Arabian Post Staff -Dubai
Grossi said the arrangements being developed would not amount to Saudi Arabia formally adopting the IAEA Additional Protocol, the agency’s standard instrument for expanded inspections. However, he said the planned authorisations would be “very, very similar” to some of the powers available under that protocol, particularly for uranium conversion, enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
“What is important is that in the consultations, in the preparation process, it has been possible to introduce a number of provisions to the bilateral agreement that will give the agency additional verification and monitoring authorisations,” Grossi told a press conference in Vienna.
The additional powers would apply to activities regarded as especially sensitive because they can produce or handle materials relevant to nuclear weapons if diverted from peaceful purposes. Uranium enrichment can raise the concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235, while reprocessing can separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
Grossi said the Additional Protocol remained the “ideal setup” for safeguards, but indicated that Riyadh was preparing to go beyond its core legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. He did not provide detailed language for the new authorisations or specify how closely they would match the protocol across different facilities.
The disclosure addresses one of the main proliferation concerns surrounding the US-Saudi nuclear cooperation accord signed in July. The agreement, commonly known as a Section 123 agreement under US atomic-energy law, establishes the legal basis for transfers of certain American nuclear materials, technology and equipment to Saudi Arabia.
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the cooperation agreement alongside a separate bilateral safeguards arrangement. The US Department of Energy said at the time that the package was intended to support nuclear power development while maintaining high standards of safety, security and non-proliferation.
Unlike the strictest US nuclear cooperation arrangements, the Saudi agreement does not require Riyadh to renounce uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing. It also does not oblige the kingdom to sign the Additional Protocol, a point that has prompted criticism from arms-control specialists and some US lawmakers.
The Additional Protocol allows the IAEA to obtain broader information about a country’s nuclear-related activities and grants wider access, including to locations not declared as nuclear facilities when needed to resolve safeguards questions. It is designed to strengthen the agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Saudi Arabia remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is therefore prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. Its safeguards relationship with the IAEA has already been strengthened: the kingdom rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol at the end of 2024, ending an arrangement that had reduced inspection requirements for states with little or no nuclear material.
That change brought Saudi Arabia under fuller implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as it develops plans for nuclear power. The kingdom has said its programme is intended for peaceful purposes and forms part of efforts to diversify its energy system.
The US-Saudi agreement envisages cooperation that could include enrichment-related activity. Arms-control analysts have focused particularly on how any Saudi enrichment capability would be governed, since the same technology used to produce reactor fuel can, with further processing, produce highly enriched uranium.
Documents submitted during the US congressional review process describe additional safeguards arrangements intended to provide the IAEA with information and access beyond Saudi Arabia’s existing baseline commitments. Critics argue that a bespoke arrangement may still be narrower than the Additional Protocol, which applies across a state’s nuclear fuel-cycle activities rather than only specified areas of cooperation.
Grossi’s comments suggest the agency is seeking direct authority over the most sensitive elements of the Saudi programme even without formal Saudi adherence to the Additional Protocol. The precise scope will depend on the final text agreed among Riyadh, Washington and the IAEA.
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