BANGALORE: Indigenous military projects such as missiles have shown consistently shorter development cycles over the years thanks to deft planning and handling of the projects, the former DRDO Director-General V.K. Saraswat said on Thursday.
Citing the bouquet of missiles that came out of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme through 2008, Dr. Saraswat said the later Agni III and V missiles had taken three to five years to develop compared to the earlier ones such as Prithvi that needed around a decade.
The former top military scientist was addressing members of the defence and aerospace industry at a conference organised by the SAE India and Project Management Institute.
A number of military and civil aerospace business opportunities worth several thousand crores of rupees were unfolding in the country and the local industry was also rising to these challenges, he said.
Dr. Saraswat had steered the missiles plan as the DRDO’s then chief controller R&D of missiles and strategic systems.
The former ISRO director B.N. Suresh, leader of Engineering and Technology from Boeing India Bala K. Bharadvaj, and Raj Kalady of the institute spoke on the role of project management and the new opportunities coming up in the aerospace and defence area in the country.
(Source: Hindu July 25, 2014)
WHY RAFALE IS A BIG MISTAKE
Why would India buy the Rafale combat aircraft rejected by every other interested country—Brazil, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Singapore, and even the cash-rich but not particularly discriminating Saudi Arabia and Morocco?
The French foreign minister Laurent Fabius’s one-point agenda when he visited New Delhi was to seal the deal for Rafale, a warplane apparently fitting IAF’s idea of a Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) in the service’s unique typology, which includes “light” and “heavy” fighter planes as well, used by no other air force in the world. Alas, the first whiff of corruption led the previous defence minister, A K Antony, to seize up and shut shop, stranding the deal at the price negotiation committee stage. It is this stoppage Fabius sought to unclog.
France’s desperation is understandable. Absent the India deal, the Rafale production line will close down, the future of its aerospace sector will dim, and the entire edifice of French industrial R&D sector based on small and medium-sized firms—a version of the enormously successful German “Mittelstand” model—engaged in producing cutting-edge technologies could unravel, and grease France’s slide to second-rate technology power-status.
More immediately, it will lead to a marked increase in the unit cost of the aircraft—reportedly of as much as $5-$10 million dollars to the French Air Force, compelling it to limit the number it inducts. With no international customers and France itself unable to afford the pricey Rafale, the French military aviation industry will be at a crossroads. So, for Paris a lot is at stake and in India the French have found an easy mark, a country willing to pay excessively for an aircraft the IAF can well do without.
Consider the monies at stake. Let’s take the example of Brazil, our BRICS partner. For 36 Rafales the acquisition cost, according to Brazilian media, was $8.2 billion plus an additional $4 billion for short-period maintenance contracts, amounting to nearly $340 million per aircraft in this package and roughly $209 million as the price tag for a single Rafale without maintenance support. Brazil insisted on transfer of technology (ToT) and was told it had to pay a whole lot extra for it, as also for the weapons for its Rafales. But the Brazilian air force had doubts about the quality of the AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar enabling the aircraft to switch quickly from air-to-air to air-to-ground mode in flight, and about the helmet-mounted heads-up-display. Too high a price and too many problems convinced the government of president Dilma Rousseff that the Rafale was not worth the trouble or the money and junked the deal, opting for the Swedish Gripen NG instead.
During the Congress party’s rule the Indian government did not blink at the prospective bill for the Rafale, which more than doubled from $10 billion in 2009 to some $22 billion today, and which figure realistically will exceed $30 billion, or $238 million per aircraft, at a minimum. But India, unbeknownst to most of us, is apparently a terribly rich country, with money to burn! Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, an apparently poorer state or at least one more careful with its money, is blanching at the $190 million price tag for each of the 60 Lockheed F-35Bs (vertical take-off, technologically more complex, variant of the air force model)—a full generation ahead of the Rafale—ordered for the first of the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class 65,000-tonne aircraft carriers.
The prohibitive cost of the French aircraft supposedly made finance-cum-defence minister Arun Jaitley apprehensive. He did the right thing, as is rumoured, of revising the order downwards from 126 aircraft to 80 or so Rafales. The IAF headquarters pre-emptively acquiesced in the decision to save the deal. However, if this change was affected in the hope of proportionately reducing the cost, it will be belied. Because in contracts involving high-value combat aircraft, the size of the order does not much affect the unit price, the cost of spares and service support, and of ToT! This is evident from the rough estimates of the per aircraft cost to Brazil of $209 million for 36 Rafales compared with the $238 million for 126 of the same aircraft to India!
Because New Delhi has been inclined to make India a military “great power” on the basis of imported armaments—a policy that’s a boon to supplier states as it generates employment and new technologies in these countries, and sustains their defence industries, a confident French official told me with respect to another deal that “India will pay the price”. Considering the various negatives of the proposed deal and the long-term national interest Jaitley would do well to nix the Rafale transaction altogether.
The bureaucratic interest of the IAF prompts it to exaggerate wrong threats and talk of declining fighter assets. But it will not tell the defence minister about the logistics hell routinely faced by frontline squadrons in operations owing to the mindboggling diversity of combat aircraft in its inventory, a problem only the Rafale acquisition will exacerbate and, hence, about the urgent need to rationalise the force structure, ideally to Su-30s, the indigenous Tejas Mk-1 for short-range air defence, Tejas Mk-II as MMRCA, and the Su-50 PAK FA as fifth-generation fighter. Nor will the department of defence production officials disclose to Jaitley that the ToT provisions in arms contracts are a fraudulent farce because, while the foreign suppliers pocket billions of dollars, no core technologies, such as source codes (millions of lines of software) and flight control laws, are ever transferred. And that the local defence industry monopolised by defence public sector units (DPSUs) is incapable of absorbing and innovating even such technology as is, in fact, relayed to it because it only assembles aircraft from imported kits.
Terminating the Rafale deal will be disruptive but sending the message to the military, the DPSUs, the defence ministry bureaucracy, and foreign companies salivating for rich, one-sided, contracts that the Narendra Modi government is determined to make a new start and conduct defence business differently, is more important.
(Source: New Indian Express July 25, 2014)
IAF TO INDUCT SIXTH C-17 GLOBEMASTER TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ON MONDAY
NEW DELHI: The Indian Air Force will induct its sixth C-17 Globemasterheavylift transport aircraft on Monday at the Palam air base here.
India had signed a deal for procuring 10 C-17 aircraft from the US under a deal worth around Rs 24,000 crore for augmenting its capability to supply loads and troops to the border areas.
The sixth aircraft would be inducted in presence of Defence Minister Arun Jaitley, IAF officials said.
Jaitley would be given a tour inside the aircraft and would be also briefed about the capabilities of the plane.
The IAF has based the aircraft at the Hindan air base near here in Ghaziabad and has flown it extensively across the country in the last seven-eight months of its induction into operational service.
Former IAF chief NAK Browne had stated that the C-17 can land on airfields such as the Daulat Beg Oldie in Ladakh near the Line of Actual Control as it needs only 3,500 feet to land whether it is hinterland or border.
The C-17, with a capability to carry around 70 tonnes of load and around 150 fully geared troops, has replaced the Russian IL-76 as the biggest aircraft in the IAF inventory till now.
(Source: Economic Times July 25, 2014)
INDIA PREPARING FOR GSLV-D6: SINGH
New Delhi: Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Ministry of Science and Technology, M/o Earth Sciences, D/o Atomic Energy and D/o Space Jitendra Singh on Wednesday said the GSLV project has successfully launched GSLV-D5 flight with indigenous Cryogenic engine and stage on Jan 5 from Satish Dhawan Space Centre, Sriharikota and is currently preparing for the next flight GSLV namely, GSLV-D6.
“The GSLV-F02, GSLV-D3 and GSLV-F06 flights could not accomplish the mission objectives. Subsequently, failure analysis committees were formed to (a) carry out in-depth analysis of the flight performance and identify causes for the failure, and (b) recommend corrective measures and future course of action on the GSLV Vehicle. The failure analysis committees have submitted their recommendations,” Singh said in a reply to a written question in the Lok Saha on Wednesday.
He said, “Based on the suggestions made by the failure analysis committees, ISRO has implemented the modifications and improvements in GSLV, which include independent inspection and quality checks for all critical components and sub-assemblies, change of bearing housing material, revision of tolerances and seal clearances of Fuel Booster Turbo Pump of Cryogenic Engine, redesign of the Cryogenic Stage Lower Shroud, revision of connector mounting scheme and wire tunnel configuration.”
(Source: India Blooms July 25, 2014)
NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE SOUTH ASIA ARMS RACE
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a key element of unfinished business in the nuclear age. As a growing number of governments and decision makers along with civil society put forward ideas to move the world toward abolishing nuclear weapons, much can be learned from how the CTBT was fought for, opposed, and finally negotiated between 1994 and 1996, when it was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly.
The Treaty’s relevance and significance was underscored first in 1998 with nuclear tests carried out first by India and then Pakistan, and then again more recently when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its own tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013.
Nearly two decades have elapsed since the treaty was opened for signature and yet its entry into force has not been achieved, the consequence of political and geo-strategic obstacles.
In South Asia a nuclear arms race continues, led by India and followed by Pakistan. India has acquired a ballistic missile defense system, invested heavily in satellites, launched a nuclear submarine (the INS Arihant), unveiled ambitious limited war fighting strategies – for instance, its Cold Start military doctrine – and moved away from a concept of deterrence to compellence. Pakistan has responded with, for instance, the fielding of Nasr (a low-yield nuclear weapon), supplemented by full spectrum deterrence. These moves have the potential to erode the prevailing deterrence stability of South Asia, and cause the region to drift toward conflict.
The steady enlargement of nuclear stockpiles and sweeping modifications in conventional as well as nuclear doctrines of these two regional nuclear-armed rivals, combined with a massive influx of foreign technology to India, first under the banner of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 2005 and later the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTI) in 2012, have pushed South Asia toward perpetual instability.
According to the U.S. 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, “the United States supports India’s rise as an increasingly capable actor in the region.” The role of extra-regional players is not only “adding fuel to fire” and exacerbating the already fraught regional security environment in South Asia, it is also pushing India to counter China’s influence in Asia, at the risk of regional as well international strategic stability.
Changes on its eastern border and a bloody insurgency against the U.S. in Afghanistan have had a deep impact on Pakistan’s security calculus. These developments undermine Pakistan’s deterrence equation vis-à-vis India, as it begins to feel marginalized.
The rapidly changing strategic landscape of South Asia brings to mind the words of George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” For India and Pakistan, the history of the Cold War could be a guide. The U.S. and Soviet Union accumulated a vast stockpile of nuclear weapons in the 27 years after the first nuclear explosion conducted by the U.S. in 1945, yet later they were still able to sign the SALT-1 accord in 1972.
However, looking at India and Pakistan’s rationale for nuclear deterrence and the rapid developments in their conventional and non-conventional weaponry, combined with the transformation of their security doctrines toward an increasing reliance on the “power” of nuclear deterrence, it appears that neither country has learned any lesson from the excesses of the Cold War.
It seems that neither India nor Pakistan have reached their desired maximum number of nuclear weapons, the point at which they might feel there is no need to produce more nuclear weapons or delivery systems.
According to a SIPRI report and IHS Jane’s, “India is expanding a covert uranium enrichment plant that could potentially support the development of thermonuclear weapons.”
According to analysts, this could potentially be used to make a thermonuclear bomb – something that India has been trying to develop for quite some time, in order to match China, which already has a thermonuclear capability.
The latest revelations regarding India’s nuclear program have validated and reinforced Pakistan’s apprehensions about its neighbor’s strategic buildup. The reports have the potential to further destabilize the complex regional security alignment. Given that Pakistan does not yet possess thermonuclear weapons, a deadly new arms race in South Asia could ensue, something that Islamabad likely wants to avoid.
Both countries will continue to produce fissile material for new weapons and their delivery systems. If the time comes, they will proceed with nuclear testing to validate their acquired capability and ultimately enhance their international standing, at the expense of established international norms against nuclear weapons tests.
In this context, the CTBT remains an essential component of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Moreover, CTBT constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ends the development of advanced nuclear weapons.
At present, 183 states are signatories to the treaty, and 162 states have ratified it. The vast majority of the world’s nations have spoken: no more nuclear testing.
What lies behind this political determination is a vision to bring an end to the age of nuclear weapons, a strong desire to establish an international norm against nuclear testing, and a firm political will to advance the treaty’s entry into force as soon as possible.
Thus far in South Asia, Pakistan and India have not found it possible to sign and ratify the CTBT, a reflection of regional security exigencies. The continued hostility between India and Pakistan, rooted in territorial disputes, has also increased the imbalance and tension between them. Thus, as long as India remains outside the CTBT, Pakistan will continue to keep its options open.
For its part, Pakistan signaled its intention to sign and ratify the treaty in parallel with its regional adversary, India. Moreover, Islamabad “will not be the first to resume nuclear testing.”
It would be prudent for India “as a father state of the CTBT” to take the lead role in signing it. That would enhance its nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament credentials, despite the fact that it received the Nuclear Supplier Group waiver without signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
India’s move to sign the CTBT will strengthen its bid for membership in the NSG. It will also not only put pressure on Pakistan to follow suit, but also put tremendous global pressure on China and the U.S. to ratify the CTBT and pave the way for its entry into force.
With the recent election in India and a new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, there is a window of opportunity for a bilateral dialogue on regional security and arms control issues. A recent meeting between Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Modi demonstrated that there is ample space for both countries to build trust and transparency, and move forward on key issues that include the strengthening of existing nuclear confidence building measures (CMBs), and addressing the issues of a dangerous nuclear arm race.
It is imperative for the two neighbors to begin discussing nuclear and regional security issues within a parallel setting. The 1998 Lahore declaration could be a starting point.
(Source: The Diplomat July 25, 2014)
INDIA’S AVRO REPLACEMENT COULD BE PROBLEMATIC
The new Indian government has re-issued the request for proposal (RFP) for 56 transport aircraft worth an estimated $2 billion, to replace the Indian Air Force’s aging Hawker Siddeley 748M twin-turboprops, known as Avros. The final date for submission of bids is August 28. The contract is expected to be awarded in late 2015 or early 2016.
The candidates will likely include Alenia with the C-27J, Antonov with the An-32, and Airbus Defence & Space with the C-295. However, a decision on whether Alenia can bid is pending, after the controversial sale of AW101 helicopters by fellow Finmeccanica subsidiary AgustaWestland was halted. There are also concerns about Antonov, from war-torn Ukraine. Should the C-295 end up as a sole bidder, the project might be shelved unless the Indian Air Force seeks special approval from the MoD.
This is India’s first private sector-only project, in which government-owned companies cannot be a lead partner. In this case, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) can be a tier-one supplier, but it will not be the so-called Indian Production Agency (IPA). The successful bidder is to deliver 16 aircraft in flyaway condition in 24 months and manufacture 40 in an Indian partner’s facility by 60 months, with all to be delivered within 120 months of contract signature.
An electronic warfare suite to be integrated on the aircraft includes Bharat Electronic Ltd radar warning receiver and missile approach warning system and Bharat Dynamics Ltd counter measure-dispensing system. Tooling, the responsibility of the OEM, will include jigs, fixtures, assembly, comprising 60 percent of the aircraft. Engine and avionic parts will be imported.
“It will be a challenge to motivate Indian suppliers who are insisting on an order of at least 200,” a manufacturer told AIN. He added that the manufacturing facility funded by an OEM with large pockets could open the way for an export industry. “The Avro replacement could be a prelude and follow in the footsteps of the Ruag production model for the Dornier 228 that, except the engine, is outsourced from India,” he said.
(Source: AIN Online July 25, 2014)
http://goo.gl/riatcx
