China’s actual gains. But through the tone and terming the Summit outcome as historic, the Chinese side is more emphasizing on the long term possibilities of a better bilateral relationship. President Trump is facing mid term polls in America in November this year. Less than six months are left. He has to show to the electorate that he is a winner. XI is leading a one party government. He has no need for such showmanship.

As against the Chinese position mostly based on long term prospects, the US side reaction was mostly from Trump through his interviews in his plane on the way to Washington. As usual, the comments were in superlatives in his usual style like fantastic. Trump also said that he and XI had settled some of the issues which no other US leader could have done. He also mentioned to Fox News he massive business deals that had been done in the interest of the American business.

The US side has agreed to define the building of a “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability” as the new positioning of bilateral ties. US President Donald Trump said that China-US relations will get “better than ever before.” Responding to media questions on Thursday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that bilateral relations are important and constructive, adding that world stability is in everyone’s interest.

Now as regards the major issues which were under discussion, Iran war was the most important as Trump was looking for some Chinese help to persuade the rigid Iranian leadership to agree to the peace terms offered by Trump. Taking into account Chinese media silence on this issue and Trump saying that China was equally interested in the end of Iran war and Iran not going nuclear, the hard truth was that China reiterated its four point peace plan and there was not big progress in their talks on Iran. But Trump got assurance that China would make all efforts to see that Iran dilutes its nuclear programme

Now after his return, stories are coming out in US media that Trump is going for major action against Iran if Iran does not agree to peace formula, are all sponsored. Trump is not in a position to start a full scale war against Iran again. He is still depending on China to help him in baling out of the Iran mess which he himself created. President Putin also is in touch with President Xi and they are both working on a compromise solution to ensure that both the US and Iran can project themselves as winners to their respective citizens.

After Iran, Taiwan is the big issue and it was most important for President Xi jinping who specifically mentioned this as the core issue for improving China-US relations. At the end of summit, the position remains at the same level with Trump giving no firm answer to Xi’s demand for suspending weapons sale to Taiwan, but at the same time, the signal was there unofficially that the US government decision on arms sale taken earlier will not take immediate effect. Taiwan was relieved because they had apprehensions that Trump would be persuaded by resurgent Xi to take open position on suspending military sales to Taiwan. This itself is good enough for the island nation at the moment.

As regards trade deals, most of the work was done earlier. After the recent Supreme Court judgment on tariffs, the problems are also not very serious. The meeting between the US CEOs and President Xi and Chinese ministers led to some good results for the US companies. As a reciprocal measure, Trump assured of lifting sanctions against the Chinese companies purchasing Iranian oil. China also agreed to buy double digit billions worth of farm goods over the next three years. Further Trump was happy that China agreed to buy 200 Boeing jet planes, the figure finally going up to 750, according to the US sources. For Trump, this was a personal success because he was canvassing for Boeings to the Chinese market for a long time. Further Trump family’s company has big interests in the business of Boeings.

On AI and rare earth minerals, both sides kept mum. It seems that the discussions are still on and the Chinese side took a tougher position in view of its recent successes in setting up AI based industries with much less investment. In rare earth supply to USA, the Busan truce will continue till October this year. So there is still time for both the countries to arrive at an amicable settlement. In all Trump’s businessmen are happy. For the present, that is the only relief for President Donald Trump. (IPA Service)

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By Dr. Gyan Pathak

The opposition has always been claiming that the Election Commission of India (ECI) is being controlled by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi and ECI has been working to ensure that BJP wins elections in the country. They alleged that ECI is compromised while the Modi government asserted that the constitutional body is independent. Now the Supreme Court of India has asked “Why this show-off about independence?” The question makes us rethink if elections are free and fair in the Modi Era in light of the decisions and observations made by the Supreme Court in the last several years?

The Supreme Court of India is currently hearing the challenges to the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 which was past just before the Lok Sabha Election of 2024. The Bench observed that free and fair elections depend on a truly independent ECI.

During the hearing the Bench pointed out the absence of even “one absolutely neutral person” on the selection committee chaired by Prime Minister. The presence of a Cabinet Minister in the committee was also questioned by the Bench observing that such a minister could not be expected to defy the Prime Minister, and asked whether the presence of the Leader of Opposition on the committee was merely “ornamental”. Since appointments could be done effectively by the Executive by 2:1 majority, “Why this show-off of independence in appointment of election commissioner?”

The Bench observed if the Chief Justice of India (CJI) could be part of the appointment process for the director of the CBI, then here was no reason why an independent process could not be followed for the appointment of the CEC and ECs, which is more important as it directly concerned “upholding democracy and free and fair elections”. It emphasized that ECI “should not only be neutral but it should look neutral in its functioning.”

It should be noted that earlier CJI used to be part of the selection committee but the Modi government removed CJI from the appointment committee. Under the current structure, the government can appoint “person of its choice”. Hence the appointment of the current CEC and other ECs do not appear credible to the public.

The observation of the Bench has political significance because it has indicated serious judicial concern regarding executive influence over the ECI, appearance of bias, and whether institutional safeguards for free and fail elections are being weakened. The courts reasoning connects directory to electoral neutrality, public confidence, and constitutional democracy. An Election Commission dependent on the executive for its appointment risks losing institutional credibility especially when ruling party itself contests elections under supervision of ECI.

The recent West Bengal election has shown direct relationship between the election and appointments. The Special Observer for SIR and the Chief Electoral Officer were allegedly remained loyal to the BJP and helped the party to win, and when BJP won, they were appointed advisor and Chief Secretary of the new BJP government. The ECI appointed by the BJP under the new law of 2023, had appointed both the observer and the CEO.

Rahul Gandhi had publicly shown how electoral rolls were manipulated by adding voters from other states to influence the electoral outcome of the state in favour of the BJP in Karnataka and in Haryana as examples. Such additions of voters were done under the presumption of legality. After the expose, the ECI supported by BJP started SIR in Bihar, and this time to delete large number of voters in the name of cleanup of electoral roll. Supreme Court intervened to get lakhs of voters included, but many left out of the voter list and could not vote. This helped the BJP to win election in Bihar and more recently in West Bengal. In case of West Bengal, the Supreme Court has asked the aggrieved TMC to file separate case. The Supreme Court is also hearing the cases under the SIR, but no final decision has come out yet.

BJP thus goes on winning elections, and the Supreme Court is still hearing the case. It is a social political concern that goes beyond the scope and ambit of the Supreme court, because it is not likely to decide on the status of the elected government, even though excluded voters finally get their names included in the voter list.

We can say this on the basis of precedents in which Supreme Court of India found electoral bond scheme of the Modi government unconstitutional, but did nothing on the status of the elections which were fought by the money unconstitutionally collected by the scheme. The electoral bond scheme was introduced by the Modi government in 2018, and every election thereafter was fought by this illegal money collected under presumption of legality.

Supreme Court, in fact, in several judgements and observations during the Modi Era, has expressed concerns about practices that it said could undermine the constitutional principle of free and fair elections. In the 2024 electoral bond scheme judgement the court held that anonymous political funding violated citizen’s Right to Information under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, unlimited corporate funding distorted electoral democracy, and the scheme violated the principle of free and fair elections.

The Apex Court had also said that allowing unlimited donations, including through shell companies, created the possibility of quid pro quo arrangements between corporations and ruling parties. It also said that the scheme enabled “unrestrained influence” of corporations over politics and elections.

The possibility of free and fair elections had actually erased if we take into consideration that how the electoral contests has become structurally unequal and Modi government has denied level playing electoral field, and ECI doing nothing. There has been allegations of even Modi government’s misusing central investigating agencies against opposition political parties and their leaders before and during elections with the soul purpose of disrupting their political campaigns. There has been unequal access to media and money. The government is also alleged of misusing government-media and administration.

It is under this backdrop India must try to restore people’s confidence on neutrality of the ECI in conducting free and fair elections in the country. We can’t ignore the assertions of the critics, opposition parties, former elections commissioners, constitutional scholars, common people that ECI appeared increasingly aligned with the Modi government. The latest observation by the Supreme Court indicates that independence of the ECI has been compromised. (IPA Service)

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