News related to
clean

The backdrop is a bruising spell for the rupee. The currency sank to record lows in March as conflict-linked fears over energy supplies drove oil prices higher and triggered capital outflows from domestic assets. That slide left the central bank confronting a familiar dilemma: allow the exchange rate to absorb the shock or step in more forcefully to curb disorderly moves in a country heavily exposed to imported crude. Reuters reported that the rupee hit a record low around mid-March before the Reserve Bank stepped up support measures as traders fretted over the growth and inflation fallout from elevated oil prices.

Against that backdrop, the central bank moved on March 27 to tighten rules around banks’ foreign-exchange exposure. It imposed a $100 million cap on net open dollar-rupee positions in the onshore market and restricted banks’ ability to deal in non-deliverable forwards, measures aimed at curbing arbitrage between local and offshore markets that officials believed had become destabilising. Governor Sanjay Malhotra has since said the steps were temporary rather than a long-term retreat from market development or rupee internationalisation, but the regulatory intent was clear: volatility linked to rapidly expanding positions would no longer be tolerated.

Bloomberg reported on Sunday that a senior Reserve Bank official criticised market makers for aggravating the rupee’s weakness during the Middle East tensions, reinforcing the view that policymakers see some trading strategies not merely as opportunistic but as harmful to market functioning. Bloomberg had earlier quoted Deputy Governor T. Rabi Sankar as saying the arbitrage build-up led to an “artificial drying up” of dollar supply in the market, affecting prices. That language is notable because it suggests the regulator believes the issue went beyond normal speculative behaviour into a form of distortion that reduced liquidity when it was needed most.

Market participants have broadly accepted that the positions were sizeable. Reuters, citing industry estimates and clearing data, said consensus had settled around roughly $40 billion of arbitrage exposure, much of it built across the onshore and non-deliverable forward markets. By early April, banks had exited the bulk of those trades ahead of the Reserve Bank’s April 10 deadline. Clearing house data pointed to around $36 billion in NDF trades between April 1 and April 7, seen largely as part of the unwind. That process helped support the rupee at points, but it also created other distortions, including sharp moves in forward premiums and strained hedging conditions for importers.

For companies exposed to foreign-currency liabilities, the clean-up has been costly. Reuters said one-year dollar hedging costs jumped sharply, at one point posting the steepest rise since the global financial crisis, as importers rushed to lock in cover and market liquidity thinned. That matters because the regulatory cure, while aimed at curbing speculative pressure, can tighten financing and risk-management conditions for genuine commercial users. It is one reason some dealers have privately argued that while the central bank was justified in tackling excessive positioning, abrupt curbs can deepen dislocations in a market that depends on continuous two-way activity.

Still, the Reserve Bank appears willing to accept short-term disruption in exchange for regaining control of the policy signal. The rupee rallied through parts of early April as arbitrage positions were unwound and a temporary US-Iran ceasefire drove oil lower, with the currency at one stage strengthening into the 92-93 range against the dollar. Yet that recovery proved fragile. On April 9, the rupee slipped again as doubts over the truce resurfaced, Brent crude rebounded and wider risk sentiment weakened. For policymakers, that sequence underscored how quickly external shocks can overwhelm domestic market plumbing if positioning is allowed to build unchecked.

Broader lessons are now emerging for the financial system. One is that India’s increasingly connected currency market, spanning domestic forwards, exchange-traded futures and offshore NDFs, can improve price discovery in calm conditions but amplify stress when geopolitical shocks hit. Another is that the Reserve Bank remains prepared to intervene not only through spot-market support but also through conduct-based regulation when it thinks market behaviour is aggravating weakness. That stance may temper speculative excess, but it also raises questions about how much freedom banks will have to intermediate risk in future episodes of volatility.

The meeting carried weight beyond bilateral symbolism. Qatar is India’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas and a major source of liquefied petroleum gas, making the Gulf state central to India’s fuel security at a time when shipping risks and production interruptions have tightened markets. New Delhi’s outreach came as it sought assurances on supply after weeks of strain across West Asian energy routes and amid concern over the effect of regional instability on domestic fuel availability and industrial consumption.

Doha’s message was also framed by diplomacy. The official Indian statement said the ministers welcomed the two-week ceasefire agreed on April 8 and underlined the need for an early end to disruption in global energy supplies. It added that Puri conveyed greetings and a message of solidarity from Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Qatar’s leadership, reflecting how the energy relationship is now closely tied to broader strategic engagement covering trade, investment and regional stability.

For India, the stakes are immediate. The country depends on imports for about half of its natural gas needs, and the supply shock has already exposed vulnerabilities in infrastructure and procurement. GAIL’s finance director said this week that the Dabhol LNG terminal in Ratnagiri was operating at less than half its 5 million-tonnes-a-year capacity because of constrained global supplies. Hindustan Petroleum’s Chhara LNG terminal in Gujarat has also faced difficulties after missing two cargoes in March and April that were expected from Qatar via ADNOC Trading.

The background to the Doha talks is a sharp deterioration in regional energy logistics. Reuters reported on April 8 that QatarEnergy was preparing to restart LNG production after attacks in March forced stoppages at facilities in Ras Laffan and Mesaieed. Two of three trains at QELNG North 1 had been restarted, but a full return depended on vessels being able to pass safely through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoints. The same disruption has inflated spot prices and increased anxiety among large importers across Asia.

That makes Qatar’s long-term importance to India even clearer. In February 2024, QatarEnergy and Petronet LNG signed their largest single LNG supply agreement, under which Qatar will deliver 7.5 million metric tonnes a year from 2028 to 2048. Reuters reported at the time that Qatar planned to lift LNG liquefaction capacity to 126 million tonnes a year by 2027, up from 77 million, as it sought to strengthen its role in Asian and European markets. The scale of that agreement gives India a measure of stability, but it also underlines how deeply its gas strategy remains linked to a single Gulf supplier.

That dependence has advantages and risks. Qatar has earned a reputation for contractual reliability and remains among the lowest-cost LNG producers in the world, qualities prized by importers facing volatile spot markets. At the same time, the events of March and April have shown that even long-established energy corridors can be shaken by military escalation, damage to infrastructure and pressure on maritime routes. For policymakers in New Delhi, that is likely to sharpen interest in diversification through additional long-term contracts, more storage, broader sourcing and faster domestic gas infrastructure expansion.

India’s longer-term energy ambitions add another layer to the relationship. The government has repeatedly said it wants to raise the share of natural gas in the energy mix to 15 per cent by 2030, from just over 6 per cent at present. That target cannot be met without dependable imported LNG, even as the country pushes renewables, domestic gas output and cleaner urban fuels. Reliable Qatari supply therefore remains integral not only to short-term energy security, but also to India’s broader transition strategy and industrial planning.

The rebound matters because EAF steel has long struggled to gain ground in China despite official support for cleaner production. The route relies mainly on scrap rather than iron ore and coking coal, making it structurally less carbon intensive than the blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace model that still dominates the country’s steel industry. World Steel Association figures show the global production mix is far more tilted towards EAF than China’s, with electric-arc furnaces accounting for 28.6% of world crude steel output, while average carbon intensity for scrap-based EAF steelmaking is markedly below that of the conventional blast furnace route.

For Chinese mills, the immediate story is not only about decarbonisation but about economics. Higher finished-steel prices and steadier demand for construction steel have made it easier for some EAF operators to restart or raise run-rates after a prolonged spell in which many were squeezed by electricity bills, uneven scrap supply and patchy orders. Reuters reported in late February that warmer weather and the resumption of building activity typically support steel demand in March, while temporary production curbs in northern blast-furnace regions also helped firm futures prices. That backdrop has narrowed the gap between scrap-fed mills and traditional producers, even if the advantage remains fragile.

Yet the broader steel market in China remains difficult. Official and consultancy data cited by Reuters show crude steel output in 2025 fell to 960.1 million tonnes, down 4.4% from 2024 and below one billion tonnes for the first time since 2019. That decline reflected a managed effort by Beijing to address overcapacity, but it also underscored softer domestic demand and the long shadow cast by the property downturn. State-backed forecasts cited by Reuters indicate steel demand is expected to slip again in 2026 after contracting sharply in 2025, suggesting that EAF mills are recovering within a shrinking overall market rather than riding a broad-based industrial boom.

That tension helps explain why Beijing continues to press for structural change. The National Development and Reform Commission said in March that China would curb excess capacity in steel and other heavy industries in an orderly way, renewing a campaign that has featured repeatedly in official policy language. The cleaner EAF route fits that policy direction because it uses recycled feedstock and can reduce reliance on imported iron ore, but steelmakers still take their cues from margins first. When profits weaken, producers often retreat to whichever process best matches raw material costs, local power tariffs and available supply chains.

The environmental case for EAF expansion remains strong. Reuters reported last year that China had aimed to raise EAF steel’s share of crude steel production to 15% by 2025 and 20% by the end of the decade, but the actual share had been stuck around 10%. A 2025 review by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air said missing the 15% milestone would add more than 160 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions compared with a stronger shift towards cleaner steelmaking, while high electricity costs, unreliable scrap flows and financial strain had kept many EAF operators on the back foot.

China’s steel industry also faces an external pressure point: trade. Even as domestic demand softened, exports climbed to a record 119.02 million tonnes in 2025, up 7.5% from a year earlier, according to Reuters. That export surge helped keep mills running, but it also intensified complaints abroad over cheap supply and raised the risk of more trade barriers. For EAF producers, this creates a mixed picture. Strong export channels can support domestic steel prices and improve mill economics, yet any escalation in trade restrictions would feed back into the entire sector, including the greener producers now regaining confidence.

Beijing HyperStrong Technology, one of the country’s biggest battery energy-storage system suppliers, expects shipments to more than double in 2026 as utilities, renewable developers and industrial customers accelerate orders at home and overseas. The company is projecting deliveries of about 70 gigawatt-hours this year, up from 26 gigawatt-hours in 2025, according to comments published on April 6, a jump that underscores how quickly large-scale storage is moving from a supporting technology to a central piece of power infrastructure.

The forecast places HyperStrong among the more aggressive corporate voices in a market that has expanded far beyond its earlier role of smoothing short bursts of solar and wind volatility. Storage is now being bought to stabilise grids, capture cheap midday renewable power, support evening peaks and back up electricity-hungry data centres. Global spending on batteries for power-sector storage is set to reach about $66 billion in 2025, reflecting the scale of investment now flowing into the sector.

HyperStrong’s position helps explain why its target is drawing attention. The company says it has been ranked among the top three global battery energy-storage system integrators and has held a Tier 1 standing with BloombergNEF since 2024. It also says it is the top integrator in China’s mainland market by cumulative installed and contracted project capacity. On its own figures, it has deployed more than 50GWh across more than 400 projects after being founded in 2011.

Demand inside China remains the first pillar of that growth story. The country’s clean-power build-out has been so rapid that storage is becoming essential to absorb output and protect grid reliability. Government data showed wind and solar capacity reached 1.84 billion kilowatts in 2025, accounting for 47.3% of total installed power capacity and overtaking thermal power for the first time. Separate official data showed installed new-type energy storage reached 136 million kilowatts in 2025, after already topping 70 million kilowatts in 2024.

Policy has also shifted in ways that improve the commercial case for storage. Earlier concerns that many projects were being built faster than they could be profitably used have given way to a more market-based system in which capacity payments, peak pricing and wider power-sector reforms are strengthening returns. Analysts have said those changes, combined with subsidies in some provinces, helped turn storage into a far more investable business. That domestic backdrop matters because it gives manufacturers and integrators a large home market from which to scale.

Overseas demand forms the second pillar. Chinese storage suppliers have benefited from orders tied to renewable expansion, ageing grids and the electricity needs of AI-linked data centres in North America, Europe and the Middle East. HyperStrong has been widening its footprint in Europe and said in March that it had projects across 15 countries there. The company has also been visibly pushing its international profile through industry events in Europe and the Americas, a sign that it sees export growth as more than a side business.

Competition, however, is unlikely to ease. China’s battery and clean-tech industries have shown how quickly rapid capacity growth can feed price wars and margin pressure. Rival suppliers ranging from CATL and BYD to other storage specialists are expanding at speed, while trade frictions and policy shifts abroad could complicate the export story. At the same time, technology is moving on: lithium-ion remains dominant for daily cycling, but sodium-ion and longer-duration storage systems are being pushed for specific use cases, especially where mineral costs, safety or duration become bigger factors.