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The decision marks a further escalation in Japan’s energy contingency response at a time when the Strait of Hormuz remains under severe strain despite a two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran. The waterway is one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints, and its disruption has hit Japan especially hard because the country depends on the Middle East for about 95% of its oil imports. Takaichi’s government has been racing to prevent shortages, stabilise prices and reassure refiners, transport operators and households that fuel will continue to flow.

Tokyo had already moved ahead on March 16 with the release of reserves equivalent to 50 days of consumption, combining privately held stocks with state reserves and supplies jointly held with producing nations. That initial step was announced before a formal coordinated action by the International Energy Agency, underscoring the urgency felt by Japanese officials as tanker traffic through Hormuz became severely constrained. The new plan adds another layer of insurance rather than replacing the earlier programme, signalling that authorities believe the market shock may last longer than first expected.

Officials say Japan still has considerable room to act. As of April 7, the country held reserves covering 228 days, including 143 days in the public stockpile. That buffer gives policymakers flexibility, but it also reflects the scale of the threat they see. Refiners have already been forced to adjust operations as crude availability tightens, and the government is attempting to manage not only total supply but also how fuel is distributed across the country. Concerns have centred on keeping essential sectors supplied first, particularly healthcare, transport, agriculture, fisheries and livestock production.

Japan’s strategy goes beyond drawing down reserves. Takaichi said the government expects that by May more than half of oil imports will be secured through routes that do not involve the Strait of Hormuz. That shift is central to Tokyo’s effort to avoid becoming hostage to a single maritime corridor while conflict risk remains elevated. Officials have not identified every supplier publicly, but the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has indicated that Japan is seeking alternative barrels from a wide range of countries, including Malaysia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Nigeria and Angola.

The United States is set to play a larger role in that reshaping of supply. A ministry document cited by Reuters said oil imports from the US in May would be four times higher than a year earlier. Japan imported about 189,000 barrels a day from the US in May last year, equal to roughly 8% of total crude purchases for that month. Tokyo is also drawing on Middle East supplies that can bypass Hormuz, including shipments from Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea outlet at Yanbu and from Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. Those routes do not eliminate vulnerability, but they reduce reliance on the narrow strait at the centre of the crisis.

Domestic politics and inflation pressures are also shaping the response. Takaichi has paired the reserve releases with fuel price measures meant to keep retail gasoline around a nationwide average of ¥170 a litre, even if crude prices remain elevated. Officials have warned that a prolonged supply shock could otherwise push pump prices much higher and strain households as well as businesses already dealing with cost pressures. Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama has also flagged the fiscal burden of existing subsidy measures, suggesting that energy security is becoming not only a supply issue but a budgetary one.

Beijing has pushed its reusable space programme a step further with the launch of an experimental spacecraft that state media described as a technology-verification mission, underlining how the country is trying to cut launch costs, raise flight tempo and broaden the range of missions it can carry out in orbit. The spacecraft was launched on 7 February aboard a Long March-2F rocket from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in northwest China, in what was the fourth publicly disclosed mission of this type since 2020.

Chinese authorities released only a brief account of the flight, saying the spacecraft would verify reusable-spacecraft technologies and support the peaceful use of space. No official duration was given, and no details were provided on the systems being tested, the orbit reached or the vehicle’s configuration. That secrecy has become a hallmark of the programme and makes it difficult to judge exactly how far the technology has advanced, but the pattern of repeated flights suggests a sustained effort rather than a one-off demonstration.

Chronology matters here. China’s first disclosed flight in September 2020 lasted about two days. A second spacecraft launched in August 2022 stayed in orbit for 276 days before landing in May 2023. A third mission, launched in late 2023, returned in September 2024 after 268 days in orbit. Those longer flights point to growing confidence in long-duration autonomous operations, recovery procedures and mission endurance. Outside observers have often compared the craft with the United States’ X-37B-style approach to reusable uncrewed orbital vehicles, though Beijing has not publicly confirmed such comparisons.

This mission also fits into a much wider acceleration in Chinese space activity. On 7 April, China used a Long March-8 rocket from the Hainan commercial launch site to place 18 internet satellites into orbit for the Qianfan constellation. On 11 April, it carried out a sea launch using a Smart Dragon-3 rocket from waters off Guangdong, sending up a test satellite aimed at supporting satellite internet technology. Taken together, those launches show a programme expanding on several fronts at once: reusable vehicles, commercial launch infrastructure and large low-Earth-orbit communications networks.

Beyond low-Earth orbit, China is tying these advances to a broader national space agenda. Beijing is aiming for a crewed lunar landing by 2030 and is developing the Long March-10 rocket, the Mengzhou spacecraft and the Lanyue lunar lander for that effort. At the same time, the Chang’e-7 lunar probe is scheduled for launch in the second half of 2026. That means the reusable-spacecraft programme should be viewed less as an isolated experiment than as one part of an expanding architecture that spans launch systems, spacecraft design, lunar exploration and space-based connectivity.

Money and industrial policy are also shaping the picture. Reuters has reported that Beijing is funnelling more support towards private launch companies as it tries to build capacity for large satellite constellations and reduce reliance on state-owned providers alone. CAS Space has targeted fresh capital for reusable rocket research, while LandSpace and other firms are also turning to capital markets. Separate policy changes have given reusable-rocket developers a faster route to listing, provided they meet technical milestones, showing how closely commercial launch activity is now aligned with national strategic goals.

Yet the programme’s momentum should not be mistaken for mastery. China is advancing, but it is still chasing a lead established by SpaceX in frequent booster recovery and reflight. On 3 April, Space Pioneer said the maiden flight of its Tianlong-3 reusable rocket had failed, and Reuters reported that no Chinese firm had yet demonstrated the ability to recover and reuse a rocket’s main stage. LandSpace plans another recovery test for its Zhuque-3 rocket this year, while the Long March-12B reusable rocket completed a static firing test in January ahead of later flight missions. Progress is visible, but so are the engineering gaps.

China has authorised state oil refiners to draw on commercial crude reserves as the Middle East war enters its sixth week, a move that points to mounting concern in Beijing over supply security, refinery operations and fuel stability in the world’s biggest crude importer. The decision marks a notable shift after reporting in March indicated that access to such reserves had been denied, underscoring how sharply the market backdrop has changed.

The policy adjustment comes as the conflict centred on Iran has disrupted flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a route that handled about 20 million barrels a day of crude and oil products in 2025 and remains one of the most critical chokepoints in global energy trade. The International Energy Agency said in March that the war had created the biggest supply disruption in oil market history, with flows through Hormuz falling from around 20 million barrels a day before the war to only a trickle.

For China, the timing is especially sensitive. State refiners have already been grappling with higher feedstock costs, disrupted shipping routes and a scramble for replacement barrels from outside the Gulf. Reuters reported in late March that Sinopec, the country’s largest refiner by capacity, had sought access to state reserves after deciding against buying Iranian crude, while also trimming refinery runs. Earlier reporting in mid-March said China had been building inventories rather than drawing them down, suggesting Beijing initially preferred to preserve stocks.

That stance now appears to have softened. Bloomberg reported on April 10 that authorities had given state refiners the green light to tap commercial reserves. While the precise volume and duration were not publicly disclosed, the move is significant because it signals Beijing is willing to use part of the country’s stock cushion to smooth supplies for domestic processing rather than rely solely on the spot market at a time of exceptional volatility.

The wider market has been under intense pressure even as talk of a ceasefire has briefly cooled futures prices. Reuters reported that physical crude markets in Europe and Africa remained extremely tight despite a temporary truce, with buyers in Asia and Europe competing aggressively for non-Middle East barrels. Another Reuters report said U. S. crude premiums had surged to record highs as importers sought alternatives to Gulf supplies. That matters for China because replacing lost or delayed Middle East cargoes has become more expensive just as refining margins in parts of Asia remain fragile.

Supply conditions deteriorated further this week after attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure cut output capacity by around 600,000 barrels a day and reduced throughput on the East-West Pipeline by about 700,000 barrels a day, according to Saudi state media cited by Reuters. The pipeline is vital because it allows exports to bypass Hormuz via the Red Sea. Damage there narrowed one of the few remaining alternative routes for Gulf producers trying to keep oil moving to Asian customers.

Asian refiners have already felt the strain. Reuters reported that seaborne crude imports into Asia in April were estimated at 19.22 million barrels a day, sharply below the three-month average of 25 million barrels a day. Although refined fuel prices eased after hopes of a truce, the same report said the market was still stressed and that it could take months for normality to return even if shipping improves. For Beijing, releasing commercial stocks is therefore less a dramatic emergency measure than a tactical effort to bridge a period of dislocation.

The decision also reflects China’s domestic balancing act. Authorities have been trying to keep fuel output steady even as weak underlying demand and higher crude costs squeeze refiners. Reuters reported on April 2 that officials had pressed independent refiners to maintain production despite the surge in oil prices and wartime disruption. That suggests Beijing is seeking to avoid sharp swings in fuel availability or industrial costs while preserving broader economic stability.

There is also a geopolitical layer. China has opposed any overtly force-based international response around Hormuz and has pushed for de-escalation at the United Nations, according to Reuters reporting on Security Council negotiations. At the same time, the reserve release shows that Beijing is preparing for a conflict that may not be resolved quickly and for shipping conditions that may remain uncertain even if diplomatic language softens.