Sanctions Fall Short in Pressuring Putin to Negotiate

The United States and European Union are ramping up economic pressure, yet sceptics say even tougher measures may fail to push Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has signalled that imposing secondary tariffs on countries continuing to purchase Russian oil—coupled with coordinated sanctions—could trigger a collapse in Russia’s economy and potentially compel the president to consider diplomacy. Sanctions fall short in forcing Putin to negotiate sets the tone for the unfolding confrontation between Western economic leverage and Russian endurance.

Bessent emphasised that despite enduring the assault on Kyiv, the US and EU believe economic coercion remains their best leverage. He proposed secondary tariffs targeting nations such as India and China that continue to import Russian crude—arguing that a coordinated effort could force structural weakness in Moscow’s finances. This analytics-driven push comes amid mounting alarm over Russia’s shrinking fiscal resilience amid ongoing military spending.

But analysts remain unconvinced. A Wall Street Journal commentary warns that, for Moscow, the true test lies in endurance: Putin wagers Ukraine’s army will break before his economy does, thanks in part to alliances with China and India that bolster his fiscal reserves. Despite economic strain, Russia may sustain its war effort for as long as 18–36 months.

A deeper strategic assessment from the Council on Foreign Relations notes that while US sanctions have yet to cripple the Russian economy, more comprehensive economic levers remain at Washington’s disposal—provided political will holds. Indeed, closing loopholes allowing Moscow access to hard currency could ratchet up pressure further.

Historical context is equally revealing. A CSIS analysis outlines how Russia has skilfully adapted to Western economic warfare—through capital controls, social spending, inflation management and deepening ties with non-Western partners. Russia’s economy, surprisingly resilient, is being sustained by hydrocarbon revenues and enforced import substitution even amid severe sanctions.

EU efforts have also intensified. Brussels has recently approved its most sweeping sanctions yet by doubling the number of oil tankers designated as part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” used to covertly transport fuel. Yet the Kremlin responds that tougher sanctions will wound Europe’s own economies more than its own, highlighting Brussels’ dilemma.

At the same time, the EU and US appear to be aligning—European Council President António Costa announced that a new sanctions package is already in preparation, with teams headed to Washington to coordinate enforcement.

Still, some caution that financial pressure alone may be insufficient. A CFR commentary argues that what ultimately brings Putin to the table is not just economic pain, but the multiplication of leverage points—political, strategic, and diplomatic. Whether the current strategy succeeds remains uncertain unless accompanied by broader pressure.

As the war drags into its fourth year, the West’s bet on sanctions is clear—but their effectiveness is anything but certain. Elliott figures suggest possible economic erosion, yet Russia’s countermeasures, global partnerships, and internal adaptation complicate the odds of success.