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The package, unveiled on Sunday at the close of Cheng’s visit to China, includes moves to restore more flights across the Taiwan Strait, permit some residents of Shanghai and Fujian to visit Taiwan, ease standards affecting food and fishery imports, and allow selected Taiwanese television dramas, documentaries and animation to be broadcast on the mainland provided they meet Beijing’s content requirements. Chinese state media also said officials would explore a regular communication mechanism between the Communist Party and the KMT.

The announcement followed Cheng’s meeting with Xi at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Friday, a politically sensitive encounter that stood out because China has refused to engage with Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, branding him a separatist. During the talks, Xi repeated Beijing’s long-held position that both sides of the strait belong to “one China”, said Taiwan independence was the main threat to peace, and called for efforts toward what he described as reunification. Cheng, presenting her trip as a peace mission, said people on both sides wanted stability, development and more balanced exchanges.

That combination of outreach and warning is central to the significance of Sunday’s measures. Beijing appears to be trying to show Taiwanese voters that practical benefits may be available through engagement with the opposition, while keeping pressure on the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and preserving the political precondition that any improvement in ties must rest on opposition to formal independence. The trade and tourism sweeteners may carry appeal for sectors in Taiwan that have long depended on mainland visitors and mainland demand for agricultural and aquatic products, both of which have been disrupted by years of political tension, pandemic-era restrictions and Chinese import curbs.

Taipei’s response was sharply critical. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said Beijing’s unilateral concessions were “poisoned pills” dressed up as generous gifts and argued that healthy cross-strait exchanges should not be tied to political conditions. That reaction underscored the core divide between the two governments: China says the issue is domestic and insists on a one-China framework, while Taiwan’s administration says only the island’s people can decide their future and that Beijing should talk directly to its democratically elected government rather than sidestepping it.

The KMT, by contrast, welcomed the package and cast it as beneficial to ordinary people in Taiwan. That stance is consistent with the party’s longstanding preference for deeper economic and diplomatic engagement with the mainland than the ruling DPP supports. Cheng’s trip was the first by a KMT leader to China in a decade, making it symbolically important as well as politically divisive at home, where critics say opposition outreach risks strengthening Beijing’s narrative while weakening Taiwan’s bargaining position.

Any goodwill message from Beijing has also been complicated by events in the skies and seas around Taiwan. Reuters reported that Chinese military activity around the island continued during Cheng’s visit, and Taiwan’s defence ministry said warplanes were detected near the island as Xi met the opposition leader. That has allowed Lai’s administration and its supporters to argue that China is offering conciliation in public while maintaining coercion in practice. The contrast has sharpened a broader political argument inside Taiwan between those who say deterrence and defence spending are indispensable, and those who believe dialogue must have a larger role in reducing risk.

Washington has added another layer to the story. Raymond Greene, the top United States diplomat in Taiwan, said Beijing should abandon threats and military pressure and keep communication open with all of Taiwan’s political parties, especially leaders elected by the Taiwanese people. His remarks reflected a familiar United States position: support for dialogue across the strait, opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo, and insistence that talks cannot be divorced from the balance of deterrence.

Beijing has pushed its reusable space programme a step further with the launch of an experimental spacecraft that state media described as a technology-verification mission, underlining how the country is trying to cut launch costs, raise flight tempo and broaden the range of missions it can carry out in orbit. The spacecraft was launched on 7 February aboard a Long March-2F rocket from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in northwest China, in what was the fourth publicly disclosed mission of this type since 2020.

Chinese authorities released only a brief account of the flight, saying the spacecraft would verify reusable-spacecraft technologies and support the peaceful use of space. No official duration was given, and no details were provided on the systems being tested, the orbit reached or the vehicle’s configuration. That secrecy has become a hallmark of the programme and makes it difficult to judge exactly how far the technology has advanced, but the pattern of repeated flights suggests a sustained effort rather than a one-off demonstration.

Chronology matters here. China’s first disclosed flight in September 2020 lasted about two days. A second spacecraft launched in August 2022 stayed in orbit for 276 days before landing in May 2023. A third mission, launched in late 2023, returned in September 2024 after 268 days in orbit. Those longer flights point to growing confidence in long-duration autonomous operations, recovery procedures and mission endurance. Outside observers have often compared the craft with the United States’ X-37B-style approach to reusable uncrewed orbital vehicles, though Beijing has not publicly confirmed such comparisons.

This mission also fits into a much wider acceleration in Chinese space activity. On 7 April, China used a Long March-8 rocket from the Hainan commercial launch site to place 18 internet satellites into orbit for the Qianfan constellation. On 11 April, it carried out a sea launch using a Smart Dragon-3 rocket from waters off Guangdong, sending up a test satellite aimed at supporting satellite internet technology. Taken together, those launches show a programme expanding on several fronts at once: reusable vehicles, commercial launch infrastructure and large low-Earth-orbit communications networks.

Beyond low-Earth orbit, China is tying these advances to a broader national space agenda. Beijing is aiming for a crewed lunar landing by 2030 and is developing the Long March-10 rocket, the Mengzhou spacecraft and the Lanyue lunar lander for that effort. At the same time, the Chang’e-7 lunar probe is scheduled for launch in the second half of 2026. That means the reusable-spacecraft programme should be viewed less as an isolated experiment than as one part of an expanding architecture that spans launch systems, spacecraft design, lunar exploration and space-based connectivity.

Money and industrial policy are also shaping the picture. Reuters has reported that Beijing is funnelling more support towards private launch companies as it tries to build capacity for large satellite constellations and reduce reliance on state-owned providers alone. CAS Space has targeted fresh capital for reusable rocket research, while LandSpace and other firms are also turning to capital markets. Separate policy changes have given reusable-rocket developers a faster route to listing, provided they meet technical milestones, showing how closely commercial launch activity is now aligned with national strategic goals.

Yet the programme’s momentum should not be mistaken for mastery. China is advancing, but it is still chasing a lead established by SpaceX in frequent booster recovery and reflight. On 3 April, Space Pioneer said the maiden flight of its Tianlong-3 reusable rocket had failed, and Reuters reported that no Chinese firm had yet demonstrated the ability to recover and reuse a rocket’s main stage. LandSpace plans another recovery test for its Zhuque-3 rocket this year, while the Long March-12B reusable rocket completed a static firing test in January ahead of later flight missions. Progress is visible, but so are the engineering gaps.

By K Raveendran Election regulation in India is trapped in a contradiction that has become harder to defend with each passing cycle. The Election Commission continues to apply old assumptions about influence, persuasion and voter exposure to a media and political environment that has been transformed by technology, scale and the permanent visibility of public […]

The article Election Commission Applies 19th Century Thinking To 21st Century Realities appeared first on Latest India news, analysis and reports on Newspack by India Press Agency).

Jack Ma-backed Yunfeng Capital and Hillhouse Investment are among investors said to be planning to buy shares in Victory Giant Technology’s Hong Kong share sale, a deal that could raise about $2 billion and add fresh momentum to the city’s revival as a venue for large equity offerings. Bloomberg reported on Friday that the Guangdong-based company could begin taking investor orders as early as Monday, though the proposed allocations and timing were described as private and subject to change.

Victory Giant, formally known as Victory Giant Technology Co., Ltd., is already listed in Shenzhen and filed an application proof for a Hong Kong offering in February. The draft filing makes clear that the process was still incomplete at that stage and that no investment decision should be based on the draft document alone, a reminder that the final terms, investor line-up and valuation could still shift before launch. China’s securities regulator had already given the green light for the offering in early March, according to Bloomberg’s earlier reporting.

The company sits in a part of the technology supply chain that has drawn growing investor attention as spending on artificial intelligence infrastructure accelerates. Victory Giant makes printed circuit boards, including high-layer-count multilayer boards and high-build-up high-density interconnect boards used in AI accelerator cards, AI servers and high-speed networking equipment. In its Hong Kong filing, the company said such products are designed for high-frequency, high-speed and high-stability applications and are used in components including GPU accelerator modules, CPU motherboards and network interface cards for AI servers.

Its own figures point to a sharp improvement in financial performance as demand for those products strengthened. According to the application proof, revenue rose from RMB7.93 billion in 2023 to RMB10.73 billion in 2024. For the nine months to September 30, 2025, profit climbed to RMB3.24 billion from RMB764.6 million a year earlier, while the net profit margin rose to 23.0% from 9.9%. The filing attributes a large part of that jump to stronger demand for high-end HDI products used in AI-related applications, which command higher prices and fatter margins.

That performance helps explain why anchor demand matters. Cornerstone-style support from investors such as Yunfeng and Hillhouse would give the offering greater signalling power at a time when fund managers are trying to separate durable AI-linked manufacturers from companies benefiting only from short-lived enthusiasm. Neither investor had publicly confirmed participation at the time of Bloomberg’s report, so any description of their role remains conditional until final deal documents are published.

Victory Giant’s filing also underlines the industrial logic behind the listing. The company says it plans to use proceeds for capacity expansion, infrastructure enhancement and equipment purchases in Huizhou, Changsha and Yiyang, as well as investment in smart manufacturing. In Huizhou alone, it expects capacity additions for premium high-layer-count multilayer boards and high-build-up HDI products, reflecting management’s bet that demand tied to AI computing, data centres and advanced electronics will stay strong enough to justify further capital expenditure.

Industry data included in the filing suggest the company is positioning itself in one of the faster-growing corners of the electronics market. The application proof says the global PCB market grew to US$75.0 billion in 2024 and could reach US$93.7 billion by 2029. It estimates the PCB segment tied to AI and high-performance computing at US$6.0 billion in 2024, with that figure projected to rise to US$15.0 billion by 2029. The same filing says Victory Giant ranked first globally in the first half of 2025 for high-layer-count multilayer PCBs with 14 layers and above, and also first globally in high-build-up HDI PCB in that period. Those market-share claims are drawn from third-party industry research cited by the company and should be read in that context.

The backdrop in Hong Kong is supportive, though not uncomplicated. Reuters reported in late February that the city had its strongest start to a year since 2021, with IPOs and second listings raising about $5.5 billion in January. By March 18, LSEG data cited by Reuters showed Hong Kong’s IPO market had raised about $11.64 billion in the first quarter, up 385% from a year earlier. At the same time, Reuters also noted in March that worsening geopolitical tensions had begun to weigh on trading debuts, a sign that even a revived market remains vulnerable to shifts in sentiment.