BJP-SAD alliance shaky as BJP claims big brother role

By TN Ashok
The much-awaited political reunion between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal appears to have hit the rocks even before the two former allies could formally sit down to negotiate a seat-sharing formula for the 2027 Punjab Assembly election.
The problem is not ideology. Nor is it the bitter history of their 2020 split over the farm laws. It is arithmetic — and, more importantly, who gets to be the senior partner.
The SAD has been signalling that it wants the old alliance revived, but on terms that recognise its long-standing political presence in Punjab. The BJP, however, no longer sees itself as the junior partner that once contested only 23 of Punjab’s 117 Assembly constituencies while the Akalis fought 94. BJP leaders now insist that the party has expanded its organisation and wants the “big brother” position.
That demand has made an alliance considerably more difficult. BJP national general secretary (organisation) B L Santosh, during his two-day organisational tour of Punjab, delivered the clearest signal yet. Addressing party workers in Patiala on August 24, he declared that the BJP would contest all 117 Assembly seats and form the next government in the state. “Punjab is fully ready for change, and the BJP is fully prepared to make this change a reality,” Santosh said.
It was a statement of confidence, but also a political challenge to the Akalis. For a party that won only two Assembly seats in 2022 and drew a blank in the 2024 Lok Sabha election in Punjab, the ambition to sweep all 117 constituencies may sound more like electoral bravado than a realistic forecast. Yet the BJP’s calculation is that Punjab’s political map has changed dramatically since its old alliance with the SAD.
The BJP does not want to return to being the “younger brother”.
For decades, the BJP’s Punjab strategy depended heavily on the SAD’s rural Sikh and Jat Sikh vote base. The BJP concentrated largely on urban constituencies and Hindu voters, while the Akalis supplied the broader rural network.
That arrangement collapsed when the SAD walked out of the NDA in 2020 following the farm-law controversy. Both parties subsequently discovered that separation had costs. In the 2022 Assembly election, AAP swept to power with 92 of the 117 seats and 42 per cent of the vote. Congress was reduced to 18 seats, SAD to three and BJP to just two.
The results were devastating for the traditional political establishment. But they also gave the BJP an argument: it could no longer be treated simply as the Akalis’ electoral appendage. Since the split, the BJP has attempted to build its own organisation in Punjab, attracting leaders and cadres from other parties and expanding beyond its traditional urban pockets.
Punjab BJP president Kewal Singh Dhillon has said the party now has teams in about 90 per cent of the state and multiple ticket aspirants in constituencies across Punjab. That organisational expansion is the foundation for the BJP’s new bargaining position. The trouble is that organisation is not the same thing as votes. Punjab remains one of the most difficult states in which for the BJP to build a majority on its own.
The 2024 Lok Sabha election provided a revealing snapshot. Congress won seven of the state’s 13 parliamentary seats, AAP three, SAD one and two went to Independents. The BJP won none. Yet the BJP’s vote share was substantial at 18.56 per cent, demonstrating that it has a sizable constituency even without winning seats.
The BJP can therefore argue that its vote is geographically dispersed and that a stronger organisation could convert votes into Assembly seats. But that is a long shot from winning a majority.
The present political picture is more complicated than the simple four-party ranking often offered by political observers. There is no authoritative “Gallup poll” establishing AAP, Congress, SAD and BJP as a definitive 1-2-3-4 hierarchy in Punjab at this stage. Available political reporting instead describes a highly fluid and unpredictable contest, with AAP seeking another term, Congress banking on anti-incumbency, SAD struggling to regain its old base and BJP still a marginal force despite its organisational expansion.
That distinction matters. AAP may have disappointed sections of Punjab’s electorate and may be vulnerable to anti-incumbency after five years in office. But disappointment with a ruling party does not automatically translate into votes for the BJP.
Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann’s AAP government faces criticism over the familiar problems of Punjab — unemployment, drugs, fiscal stress, agriculture, law and order and the difficulty of delivering the sweeping promises made when the party stormed to power in 2022.
Yet AAP has not collapsed. Its 92-seat majority gives it an enormous cushion. Even a substantial erosion of its support could leave it as the largest party or deny it a majority without necessarily transferring those seats to the BJP.
Congress is the more obvious beneficiary of anti-incumbency in many constituencies because it already possesses a substantial statewide organisation and a long political history in Punjab. The BJP’s calculation is therefore more complicated: it must simultaneously persuade voters that it is capable of replacing AAP while preventing Congress from becoming the principal beneficiary of anti-incumbency. This is where the SAD becomes important.
The SAD may be electorally weakened, but it is not politically irrelevant. Its 2022 performance — three Assembly seats — represented an historic low. Yet the party polled nearly 18.4 per cent of the vote, demonstrating that its organisational network and residual support were far larger than its seat tally suggested.
That is precisely why the Akalis believe they deserve a meaningful share of seats. SAD leaders have openly suggested that the BJP-SAD reunion is the “need of the hour”. Bikram Singh Majithia has said people want the two parties to come together, while Harsimrat Kaur Badal has also hinted at reconciliation.
But the BJP’s answer is effectively: not on the old terms. Under the previous arrangement, the BJP was the junior partner. Now it wants to be a senior partner — with a larger number of constituencies and potentially a claim to lead the government if the alliance wins.
For the SAD, accepting that formula could amount to surrendering the very political identity it is trying to revive. For the BJP, conceding the majority share to the SAD would mean acknowledging that its organisational expansion has not yet translated into political dominance. Neither side wants to blink first.
Who gains if they remain divided? The irony is that the breakdown of the alliance could hurt both parties. A four-cornered contest gives AAP, Congress, SAD and BJP separate vote pools. In Punjab’s first-past-the-post system, this can produce dramatic differences between vote share and seats.
The 2024 Lok Sabha election demonstrated the danger. The BJP and SAD separately secured sizable vote shares but converted them into just one seat for the Akalis and none for the BJP. An alliance might have altered the arithmetic in some constituencies, although it would be impossible to assume that their votes would automatically have transferred to one another.
For AAP, meanwhile, a divided opposition is potentially valuable. For Congress, the calculation is similar but more complicated. A fragmented anti-AAP vote could help the ruling party retain constituencies even if its own vote share falls.
The BJP therefore faces a paradox. Going solo gives it freedom to build its own identity and contest constituencies where it believes it can win. But an alliance could give it access to the Akali network and prevent the opposition vote from fragmenting.
SAD can hurt both BJP and AAP. The Akalis’ greatest strength may therefore lie not in winning power but in denying power to others. Even a modest revival could make the SAD a spoiler in dozens of closely fought constituencies. It can draw Sikh and rural voters who might otherwise move towards AAP or Congress. At the same time, its presence could prevent the BJP from consolidating an anti-AAP vote in constituencies where the BJP hopes to emerge as the principal challenger.
That makes SAD a nuisance for both sides. Yet the party itself faces the larger question of whether it can recover from the political damage suffered after the farm-law controversy, the erosion of its traditional support and years of organisational decline.
The BJP’s calculation is that it can wait. Its leaders believe time is on their side and that the party can use the next several months to strengthen its booth machinery, recruit leaders and expand its rural footprint. The BJP has already made clear that it is preparing across all 117 constituencies.
The Akalis, by contrast, need the alliance more urgently.
The election is still months away; Santosh’s declaration may therefore be less a final obituary for the BJP-SAD relationship than an opening bid in a high-stakes negotiation. Politics in Punjab has a long history of improbable reversals. The BJP itself has not completely shut every door in previous months, with reports indicating that the possibility of an alliance had earlier remained open even as the party prepared to contest independently.
But the latest message is unmistakable: the old formula is dead. The BJP wants to enter the 2027 election as a principal political force, not as the Akalis’ junior partner. Santosh’s 117-seat declaration is designed to demonstrate that confidence.
Whether Punjab’s voters share that confidence is another matter. AAP can lose seats without losing power. Congress can gain without winning the government. SAD can revive without returning to office. And the BJP can increase its vote share substantially without becoming the largest party.
That is what makes Punjab’s 2027 election so unpredictable. The BJP may dream of all 117. The more immediate question is whether it can win enough seats to become the big brother it now insists it is — or whether, by refusing to share the family inheritance with the Akalis, it ends up helping AAP retain the house. (IPA Service)