The technique, described as cloud bucket hijacking, exploits the way many cloud providers use globally unique storage names to route logs, telemetry and replicated objects. If a bucket is deleted but an automated service continues to send data to that destination name, an attacker who can recreate the same name in another account or subscription may receive the continuing data stream.
The finding carries significance because cloud storage buckets are widely used as destinations for audit logs, application telemetry, backup streams, object replication and data lake pipelines. These flows are often configured once and then left to run automatically. That “set and forget” pattern can turn a deleted bucket into a hidden exfiltration channel if identity and access controls allow deletion by compromised or over-privileged accounts.
No active exploitation by a named threat actor has been identified. The concern is that the method is difficult to detect once a routing resource remains valid and the flow continues. Security teams may see no immediate failure in the logging or replication configuration, even though the destination has changed ownership.
The weakness differs from the familiar problem of public cloud buckets being exposed through poor permissions. In those cases, data is often left openly accessible. Cloud bucket hijacking instead relies on name reuse and automated routing. The victim’s cloud service may continue sending information to a bucket bearing the expected name, while the bucket itself has been re-created in an attacker’s environment.
Tests found that the concept could affect multiple services. In Google Cloud, logging sinks, Pub/Sub delivery and Storage Transfer Service were among the areas assessed. In AWS, S3 replication and Amazon Data Firehose showed related exposure where data streams target S3 buckets. Azure presented a narrower version because storage account names are not immediately reusable across tenants after deletion, but cross-subscription abuse remained possible under certain conditions.
The issue highlights a broader architectural risk in cloud computing: identity is sometimes tied to a resource name rather than to a permanent owner. Globally unique bucket names simplify routing and reduce naming conflicts, but they also create a shared namespace. Once a resource is deleted, the name may eventually become available again, allowing another account to claim it unless provider-level safeguards or account-scoped naming are applied.
The implications are sharper because cloud infrastructure spending is accelerating as companies expand artificial intelligence, analytics and digital operations. The largest providers together control the majority of enterprise cloud infrastructure expenditure, making cross-cloud weaknesses especially important for multinational companies that run workloads across several platforms.
The attack path would still require meaningful access. A threat actor would generally need the ability to delete a bucket or storage account, or exploit an abandoned routing configuration left behind by an organisation. That makes excessive permissions a central risk. Broad storage administrator roles, service accounts with deletion rights and poorly governed DevOps permissions can raise exposure.
Defensive steps focus on reducing deletion rights and ensuring data cannot leave trusted boundaries. Cloud teams are being urged to restrict bucket and storage account deletion privileges to a small group of administrators, remove those rights from routine service accounts, and require stronger approval workflows before deletion of high-value storage.
Monitoring is also critical. Organisations should treat deletion of sensitive storage buckets as a high-severity event, especially where the bucket is linked to logs, telemetry or replication. Alerts should be tied to business context, because large cloud estates can generate many storage events. Data security posture management tools and cloud-native audit monitoring can help distinguish ordinary housekeeping from risky deletion of critical destinations.
Provider-level controls also matter. Account-scoped or region-scoped naming reduces the risk that another account can reclaim a deleted bucket name. Data perimeter policies can block workloads from writing to storage outside the trusted organisation. Google Cloud has adjusted how some router resources interact with target storage resources, while Microsoft has directed customers towards guidance on dangling DNS and takeover risks. AWS offers mechanisms that can scope bucket naming and restrict cross-account writes when configured properly.
The finding is likely to strengthen scrutiny of cloud governance at a time when enterprises are moving more audit, security and application data into automated pipelines. For regulated sectors such as finance, healthcare, energy and government services, the loss of audit logs or telemetry may undermine both incident response and compliance reporting.
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