The trip, Xi’s first to North Korea in nearly seven years, places China at the centre of a shifting security landscape in north-east Asia. It comes after Kim used the months before the visit to project military confidence, including calls for a rapid expansion of nuclear forces, higher missile production and the development of naval assets that would broaden the country’s strike options. Pyongyang has also rejected renewed denuclearisation language from Washington, insisting that its status as a nuclear-armed state is irreversible.
Beijing’s immediate objective is to reaffirm that it remains North Korea’s most important economic and diplomatic partner, even as Kim’s deepening alignment with Moscow has given him room to manoeuvre. North Korea has supplied Russia with military support for the war in Ukraine, while gaining access to food, fuel, diplomatic cover and possible military-technical assistance. That relationship has altered the balance around Pyongyang, reducing the pressure Kim once faced to rely primarily on China for survival.
Xi’s visit therefore carries a dual message. To Pyongyang, it signals that Beijing is prepared to keep the alliance politically warm and economically useful. To Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, it underlines China’s determination to remain an indispensable actor in any future discussion over North Korea’s weapons programme, sanctions, military escalation or regional crisis management.
North Korea’s timing has been deliberate. On the eve of the visit, Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of the North Korean leader, dismissed US calls for denuclearisation and said Pyongyang would not retreat from its nuclear path. Her statement followed a pattern of calibrated pressure in which North Korea stages weapons activity or issues hard-line declarations before major diplomatic moments, raising the cost of engagement while strengthening its bargaining position.
China has long opposed instability on the Korean Peninsula, but its influence over Pyongyang has limits. Beijing does not want a nuclear crisis on its border, a refugee shock, or a conflict that could bring US-aligned forces closer to its frontier. At the same time, it has little appetite for measures that could weaken Kim’s regime or push North Korea fully into Russia’s strategic orbit. That calculation has produced a careful policy: public support for denuclearisation in principle, resistance to severe pressure in practice, and steady backing for dialogue that keeps China central.
Economic issues are likely to feature heavily in the talks. North Korea’s economy remains strained by sanctions, pandemic-era border closures and weak industrial capacity. Cross-border trade with China has been a lifeline, and Pyongyang is seeking more tourism, infrastructure cooperation and commercial flows as it continues a controlled reopening. Chinese support, even when limited, matters because it can ease shortages without forcing Kim into political concessions.
For Xi, the optics are equally important. A high-profile appearance in Pyongyang allows him to display command over a difficult neighbour at a time of sharpening rivalry with the United States and closer security coordination among Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. It also allows Beijing to show that it can engage both Russia and North Korea while presenting itself as a stabilising power rather than a passive observer of Kim’s nuclear advance.
South Korea will watch the visit closely for signs that China may restrain North Korean provocations, though expectations remain modest. Seoul has faced an intensified missile threat, stronger North Korea-Russia cooperation and a hardened Pyongyang stance that no longer treats inter-Korean dialogue as a priority. Any Chinese effort to reopen communication channels would be welcomed, but Beijing is unlikely to risk a public rupture with Kim by pressing too hard.
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