Israel has conflicting goals of neutralizing Hamas and rescuing its civilians kidnapped during the October 7 storming of its territory in a surprise—and vicious—attack after they broke through the heavily guarded perimeter fence, landing by sea and using paragliders, killing about 1,200 people and taking 240 hostage. In order to achieve both objectives, Israel opted to halt its military operation against Hamas in exchange for the release of some of those hostages. The truce is off now as Israel has started pounding Gaza localities saying Hamas did not honour the conditions.
There is a significant threat to Israel’s l right to defend itself that needs to be considered. It is referred to as the ‘terrorist veto’. And, as time goes by, Israel’s chances of overcoming this threat is becoming increasingly slim, despite the resumption of hostilities on Friday. The term, ‘terrorist veto’, refers to the tactic employed by Hamas groups to hinder, or prevent, a country’s ability to defend itself by exploiting international pressure and humanitarian concerns.
Many believe that the underlying purpose of these hostage negotiations as far as Hamas is concerned is to divert international attention and evoke strong emotions in order to indefinitely halt hostilities, restrict Israel’s military actions and regroup to lick their wounds of war. Regardless of the label given to this pause—truce, ceasefire, or whatever term may apply—the strategic consequences undeniably favour Hamas. By using innocent people as bargaining tools and using fellow Gazans for shielding themselves, Hamas seeks to prevent Israel from eliminating the terrorist threat it poses.
If Hamas manages to maintain a limited presence in Gaza and rebuild it to its pre-October 7 state, it can be considered a success for the group. However, this outcome essentially acts as a veto by them regardless of whether those in favour of the military pause try to downplay its significance. This result is labelled as a ‘veto’ since it enables terrorists to dictate terms and hinder progress towards a resolution.
“Regardless of whether those in favour of the military pause try to downplay its significance” implies that the military pause contradicts the goals of its supporters. This is evident in Hamas’s success in surviving and rebuilding Gaza, which goes against the intended outcome of neutralizing the terrorist threat posed by Hamas through the temporary halt in military operations.
If the Hamas veto prevails, other groups like Hezbollah and the mullahs in Tehran (the main adversaries here) can shield themselves from the consequences of their terrorist acts. What is even worse is that this veto could be adopted by nations with aggressive tendencies, leaving victims unable to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Taiwan can be considered a potential victim in this new scenario.
US President Joe Biden and others claim they are not attempting to hinder further military action, but their policies are having precisely that impact. According to CNN on Wednesday last week, Biden’s approach is based on three pillars: release of hostages, increase in aid to Gaza and planning for post-war scenarios. Notably, there is no mention of eliminating Hamas. Meanwhile, some Democratic senators are pushing for conditions on aid to Israel, aiming to limit its military operations—a stance Biden has supported.
The heads of major UN agencies have termed an “outrage” the cutting off of essential supplies to 2.2 million Palestinians and, time and again, called for a permanent ceasefire on humanitarian grounds. Following the October 7 attack, Israel had closed its border crossings with Gaza, blocking off food, water and medicine supplies from the territory. All fuel deliveries to the territory were cut off until late-November, arguing it could be stolen by Hamas and used for military purposes.
Regardless of the arguments supporting the extension of the initial or subsequent pauses, Israel could face three potential negative outcomes if it stops, or restricts its military campaign.
First, despite strong statements from many Israelis, both in and out of the government, the country’s determination is waning. Right after October 7, Jerusalem may have been open to hearing US military advisers warn that pacifying resistance in Mosul and Fallujah—cities in Iraq that experienced significant resistance and conflict, particularly during the Iraq War—took between nine months and a year.
This would serve as a comparison or benchmark for the potential challenges that Israel may have faced in achieving its objectives. Initially, Israelis may have been ready for a prolonged struggle, but it seems unlikely after this initial pause. A decline in Israeli resolve makes it unlikely that Hamas will be completely eliminated.
Those supporting a ceasefire argue that, when Israel convinced a million Gazans to relocate south before their initial campaign, it set the stage for higher ‘civilian’ casualties in subsequent operations. While Hamas and Iran were responsible for placing Gazans in danger initially, unfair blame from the international community is likely to weigh on Israelis, weakening their determination.
Second, because Hamas, Iran and their allies stand to benefit more militarily from the pause than Israel, the human toll on the Israeli military will increase. This, in turn, may lead to growing domestic opposition against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives. Quantifying the exact number of Israel Defense Forces casualties resulting from the pause might be challenging, but it could surpass the count of released hostages.
And third, if there are more pauses or restrictions, it gives Hamas’s allies around the world more time to pressure their governments to oppose Israel. As a result, many governments may push Israel to accept much less than what Netanyahu has stated as his goals.
After the conflict, the White House is suggesting that the Palestinian Authority take control of Gaza. However, this overlooks the poor track record of the authority in the West Bank, where it has been ineffective, corrupt and secretly supportive of terrorism. Some sources even claim that Hamas is now more popular in the West Bank than in Gaza.
If Palestinian Authority control is extended, Israel could face the same threat that intensified on October 7. Israel Defence Force (IDF) views that every prolongation of the truce gives leeway to Hamas to consolidate in Gaza strip which Israel is not ready to allow. This contrast in the objective of the two contending groups is the main reason why the truce could not be prolonged. For bringing about any lasting solution, the present status on the objectives has to be changed. (IPA Service)
(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru.)
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